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Global Indonesia

Jean Gelman Taylor

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Global Indonesia

In the nineteenth century, colonial rule brought the modern world closer to the Indonesian peoples, introducing mechanized transport, all-weather roads, postal and telegraph communications, and steamship networks that linked Indonesia's islands to each other, to Europe and the Middle East. This book looks at Indonesia's global importance, and traces the entwining of its peoples and economies with the wider world.

The book discusses how products unique to Indonesia first slipped into regional trade networks and exposed scattered communities to the dynamic influence of far-off civilizations. It focuses on economic and cultural changes that resulted in the emergence of political units organized as oligarchies or monarchies, and goes on to look in detail at Indonesia's relationship with Holland's East Indies.

The book analyses the attempts by politicians to negotiate ways of being modern but uniquely Indonesian, and considers the oscillations in Indonesia between movements for theocracy and democracy. It is a useful contribution for students and scholars of World History and Southeast Asian Studies.

Jean Gelman Taylor teaches Indonesian and Southeast Asia History, Islamic Civilisation and Historiography at the University of New South Wales, Australia. Her research interests include the social history of colonialism and Indonesia in the modern world.

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Global Indonesia

Jean Gelman Taylor

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For Jamie Mackie
In grateful and affectionate memory

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

Map 1 Indonesia is an archipelago state made up of thirty-three provinces (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Indonesia).

Note
Legend: Dark lines show state borders; lighter lines show province borders; broken lines show provinces made up of island clusters.

1 Introduction

Globalization and Indonesia

Globalization: definitions and debates

Globalization is a term much used by journalists and academics since the 1990s to describe flows of capital, information, commodities and people across national borders. Key actors are transnational corporations; key features are electronic communications and rapid transfers of technology. In popular media discussions, globalization is an emotionally charged word. To supporters, before the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, globalization had become shorthand for a process promising universal economic prosperity and democracy. To its detractors, globalization imposes Western economic, political and cultural hegemony worldwide. Globalization is said to weaken nation-states by subordinating them to international treaties to reduce trade tariffs, limit pollution, control the flow of drugs and diseases and fight terrorism. It has the potential to destroy national economies because of interlocking financial systems.

Economists and political and social scientists often discuss globalization as a novel phenomenon in human history, emerging around 1970, engineered and led by the United States to remake the world in the image of the West. Observers of globalization emphasize the emergence of universal mass consumption patterns. They argue that worldwide advertising and marketing of branded consumer goods modify peoples' behaviours and values by introducing and emphasizing choice. Cultural globalization fosters cosmopolitanism and secularism. Such values underpin the ability of international capital and regulatory bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to oblige individual states the world over to adopt political and economic programmes that result in deregulation of industry and banks, privatization of national assets, limited government, tax cuts for the wealthy and reduction of state subsidies.

Much of the huge literature on globalization analyses it from the perspective of a select group of Western liberal democracies. Advocates of globalization built on the optimism of Francis Fukuyama who argued in his 1992 book, *The End of History*, that liberalism in politics and economics was the course and destiny of human history. Globalization has its key dates: 1972, the year of President Richard Nixon's visit to China; and 1989, which marks the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Many studies focused on the United States' subsequent rise

to single-world-power status and its ability at the end of the twentieth century to dictate the terms of trade and production worldwide. Analysts point to new communications technologies, the speed of movement of information and the freeing of capital from the constraints of time and space. All note American English as the universal language and vehicle of globalization.

Globalization, so defined, has its critics. International treaties to limit gas emissions and to protect forests and waterways, for instance, are seen as infringements on national sovereignty. Some argue that they are policies of a First World, grown rich on exploiting the Third World, and now able to worry about depletion of the earth's resources, while still consuming much of them. Other critics argue that globalization entrenches Western wealth and power. Poor nations cannot compete without tariff protection. Free trade is not fair trade. Third World governments that accept IMF rules violate their citizens' sense that the state has a duty to keep the price of rice and cooking oil low through subsidies. Globalization is comprehensively condemned from Cuba to Malaysia as the triumph of Western economies grown rich through slavery, conquest, underdevelopment and cultural annihilation of the Third World. Critics claim that the West, through its domination of international scholarship and media, exports ideologies of human rights, feminism, environmentalism and a culture of individualism; it seeks to impose these values on societies with different traditions.

Globalization has thrown up critics who counter the model of Western liberal democracy with, for example, Asian values, stated to be deference to authority, respect for hierarchy and submersion of individual desires for communitarian good. US-led globalization is condemned by exponents of a competing Islamic globalization that justifies action in the name of Allah, and seeks to substitute Islamic economics for free market capitalism. Enemies of globalization argue that international capitalism and capitalists are wandering, rootless forces, with no commitment to local concerns, focused solely on immediate advantage. They identify particular nationalities and ethnicities with globalization: Americans, Chinese, Indians and Jews. These are precisely the groups Joel Kotkin discussed in his 1993 book, *Tribes*: the people, he says, who are best equipped to operate in a global context because of their networks, their language skills and their respect for learning of all kinds. T. N. Harper sees migrant or diasporic groups as "the key to writing a truly global, as opposed to international, or world history" (2002: 145–146).

In *The Human Web* (2003), J. R. and William H. McNeill counter this short-term perspective on globalization. They stress, instead, a long history of human interaction, although less far-reaching in geographic extent and slower than the instantaneous communications of today's "age of the Internet". Immanuel Wallerstein (1976) argued that the modern world system began emerging in the sixteenth century in a core of economies in Western Europe. Many scholars have adopted his view of "the West and the rest": action in the core and reaction in the rest of the world, which is perceived as a fringe of peripheral economies and societies. They identify uniquely Western institutions to explain the rise of the

West to global power in the nineteenth century. Samuel Huntingdon (1996), for example, explains Western scientific achievements, military successes and political reach across the globe in the nineteenth century by: the early development of property rights; charters protecting landowners, artisans and merchants from royal depredations; growth of national churches and states; technological advances in metallurgy; innovations in military organization; and critique of church and government in clubs, coffee shops and pamphlets.

Jared Diamond (1997) focused on the unequal distribution of crops and animals capable of being domesticated to explain why it was that the Spanish sailed to the Americas to conquer new territories rather than Incas and Aztecs crossing the Atlantic to conquer Europe. Louise Levathes (1994) discusses the seven major journeys by Chinese fleets through the South China Sea, across the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Peninsula and the east coast of Africa between 1405 and 1433. These were not voyages of exploration, but journeys along well-known, busy sea highways. The Chinese sent no follow-up expeditions to discover new lands. Instead, China's government chose to end financing ocean-going fleets in favour of remaining a land-based power. Unlike China, Europe had no single, strong government. Conflict and competition between European states propelled rivals to discover sea routes around Africa and across the Pacific Ocean to reach India and China. As a result, Levathes argues, it was the West, not China, that rose to global dominance.

Historians of Asia and the Middle East maintain that a short-term perspective prevents recognition of the historical diversity of globalizing forces, the non-Western dimensions and unevenness of globalization. Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) argued that our modern world system grew out of an earlier, thirteenth-century world system. Europeans built on it; they were beneficiaries of the cumulative technologies of China, India and the Middle East. Western Europe was the periphery area to this world system, not its core. Unlike twenty-first century globalization, it was not a *worldwide* system, but a *world* system linking Asia and Europe, which together, at the time, contained most of the world's population. Abu-Lughod argues that this thirteenth-century world system was built, in turn, upon earlier world systems of classical times based on the Greek and Roman empires and on China. Contact between parts of this world system was sporadic until the rise of the Islamic world. From its mid-point location, the Islamic Middle East revived and stimulated the earlier long-distance trade and cultural exchange between China and Europe.

Robert Irwin (1998) makes the case that Islam had produced an encompassing politico-religious, cultural and economic system within the limits of the known world by the tenth century. Amira Bennison (2002) argues that, until European imperial powers divided the Islamic world into states, it was a borderless community composed of Muslims worldwide. This Islamic world sponsored an early form of globalization within a series of interconnected economic units through which there was a continuous flow of capital, goods, ideas and people. Features of Islamic globalization were: an all-encompassing ideology grounded in the Islamic religion; a common language and writing system in Arabic; a

world ruler in the institution of the caliph; a unifying destination for pilgrims in Mecca; and a comprehensive juridical system. Islamic practice regulated markets and economic behaviour. Rulings by Islamic jurists linked local to global. Islamic ideology, institutions and laws enabled Muslims to envisage their place in a global community and travel through it.

Christopher Bayly, a specialist on India, has written a world history (2004) in which he also challenges the notion of globalization as a new phenomenon. He documents a long, ancient history of interconnections that he calls "archaic globalization". He rejects the model of "the West and the rest" in the writings of Wallerstein (e.g. 1976) and André Gunder Frank (1998). Bayly develops a theory of "industrious revolutions" by artisans scattered across the world, linked by networks of Chinese, Semitic, Indian and European traders. He locates the birth of the modern world in the years 1750–1914. According to Bayly, modernizing forces produced uniformity, but not homogeneity, and communications technologies induced a greater awareness of difference, created ethnic identities and a common language of rights for articulating difference. The anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, had made a similar argument in 1963 to explain the many separatist movements for nationhood in today's globalized world (Geertz, 1963).

Benjamin Barber (1995) also argued that communications technologies nurture identities of difference. Like historians of Asia, he looks for responses, reactions, participation and counter-processes in the world beyond "the West". David Held, Andrew McGrew and their fellow authors in *The Global Transformations Reader* (2003) focus on the United States, the OECD[1] and NATO[2] on the world as perceived from New York or Paris. They give slight consideration to how the world is perceived from Cairo or Jakarta; their examples of regional groupings do not include OPEC[3] or ASEAN.[4] Barber chooses the term "McWorld" to mean transnational business that is not tied to a single nation-state, and capital that is searching constantly to expand markets by creating consumer demand through advertising. He argues that McWorld grew out of Europe's Renaissance and Enlightenment because it is committed to freedom of the individual, secularism and the rational. (He concedes that "McWorld" ignores issues of religion, and its freedom is the power to choose and to purchase.) Like Fukuyama, Barber sees the nation-state as hospitable to democracy and in conflict with McWorld, because the state has a duty to protect its citizens by, for example, providing lifelong employment, whereas McWorld flourishes where labour is unregulated, casual and dependent.

Barber uses the controversial term *jihad* to identify opponents of McWorld: people who promote the parochial, the local, the tribal, ties of blood, community and conformity over McWorld's cosmopolitanism, pluralism and secularism. *Jihad* advocates look to the past, aim to restore a supposed former state of purity. They use modern technologies that are products of McWorld to advance their message and achieve their goals. *Jihad* is therefore a creation of McWorld and, at the same time, its opponent. Barber argues that, while *jihad* is an Arabic word and has a specific association with Islam, it can be applied to fundamentalists of any religion – whether Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism or Islam –

and to any geographical community. He argues that what McWorld offers is "fun", "lifestyle" and consumer brands. The West is seductive, tempting, even as it engenders the hatreds that Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit call "Occidentalism" (2004). Hatred of the West, they argue, is shorthand for rejection of individual liberties, for objection to the confinement of religion to the private sphere, and for denunciation of international capitalism. Occidentalism thrives inside Europe as well as across the globe.

Barber does not discuss Islam as an alternative, competing form of globalization in his book, *Jihad Versus McWorld* (1995). Globalization theorists, according to critics, leave no room for non-Western voices or for modernization that is not Westernization. Bayly's world survey, however, offers evidence of two-way flows of ideas, material culture and technologies. Scholars like Ann Bernstein (2002), Ergun Ozbudun and E. Fuat Keyman (2002) employ the term "hybridization" to describe how people everywhere adopt the same international goods and styles, but with a local twist. Frank Dikötter (2007) champions the concept of "appropriation". He argues that the global circulation of things and ideas offers possibilities and choices to ordinary people who are more concerned with practical issues than ideology, and that globalization therefore leads to greater, not less, cultural diversification. The global centre itself is not fixed. It has moved away from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean; today's major players are Pacific-rim countries: China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and the United States.

Indonesia, which straddles the water highways that connect Asia, the Americas, the Middle East and Europe, makes a particularly interesting case study of globalization. Its very existence today as a nation-state is the result of a long history of global contacts.

Indonesia: place and context

At the time of writing, Indonesia the nation-state is sixty-seven years old. Over 300 distinct language communities co-exist within one political unit. It is a country of islands administered from the capital, Jakarta, which is situated on Java's northwest coast. National government reflects many political traditions. In the early centuries of the Common Era (CE), on the islands of Java, Sumatra and Bali, kings legitimized their rule as devotees of the Buddha or as incarnations of Hindu gods. From the thirteenth century, rulers across the archipelago began taking the title of sultan; they sponsored Islam and Islamic institutions in dozens of sultanates.

Early in the seventeenth century, the Dutch established a string of trading posts along the islands' most important waterways. From these toeholds Dutch economic, political and military power gradually extended until, by the early twentieth century, the entire Indonesian archipelago had been incorporated into a single colony, called the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch made the colony an exporter of sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco, rubber, tin, palm oil and petroleum. In 1942, Japan's armed forces invaded the Indies to seize these vital resources and

Figure 1.1 Indonesia on the world map. Indonesia lies across sea-lanes that link the world's continents and civilizations (source: www.d-maps.com).

to harness the colony's labour force for its war goals. Japanese generals established the model of military control over government and spread an ideology of Asian empowerment and hatred of Western rule. Following the Allies' defeat of Japan in 1945, a four-year struggle for national independence broke out across the Indonesian archipelago. When the Netherlands officially gave up its sovereignty on December 27, 1949, sixty million people became citizens of the new country of Indonesia.

Today, there are almost 240 million Indonesians.[5] The 2010 Indonesia Population Count is the most accurate of the six census surveys conducted since independence. In place of handwritten records, the 700,000 interviewers uploaded data on to spreadsheets via their mobile phones. Detailed analysis of the previous census showed that 88 per cent of Indonesians, at the start of the twenty-first century, follow Islam (Suryadinata *et al.* 2003), making Indonesia the world's largest Muslim country. Thirty per cent of Indonesians were under fifteen years of age. Sixty per cent of all Indonesians lived on Java, although it has only 6.6 per cent of the total inhabited land of the archipelago. Population densities varied enormously, from 12,688 persons per square kilometre in Jakarta to just four per square kilometre in Papua (the Indonesian half of the island of New Guinea). At 41.71 per cent, the Javanese were by far the majority ethnic group of Indonesia. The next largest, the Sundanese (also from Java), were just 15.41 per cent of the population, and another thirteen ethnic groups each number above one million people. Today, no region is ethnically homogeneous. The 2010 census shows that Den Pasar in Bali and Manokwari in Papua are becoming major destination cities for Indonesian migrants, followed by Mamuja (West Sulawesi), Batam Island and Pekanbaru in Sumatra. Many regions now contain groups asserting their rights, as the area's original inhabitants, against other Indonesians who come seeking better jobs and schooling or sanctuary from armed conflicts in their own home regions. Increasingly, new families are the product of inter-ethnic marriage.

Indonesia has always had global contacts. Its unique products have travelled to distant markets since the beginning of the Common Era and attracted the world's traders to its ports. The Romans paid Alaric the Hun with pepper from Sumatra and Java in 410 CE to preserve Rome from destruction. For centuries, scholar-pilgrims from China travelled to Sumatra to advance their studies in Buddhism and Sanskrit before continuing to Buddhist centres in India. Archipelago kings offered the brilliant feathers of the West New Guinean bird-of-paradise as tribute to emperors of China in the eighth century. Arab traders bought Sumatra's camphor crystals in the ninth century to sell to the Chinese. When the Mongols lost control of Asian overland trade routes, called the Silk Road, in the fourteenth century, merchants moved their goods to ships that put in at Indonesian ports on their voyages to and from China. In the seventeenth century, fishermen from Makassar on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi (the Celebes) hunted for sea cucumbers in waters off Australia's north for export to China's markets. They introduced tobacco from the Americas to Indigenous coastal communities and named Australia's northwestern shores Kayu Putih and Marege.

The oldest forms of writing found in Indonesia are Sanskrit-language inscriptions chiselled on to stone pillars in an Indian writing system. They date from around 400 CE and were discovered in East Borneo. Two hundred years later, the local Malay language, written in an Indian script, recorded royal edicts in Sumatra. Indonesia's oldest inscriptions in Arabic are on eleventh-century tombstones in east Java. Dutch traders translated Malay words into their own tongue and wrote them in the Latin alphabet. The first Malay–Dutch dictionary and sample conversation dialogues were published in Holland in 1603. Modern Indonesia's vocabulary shows this history of global contact. It has incorporated loan words from Sanskrit, Arabic, Portuguese, Dutch and English into standard Indonesian. Colloquial Indonesian, spoken by Jakartans and marking youth culture, also incorporates words from southern Chinese dialects. Indonesia's national language positions itself globally by being written in the West's Latin alphabet.

In the nineteenth century, colonial rule was the agent that meshed Indonesian communities within the modern world, for colonialism brought mechanized transport, all-weather roads, postal and telegraphic communications, and steamship networks that linked the islands to each other and to Europe. Colonial rule transformed subsistence peasants into wage earners and purchasers of mass-produced goods; it turned Indigenous officials into salaried bureaucrats whose advancement depended on knowledge of the Dutch language and Western habits of thought. Colonial rule geared the economy to producing and exporting goods to finance Holland's industrialization. In the twentieth century, the colony's mineral and palm oils turned Europe's machines; its rubber supplied tyres for the bicycles, cars and trucks that made Europeans and Asians mobile; its tin supplied an alloy for metals used in construction and made possible the preservation of foods in cans.

Indonesian plantation workers became the producers of hunger killers for Europe's workers. European factory hands drank tea and coffee, sweetened with sugar, grown by labourers in Java, and they smoked tobacco raised by Chinese and Javanese coolies in Sumatra. Plantation workers in the Indies spent their wages on goods that European workers manufactured, such as sewing needles, kerosene lamps, ready-made cotton clothing, soap and matches. The colony's urban and rural workers became dependent on the rise and fall of prices in distant markets. Dutch economic planners judged rising standards of living in the Indies by the numbers of brick houses and buffaloes their colonized subjects purchased and the trips they made to Mecca via the Royal Dutch Steamship Service. Globalizing the colonial economy meant that Indonesian workers also suffered precipitous drops in income during the world depression of the 1930s.

Treaties of 1824 and 1871 between the Dutch and British governments divided up the sultanates in the western end of the archipelago between British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. At the other end of the archipelago, the border between West and East New Guinea was finalized through treaties with the German colonizing power in 1898, and the border between West and East Timor was settled with the Portuguese in 1914. Europe's treaties subordinated archipelago communities to policies determined by the governments and business communities of Britain, the Netherlands or Portugal.

The governments of Southeast Asia's sovereign states today zealously guard the borders established by European colonial administrations. In the early decades of its independence, Indonesia came into conflict with neighbours Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines over ownership of islands in the Sulu Sea, and over territories on the huge island of Borneo that Indonesians call Kalimantan. But, in recent years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Indonesia was a founding member in 1967, has minimized the potential for regional conflict. Adopting the global language of English as the medium for its discussions, ASEAN now represents ten of the eleven countries making up Southeast Asia.[6] Member countries agree not to comment on each other's internal affairs.

In addition to ASEAN, Indonesia is also a member of the World Islamic Conference and of the United Nations, but it does not play the role in world affairs that its size and wealth in people, petroleum, natural gas, nickel and bauxite would suggest. By 1990 Indonesia had become an exporter of finished goods. Indonesian-made paper products, plastic ware, textiles, shoes and packaged foods found world markets. Indonesia's principal trading partners are Japan, the United States and China. However, the chief targets of Indonesia's industries are the country's own domestic customers, and this focus insulated Indonesia from the worst of the 2008–2009 world financial crisis.

The political course charted by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno (in office 1945–1966), connected Indonesia to the communist world of the Soviet Union and China. Subsequent presidents fostered links to the West, Japan and the Middle East. In recent years proponents of Islamizing Indonesian society have succeeded in establishing Islamic banks and aligning Indonesia with the foreign policies of the Arab League and World Islamic Conference. Indonesia today moves cautiously between the Islamic world and the West.

The first sixty-seven years of independence as a nation-state (a form born out of Europe's political history) have been tumultuous. The triumph of liberation from Japanese and Dutch rule and a sense of riding the course of world history were quickly tempered by internal conflict. Uprisings in the name of communism and of Islam in 1948 pitted Indonesian militias against each other. The nation that came into existence as a republic with a multi-party system of representation put down breakaway movements for separate Christian and Muslim states in the 1950s.

President Sukarno instituted rule by the military in 1957. He closed down the parliament that had been elected in 1955 and substituted an assembly of his own appointees. He advocated Indonesian solutions for Indonesian problems: Guided Democracy, Nasakom government and Panca Sila ideology. Guided Democracy suppressed public discussion of difference. Nasakom government offered nationalist, religious and communist parties representation in cabinet and outlawed opposition politics.[7] Panca Sila was Indonesia's answer to American and European constitutions. Its language borrowed Sanskrit vocabulary[8]; its five principles related state creed to the five pillars of Islam. Sukarno's presidency ended in coup, counter-coup and massacre. Around 800,000 Indonesians accused of

communist sympathies were killed by army and civilian death squads between 1965 and 1967. Another 250,000 alleged leftists were gaoled without trial until 1979.

Indonesia's "New Order" government under General (later President) Suharto (in office 1966–1998) set out to extirpate communism from Indonesia by banning its texts and organizations, severing ties with the People's Republic of China and determinedly tackling Indonesia's economic problems. Suharto renewed the ties Sukarno had severed with Western aid agencies. He negotiated Indonesia's readmission to the United Nations, and turned to the World Bank for loans and advice in devising a series of five-year development plans that integrated Indonesia into the West's successful economies. Indonesia joined OPEC in 1973 and financed massive expansion of infrastructure, heavy industry, medical clinics, schools and housing with its petro-dollars.

Internally, Suharto's government promoted order in place of Sukarno's revolutionary fervour. Military officers functioned as provincial administrators, and ran the nation's oil industry, transport and security companies. Active officers held seats in the appointed parliament in accordance with the military's doctrine of Dual Function, meaning defence of the state against internal as well as external enemies. The press was allocated the role of supporter of the state's programmes for nation building. Analysis of conflict in all its Indonesian forms – religious, ethnic, political – was banned from open discussion. At intervals the state allowed mob rampages against Indonesians of Chinese descent who continue to control the country's major businesses. The state taught that a resurgence of communism would destroy the good life Suharto's government had brought by the early 1990s to an Indigenous middle class.

Material culture makes Indonesians conscious of being part of a global community. Advertising billboards offer Japan's electrical goods, America's Coca-Cola, Hong Kong's movies, South Korea's cars, Australia's banking services. Malaysian imprints and Egyptian magazines are found in bookstores; newspapers advertise Lebanese treats at smart hotels on Ramadhan[9] nights. Since the 1990s Arabic lettering on buildings and Middle Eastern-inspired mosque and domestic architecture has been more visible. Skyscrapers and high-rise apartment blocks, toll roads and satellite dishes shape Indonesia's urban landscapes along global models. Densely populated Java closes the gap between city and village. Internet facilities exist in coffee shops far from major highways. Western and Islamic pop music, jeans, motorbikes and mobile phones characterize village as well as city lifestyles.

Such everyday evidence of cultural globalization inevitably produces *angst* in intellectuals. What is authentically Indonesian? Is modernization inevitably Westernization? Can a Muslim Indonesia be democratic? How can Indonesia change its political culture of corruption and nepotism to obtain the benefits of economic globalization? How far can the state protect Indonesian sovereignty against the rule-making of the West? How can the state promote welfare and still meet IMF guidelines for success? Proponents of Islamic globalization attack

McDonalds outlets where Indonesians who can afford it linger in air-conditioned comfort to demonstrate their participation in a global consumer culture of common brands and products. Hatred of the West and of non-Muslims is demonstrated in periodic bouts of "sweeping" by roaming youth gangs who force their way into hotels seeking to eject foreigners from Indonesia. In 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2009, Indonesians acting in the name of Islam set off bombs in Indonesia's non-Muslim spaces. Targets were churches across the archipelago, nightclubs in Hindu Bali, and international hotels and embassies in the nation's capital.

Debates over the place of women in Indonesian society came into sharp focus during the political campaigns of Megawati Sukarnoputri (Vice-President 1999–2001, President 2001–2004). Her ascension to highest office exemplified many facets of contemporary Indonesian life: the force of kinship politics propelling the daughter of Indonesia's first president into public office; the wide gap between elite and the masses that means class triumphs over gender; and the Indonesian variant of Islam that allows women to assume public roles. *Fatwas*[10] issued in 2004 by different bodies within Indonesia's Islamic establishment gave out conflicting rulings: one set of religious leaders advised Muslims not to vote for female rule over men; other Muslim leaders opined that a candidate's Islamic platform was more important than the candidate's gender.

The Asian monetary crisis that hit Indonesia late in 1997, the ethnic wars that broke out across the archipelago, especially between 1999 and 2002, and the operation of Islamic terrorist networks inside Indonesia caused the flight of Chinese and Western investment capital and of foreign tourists. While it has successfully managed its economy throughout the 2008 global financial crisis, Indonesia remains a volatile place. It is a magnet for Islamic groups that hate the West and American-powered globalization. At the same time, Indonesia is a site for experimentation with democracy. In October 2004 voters showed, in the country's first direct election of their president, that they understood they had the right of choice. President Megawati, the defeated candidate, did not call on the armed forces to protect her job and privileges, nor did she hire mobs to disrupt civil order, but transferred government authority to the nation's sixth (and current) president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Indonesia's voters re-elected Yudhoyono in 2009.

The Yudhoyono government has to deal with a West that regards Indonesia as a weak state. It also has to deal with an Islamic world that offers Indonesia dangerous alternatives. Neither offers a manageable plan to end the country's poverty. Indonesia's constituent communities have been integrated into world systems for centuries. Its current constitution as a nation-state is the product of nineteenth-century Western imperialism; its agricultural and extractive industries are the product of nineteenth-century colonial economics. In the post-colonial world, Indonesia's workers are exported to Singapore, Malaysia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, while at home employees work for transnational corporations. Indonesia's jihadists are veterans of wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan and eastern Indonesia. Indonesian aspirations are formed by the competing universalisms of

Western and Islamic values. The study of Indonesia reinforces the proposition that globalization is a multi-dimensional process with competing pulls, pushes and attractions.

The book

The following pages trace the entwining of Indonesian peoples and economies with progressively wider worlds. Beginning with archaic globalization, Chapter 2 shows how products unique to Indonesia first slipped into regional trade networks and exposed scattered communities to the dynamic influence of far-off civilizations. Economic and cultural changes resulted in the emergence of political units organized as oligarchies or monarchies. Chapter 3 looks at the operations inside the archipelago in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the world's first global corporation, Holland's East Indies Company. Chapters 4 and 5 describe impacts of Dutch colonial rule in the following 150 years. Colonialism brought to the colony scientists, cartographers and engineers, as well as soldiers, bankers and administrators. These chapters chart the integration of Indonesian communities into patterns of modern globalization. Postcolonial globalization is explored in Chapters 6 and 7. International capital flows in and out of Indonesia. Indonesia's palm oil, timber, manufactured goods and citizens travel the world. Internet connections engage Indonesians in competing global discourses. Politicians attempt to negotiate ways of being modern but uniquely Indonesian, and to steer a course between loss of sovereignty to Middle Eastern imams and Western financial speculators alike. The concluding chapter considers the oscillations in Indonesia between movements for theocracy and democracy.

A personal note

I first travelled to Indonesia in 1967 as a post-graduate student from the University of Melbourne. It was an era when girders of President Sukarno's unfinished "prestige projects" were rusting, people were begging on Jakarta's streets, and soldiers armed with bayonets manned barricades at major thoroughfares. My studies of Indonesia have taken me also to the United States and the Netherlands. I have visited Indonesia numerous times as student, tourist, administrator of scholarship programmes for Indonesians, and as a university academic. Over the past four decades I have observed profound changes in Indonesia: the dramatic increase in numbers of schools; the construction of modern transport systems and housing; the expansion of television channels, shopping malls and well-stocked bookshops; the beautification of tourist sites, and the multiplication of mosques and neighbourhood prayer houses. At the same time, for many Indonesians, small businesses, crowded streets, cramped housing, noise, polluted air and water, and a daily struggle to sustain and improve living conditions remain constants.

I am a citizen of Indonesia's neighbour, Australia, a wealthy, predominantly white country of twenty-two million, and a stable democracy on Southeast

Asia's fringe. Australia became a major benefactor for Indonesia following the devastation wrought by the 2004 tsunami and advanced one billion dollars in "safety-net" funds to assist Indonesia ride out the 2008 global financial crisis. At the same time, Australia's government and citizens frequently find fault with Indonesia and its internal policies. Indonesia's government is often a sharp critic of Australians. Australia is a site of tertiary study and investment for privileged Indonesians; it is also a destination for political exiles and economic refugees from Indonesia. Nearly 100 Australians have lost their lives in Indonesia to suicide-killers who claimed Islamic goals in 2002 and 2009. Polls conducted in 2006 showed that citizens of Australia and Indonesia viewed each other with suspicion (Lowy Institute, 2006).[11] Both countries attempt to secure their national interests through direct relations and participation in regional forums.

In an earlier book, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (Taylor, 2003), I placed Indonesians at the centre of the narrative and attempted to convey the impact of historical events and processes through vignettes of Indonesian lives and stories. Because the theme of this book is the drawing of Indonesia into global history and trends, I necessarily here give far more space to the actions and impact of outsiders.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge and thank the many scholars whose research and analyses have enriched my studies, stimulated interests and opened up insights. It has been a special privilege to enjoy academic and personal relationships with so many. I feel particularly indebted to: Barbara Watson Andaya, Jaap Anten, Diah Ariani Arimbi, Margaret Astar, Peter Boomgaard, Joost Coté, Kees van Dijk, Giora Eliraz, Noorhaidi Hasan, John Ingleson, Clive Kessler, Gerry van Klinken, Rochayah Machali, Rudolf Mrázek, Julie Nolan, Iskandar Nugraha, Dimas Oki Nugraha, Norman Owen, Hans Pols, Bambang Purwanto, David Reeve, Anthony Reid, Henk Schulte Nordholt, Laurie Sears, Fridus Steijlen, Eric Tagliacozzo, Ian Tyrrell and Liam Wyatt. I thank the Faculty of Arts of the University of New South Wales for generous provision of study leave, conference and travel funds. I recall with respect and affection my professors, the late Jamie Mackie, John Smail and Herbert Feith. To Howard and Harry Gelman, who light my days, enduring gratitude.

2 Early encounters

Archaic globalization

Spices and sago, engines of early globalization

Though they could not possibly have known it, small communities of hunter-gatherers in the remotest corner of the Indonesian archipelago forged tenuous connections with the wider world in the early centuries of the first millennium. In their rain-soaked, mountainous islands, intervals of sunshine were too short to allow cereal grains to ripen, and there were no open grasslands for animal husbandry. This environment compelled inhabitants to discover in their forests products they could exchange for food staples. Trees native to their small islands yielded cloves and nutmegs. These spices formed the basis of an ancient exchange economy with inhabitants of neighbouring Halmahera, Seram, Buru and Aru islands where sago palms grew abundantly in swampy lowlands.

Sago palms produce a sap that could be processed into a fermented drink; its fibres and leaves provided building materials. But it was the pith from the palm that was to make sago an engine of archaic globalization. Processed and baked into loaves, sago had a lengthy "shelf life". Sago loaves sustained sailors at sea and doubled as an international currency. Inhabitants of the Spice Islands bartered spices for sago, which was an important staple in their diet. Sago producers acquired spices found nowhere else in the world. Other peoples wanted the cloves, nutmegs and mace for varied purposes: for the spices' medicinal properties; for the flavour they brought to cooking; for the dyes that could be extracted from them; and for the fragrance that enhanced religious rituals. Spices were light, small in bulk and multi-functional. They could be bartered for goods that spice and sago producers wanted such as metal knives, axes and cotton cloth.

Metal tools had many uses for forest dwellers. Textiles offered them novel forms of body covering and embellishment. But their contact with foreign cultures was indirect and irregular. The stimulus was not sufficient to encourage transition from sporadic harvesting of trees in the wild to cultivation of spice-bearing trees in purposely-designed gardens. The mountainous terrain of the Spice Islands was not conducive to breeding draft animals and developing wheeled vehicles that, in other societies, enlarged scale of production and stimulated invention. Spice gathering did not propel immigration and infusion of skills from other islands. So the rainforest economy did not spawn cities in eastern

Indonesia or turn forest dwellers into long-distance traders. Those profiting from the spice–sago economy of the eastern archipelago were traders operating from bases elsewhere in the archipelago.

The coastlines of Indonesia's many islands equal twice the circumference of the globe but, paradoxically, many communities, like the spice islanders, were land-oriented and dependent on sea-oriented peoples for essential goods and knowledge of the outside world. Location and connection to powerful civilizations have determined Indonesian history. The eastern end of the archipelago, home of the Spice Islands, blends into Melanesian societies of the Pacific Ocean. Ancestors of modern-day Indonesians peopled island clusters of the Pacific, but it was a one-way movement, so Pacific contacts brought no external economic or cultural stimulus to eastern Indonesia until the Spanish-financed Magellan fleet crossed the Pacific in 1521. From the western end of the archipelago, ancestors of modern Indonesians also sailed vast distances. By 700 CE they had settled in Madagascar, off Africa's east coast. Again, this seafaring produced no return journeys of discovery by Africans or economic stimulus from the African continent.

Tools of civilization: early contact with India

Impetus to growth came from the agricultural and manufacturing economies of India and China, and from the desire of their urban wealthy for exotic, foreign luxuries. From the fifth century CE improved shipping and navigation in the Indian Ocean stimulated long-distance sea traffic between the two giants of the region. Ships travelled along routes in the far west of the Indonesian archipelago. Cotton goods from India and Chinese silks, ceramics and metal goods were "eye-openers" to peoples in Indonesian ports where foreigners put in for water, food and local specialties. The products of foreign industries whetted ambition to acquire manufactured goods and to alter present living conditions so that traders would keep returning.

Malay and Javanese traders adapted their work habits. They serviced the sea highway between India and China by collecting spices from the far eastern end of the archipelago and bringing them to ports in Sumatra and Java that were closer to the main seaborne traffic. There, foreign traders could conveniently find an array of archipelago produce that included turtle shell, sea cucumber, gold dust, tree resins, pepper, cloves, nutmeg and mace. So it was communities on Sumatra and Java that came into direct contact with foreigners, acquired their material goods and were exposed to sophisticated foreign technologies, information and ideas. The economically and socially transformative impulses of Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim and Christian civilizations entered Indonesia from its western end.

Textiles exported from India and China show the dynamic consequences of archaic globalization for Indonesian communities. These textiles were a sought-after substitute for clothing made from bark fibres. Bark cloth is still found in contemporary Indonesia in heirloom costumes worn on ceremonial occasions by

Borneo peoples, but constructing apparel from tree fibres is a time-consuming process. Ready-made cotton cloth freed time for other gainful tasks and spurred economic activity to acquire the material. Imported textiles were more than body covering: they carried political and religious meanings from the societies that produced them and developed local significances. For instance, Chinese silks became ceremonial clothing of archipelago chiefs. Gold, the colour reserved for China's emperors, still carries connotations of leadership when worn by South-east Asia's politicians and heads of states today. Possession of sumptuous cloths became a sign of the increasing social stratification that followed on quickened economic life. Hindu and Buddhist symbols woven into designs imbued Indian cloths with magical properties to safeguard or heal, and conveyed religious messages to receiving communities, along with new aesthetics.

The Gupta dynasty that dominated northern and central India between the fourth and fifth centuries of the Common Era (320–455 CE) exported more than cotton goods. Its large agricultural base supported urban establishments of merchants, artisans and Buddhist specialists (monks, scholars, astronomers, astrologists). Merchants were organized in guilds that managed their business interests and congregational religious life in India and in ports along the route to China. Holy men, scribes, sculptors and stone masons surplus to local requirements circulated within this overseas network of Indian communities and replicated hometown lifestyles. In Indonesian ports they established temples that served as meeting place, guildhall, workshop and school, as well as Buddhist worship centre.

Buddhism had grown out of an Indian Sanskrit culture whose superior caste of brahmins worshipped Hindu gods and engaged with a vast body of writings in Sanskrit on philosophy, astronomy, architecture, sculpture, literature and lexical studies. Surplus brahmins also found employment overseas as foreign experts. They were welcome to Indonesian chiefs because they gave religious legitimacy to temporal hierarchy. Brahmins staged coronation ceremonies for their patrons, conferred on them the Indian title of raja (king) and Sanskritized reign names. Brahmins administered public oath taking that bound officials to their rajas. Brahmins composed epics in honour of their royal employers, likening them to Hindu gods. Indian-style titles made the position and functions of local chiefs known and understandable to the foreign merchant community, and became another way of differentiating the chiefs from commoners. Buddhist monks and brahmins took on jobs in Indonesian communities as scribes, record keepers, professional flatterers, teachers of literary arts and spiritual guides. In time, archipelago elites within the Indian radius became devotees of the Buddha or of Hindu gods such as Siva and Visnu.

Beyond the ports, in habitats adaptable to rice ecology, there emerged a productive combination of Indian religions, knowledge and writing systems with rice agriculture, iron tools and domesticated buffalo. Rice can grow along the flood plains of rivers, but yields are higher when the water supply is regularized through irrigation channels, allowing for a growing season in inundated fields and a ripening and harvesting period after fields have been drained. Rice requires

sunshine to ripen and therefore fields cleared of forest. Rice culture does not deplete the soil, but rather protects tropical soils by covering them in water as young shoots grow. The same plot can be used over and over again. The productive capacity of rice and the effort required to raise it promoted settled populations and organization of communal labour. Irrigated agriculture produced rice harvests greater than families needed for survival. In areas suitable for rice cultivation in Indonesia – the northern coastal plains of Java, mountain plateaus and river valleys of Sumatra, hillsides of Bali – communities expanded in size and complexity. Rice agriculture supported the emergence of artisans who supplemented farm labour with crafts. Unlike wild spice and sago trees that can be tapped year-round, rice grown in fields is harvested all at once. Its storage properties allowed surpluses to be stockpiled and transferred as taxes to an administering class.

In Java, irrigation, Indian influence and royal government are historically linked. One of Java's earliest inscriptions (fifth century CE) records a prince with the Indianized reign name of Purnavarman[1] ordering a canal to be built. The text was composed in the cosmopolitan vernacular of Sanskrit. The inscribed stone was excavated on Java's northwest coast in the vicinity of modern-day Jakarta. A total of five inscriptions are all that remain to testify that this fifth-century Indonesian chief grasped the potential of proximity to international trade routes when combined with river access to forest produce such as pepper and cardamom and a hinterland capable of rice cultivation.

A striking example of creative exploitation of the possibilities archaic globalization offered can be found in central Java. There, royal devotees of the Buddha and of Siva harnessed the labour of settled rice-producing peoples to realize personal religious visions. Over a seventy-year period, starting around 780 CE, the world's largest Buddhist monument, Borobudur, was built from stone quarried from Java's volcanic mountains. Over one million large blocks were cut, hauled to the site and shaped to form a temple-mountain bearing 504 statues of the Buddha. The base consists of four square terraces whose walls are carved with scenes from the Buddha's life. Galleries, with niches for images of the Buddha, lead the visitor around and up to three circular terraces on which originally were seventy-two *stupas*, latticed bell-like structures, each enclosing an image of the seated Buddha. At the summit is a single massive, solid *stupa*, with a votive niche, possibly once safeguarding a relic. To the east is Prambanan, a complex of 224 temples dominated by shrines to the Hindu gods Brahma, Siva and Visnu.

No traces of royal palaces and town life have been found at these temple sites. Houses must have been built from perishable materials, with stone being reserved for the monuments that fostered urban growth. The city's economic life in artisans' workshops and labourers' quarters was determined by the requirements of the monument and of the religious community serving it. Calendars of religious rituals determined the ebb and flow of religious tourism. Archaeologists have interpreted terracotta figurines of the Buddha excavated around the base of the Borobudur as items for the souvenir trade directed at pilgrims (Miksic, 1990).

Scholars attached to the Borobudur and Prambanan temples devoted their efforts to conserving Sanskrit-language religious, literary and scientific texts, and technical manuals by copying them. Innovation was in the form of translation. Scholars turned the local Javanese vernacular into a literary language and devised a way to write it in Indian letters. This was a major intellectual achievement. No one spoke Sanskrit in Indianized centres in the Indonesian islands. Religious specialists of the classical kingdoms on Java made it possible for scholarship to break out of its narrow confines and gave future generations the first written forms of their own language.

The Borobudur and Prambanan temple complexes were the centres of *inland* cities. India's alphabetic writing, its congregational religions and devotional cults sustained societies that were inward looking. Religious specialists, master craftsmen and laity were producers and consumers in a religious economy. The material and human resources poured into the two temple-cities in the eighth and ninth centuries did not engender an expanding commercial life. No subsidiary or satellite towns apparently grew from either temple-city. Investment was poured into religious buildings and sculpture, not into bridges and roads.

Environmental conditions also placed limits on development, just as they did in the much smaller spice island economies. Chickens and goats were the most common domesticated animals. They provided a food source, but not muscle power for ploughing or transport. Horses do not thrive in the humid zones of Southeast Asia.[2] Water buffalo are native to the region, and they were used as draft animals. But buffalo are much slower than horses: they are not adaptable for military use, and they function best on flat ground. In royal Java, buffalo-powered vehicles carried kings and queens in processions, rather than bulk goods to market. Human muscle power determined and limited the scale of agricultural production and volumes of goods carried to water transport.

Java's monument-centred civilizations did not outlast their founding dynasties. Various theories have been advanced to explain why it was that the centre of political power and religious life shifted from central to east Java around the tenth century. Scholars suggest climate change, natural cataclysm such as eruption of volcanoes (eighteen are still active in Java today), epidemic or warfare. Both Borobudur and Prambanan had characteristic aspects of classical cities. They created sacred space and projected power, but their elites did not foster the economic conditions that would encourage technical innovation or sustain the necessary long-term linkages with more advanced societies.

Some of Java's rice did get exported. It supplied Sumatra's delta ports that lacked their own rice-producing hinterlands. The most important of the ports forging Indonesia's links to markets and manufacturing centres beyond the archipelago is known by the Sanskrit name of Srivijaya. By developing its market as an emporium for archipelago goods, Srivijaya was able, in the fifth century, to entice ships handling the India–China trade to alter their sailing route. The Malay Peninsula stretches barrier-like between the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Until Srivijaya made it profitable for ships to sail *around* the peninsula, the practice had been for shippers to offload cargoes at its narrow,

northern neck for hauling overland and transferring to ships on the opposite coast. Adding a southern loop meant a ship could make the entire voyage. Instead of being a terminus of global routes, the western archipelago of Indonesia became a crossroads.

No records were apparently created in India to record this change in sea route that was to prove so momentous for Indonesian history. Indians have left only a hint of their entrepreneurial interests in the name that they gave to Sumatra, which is Suvarnadvipa, meaning Island of Gold. Scattered across Sumatra are sculptures of the Buddha, remains of brick temples and commemorative stones inscribed in Indian alphabets. These are material evidence of the stimulus to local development from Indian civilization, but traces of Sumatra's ancient urban centres are hard to find (Schnitger, 1989). Tropical climate, the dense urban expansion of modern times and scant funds for archaeological research are limiting factors in learning about Sumatra's first millennium. As in Java, the crucial legacy for Indonesia was the process of writing down the spoken language. Srivijaya's oldest inscriptions date from 682 to 686 CE. Again, the writing system was an Indian alphabet, but the language was Malay. In its modern form Malay is the national language of Indonesia.

Srivijaya's capital was in the vicinity of modern-day Palembang. The port had access through the Musi River to gold-producing regions of the west-central Sumatran highlands. Srivijaya's territory was scattered across small islands in the Straits of Melaka (Malacca) and a network of subsidiary ports along the east Sumatran coast. Its population lived on land and sea. Their livelihood depended on Srivijayan navies keeping the Straits clear of pirates (or competitors) and on the ability of harbour masters to supply market services for a cosmopolitan clientele. Scholars debate whether ports in the modern states of Thailand and Malaysia were once part of an extended Srivijayan "empire", nominal vassals or independent trading partners. What is clear is that Srivijaya played a leading role in the region's trade with China.

The Chinese stimulus

Kotkin writes that "Politics, not commerce, propelled the fates of China's cities" in the first millennium (2005: 54). Chinese governments conducted commercial relations with ports bordering the South China Sea in a vocabulary of diplomacy that fed into the prevailing ideology that China was the centre of the universe. Successive dynasties permitted "tribute missions" from designated ports in "barbarian lands" to enter China to pay homage, present "tribute" to the emperor and to receive "gifts" (trade goods, honours) in return. Products native to Indonesia are recorded in tribute lists preserved in Chinese annals. These lists furnish evidence that Indonesian producers and traders were caught up in networks of exchange that linked them to the world's foremost manufacturing power of the time. The earliest mention of Srivijaya as a tributary of China comes from a Tang dynasty history recording a mission from Srivijaya in the years 670–673 CE (Wolters, 2008: 107, footnote 124).

Tribute put Srivijaya on the Chinese map. So did Buddhism. Buddhism had reached China by overland trade routes from India in the fourth century CE. By late Tang times, monks in China sensed that their monastic life was deviating from precepts the Buddha had laid down, and that their Chinese-language renderings of Buddhism's sacred writings and commentaries were not accurate. Some, therefore, travelled to India to immerse themselves in Sanskrit language studies, to observe practice of the monk's discipline and to collect Buddhist manuscripts for monastery libraries in China. Those who chose the sea route to India departed from Guangdong on merchant ships whose first port of call was now Srivijaya. Time spent in port waiting for good weather to continue on their journey to India was given over to Sanskrit studies, so that by the 680s Srivijaya had achieved renown as a centre for Buddhist learning and practice. The monk-scholar Yiqing (I-Tsing, 635–713), who spent ten years studying at Nalanda, Buddhism's heartland, arrived in Srivijaya with 400 Sanskrit-language Buddhist manuscripts and began his great work of translation (and preservation of India's Buddhist heritage) there. Yiqing records there were "more than 1,000" monks then studying in Srivijaya under the patronage of its king. He named Sakyakirtti as Srivijaya's most distinguished teacher of Buddhism, and he recommended: "If a Chinese priest wishes to go to the West (India) in order to hear (lectures) and read (the original), he had better stay here (Srivijaya) one or two years and practice the proper rules and then proceed to Central India."[3]

Unlike contemporary kingdoms in Sri Lanka (and later kingdoms in Myanmar and Thailand), Sumatra's Srivijaya did not claim to possess a relic of the Buddha that might have stimulated religious tourism and ensured its survival as a significant regional centre of Buddhism. Srivijaya's importance to Chinese Buddhists lasted only as long as China's rulers sponsored Buddhism and looked south. When China focused more on its northwest frontier and central Asia and moved its capital north, interactions with Sumatra declined, and with this reorientation the potential creative spark from contact with China was lost.

The Chinese monks who had studied in Sumatra apparently did not teach their own language to a local student body in Srivijaya. The powerful stimulus from China's technical inventions, its philosophy and system of government, its writing system, language and the knowledge stored in Chinese texts were felt in territories bordering China. It was, therefore, Vietnam, Korea and Japan that derived "templates" for the organization and development of their societies, rather than forebears of today's Indonesians. Indonesian scholars in the first millennium did not learn to read and write in Chinese, so China's literary and scientific treasures, its philosophy and accumulated knowledge did not drive intellectual development in archipelago states. Knowledge of China's technical inventions became important to Indonesian working men. They learned Chinese metal working techniques and the use of incendiary weapons; they copied Chinese naval designs and built the watertight storage compartments into their own trade ships. Such borrowings were important to Indonesian economies, rather than a Chinese-style bureaucracy recruited through a uniform education and examination system, which was never adopted by Indonesian kingdoms.

The tributary system that governed China's relations with territories in its Nanyang (southern seas) was designed to limit, not enlarge contacts. Foreign traders and envoys were confined to specific ports and contacts inside China. Items that the Chinese wanted, such as birds' nests, sea cucumber, tree resins and spices, were to be found only in thinly populated regions scattered around the Indonesian archipelago. The Chinese market was potentially huge. The great southern city of Guangzhou (Canton), for instance, had a population of 200,000 by 1200 CE (Kotkin, 2005: 56). But Chinese demand did not, at this stage, inject an economic revolution into Indonesian societies harvesting the resource-rich zones of forest and sea. Communities were too small, their skill base too narrow and the Chinese tributary system too controlled to encourage a shift in far-off eastern Indonesia from plucking nuts from trees growing in the wild to their cultivation in plantations for the export market. Instead, in a case of reversed influence, it was a Southeast Asian product that stimulated economic take-off in China.

The Southeast Asian product that was to drive the Chinese economy was not a gourmet food for the very rich, but rice. Farmers in China's tropical zone, working in similar environmental conditions, cultivated Southeast Asian rice varieties that could yield two and more crops a year. Under the Tang dynasty, which was based in southern China from 618 to 907 CE, taxes on agriculture supported an expansion of roads, creation of a postal and communications system, and manufacture of copper coinage. All these developments stimulated economic life. The Song dynasty (960–1127), also headquartered in the south, built on this infrastructure and on wealth from agriculture. It financed a navy, built more ships and port facilities and encouraged more long-distance trading operations to Southeast Asian ports. Such policies stimulated demand in China for a wider array of products that Southeast Asia could provide.

Southeast Asian territories fringing the South China Sea had deposits of coal that could be used in China's blast furnaces. Riverbed gravels yielded ores that produced tin.[4] Southeast Asia also had potential pepper and sugar producing regions, but it lacked the settled populations and sufficient numbers of people to grow crops in plantation conditions and to exploit the mineral resources. During the Song dynasty colonies of Chinese workers were planted in Southeast Asia to create enterprises that would export products to China.

The earliest discernible "China town" in the Indonesian archipelago dates from about 1000 CE and was on the northeast tip of Sumatra. By 1600 there were colonies of Chinese across the Indonesian archipelago growing pepper in the Riau Islands, raising sugar and distilling it for arrack in northwest Java, mining tin in Bangka and panning for gold in western Kalimantan. These Chinese work colonies were far from the archipelago's major concentrations of population. On the fringes of the archipelago, they worked for the Chinese market in what Carl Trocki calls an early version of "offshore production" (1997: 87).

For Java's Hindu–Buddhist kingdoms, contact with China was also sporadic and unpredictable. Mongol raids launched by the Yuan dynasty in 1293 altered the balance of power between small states in east Java. But, after disasters at sea

while attempting to invade Japan, the Mongols gave up plans to extend their supremacy across oceans, and concentrated on being the great land-based power of Asia. The Zheng He (Cheng Ho) voyages of the early Ming dynasty also came and went.[5] From 1433, China's government restricted long-distance merchant shipping by banning construction of ships with more than two masts. It dismantled its navy and dockyards, and revived the old tributary form of commercial exchange. Chinese colonies continued to work Southeast Asia's resources. Chinese sailors still plied Southeast Asia's trade routes, but Chinese merchants were forbidden by imperial edict from returning to China. Those who did were liable to confiscation of their property and execution. The economic policies of the Ming dynasty (1378–1644) developed China's agricultural economy and reinforced the Chinese view that the outside world had little to teach the Chinese.

There were two major consequences for Indonesia resulting from these decisions taken in China's imperial capital, now located in northern China. First, Chinese traders, acting illegally in the eyes of Chinese governments, based their trading hubs *outside* China in Taiwan, Japan and Southeast Asia, and focused their commercial activities on the inter-Asian trade. These highly mobile traders moved the products of Chinese colonies of workers in Southeast Asia to markets along the India–China sea highway; they supplied Chinese and other communities with goods. As savvy operators from a numerate civilization who knew prices obtaining for goods across a wide zone, they were able to operate in many archipelago ports. Like international entrepreneurs today, Chinese traders came and went, flexibly responding to changed political, social and economic circumstances. Knowledge of conditions obtaining elsewhere gave the Chinese a competitive edge over local entrepreneurs, and contributed to an idea deeply rooted in Indonesian thinking until today: that Chinese (including Indonesia's citizens of Chinese descent) are rootless and not really committed to the host societies in which they do business.

The second major consequence for Indonesia of imperial China's ban on Chinese long-distance shipping was that it opened up a space for foreign traders who were Muslim and Christian. The Islamic trade network, like the Indian and Chinese, forged intercontinental connections for communities in the Indonesian archipelago.

The Islamic connection

From the early eighth century, land-based armies composed of Arabs and non-Arab converts to Islam pushed back China's western limits in Asia. Communities of Muslims grew up in cities of China's west and central provinces, and in Yunnan. By mid-century direct sea contacts had been opened between the Arabian Peninsula and China, and Arab merchants and seafarers were forming Muslim communities along China's important southeast seaboard. Chinese inventions made valuable contributions to Muslim polities throughout the Islamic world from India to Spain. The manufacture of paper, learned from Chinese papermakers, for instance, expanded the uses of literacy. Quranic

revelations and theological commentaries were now written on paper,[6] and paper also served scholarly and administrative purposes as the medium for Arabic grammars, technical and scientific manuals.

From Greek, Egyptian and Indian sources, Arabs knew of a far-off "golden peninsula" that was the source of cloves and precious woods and also seemed to be the site of fabled products, such as women who grew out of ripening fruit of the wak-wak tree (Suarez, 1999). Arab geographers named this place "Zabaj". By the eleventh century, increased contacts with the western Indonesian archipelago allowed geographer Abu Rayhan al-Biruni (973–1048) to link Zabaj to Sumatra (Laffan, 2009: 27).

The entry of Arab and other Muslim merchants as regulars on the India–China sea highway opened up new opportunities for residents of Sumatran coastal villages that were accessible from the sea. Barus on the northwest coast of Sumatra may be taken as an example of the impetus given to local exchange economies in remote places, and of the long-term consequences. Forest-dwelling Batak peoples tapped pine trees native to their habitat for camphor crystals; they carried these down mountain paths to exchange for goods that coastal villagers could obtain from passing Arab merchants who wanted camphor to sell in China. Villagers adapted their work habits to the rhythms of monsoon-driven shipping. In time, they also modified their outlook to accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of their Muslim business partners. For Arab traders, Barus was never more than a small stopping off point, but for Indonesians Barus is famous as the city of Hamzah Fansuri (d. before 1604[7]). He is celebrated in Indonesian literary history as an Islamic poet in the Sufi tradition, who turned the Malay language (written in Arabic script) into a medium for expressing the soul's yearning for mystical union with the divine.

The segment of the Islamic trade network that operated in Indonesian waters included Muslims who were Arabs, Indians and Chinese from Yunnan. Information about the places in which they did business travelled back to geographers. The twelfth-century Arab geographer, Muhammad Al-Idrisi (1100–1165), knew of Sumatra as an important site for Muslim–Chinese trade. By the fourteenth century, Arab writers labelled trading communities in the archipelago Jawi, by which they meant Malay speakers who were Muslim. Muslims were still a minority in the archipelago, but they came to dominate political and economic life in new harbour states forming along the Straits of Melaka, along Java's north coast and in eastern Indonesia, between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries.

Rulers who emerged to head harbour states at trade terminuses of the Islamic network were Muslim. They had Arabic reign names and modelled local practice on international Islamic culture. Indonesian nationalist history glosses over the foreign origins of the Arab, Indian and Chinese Muslim merchant groups that threw up rulers of sultanates now considered to be the oldest and holiest in Java: Demak, Tuban, Gresik and Surabaya.[8] Harbour masters of these sultanates were known by the Persian title of *shahbandar*. Their rulers hooked into the Islamic trade network, employed scribes who could write in Arabic, and channelled trade revenues to support the religious establishments that now formed around mosques.

In comparison with the Chinese trade network, the Islamic trade network was to stamp a more profound and permanent cultural influence on Indonesian societies. Envoys from China's courts came only to observe and record the "Indonesian scene" for Chinese purposes. They did not stay to direct, teach or convert. Chinese commercial activity made Indonesian ports busier places. The increased tempo in economic life attracted Muslim traders who operated in a quite different network of people, institutions, beliefs and practices. Muslim intellectuals, holy men and adventurers could journey extensively through this network because universal Islamic institutions and values facilitated travel and employment in a world without hotels and recruitment firms. Sultans offered Muslim foreigners employment as judges, teachers and mosque preachers. Indonesia's sultans also bestowed titles and wives on foreign experts to induce them to stay.

Some Muslim travellers became fixtures at Indonesian courts, spiritual guides to the ruler, policy advisors and representatives to the world Islamic community. In Indonesia today they have mythical status as introducers of Islam and are associated with miracles. Others (for whom there is documentary evidence) were temporary residents, men like the North African Abu Abdullah ibn Battuta (1304–1377) who visited the Pasei sultanate in northeast Sumatra in 1345, and the Gujerati Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1666) who was chief imam[9] for the sultanate of Aceh between 1637 and 1644. Ibn Battuta's *Travels*, written in Morocco in 1354 (translated edition 1969), set down his accumulated knowledge on Asia and Africa for Muslims everywhere in the expanding community of Islam. Al-Raniri brought his store of Islamic knowledge to inhabitants of Aceh and their sultans for whom he wrote histories of Islam, theological essays and advice manuals.

By the end of the sixteenth century, this Islamic web of culture and contacts still caught up only very small numbers in the Indonesian archipelago. The population of any port amounted at most to a few thousand. Many residents were not indigenous inhabitants, but cosmopolitan transients who moved from port to port as boat schedules, wind patterns and availability of goods dictated. They had little contact with the denser populations of settled rice-growers of upland valleys and inland plains. Opportunities in the ports were disproportionately enjoyed by foreigners because rulers outsourced jobs in market administration to Chinese, Arabs or Indians. Urban skills therefore remained the specialty of outsiders. Indigenous communities continued to function in barter economies; members missed out on acquiring commercial experience in such basic matters as calculating the relative values of the gold, silver and copper coins in circulation in port markets.

Industries that started up in the new urban centres, such as arrack brewing and gun smithing, were operated by the Chinese. New port cities did not create job opportunities for the larger populations of the countryside or attract rural immigrants. Foreign traders were men. Local rulers bought up female slaves from cargoes passing along archipelago trade routes and rented them out to the commercial travellers. Those men who settled contracted temporary or more permanent arrangements for domestic services with port women. From such unions

there emerged Mestizo communities (called *peranakan* in Indonesian), which added a new social element to the urban mix.

Economic and religious interests of port residents oriented them *outwards*, away from the hinterlands. The next deal was to be made in another market, and there was the pull of Mecca for the devout and the student alike. Native Indonesian Muslim scholars made extensive stays in the core Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina. There they wrote guidance manuals and issued learned opinions on religious belief and practice for archipelago communities. For example, Abdurrauf Singkel (*c.*1615–1693) composed the first extensive commentary on the Quran in Malay for Indonesian believers while he was in Arabia between 1641 and 1660. His exegesis continued to be consulted in Indonesia's Islamic schools well into the twentieth century.

Indonesian products passing along the Islamic trade network were still small quantities of high value luxury items desired by elites in far-off cities. Port rulers could not earn enough from trade tariffs to finance religious buildings on the scale of the great monuments of Java's classical agrarian kingdoms. Their harbour capitals did not have ready access to the stone of Java's mountains. Mosques were built of the materials at hand. They were constructed of wood, on a much smaller scale, and in their design – a square structure topped by numbers of stepped roofs – they showed architectural influences from Muslim builders in India and China (Van Dijk, 2006; Tan, 2009).

There is little evidence of urban guilds in harbour states that could protect artisans and further merchant interests. Teachers of Islam employed by port rulers encouraged royal absolutism because they taught that Muslim rulers were Allah's earthly deputies (caliphs) and that treason was the worst of crimes. Religious teachers also had a frame of reference in which to place the Portuguese newcomers who, in the sixteenth century, began competing with Muslims in the Indonesian archipelago for both market share and minds.

The Portuguese

Portuguese seafarers in the fifteenth century had probed by sea down the west coast of Africa. By 1498 they had learned the route around Africa's southern tip and had crossed the Indian Ocean. In 1505 their ships found the Straits of Melaka and the passageway to the South China and Java Seas. They put in at the port of Melaka. It was then a busy harbour state strategically located at midpoint on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, plugged into international circuits of trade and ideas. Melaka was on the Chinese map. Ships from the Zheng He fleets had stopped there between 1405 and 1433, and from around 1411 Melaka's rulers began sending regular "tribute missions" to China. Melaka had built itself up as an emporium where merchants could sample produce from many different regions. Its navy was able to force passing ships to put into port, pay licence fees and make "gifts" of trade goods to the harbour master.

Melaka was also an important junction point for the Islamic trade network. At the same time as its ruler was courting the Chinese, he adopted Islam as his

personal religion and made it the port's religion around 1430. Muslim merchants and itinerant religious scholars could be assured of a hospitable reception when the harbour state's ruler called himself sultan. Under royal patronage, court poets developed Malay, written in Arabic script, as a literary language for chronicles of kings and epic tales. Malay became the vehicle for a huge corpus of Islamic literature. Arabic and Persian theological commentaries, legal digests, biographies of pious Muslims and folktales of heroes of Islam were translated into Malay, and from Malay into many of the languages spoken in the archipelago.

Stories that Muhammad himself had appeared in a dream to Melaka's king, who took the reign name of Sultan Muhammad Shah, helped establish Melaka's reputation as a prestigious sultanate and drew visitors from the archipelago (Ricklefs, 2008: 11). Melaka's royal court was taken as a model by sultanates established at later dates around the Indonesian archipelago. Malay came to be perceived as a language of Islam; the Malay culture of the court became a model for the newly converted, socially ambitious rulers of the archipelago. One example of how far Melaka's importance penetrated the Indonesian archipelago is the spice island of Ternate at the eastern end of the archipelago. Local traditions narrate that the first ruler of Ternate to take up Islam as his personal and state religion did so after he had travelled to the Melaka sultanate in 1460. He adopted Malay dress, used the Malay language written in Arabic script for diplomatic correspondence and introduced Arabic numerals to Ternate.

Melaka impressed the Portuguese as a potential obstacle to expanding their business operations. But it was an obstacle easily swept aside. Compared to cities where the Portuguese were doing business in India, Melaka was small and poor in resources. It had no vast agricultural hinterland to draw on. The heavily forested mountains of the Malay Peninsula were home to small nomadic groups who sporadically gathered tree products for a barter trade with coastal Malays. Farmers in the few villages around Melaka did not produce enough rice to support the international crowd of shoppers and crew that passed through. Dependent on imports of rice to survive, Melaka was vulnerable to blockade by Portuguese ships.

The Portuguese conquered Melaka in 1511. They made it the headquarters of their operations east of India and laid down their own trade network along established shipping routes in the South China and Java Seas. Macau in southern China and Hirado in southern Japan became locations for Portuguese commercial agents and warehouses, as did Banten, Makassar (on the southern arm of Sulawesi) and Ternate in the Indonesian archipelago. In China and Japan, as in India, the Portuguese operated on the fringes of wealthy and powerful states, their activities circumscribed by strong governments. In the smaller Indonesian ports, however, the Portuguese had greater latitude to fortify their residences and workplaces, to challenge local rulers, and to compete vigorously for Indonesian products with Asian merchant competitors.

The Portuguese also brought Christianity in its Roman Catholic form. Like all universal religions, Christianity is a belief system and a knowledge system encompassing philosophy, a writing script, law codes and forms of art,

architecture and literature. Latin, then the language of the Catholic Church, was at the time also the language of learning in Europe's universities. The Portuguese trade network, like the Islamic, furnished means and institutions that allowed Catholicism's itinerant holy men (Jesuits, Dominicans) to travel the length and breadth of the Portuguese seaborne state from Brazil to Africa, India, Indonesia, Japan and China. Everywhere they excited or antagonized Asian rulers with their claims, beliefs and knowledge.

In Asia's "Portuguese century", communities of Asian Roman Catholics grew around Portuguese quarters in ports on the coasts of India, China and Japan, and at key emporia in the Indonesian archipelago where they competed with Muslim communities. At the furthest end of the Portuguese trade network in the sandalwood territory of Flores and Timor Islands permanent Catholic communities were to take root.

The Portuguese trade network benefited from the upsurge in Chinese commerce that followed when the Ming government lifted its ban on marine commerce in 1567 and licensed trade with southern lands by private Chinese individuals and groups. By 1600, there was a steady flow of Chinese ships, and men set out each year from Xiamen (Amoy) on China's southern coast for Luzon in the Philippines, Champa on the central coast of Vietnam and ports in Cambodia, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java and all the way to Timor and the Moluccas (Spice Islands). The Chinese were not newcomers like the Portuguese. But now there were more of them, doing more business, more mining and raising more crops, and they operated over a wider zone. Chinese traders now connected tropical and non-tropical regions between the continent of Asia, Japan, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes. All this opened up more opportunities for Indonesian shippers who also plied the sea routes of the archipelago.

Indonesian responses (1): theatre arts and mosque architecture

Wherever Indians travelled, traded and settled in Southeast Asian ports and royal courts in early times, their epic stories followed them. Prince Rama's adventures in his quest for his abducted bride, Sita, the great battle between the ninety-nine Korava and five Pandawa brothers, the intervention of gods and demons in human affairs, and the ideal kingdom became core ingredients of story telling. Scenes from the *Ramayana* (Rama's Journey) cover the walls of the ninth-century Prambanan temple complex in Java. Itinerant stonemasons spread conventions for depicting gods, demons, royals and their human and celestial companions across a wide geographic zone. Appearance, posture and gestures made each carved character recognizable to temple visitors, who walked from panel to panel with a guide who narrated the scenes.

These stylized forms were repeated on parchment scrolls (*wayang beber*) that a skilled narrator unfolded as he chanted the tales. They were continued in the two-dimensional leather puppets of central Java's shadow theatre,[10] in the round,

wooden puppets of west Java, and in the costumes, make-up and dance movements of human enactors of the ancient tales. Java's mountains, forests and springs became the setting; characters from native stories mingled with the princes and warriors in sung, written and theatre versions.

The cycle of stories in the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* (Great War) epic and their moral teachings, which sprang from Sanskrit literature, infused Java's Muslim culture. In Javanese tradition, the creator of the *wayang* shadow theatre is Sunan Gunung Jati, one of the legendary nine *wali* (literally: "friends of Allah") who brought Islam to the island. Dominant culture clusters from external sources were localized over time, so that they became eminently Javanese. Similarly, motifs associated with Buddhism and Hinduism decorated the batiked cloth that wrapped Muslim bodies on Java. (The lotus flower and banyan trees stand for the Buddha's striving for enlightenment; paired wings represent the bird, Garuda, who bore Hindu gods on its back.)

Mosque architecture also related Islamic practice to its Indonesian environment. Design elements, such as the place for ritual washing, the building's rectangular shape that allows horizontal rows of worshippers to line up for prayer and an indicator of the direction of Mecca are features common to mosques wherever Muslims gather. In the arid regions of the Islamic heartland, trees were scarce and so not cut down for building material. Instead, the stony lands provided construction material for mosques. In Indonesia, with its abundance of forest products, the walls of village mosques were built from wood and roofs thatched with palm leaves. The tiered, pyramid form of the roof, with three, five or seven levels, has been explained by scholars as deriving from Chinese and Indian architectural forms, or as a local design for increasing air flow modelled on the Balinese building form called *wantilan*.



Figure 2.1 Shadow puppets of Java. Stories from India's *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* epics, retold in Javanese language, became the core of Javanese oral and written literature and performing arts. Here as stylized puppet figures in Java's wayang shadow theatre are the five Pandawa brothers of the *Mahabharata* (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wayang_Pandawa.jpg).

Royal mosques might be built of brick, set within a walled compound and approached through split gates that were features of temples from earlier Hindu and Buddhist times. Stone carvings of a *kala*, which is a monster's head in the form of a lion with large bulging eyes, were placed over the lintels of temple entrances in Java. This feature of temple architecture sometimes found its way into mosques where, carved in wood and painted in bright colours, *kalas* continued their ancient duty of protecting place and people from evil spirits. Appropriation of Islamic art forms by Indonesian artists and their combination with styles imported in earlier times from India contributed to localizing and spreading Islam in Indonesia.

Indonesian responses (2): ships and sultanates

Indonesia's mountainous topography, island clusters, shallow seas and strong, predictable winds made water routes more important than land routes for the transport of people and their goods and for establishing intellectual connections. Some Indonesian peoples had adapted to this archipelago environment by living at sea or in houses built on poles along the coast or riverbanks. Indonesian boat construction consisted of lashing together planks of wood, or binding them by wooden pegs. Gaps between the planks were sealed by resinous pitch obtained from the archipelago's forests. Rafts and flat-bottomed boats ferried people across rivers and carried them downstream to ports. Already in the first millennium CE archipelago boat builders were constructing double outrigger canoes with rudder, a support mast and fixed sail, and ships up to ten metres long. By the sixteenth century, in response to the upsurge in inter-Asian commerce, some Indonesian shipbuilders were constructing large, ocean-going vessels with three or four masts and multiple hulls (Reid, 1999: 60). They carried many metric tonnes of goods stored in baskets and clay jars.

Indonesian shipbuilders also incorporated navigational aids that were characteristic of foreign ships sailing their waters. They adopted the rigging of Portuguese ships and switched from woven mats of rattan to linen or cotton sails. They replaced their stone and wooden anchors with the iron anchors that foreigners used. These were innovations that Indonesian boat builders and pilots could easily observe, recognize their practical application and adapt for their own purposes. They were slower to incorporate other innovations in marine navigation that were the product of literacy and technical institutes and developed in China and Portugal. Chinese shippers, for instance, made use of a magnetic compass that floated in a bowl of water (invented in China in 1119 CE). Indonesian shippers did not quickly appropriate the Chinese compass or European navigational devices for measuring position into their seafaring technology. They sailed by the stars, currents and winds, stored their knowledge in memory, and did not develop the written logs and charts of sailing directions that were foundations of the marine science of their Chinese and European competitors. But upswings in sea trade led to the formulation of the Melaka Maritime Code that regulated relationships between a ship's captain and merchants joining a trading venture and set protocols for selling cargo in port markets.[11]

The sixteenth century was a period of considerable adjustment and ferment in those commercial zones. Rising income from the spice trade, awareness of greater possibilities and of the need to protect their turf encouraged rulers of the Spice Islands to build up armed fleets that were independent of winds. *Kora-kora* were large war boats driven by rowers. Individual boats had crews of 200. Rowers sat on platforms erected on outrigger booms on either side of the boat, whilst fighting men rode on platforms raised over the hull. Because of their construction, *kora-kora* were able to manoeuvre among shoals, sandbanks and reefs, against currents and whirlpools. These ships were able to outperform European ships until the 1850s and the invention of the flat-bottomed, steam-powered ship.

Another sign of the times was the proliferation of small harbour states at river mouths along the trade routes with ruling elites who were Muslim. Approximate dates of the founding of coastal sultanates are: Brunei, early fifteenth century; Melaka, 1430; Ternate, *c.*1460; Demak, *c.*1470; Cirebon, Tuban and Gresik, around 1500; Aceh, *c.*1515; Gorontalo, *c.*1525; Madura, *c.*1528; Butung, 1542; Makassar, 1605. By the end of the sixteenth century and early years of the seventeenth, some of Indonesia's sultans were sufficiently strong in population and resources to take on competitors. Java's sultanate of Demak, for instance, destroyed the Hindu leadership of the east Javanese kingdom of Majapahit around 1500. Over the following decades Demak exported Islamic influences into the interior of Java. The men who founded the important inland kingdom of Mataram in the last years of the sixteenth century were Muslim and they pursued deliberate policies to transform their subjects into followers of Islam.

The sultanate of Banten, from its base on the northwest Java coast, launched raids into southern Sumatra in the 1550s with the dual purpose of forcing conquered populations to pay annual taxes in pepper and of spreading Islam through the appointment of Muslim administrators. Across the Java Sea a Muslim elite seized control of Makassar in 1605 and launched raids into surrounding territories where it installed Muslim vassals and institutions. At the western end of the archipelago the sultanate of Aceh competed fiercely with foreigners for control of the increasingly lucrative trade in pepper. Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–1636) closed markets to Chinese and Portuguese traders. His war ships attacked Portuguese vessels in the Straits, and launched raids on the west coast of the Malayan Peninsula. Captured labourers were brought to Aceh as slaves to cultivate pepper vines in specially created gardens to increase quality and supplies. In 1629, Acehnese war ships blockaded the Portuguese in Melaka and maintained a four-month siege on the port.

All these sultanates were places where the Dutch were going to do business. The Dutch acquired the knowledge base that the Portuguese had built up during the sixteenth century on Asian winds and waters, markets and products, peoples and places. With that knowledge Dutch merchants could cater to the demand for European imports that Portuguese merchants had created. Over the sixteenth century, Asian elites learned to want products of European invention such as mechanical timepieces, maps and firearms; their markets developed a voracious

demand for silver from South American mines. The Dutch were able to benefit from the widening commercial contacts of Indonesian sultanates.

Indonesia's sultanates could also pose obstacles for the Dutch who set sail to the archipelago in 1595. With their increasing integration into an Islamic world, Indonesian sultans had learned to consider non-Muslims with contempt, to label them *kafir*, which means non-believers, rather than believers in a different religion. Acehnese tradition, for instance, records that Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh sent gifts and envoys to the Ottoman sultanate seeking cannon, artillery and gun makers from the caliph of the Islamic world to block competition in commerce and religion from Christian Europe (Reid, 2005: 71).

From archaic to proto-globalization

Interaction between Indonesian communities and foreign traders brought about what Bayly calls archaic globalization (2004). By this he means a system whereby goods he terms "charismatic"– spices, tree resins, precious metals – slipped from local into regional and intercontinental exchanges operated by trading diasporas. Commercial exchange was followed by expansion of text-based religions far beyond their sites of origin. With these religions came the knowledge systems contained in the languages in which their holy books were written. J. R. and William McNeill (2003) use the terminology of the human web to analyse the same process. Exchange between human beings, whether by chance, trade or warfare, communicated ideas and information as well as material goods, crops, weeds and diseases. Archaic globalization made for a tighter web. Contact was more interactive and sustained in environments that favoured settled agriculture and regular contact with a range of other peoples and cultures.

Early inter-community contact was patchy, connections were not instantaneous as they are today, so contact seems circumscribed or difficult to document in many instances in the Indonesian archipelago. Votive tablets at temple sites in India record that Buddhist rulers of Indonesian states made pious donations and sent monks to further their studies at Nalanda, the great centre of Buddhist learning in north India (fifth to twelfth centuries CE),[12] but Indians do not seem to have learned from Indonesians. Chinese envoys visited Southeast Asia's kingdoms, and wrote reports on their populations, customs and products. In the mid-sixteenth century, they compiled in Chinese characters with translations a list of 482 Malay geographic and trade terms and words for flora and fauna (Sneddon, 2003: 59). Their Indonesian contemporaries apparently did not store their knowledge about China in permanent form.

Temples, mosques and writing systems, however, prove that the archipelago's peoples responded to foreigners' religions and knowledge systems. They could not export their own belief systems, for the spirits Indonesians believed in were local, fixed in the rocks, mountains, forests and rivers of their habitats; their spirits were not transferable to the rocks, mountains, forests and rivers of peoples on other continents. When local chiefs encountered practitioners of foreign religions, they were confronted with claims of universal truths, and introduced to

moral principles, laws regulating social organization, knowledge systems, forms of art and architecture, novel practices and inventions. Societies in Java, Bali, and Sumatra acquired the tools for state building from an Indian cultural amalgam: Hindu and Buddhist belief systems; the learned language of Sanskrit; alphabet, literature, technical knowledge in building, astronomy and mathematics. Modern Indonesian language carries this ancient history of contact. Borrowings from Sanskrit include words for religion, titles, ceremonies, nature, numbers, parts of the body and qualities of character.

At the popular level, the religions of foreigners permeated local beliefs. But villagers and townspeople did not remain Hindus and Buddhists when their rulers were Muslim. Congregational religions depended on patronage that only kings could give. Without a ruler's channelling of taxes to finance the construction of places of worship and to train teachers, without support for the copying of holy books, without sponsorship of continual connections to the heartland of the religion, without royal enforcement of protection and respect for monks and brahmins, Hindu and Buddhist devotional cults could not survive in Indonesia when their rulers followed Islam. When rulers stopped patronage, temples fell into decay and monks dispersed for jobs elsewhere, taking their manuscripts of holy works with them. Stonemasons and sculptors moved on when there was no more paid work at temple sites, and because it was forbidden by new Islamic rules to create images of Allah in stone. A laity bereft of teachers, books and means of contacting theologians in far-off places was susceptible to teachings of the new religion of Islam now being promoted by its sultans.

Indian merchants did not detour from the major trade routes as far as the Spice Islands, so spice and sago producers did not become Hindu or Buddhist. Chinese traders did not often sail there either. Nor did Arabs, but Malays and Javanese who had become Muslim did, and consequently Islam spread into eastern Indonesia. The tiny clove islands of Ternate, Tidore, Makian, Bacan and Motir at the furthest end of intercontinental trade routes became Muslim early in the spread of Islam in Indonesia. By 1460 the ruler of Ternate was a Muslim, decades before the conversion of rulers of Mataram in central Java.

Islam proved to be lasting because the Dutch, who won control of key ports and trade routes in the seventeenth century, had no plans for takeover of the archipelago's major kingdoms or conversion of their populations to Christianity. There was also no competition for hearts and minds from China. No Chinese government ever backed Chinese labourers and merchants overseas, financed the establishment of plantations, or licensed merchants to conquer territories in the Nanyang and set up formal government there. Nor did China sponsor Buddhist missionaries or Confucian scholars to proselytize. Instead, China focused on making peoples with whom it shared a land border Chinese. As a result of these characteristics of the Dutch and the Chinese, Islam got time and space to spread to the rice farmers of the archipelago's plateaus and plains. Again, the Indonesian language conveys this history in Arabic loan words that have entered it for many religious concepts and conceptualizations of time.

The Portuguese did pursue the twin aims of conquest and conversion in Asia. Their language became a lingua franca in Asian markets. Portuguese words that have entered the Indonesian language reflect new items of material culture and new ideas introduced by the Portuguese. Examples are: words for foods native to Europe and the Americas; words having to do with the military, such as flag, soldier and bullet; words for household novelties such as fork, table and glass window; and words related to Christianity such as church and Christmas. Proto-globalization was achieved by Indians, Chinese and Arabs in interaction with Indonesians. It was the Portuguese and Dutch, as heirs of Christopher Columbus, Vasco da Gama and Ferdinand Magellan, who forged fully global connections for Indonesians. The Portuguese started the engagement of Indonesians in truly global networks because, as Iberians, they had sailed the world, forged connections between the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia, and discovered the way across the world's major oceans.

At the same time as the Iberians exploded human knowledge by fusing the world together, they were in the business at home of closing down knowledge by expelling and destroying people who were different. Cities of Spain and Portugal were emptied of their Jewish and Muslim entrepreneurs, artisans and intellectuals. Urban populations and economies of the Iberian Peninsula declined. It was the Dutch in the seventeenth century who were to enmesh Indonesians in a proto-capitalist globalization through the operations of their United East Indies Company, the world's first global corporation.

3 The global corporation comes to Indonesia

The VOC

Dutch assets: Europe's urbanites

The United East Indies Company, commonly known by its Dutch initials as the VOC (from *V*erenigde *O*ost-Indische *C*ompagnie), or simply as the Company, was formed in 1602 after the return of Dutch merchant fleets from the Indonesian archipelago. The initial expedition of discovery and commerce had visited ports in Sumatra, Java and Bali in 1596, while the second, in 1598, sailed deep into the archipelago as far as markets in Ambon, Ternate and the Banda islands. Sales of pepper and spices in Amsterdam demonstrated that substantial profits could be made by purchasing Indonesian products directly from their source. The Dutch artist Hendrick Vroom catches the long-term significance of these early contacts in words that frame his painting of ships returned from that second expedition: "Four ships that sailed forth together to Bantam[1] to fetch spices planted the seeds of commerce once there, and returned with their ample load to Amsterdam."[2]

The early success of the Dutch rested on a conjuncture of developments over the course of the sixteenth century. These were: the entry of Portuguese into Asian commerce at the beginning of the century; the rapid increase in numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs in the second half; and the ensuing improvements to Indonesian shipping and port services. The Dutch were peculiarly poised to take advantage of these circumstances at the opening of the seventeenth century.

Low-lying territory gave the name Netherlands to an area bounded by German principalities in the east and by the North Sea in the west. Dutch soils and climate did not favour cultivation of cereals. The struggle against water and wind to preserve and extend living space along the coastline, and the network of major European rivers crossing the flat landscape, produced an economy geared to waterborne commerce, fishing, livestock and the processing of raw materials. Economic growth and innovation were most dynamic in ports on the seaboard and in towns that grew up along rivers. The textile-manufacturing centre of Leiden, for instance, was based at a confluence of two branches of the Old Rhine.

Pottery, brewing, brick-making and timber industries relied on the systematic exploitation of peat fuel and wind power. Mills are still a familiar feature of

Dutch landscapes. Emblems of the modern tourist industry, mills are reminders of unique features of Dutch industry of earlier centuries. They drew together the skills and knowledge of numerous craftsmen such as carpenters, rope and tool makers, ironsmiths and water engineers. Cartwrights and bargemen supplied mills with timber and grains. Mills also produced paper for the purposes of government, commerce and scholarship. The mill owner was a literate man, a record keeper; he connected supplies and sales; he maintained relations with men who were members of urban scientific and literary circles, as well as with men who were woodcutters, farmers, porters and boat builders.

The engine of Dutch economic growth was in the cities of the western seaboard. Their origins lay in mediaeval towns that, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, had freed themselves from the domination of feudal lords. Townspeople had won charters that guaranteed their civic liberties and rights to private property, and that made them responsible for their own municipal administration and security. Dutch towns were walled. They drew on able-bodied inhabitants for defence against fires, floods and armed attack. Municipal councils administered daily life. The town hall and weigh house were characteristic features of urban existence. Prominent merchant families came to monopolize administrations in each city. They drew up statutes governing personal, commercial and criminal matters, and they managed civic institutions such as orphanages, poorhouses and homes for the elderly. Craft guilds regulated trades by controlling admission to apprenticeship training, certification of skills and standards for products.

Dutch farmers worked family-sized plots. They were not subsistence, but commercial farmers who owned title to the land they worked and sold their produce. Rural areas were linked to urban centres by an efficient system of transport. By 1609, the Dutch were extricating themselves from Spain's European empire after long and costly wars, and the wave of attacks by Protestants on Roman Catholic church property (the iconoclastic period) was over. Religious minorities – Remonstrants and Jews – were conceded freedom of worship and greater liberty to pursue a living. Protestantism and republicanism triumphed in the seventeenth century, and Dutch townspeople became the healthiest, most literate and well off in Europe by standards of the times (Schama, 1987; Aymard, 1982).

Chambers of commerce in seaboard towns financed the first expeditions to the Indonesian archipelago as "one-off" enterprises. They sought capital from individual investors, hired ships and sailors, and, after auctioning off the cargoes of return fleets they distributed the profits to their investors, cancelled their leases on ships and dismissed the crews. Early on, however, the directors of individual companies realized the competitive advantage likely from comprehensive long-term planning and investment in a single company. The Amsterdam chamber of commerce was the largest of the individual companies and located in Holland, the most populous and richest of the Dutch provinces. Holland's "super star" status has made its name synonymous with the Netherlands itself. Holland became the seat of the federation of six companies that formed in 1602 to

conduct trade in the Indonesian archipelago (which they called the Indies), and its chamber of commerce contributed eight of the Company's seventeen directors.

The VOC in Holland: manufacturing and maps

For the 200 years of its existence (1602–1799), the VOC's core was in Amsterdam. Three huge buildings were constructed along the IJ River where it empties into Amsterdam's harbour. They formed a substantial industrial complex of offices, warehouses and work sheds. Warehouses held goods to be shipped to Asia and Asian products awaiting sale in Europe; they stored parts for ships, tools and navigation supplies. The main warehouse had thirty cranes constantly working loading and unloading ships. Workshops manufactured ships' parts, rope and sails. A forge under a master smith employed around ninety men to make anchors and nails. Mostly male labour went into preparing ships and supplies for voyages to the Indies. Convict men were assigned to work on horse-drawn barges to scrape up the mud from the IJ River to keep the harbour navigable for big ships. Female labourers, drawn from workhouses and prisons, prepared fibres for coating the bottom of hulls to keep them watertight before it became the practice to apply lead-white paint and copper sheathing.

The VOC was in the forefront of modernizing European manufacturing processes. It financed practical, technical and scientific education; it introduced standardization and interchangeable parts; and it coordinated manufacturing. For instance, the VOC imposed on its various suppliers in the Netherlands standardized sizes for the barrels, bottles, nails and lengths of rope it ordered for its ships. The Company used examination and inspection to raise industry standards. It was open to innovation.

The charter which the States-General (the body representing the Dutch provinces) issued to the VOC in 1602 granted it exclusive right over all other Dutch merchants to conduct trade in the east, to enter negotiations with Asian powers, to establish trading outposts, and to defend the Company's interests by armed force. The VOC did not build a fleet of dedicated war ships to assist in achieving these grand tasks. In the fifteenth century, modifications to the design of the European sailing ship had made it a vessel that could be used for both trade and war. Cannon were fastened on to the lower decks; in naval action they were manoeuvred into gun ports cut into the hull.

Changes to the design and number of sails enabled European ships to make trans-oceanic journeys. Ships' captains sailing for Asia also had the advantage of earlier developments in navigation science. Men wishing to be appointed as first and second mate on VOC ships had to be able to read and write because sailing charts included written descriptions of coastline, harbours, rocks, shoals and currents as well as pictorial representations. Captains were supplied with maps, compass, quadrant, dividers for marking position on charts, a plane scale to calculate distances, and sounding leads for sampling seabeds and estimating the depth of the ocean. The invention of the pendulum clock around 1650 improved precision in timekeeping so that navigators could determine longitude.

From the seventeenth century, ships' officers had to pass tests in practical and theoretical knowledge conducted by special examiners employed by the VOC. The VOC had on its payroll men whose job it was to write manuals on navigation and to inspect the written logs that captains were required to maintain. Training schools for navigation officers were established in Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the eighteenth century. The VOC had its own hydrographic department that produced charts and itineraries for captains. These had to be regularly updated.

VOC navigators belonged to that group of men in Europe who combined literacy with practical application of knowledge and invention. Like clockmakers, manufacturers of precision instruments and printers, they were outside the confines of the theologically driven learning of university and monastery. It is in this combination of academic and manual work that European navigators differed most from Indonesian sailors and were closest to Chinese: the Chinese produced navigational aids, charts with sailing directions and compendia of foreign knowledge that were printed, whilst archipelago skippers were men of practical experience, but divorced from the world of academy.

The Malay Peninsula had been included in maps drawn by Ptolemy (87–150 CE). His *Geography*, preserved in an eighth-century Arabic translation, was published in Italy in Latin with his maps in 1477. Like Ptolemy, many creators of maps for the VOC did not themselves ever see the lands whose shapes they attempted to define. Captains, merchants, naturalists, explorers and missionaries came to mapmakers in Venice, Antwerp and Amsterdam. Mapmakers' workshops were places where philosophers and scientists met to analyse the information, sort fact from fiction, and fill in blank spaces in their conception of the world (at first mapmakers confused the islands of Ceylon and Sumatra, the relative sizes of Java and the Moluccan islands, and the relationship of New Guinea to the Australian continent).

Gerhard Mercator (1512–1594) invented the method of drawing a round world on a flat surface that enabled navigators to establish straight-line directions to distant places. Mercator also developed the atlas as a book containing numbers of maps arranged in a logical sequence. Many of the maps drawn up by Portuguese and Spanish cartographers on the basis of sixteenth-century journeys remained in manuscript form or were published in such limited numbers that their impact was not widely felt until geographers living in Holland obtained their secrets. Petrus Plancius (1552–1622) included information learned from the Portuguese in the large map of the world that he published in 1592. He became official cartographer for the United East Indies Company. The Company employed Europe's best mapmakers. Dutch presses published sea and land atlases throughout the seventeenth century. These show the steady accumulation of knowledge of parts of the world far distant from the Netherlands (Zandvliet, 2002). For instance, a map from around 1602 of the western Indonesian archipelago showed Sumatra, the north coast of Java and a small island named Makassar.[3] By 1655 accurate representation of China and Japan was possible.

Before the nineteenth century, Dutch mapmakers had most knowledge of the archipelago's coasts. The densely forested interiors of Indonesian islands, the difficulties of travel and prevalent fevers made many islands impenetrable before the invention of flat-bottomed steamboats and quinine medicine. Mapmakers decorated their depictions of the unknown interior of islands and uncharted seas with mythological creatures, rosettes and elaborately drawn compasses. They produced maps that were works of art for European parlours and so stimulated public interest in, and support of, VOC enterprises in the east.

The dockyards of the VOC in Amsterdam constantly built ships. When ready, ships sailed from Amsterdam to the deep-water port of Texel in the north. There, ships were loaded and took on crew and passengers. Two smaller ships were also carried within a large VOC merchant ship. They were for ferrying crew and cargo ashore in foreign ports. One-third of all the ships that were built in the Netherlands and sailed east were left in Asia for use in local trade (Aymard, 1982: 9). The journey to the Indies could take as long as thirteen months in the seventeenth century, but by the eighteenth the average voyage from the Netherlands lasted eight months.

The VOC on water

VOC ships journeyed in convoy. They were floating towns. Pantry supplies included salted meat, cereals, pulses, butter, cheeses, mustard and ship's biscuit. Ships carried barrels of onions, carrots and potatoes. In the Amsterdam VOC warehouse complex there were abattoirs for the slaughter of cows and pigs, and smokehouses for preserving meats. Live animals were also taken on board to supply fresh meat during the long sea journey. Cooks on VOC ships served meals to the officers in their cabins on porcelain, with silverware and glasses on tables laid with cloths. The crew was divided into eating groups composed of seven men. They shared the contents of a wooden tub together and ate from pewter plates with spoons and knives.

Food was cooked on an open fire in the ship's kitchen that was situated on a lower deck and covered in bricks with a copper chimney. Lighting below decks was by oil-burning lamps. Because of the danger of fire, the VOC sponsored new designs in fire-fighting machinery in the Netherlands and transferred the new equipment around the world. The Company paid for the most up-to-date technology. For instance, in 1678 it ordered the new fire engine developed by Jan and Nicolaes van der Heyden over the years 1671–1677. It consisted of a container holding water, a flexible leather hose to draw water and a brass pressure vessel that allowed a continuous stream of water to be directed at a fire. The hose attachments were cast in bronze. The parts were interchangeable, and they could be shipped east, together with leather grease to maintain the hoses.

The VOC ship was the product of Dutch artisans, an example of "industrious revolution" (see Chapter 1, p. 00) that characterized proto-globalization. The ships, called East Indiamen, represented Europe's skills, for example, in the array of tools carried in chests for use on board and for Dutch settlements in

Asia. East Indiamen also transported Europe's medical knowledge. Surgeons took with them tools and medicines. Their medical instruments included a saw, tongs, needles, syringes and a drill. Medicine chests contained herbs, honey, laxatives, syrups, powders, plasters, lotions and chemicals.

It is a commonplace that Asian entrepreneurs wanted only American silver from European merchants, and that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was little produced in Europe itself to tempt the Asian consumer. But there were European goods shipped by the VOC that were to be of great importance to Asian societies. Reams of paper, for example, were in ship consignments. Paper promotes intellectual life, as well as government administration. Very quickly poets, chroniclers and copyists in Indonesian courts began using paper produced by Dutch mills because of its smoothness, whiteness and sturdiness. Such qualities made Dutch paper superior to paper produced laboriously by hand from native tree barks and leaves.

Buttons made from bone, pewter, mother-of-pearl, even of gold, were another item sent east. They were unobtainable in Asia because clothing styles did not have buttonholes. People wore wraps; men might also wear trousers that were held together by drawstrings. Holland's buttons promoted changes in tailoring. Incorporated into clothing and jewellery, they became status markers. Needles and bobbin lace-making equipment were also exported, as were mirrors, paintings, furniture, clocks and printing presses. Such objects of Dutch material culture introduced novel ways of viewing the self, new lifestyles, more precise ways of measuring time, and expanded the amount of reading material available. As such goods circulated among Indonesian elites, they were to produce visible changes in social and intellectual life, and engender habits that moved Indonesians closer to Europeans.

The VOC also shipped to Asia cast iron weights from one to sixty pounds, brass cups for weighing money and jewels, and tin tankards for measuring wine and beer. Every Dutch town had its own weights and measures, and the weigh house was a feature of every market. A sign of central authority is the ability to impose one set of weights and measures as the standard, and to require all markets to adopt them. VOC traders and agents in Asian ports encountered many varieties of weights and measures. In areas under VOC administration the Company introduced its own standards. In Indonesian harbour sultanates VOC traders often found that Chinese were employed as weighers and enforcers of market standards, so that the VOC came also to use Chinese weights, especially in the trade in gold and opium.

In addition to supplies of personnel and trade goods, VOC ships also transported the paper business of government: reports; official letters; appointment lists; inventories of goods; receipts and records of prices. In an era before telegraph and electronic communication, these ships and their boxes of documents were the means of keeping Dutch outposts in Asia linked to each other and to the Netherlands. VOC ships also carried private letters that brought occasional news of relatives and generated the services of notaries to write and read private letters.

Along the way: the founding of Cape Town

The long, slow, sea journey posed problems for the floating town. Ships could be blown off course, break up in severe storms, or be attacked, boarded and burnt by rivals. There were few women and children on board, so boredom and indiscipline among sailors and soldiers, who numbered together up to 300 per ship, were constants, as was illness. Lack of fresh food induced sickness, especially in the soldiers, many of whom were already in poor health when they set out, because they were recruited from among Europe's homeless.

From the 1630s, ship captains put in at the southern tip of Africa on the way to the Indies. The availability of fresh water, a safe harbour, temperate climate and absence of the diseases rampant at many west African ports, made Table Bay a desirable stopping off point. By 1652 the VOC had decided on setting up a permanent post there and recruited Jan van Riebeeck (1619–1677) to oversee operations. In his ten-year tenure as commander, Van Riebeeck had a fortified settlement built to house VOC representatives and store supplies, as well as dock facilities for repair of ships. The beginnings of urban life were evident in the private housing, church, hospital, taverns and workers' quarters. Grants of land were made to Dutchmen to grow vegetables, fruits and cereals to supply the passing sea traffic of various European countries and to sustain the settlers themselves. The Khoikhoi indigenous to this southern region of Africa were animal herders and gatherers. Van Riebeeck organized the importing of Africans from other areas to be slave labourers on the farm allotments he consigned to Europeans.

Such dramatic changes in southern Africa are examples of the reach and long-lasting impact of a commercial company formed to buy cloves and nutmeg in eastern Indonesia. The VOC altered the ethnic composition of the region's population and imposed a new economic system and form of governance. It opened southern Africa to Christianity and Islam. Europeans in transit between Europe and Asia stopped off there on average for three weeks, but Africans and Indonesians brought in as slave and convict labour, respectively, became permanent residents and for long an under-class.

Foreigners in Indonesian harbour sultanates

Harbour principalities in the Indonesian archipelago followed the model of the former Melaka sultanate in methods adopted for control of the many foreigners in their ports. Each ethnic group was allotted specific quarters for lodging and warehousing, and the ruler recognized a leading entrepreneur from each ethnic group as spokesman and intermediary for his compatriots. Prominent in the ruler's entourage was the chief Muslim official, who was often a member of the royal family through marriage to one of his employer's daughters. His attitude to non-Muslims influenced the reception foreigners received, as did that of the harbour master, who was also often related through marriage to the sultan.

Many of the ports were walled cities. Quarters inside the walls were reserved for Muslim traders. Non-Muslims could set up outside, so the Dutch often found themselves assigned lodgings alongside non-Muslim Chinese. This measure, intended by Indonesian sultans to impress non-Muslims with a sense of their inferior, *dhimmi* status,[4] had the unintended consequence of throwing together members of the two most dynamic trade networks of their day.

Central features of these walled cities were the ruler's residence and royal mosque. Often the busiest market was outside the town walls, right on shore where boats pulled in. A Dutch drawing of the market where they did business in the sultanate of Banten in 1596 shows goods being sold from small boats drawn up on shore. That the drawing was intended as a guide for Dutchmen doing business in the east is obvious from its meticulous drawing of sellers and labelling of goods. Women sit on the ground selling fruits, vegetables and textiles, Gujerati and Bengali Indians sell iron goods from wooden stalls, and other men sell rice, spices, bamboo and weapons.

The Dutch found that port rulers had a sense of being vassal to a shadowy figure they called the "king of Mecca". Rulers sent envoys to Mecca to request permission to use the title sultan (which means "implementer of Islamic law"). Banten's ruler, for instance, received a writ from Mecca conferring the title on him in 1638. Rulers of places as widely scattered as Aceh, Banten and Minangkabau (west–central Sumatra) had genealogies constructed by their professional scribes that made them descendants of Iskandar Zulkarnain, a Muslim version of Alexander the Great in Persian Islamic literature. The popularity of Iskandar tales demonstrates the familiarity of archipelago societies with Islamic literature and their absorption of Islamic culture. Very early on, the Dutch discovered that Indonesia's Muslim rulers sent embassies to Arabia, and maintained exchanges of envoys with Islamic states such as Gujerat and Golconda in India, and with Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire. In 1603 the sultanate of Aceh sent a delegation to the Netherlands by VOC ship.



Figure 3.1 Banten Market, 1596. Outside the walls of the sultanate of Banten (Java), 1596, sketched by an unknown member of the first Dutch expedition to Indonesia (source: Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RP-P-OB-80.246).

It was customary for representatives of foreign merchants to be received in public audience by archipelago sultans after they had offered suitable gifts. Foreign merchants were welcome visitors because, in an era before newspapers and television broadcasts, foreigners were a fount of useful information on prices and political conditions prevailing in other markets. Archipelago kings quickly perceived that Europe was home to many states and that their merchants were in fierce competition with each other. Favourites were offered jobs at court on condition that they convert to Islam. Those who accepted were given sets of local clothes and girls to facilitate their integration into the native populace.

The Dutch merchant, Frederik de Houtman (1571–1627), was one who refused to convert, and consequently spent two years in prison in Aceh for his defiance of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah (r. 1589–1604). De Houtman used his time in prison to learn Malay. On his return to the Netherlands in 1603 he published a dictionary of Malay terms with their Dutch translation and also a set of sample dialogues so that other Dutch merchants would know how to exchange greetings with Malay speakers, how to ask for directions, how to inquire about market supplies and what to say at dinner.

VOC East Indiamen were large, so they had to anchor in deeper water offshore. Small Indonesian boats sailed out to them to sell food and fresh water, and to ferry passengers and cargo between ship and port. Indonesian traders bought small amounts of VOC cargoes for selling on to neighbouring markets, and in this way brought Indian textiles, rice, salt and other commodities to archipelago consumers. Collecting goods and loading them on to a European ship could take up to four months, and required the services of porters, foremen, market and warehouse agents, weighers, customs officials and inspectors. VOC crews needed to be fed and entertained while in port. Numerous local men, women and children were involved in raising and selling chickens, salting fish, selling lemons, eggs and oil for ship lamps, and selling sex and other entertainment services to crews. Indonesian navigators piloted the VOC's great ships through the numerous small islands, shoals and sandbars that protected river mouths.

In ports in the east, from Ayuthya (Siam) to Nagasaki (Japan), Dutch merchant activity functioned according to the whim of the ruler. There was no avoiding the exactions or dictates of Asian kings and their officials in most places where the Dutch did business. In Indonesian sultanates the insecurity of goods and persons and the cumbersome procedures of courts made VOC staff eager to find niches where they could act "rationally", as they understood business. Already by 1605 they had dislodged the Portuguese from their fortified trading post in Ambon. But Ambon was four weeks' sailing time from Banten, at the time the archipelago's major pepper emporium and chief port of call for foreign traders. Banten was also an important centre of Islam in the archipelago and had, since the 1550s, been in the business of expanding westwards across the Sunda Straits into territory in southern Sumatra.

By 1610 a combination of a tough sultan and the presence of English and Portuguese rivals in Banten caused the Dutch to transfer operations to the nearby

port of Jayakerta (Jakarta in modern form). There an insignificant sultan commanded a population of around 2,000. Again, the Dutch were sent to the Chinese quarter outside the town's walls.

In Jayakerta the Dutch quickly grasped the site's natural advantages: it was located at the mouth of the Ciliwung River; forest goods travelled down it to the coast; its banks were planted in rice. Dense forest seemed to supply a protective wall against inland kingdoms. The port was close to the major sea routes that linked the archipelago to China, India and Europe. The sultanate of Banten and its European allies attempted to choke off this promising trade post. VOC merchant ships, assembled from across the archipelago as a fighting fleet, managed to lift their siege, and in May 1619 the VOC took possession of Jayakerta. From that time merchants of a Dutch commercial company, not a sultan, would be rulers, and from there the VOC would coordinate all Holland's trading east of Europe. The Dutch renamed the place Batavia.

Batavia: VOC capital in Asia

Batavia was the name of the Germanic tribe from whom the Dutch considered themselves descended. Name change signified more than possession. It was a statement about planting Dutch ways of doing business and civic administration in the Indies. In the little harbour state, Javanese monarchy was replaced by a Dutch republic. Very quickly a town was built on Dutch planning principles with straight roads, canals and drawbridges. Rectangular allotments for housing and gardening were laid out in herringbone style from the canals. A public square and town hall were established, also civic institutions such as a court of justice, burgher militia for fire and defence, and boards for running schools, church, orphanage and poorhouse. A European residential quarter grew up around the town hall. Just as in Dutch towns, grand residences of the wealthy lined the principal canal. Markets for vegetables, fish and dry goods were scattered throughout the town.

The city proved to be a magnet to groups from all over the archipelago and beyond (as it still is). Certain ethnic groups dominated specific wards of the city. Each group dealt with the Dutch authorities, represented by a board of sheriffs, through a headman. Chinese predominated in neighbourhoods closest to the wharves, where they built rows of shop houses.

Batavia, like Dutch and Muslim towns, was walled. Beyond the walls land was cleared for vegetable gardens, rice and sugar. Labourers were either Chinese men imported by Chinese entrepreneurs who had bought leases from the VOC, or they were Sundanese, the dominant ethnic group of west Java, whose labour was sold to the VOC by their chiefs. These agricultural businesses were pushed farther out as the town population expanded into new suburbs beyond the walls. In the eighteenth century, Batavia's principal Dutch inhabitants built themselves country villas, set amidst large gardens and orchards, tended by Balinese and other Indonesian peoples being brought to the Batavia labour market.

At the water's edge was Batavia Castle or Fort Batavia, a complex of buildings within high walls and battlements. The fort was surrounded by a moat on three sides and further separated from the town by an open space that could be used for parades, but that also had a defensive purpose. Inside the fort were offices and residences for the VOC's senior staff, a meeting hall and church. In Batavia's early days, clerks, professionals (surgeons, accountants, judges) and soldiers also lived inside the fort. It dominated the harbour and islands in the bay where the VOC's shipyards were established.

Despite the proliferation of civic institutions and participation by the (male, Dutch) citizenry on their boards, the castle rather than the town hall dominated Batavia's urban life. The VOC's senior management team of governor-general, director-general of trade and councillors of the Indies – all appointed by the board of directors in the Netherlands – governed the Company's vast operations from the castle. These men, not the town's aldermen or members of its church synod, were in charge. Merchants were in graded ranks. The lower rungs of the VOC hierarchy were filled with bookkeepers and clerks; merchants combined administrative with commercial duties. They could be appointed to head second tier trading posts, such as Ambon and Makassar, or be sent further afield to run trade offices in Isfahan and Basra (in modern-day Iran and Iraq, respectively). A clear career ladder allowed the man with strong literacy and numeracy skills, good health and patronage to climb from bookkeeper to the apex of the system, accruing the perks of each office as he rose. In the course of a VOC career, a man could be transferred between VOC offices in Cape Town, Colombo and Batavia, be sent as envoy to kings of China, Siam and central Java, or command a naval armada to seize control of an Indonesian port. The VOC man became an "international player", familiar with diplomatic and business practices across Asia, and fluent in one or more Asian languages.

The Company also hired men with academic skills – lawyers, doctors, clergy, linguists and botanists – and men with practical skills such as draftsmen, coachmen, stonemasons and printers to help it function in new surroundings. Some Dutchmen switched employers from the VOC to Asian kings. Philips Angel (1618–1665) spent three years as court artist to Shah Abbas II of Gamron (Bandar Abbas in modern-day Iran); Lucas Cardeel (*c.*1650 – d. after 1706) oversaw construction of a new fort and mosque for Sultan Ageng Tirtajaya (r. 1651–1682) of Banten. Everywhere Asia offered new fields for employment to European gunners, coachmen, diamond appraisers and surgeon–barbers.

Asians also found opportunities through the VOC. Vietnam, despite its long coastline and favourable position on the international sea highway, took little direct part in long-distance trade. Its rulers left international trade to foreigners, and followed China's practice in encouraging agriculture and limiting foreign influences. But the VOC, setting up a trading post in Tonkin in 1637, became important in Vietnamese calculations. The Trinh clan was engaged in a long war with the Nguyen clan, and the Dutch, with their cargoes of weapons, seemed useful. Dutch trade stimulated Vietnamese production of porcelain. The Dutch carried Vietnamese manufactures to Asian markets, including those in Indonesian ports.

VOC merchants focused on market tastes, cultivating, researching and responding to them. They ascertained Javanese preferences for Indian chintzes and ordered them from agents in India. They gave designs to Chinese ceramics workers in Xiamen to meet the tastes of Batavia's Europeans and preferences in the Netherlands. *Chine-de-commande* was Chinese-made porcelain decorated to the requirements of specific customers. Chinese porcelain painters also adopted certain European styles, such as painting central images within a three-dimensional perspective. The VOC, in its two centuries of operations, shipped forty-three million pieces of porcelain to the Netherlands (De Vries: 2008: 130). Trade created desires, spread tastes and techniques, and linked peoples far distant through the connection of makers and users of material goods.

Batavia was the centre of the web of settlements and trading posts the VOC laid over Asia. It had agents in ports on both coasts of India, in Ceylon, Siam, Burma, Vietnam and Japan. Across the Indonesian archipelago, during the seventeenth century, the VOC forcibly seized control of ports that were important centres for international trade. Melaka was taken from the Portuguese in 1641; Makassar was seized from Sultan Hasanuddin in 1669 after prolonged sea and land fighting. Elsewhere in the archipelago, such as in the sultanate of Palembang, the VOC maintained a fortified trading post; at other places the Company had just a few commercial agents. Some trading posts were of short duration, closed because they proved unprofitable or because local political conditions made continued operations impossible. The VOC had a brief presence in Pontianak (west Kalimantan), for instance, where a trading post was opened in 1778 and closed by 1791. In other places, such as Japan, the Company persisted even under the very restrictive conditions that Japan's shoguns imposed.

Deshima Island: the VOC in Japan

In 1635, Shogun Iemitsu (r. 1632–1651) closed Japan to foreign traders, ordered all Japanese converts to Christianity to renounce this recently introduced religion, and banned all Japanese then overseas from returning home. These measures, designed to stem the spread of foreign ideas, goods and people, were based on a clear understanding of the power of external contact to affect change. They were pre-emptive moves taken by the Tokugawa clan that had only recently defeated rivals for control of Japan's imperial government. A common assumption is that Japan remained hermetically sealed until Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States and his fifteen sail- and steam-powered warships forced entry into Uraga Bay, Edo (now Tokyo) in 1854. On the contrary, Chinese traders were permitted to continue operating under restricted conditions. In addition, one European group maintained trading under unique circumstances.

For the Dutch, the Japanese constructed an artificial island off Nagasaki, which had grown into an important trading port in the later sixteenth century. This was the fan-shaped Deshima Island on which the VOC built warehouses and lodgings, vegetable and pleasure gardens. Entry to Deshima was restricted to Japanese agents appointed by the shogunate. Guards manned the entrance to

exclude other Japanese from relations with the foreigners (although they did allow port women entry). One Dutch trade ship was licensed to travel from Batavia to Deshima each year. It had to offload its weapons on arrival. No clergy or European women were permitted to land. From mid-century the Japanese limited the term of appointment of VOC officials to one year. Despite these conditions, trade continued for 250 years and ramifications were wider than might be expected from the annual exchanges of Japanese copper and silks for silver. Two examples are "Dutch learning" and Japanese lacquer ware.

Once a year the principal Dutch trader was summoned to Edo (then Japan's capital) for an audience with the shogun and selected members of his court. There the Dutch offered as "gifts" the foreign items the ruling elite sought. Most important were books on anatomy, science, horticulture and language that were translated into Japanese. VOC agents acquired lacquerware that the Company's directors subsequently presented to foreign dignitaries visiting the Netherlands. They also sent Japan's lacquerware to their representatives across Asia to include in "tribute" offered to Asian kings. For a small segment of Japanese society, Deshima was a window to the Western world. The VOC nurtured consumer tastes for Japanese artwares across a number of societies, and forged permanent connections of trade and cultural exchange between Japan and Indonesia.

Monopoly and trade

Like the Japanese government, the United East Indies Company tried to control trade in Asia for its advantage, although it never succeeded to the degree of Japan's shoguns. The VOC's initial aim was to buy cheap in Asia and sell dear in Europe. To push prices of spices down at their source, the Dutch strategy was to keep production volumes low and to corner the market in the nuts and cloves as they ripened. To do this the VOC attempted to keep the sea approaches to the Spice Islands clear of other shipping. VOC agents obliged sultans in Ternate and Tidore to enter contractual arrangements giving the Company's merchants exclusive purchasing rights. It also transplanted clove trees to Ambon Island so that Company staff could oversee production. To control the nutmeg and mace output, the Company killed or drove out the indigenous population of Banda Island and brought in its own lessees who established plantations worked by imported slave labour. Instead of expanding the numbers of potential purchasers of spices by mass production and lowering the price, the VOC periodically required spice-bearing trees to be destroyed so that small volumes would push up market prices paid by a limited clientele.

Beyond the tiny Spice Islands with their small populations, the VOC's agents were obliged to negotiate the terms of trade. In most harbour states the sultan was the chief trader. This royal trader promoted commerce in his territory by collecting, through taxation, local goods that could be sold abroad such as rice, timber and pepper. He taxed tradable goods coming downriver, set tariffs on imports and charged foreign merchants licence fees. Royal traders also had

shares in commercial ventures. They financed boat construction, advanced goods for sale, and took a cut of the profits. The VOC therefore tried to set up agreements with each harbour sultan whereby he would allow the sale of specified products at specified prices to VOC agents only and exclude all other merchants from such deals.

This form of securing goods was called the "monopoly system" and has been judged by many historians as an aggressive, "bully" approach to commerce whereby Europeans destroyed local business, drove away entrepreneurs and snuffed out Indonesian capitalism. The historian Reinout Vos (1993), however, shows that, from the Indonesian ruler's point of view, such agreements provided a guaranteed sale and predictable cash income, and that the treaties never covered all the goods traded in his port. Vos uses the term "state trade" to distinguish this commerce from other sales between the VOC and Indonesians.

Alongside "state trade" was a parallel trade conducted by independent or private traders who were issued licences by the VOC. These traders included Europeans (called free burghers by the Dutch) and Asians. They dealt in goods and markets of lesser interest to the Company. Often the European supplied capital to his Asian partner who used it to purchase goods and cargo space on trade ships, and returned to his partner a share of the profits, either in goods or cash.

Another aspect of monopoly trade related to the Dutch only. The charter which the States-General awarded the VOC in 1602 stipulated that all Dutch trade with the east had to go through the VOC, all goods had to be transported on VOC ships, all VOC employees had to travel on Dutch ships, and all VOC employees were to sign contracts that forbade their entering into private trading arrangements with Asians unless they had the VOC's permission. Those VOC employees who did augment their incomes through unlicensed trade on the side (and there were many of them) risked prosecution as "smugglers", with stiff penalties if detected, including confiscation of property, dismissal from office and deportation in chains to the Netherlands.

The best documented of the VOC's commerce in Asia is the monopoly trade, with the result that Dutch monopolies in the spice and tin trades, for instance, are often considered the major economic activity of the VOC. There is no way to quantify the private trade conducted by Asians and Europeans that was illegal from the VOC's point of view, but records kept by the VOC of legalized private trade shows that Asian trading was not extinguished. In the 1770s, for example, there were 8,000 Javanese, Chinese, Malay and Buginese shippers with 72,000 crew working in north Java ports alone, and their ships carried 60 per cent of all goods traded (Knaap, 1996: 69). Trade was complementary. Asian shippers bought up goods from small ports and carried them to stapling ports for sale to VOC merchants. Some of the goods, such as timber, were for VOC sales elsewhere in Asia, whilst cargoes of coconuts, tamarind, fruits and rice were purchased by VOC merchants to supply the (mainly) Asian populations resident in VOC-controlled ports. VOC ships brought textiles and opium from India to Batavia where they were sold to Asian shippers for resale in their home ports.

European ships were much larger than Asian ships, they carried more goods and sailed longer distances. In the late eighteenth century, for instance, the average Dutch ship journeying between Europe and Asia was forty-five metres long and had three masts and several decks. Ships built in VOC dockyards in Java for transporting goods to Asian markets were smaller, two-masted, with one to two decks, and twenty-five to thirty metres long. They carried a crew of 100 mainly Javanese, Malay, Butonese and Buginese sailors, and were armed with twenty-eight cannon, eight swivel guns and many rifles. They transported bulk cargoes of rice, logs, textiles and precious metals in ingots and coins. By contrast, ships captained by Chinese, Javanese, Malays and Buginese from the same period averaged between six and nine metres, had crews of five to eight men, and ferried between ports along Java's coast cargoes of salt, tamarind, coconuts, dried fish, rattan, straw storage bags and opium. They were armed with two cannon, some muskets and gunpowder. The crew had spears and daggers as well (Knaap, 1996).

The VOC, then, was one of many traders in the archipelago, jostling for its share, that was able to impose its will and make the highest profits because of its superior marine technology, the desk skills of its planners, its capital, its global operations and its linkage with the Chinese trading network. The VOC also owed its success to another key feature of Indonesian administration: the outsourcing of jobs to foreigners.

Indonesian kings invested their trade profits in shoring up their thrones. They did this by building up their image and by trying to prevent potential rivals from access to the wealth that came from trade. First, they nurtured belief in their special powers. They claimed a splendid lineage that travelled from Hindu gods via Muhammad to immediate past royals. They took titles such as "Shadow of Allah on Earth". They cultivated a powerful personality, amassed magically endowed objects, such as special daggers (called *kris*), bezoar stones and religious texts considered especially holy. They collected followers such as dwarves and albino people whose obvious difference hinted at extraordinary powers, and surrounded themselves with many female followers (Moertono, 1968). The habit of royal polygamy allowed a ruler to take many women. Daughters and sisters of rich merchants, militia commanders, *hajis* (men who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca)[5] and heads of villages could be hostages for their relatives' good behaviour and the men's ticket to social advancement. But many women meant many sons. Indonesian royal households were always centres of intrigue as numerous half-brothers (and their mothers) attempted to win support in contested successions.

Sultans knew that wealth meant power, so their other strategy to keep themselves head of state was to exclude their subjects from opportunities for amassing riches. For example, they tried to control charismatic religious teachers who accrued wealth from their followers' donations of land, labour and goods. Amangkurat I (r. 1646–1677) of the Javanese kingdom of Mataram had up to 6,000 Muslim teachers, their wives and children killed in 1646 and their property seized. Sultans also allocated to foreigners the collection of taxes and monopoly

rights to trade. Amangkurat I, again, banned the Javanese from travelling overseas in 1651 and from exporting rice and timber in 1652 (Ricklefs, 2008: 88). He turned over the operation of Java's north coast ports, the collection of taxes and trading rights to the VOC.

So it was left to foreigners to invest in trade and to skim profits from tax-producing villagers. It was a high-risk venture, as kings could change their minds, set thugs against "infidel" foreigners and have them expelled or killed and their property seized. But business in the archipelago could also be highly profitable for foreign risk-takers. Dutch and Chinese increasingly dominated Indonesian economies, engendering local hatreds. They benefited from a system that excluded most Indonesians from capital accumulation and from gaining experience in building up their own intercontinental businesses.

Batavia and beyond: the VOC in Java

VOC economic policy was to buy and sell in Asian markets, and to avoid the financial costs and political entanglements that becoming a territorial ruler would entail. The Company's trading posts were perched on the shores of Indonesian islands, and staff made few journeys inland. Abraham van Riebeeck was the first governor-general (r. 1709–1713) to travel into the mountains directly south of Batavia. The first European to visit Prambanan in central Java was probably Frederik Coyett in 1736. As well as wishing to keep expenses low, the VOC had no wish to antagonize the rulers of the populous and powerful kingdom of Mataram, who ruled most of Java. Within ten years of Batavia's founding, Mataram had attacked the Dutch town twice with large armies. Only control of the sea roads to Batavia had enabled the Dutch to outlast siege and to cut off Javanese troops from their supplies. The VOC regarded Indonesians as warlike. They were careful to send envoys to powerful sultans and maintain diplomatic relations. Despite its goal of being a merchant and not a ruler, the Company did become involved in local Indonesian politics and, as a result, it came steadily to control great stretches of territory during the period of its charter.

This was because the Dutch sold military protection to Indonesian sultans. Mataram's kings, for example, frequently resorted to hiring contingents of VOC troops to help them defeat rival claimants to their throne. Javanese kings did not maintain standing armies. They prosecuted war by calling on vassals who had to bring contingents of men, arms and supplies. Part-time conscripts lacked the training, discipline and equipment of VOC professional soldiers. The VOC had standing orders for weapons in the Netherlands. It outfitted each soldier with a sword, small arms, cartridges, carrying pouches and belts, smoke bombs and grenades. Indonesian armies had muskets and cannon. The Javanese had been manufacturing gunpowder and muskets since at least 1620. Ricklefs states the "transfer of military technology from the European to the Javanese side was virtually immediate" (1993: 130). Indonesian rulers hired Europeans to train their troops in handling weapons, to command companies and to direct the construction of forts and defensive earthworks that could stop cannon balls. But conscript

armies scattered in battle. White men could not desert and blend into the rural population. VOC squads were placed in the middle of the battle line, and they brought victory to the sultans who engaged them.

The Republic of Batavia was willing to send troops to shore up Javanese kings because upheaval in Java interrupted VOC trade, and because, by the 1670s, it had a mechanism to exploit Java's rich resources of timber and rice. The price of VOC military support was exemption from restrictions on trade, consignments of free rice, wood from Java's valuable teak forests, and the right to control the collection of taxes along Java's rich north coast. Alliance with Chinese financiers and their strings of porters made it both possible and profitable for the VOC to set these terms. The cost of moving tiny quantities of rice from hundreds of small farms in Java's populous farming zones was prohibitive until Chinese porters walked to villages, collected rice and carried it on their backs to VOC collection depots. Chinese financiers also supplied their porters with small goods to barter with farmers for additional produce. Consequently, Dutch and Chinese jointly penetrated inland village economies, but it was the Chinese porter and peddler who had face-to-face contact with rural Javanese, while the Dutch handled the bulking and shipping from coastal ports and interacted more with the multi-ethnic and migratory townspeople.

Taxes, tollgates and coins

Javanese villages were linked to each other by markets held once in a five-day week, where farming and artisan families exchanged their goods for items they could not themselves produce. A very early prerogative of Java's kings, known from tenth-century inscriptions, was to charge taxes on the passage of goods in and out of an area. Tollgates were erected at entrances to markets, at ferry crossings and rest houses along major pathways. Travellers had to open their bundles for the tollgate keeper to assess the value of goods and estimate the charges to be paid.

Javanese states did not develop bureaucracies of salaried staff to run branches of government. Instead, the king assigned households in specified territories to relatives, favourites and officials. These vassals had to remit goods and labour to the king in return. It was the job of the appointee to calculate amounts needed to reimburse himself and his staff. No limits were set by the king.

It became attractive to officials as well as to sultans to sell their rights to collect taxes to others for a cash payment. The kind of person interested and able to purchase the right to collect taxes was the merchant–financier who had access to capital, a network of employees, extensive contacts, knowledge of prices in many markets and a business plan. In Java, that person was Chinese. He purchased the right to operate tollgates and also stalls where his staff could sell opium, textiles and sex to passing traffic.

Tollgates were obvious causes of resentment, for they impeded trade and pushed up the price of items that had to pass through several tollgates before reaching their final destination. But there was no authority to which traders could

bring complaints of overcharging or multiple charging. To the farmer and small trader, tollgates were ways for non-Muslims to oppress Muslims. Attacks occurred on tollgate keepers, even though they hired Javanese thugs as protection and paid informers in villages to keep them advised of the movement of goods and attitudes of villagers.

Chinese-operated tollgates and stalls were like small banks: they held quantities of goods and coins. In the pre-modern world, China was a major producer of coins made of bronze and copper from its extensive supplies of copper ore and lead. Two dynasties are associated with the development of coins, the Tang (618–906), which introduced a unified currency system, and the Northern Song (960–1125), when huge quantities of coins were manufactured for use in China and for export overseas. Chinese money was designed for portability and ease of calculation, being small, light and bundled together in units by a string passed through a square hole in the centre of each coin. Money was also one of the "gifts" the Chinese court bestowed on Southeast Asian kings in return for their "tribute" (trade goods). In 1079, for instance, Srivijaya "offered" rhinoceros horn, camphor, resins, mother-of-pearl and tin, and received from the emperor "gifts" of 30,000 strings of copper cash and 10,000 *liang*[6] of silver (Hall, 1985).

The great increase in numbers of traders in the archipelago in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries resulted in an increased use of coins and their geographic spread. For instance, Javanese traders introduced coinage to the Spice Islands. VOC agent, Johannes Nieuhof (1618–1672), noted the great variety of coins used in Aceh's main market in the early 1600s, and observed that money changing was a woman's job.[7] New coins were added to Indonesian markets by European traders. The VOC imported American silver in the form of bars and also in coins that were made by hand in Holland. From 1750, Dutch mechanical presses minted coins for export to VOC Asia.

The Dutch stimulated currency use in archipelago ports and markets because they imported copper and lead from Japan and China for the manufacture of coins of small denomination. In 1730, for instance, the VOC sold 375 metric tonnes of lead to a Chinese contractor to manufacture and sell coins. The use of money in commercial transactions was most frequent in Java's commercial centres of Banten, Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya (the latter two cities being on the north–central and northeast coast of Java, respectively). The role of the VOC in the history of currency in the Indonesian archipelago was to add to the variety of coins in use, to introduce paper money (in 1782) and to increase the number of users of money by generating jobs for cart drivers, manufacturers of pots, bricklayers, carpenters and farm labourers, and paying them in cash. At the same time, cloth and other goods continued to be used as forms of payment, alongside coins, by Indonesians and Europeans alike in archipelago markets.

The VOC as consumer and producer of knowledge

Corporations need data to survive and grow. There was a great demand for knowledge. VOC officials everywhere were charged with discovering how Asian

kings ruled, how they raised taxes, what were the histories of their states, what were beliefs and customs, what kinds of crops were grown and the like, and to submit written reports to the Company directors. Some men, such as François Caron and Joost Schouten, published histories of the societies in which they lived and worked for many years. Their *True Description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam* was published in Amsterdam in 1636. Rijcklof van Goens (1629–1682) travelled to Mataram as the VOC's envoy five times between 1648 and 1654. While back in the Netherlands in 1656, Van Goens wrote up a detailed account of his observations of the Javanese officials with whom he did business, of the sultanate's mode of governance, its history and culture, and relations between the sultan and men of religion who were opinion makers in his realm.[8]

Edward Said (1978) has argued that Europeans used description, measurement, quantification and classification to impose colonial rule on non-Western peoples. But VOC investigations were an application of the same knowledge-seeking techniques then current in the Netherlands. The Dutch were hungry for knowledge for its own sake, as well as for the potential commercial and political advantages it could bring. On his return from China, the seventeenth-century Indies councillor and envoy, Pieter van Hoorn, for instance, composed a study of the Chinese philosopher and ethicist, Confucius, in a long poem entitled "Some Salient Characteristics of the true Virtue, Prudence, Wisdom and Perfection derived from the Chinese Confucius and Versified", and had his work published in Batavia in 1675. The Dutch clergyman, François Valentijn, who was in Ambon and Batavia between 1685 and 1695 and again between 1707 and 1713, accumulated an encyclopaedic amount of material on things "old and new" about the Indies and published it in five volumes over the years 1722 to 1726. Other scholars collected Indonesian flora and fauna, charted stars from Batavia's observatory (established in 1768), and studied Asian languages.

In 1778, men with literary and scientific interests came together to found the Batavian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Academy, the first of its kind in Asia, built up a museum of Javanese art objects and a library of Javanese manuscripts. It sponsored lectures and championed causes of direct relevance to Batavian conditions, such as inoculation against smallpox and reform of the conditions under which Batavian domestic slaves lived.

The first presses and printers to publish books and pamphlets in the archipelago were Dutch. Printing was an early invention of the Chinese, but they did not bring their wooden printing blocks to the archipelago. Nor did Arabs introduce printing to Indonesia, even though the European printing press had been taken to Ottoman lands by Jews when they were expelled from Spain in 1492. The Ottoman sultans banned printing in Arabic until the nineteenth century.[9] As a result those books from the Islamic heartland that found their way to the Indonesian archipelago before the middle of the nineteenth century were handwritten manuscripts. Manuscripts were, therefore, few in number, expensive and could only be preserved and duplicated by the slow process of copying by hand.

As early as 1611, eight years before Batavia was founded, presses in Holland were printing texts in Malay for export to the Indonesian archipelago. Because Italian printers had devised metallic font for Arabic in 1530, the Dutch knew how to produce books in Malay in both the Arabic and Latin alphabets. Devotional texts, such as portions of the Bible, prayers and catechisms were sent to Dutch settlements. The first printing press to operate in Indonesia itself was shipped from Holland in 1624. A government printing house was established in Batavia in 1668, a second in 1718 and a third in 1744.

The VOC-era printing press was small and portable. It consisted of a wooden frame and a tray for the type, and was operated by turning handles. It needed competent draftsmen to operate it. Supplies of printers' ink, the lye bath, plates and paper had to be ordered from Holland. VOC presses in Batavia, Ceylon and the Netherlands printed a total of 1,674 treaties, regulations and notices, as well as dictionaries, catechisms, books, poems and, briefly, a newspaper over a 200-year period (Van der Krogt, 1991).

Cultural impacts

Much of the information the Dutch collected came from Asian colleagues and assistants. The Dutch preserved that knowledge by writing it down and publishing it. Most was contained in books printed in Holland. Those published in Java seemingly made little impact on Java's intellectuals. Because the Dutch lived in far-off Batavia or in garrisons and enclaves in Javanese towns, and because Dutch people ranked low in the estimation of Javanese royal circles, they stimulated no intellectual revolution there. Javanese scholars did not make studies of Dutch language, religion, culture and customs; they did not seek out the history of Holland, make copies of Dutch atlases or translate Dutch-language texts. Intellectual interest was one-sided.

There was little interest among the archipelago's indigenous populations in Christianity either, and scarce opportunity for pursuing it. The Dutch of the seventeenth century perceived religion as a matter of nationality. The VOC's directors understood the upheaval that the clash of religions could bring, so they had no general plan for conversion of the Indies. They brought out Protestant clergy from Holland to cater to the spiritual needs of Dutch communities, and they required Roman Catholics (Asian and Portuguese) to become Protestant as proof of their loyalty to the VOC. Those Asians who became members of the Dutch Reformed Church during the two VOC centuries lived mostly at the terminuses of Dutch trade networks: in Batavia, Ambon, Minahassa (northern Sulawesi) and in Roti, the southernmost island of the Indonesian archipelago. Because the Dutch wrote Malay in the Latin alphabet and used Malay as the language of the churches and schools they established for Indonesian Christian populations, the Christian minorities of Indonesia were the ones who were well placed to get jobs with the colonial government as it spread across the archipelago in the nineteenth century. They were the ones who came most in contact with printed books, who developed sympathies for Dutch ideas and were ambitious to gain Dutch skills.

When the Dutch first sailed into Indonesian waters, most Indonesians were not Muslim. Because the Dutch did not attempt large-scale conversion of Indonesians to Christianity, the missionaries active throughout the archipelago during the VOC centuries were Muslim and they taught Islam. Sultans welcomed distinguished scholars of Islam to their courts. They paid Quran readers to give public recitations; they financed the copying of manuals on how to perform Islamic rituals correctly; they sponsored the Islamic arts of calligraphy and book illustration; they established law courts and appointed Islamic judges to them; they gave tax exemptions to businesses run by schools of religion; they promoted conversion by sponsoring significant festivals in the Islamic calendar and by attending the main mosque in great public procession on Fridays. In 1633, Sultan Agung of Mataram inaugurated the Islamic calendar for measuring time and ordering daily life in his Javanese kingdom. The conversion of archipelago inhabitants connected them to the world Islamic community.

It was a period in Islamic history of the spread of Sufism. Sufi cults celebrated total submission and obedience to the teacher or spiritual guide; they taught a mystical, inwards-looking path to achieving union with Allah; they spread a folk Islam of venerating saints and visiting their graves. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Islamic world was losing out to Europeans. Indonesians were connecting to the Islamic web in this period. Indonesian thinkers were less open to early modern globalization steered by Europeans because of their allegiance to religious circles in Arabia that regarded "Christian learning" as irrelevant or evil. The VOC unwittingly helped promote a more homogenized version of Islam by exiling controversial Islamic teachers to far-off places in the VOC universe, such as Colombo and Cape Town. By the time the VOC's charter lapsed, most archipelago inhabitants were Muslim, and the core of today's Islamic communities in South Africa and Sri Lanka had been established.

On the whole, the VOC Dutch appear to have been more deeply influenced by the societies in which they lived and worked than they were agents of transmission of their own European culture. Batavia's municipal council was always subservient to the governor-general; urban liberties did not flourish. Everywhere in the archipelago the republican Dutch intervened to prop up kings. VOC top officials acted like Java's royals. Their official and personal interactions were permeated with strict hierarchy and respect for rank. They rarely left their enclaves to visit territories taxed and administered in their name.

VOC Dutch became purchasers and employers of slave labour for municipal building projects and for chores in their own households. Wealthy Dutch men copied Java's upper classes in taking concubines. Senior Dutch officials signing treaties with Indonesian princes exchanged girls along with signatures and seals. VOC Dutch left their children to be raised by slave personnel, then lamented that their offspring understood little Dutch but spoke fluent Malay. The families of senior officials intermarried, and so replicated the municipal oligarchies of Holland, with the difference that wives were Indies-born daughters of Dutch men and Asian slave women (Taylor, 2009). VOC officials were intolerant of dissent. While they sponsored the acquisition of knowledge, they often acted to

suppress or delay publication of reports and books to avoid giving an edge to their business competitors. In practising tax-farming in Java, the VOC was using methods already outdated in Holland. So, while the VOC was at the forefront of innovation in Europe, in Asia it was autocratic, conservative and rigid.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Dutch were to be Christian rulers of a colony of Muslims. Two processes in which the VOC played an important part – the introduction of commercial agriculture and the division of Mataram kingdom into four petty principalities – propelled the transformation of the Dutch in Indonesia from merchant trader to colonialist.

Coffee

Coffee bushes are native to Ethiopia. Around the fourteenth century they were introduced to the mountainous southwestern region of the Arabian Peninsula. Coffee drinking spread to Egypt, Syria and Turkey in the sixteenth century. Coffee was not introduced into Indonesian diets by Arab traders. In the Islamic world, coffee itself was the subject of debate as to whether it was an allowable addition to the Muslim diet. Religious leaders feared the sociability of coffee drinking would lead to unregulated talk and ideas.

It was the Dutch who introduced the growing and drinking of coffee to the archipelago. Coffee seedlings were first imported to Java by the VOC in 1696. They were planted on private estates belonging to senior Dutch officials who had personal interests in botany and agriculture. Working through district chiefs, they set west Javanese farmers to raising coffee on hill slopes and paying their taxes through deliveries of coffee beans. Farmers who supplied more than their tax quota were paid in textiles and cash. The first beans were harvested in 1718. The VOC took over the coffee business at the warehouse, and organized export and European sales.

At first the VOC paid high prices, so farmers had an incentive to grow more coffee and migrants were attracted into the area. By 1725 three million pounds were harvested and the district chiefs were getting rich from their percentage of the profits (Knaap, 1986). As coffee became more plentiful in Amsterdam's market, prices for the luxury product began to decline. The VOC reacted by cutting prices paid the farmer and requiring coffee bushes to be uprooted. Such actions brought economic loss to communities just learning to enjoy a higher standard of living, as marked by the increased numbers of households able to own a buffalo.

Coffee became a major industry on Java in the nineteenth century, when it was raised by waged Indonesian labourers on plantations owned by agribusiness companies, and also grown on family farms by Indonesian smallholders. Its eighteenth-century origins as an industry on Java mark a new stage in VOC economic policies. The Company was moving from purchasing goods raised by Indonesians under Indonesian control to introducing new crops, controlling production and quality, and supporting agro-business through horticultural research and testing. The experiment showed that Indonesian workers were adaptable farmers and willing to move

for new jobs and incomes. Use of the land of Java and indigenous labour, combined with inputs of European science and management, were to be characteristic features of colonialism in the era of modern globalization.

The division of Mataram

The history of royal Java from the 1670s to 1755 is a story of contraction and submission to the Dutch. In those years, the territories on Java's north coast that Sultan Agung had conquered in the 1620s and 1630s were lost to rebels or paid out to the VOC for supporting kings against challenges from royal siblings. Eventually, when the royal family proved incapable of generating a political consensus, the VOC helped broker a peace that divided Mataram into two states, the sultanates of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. The solution, first proposed as a temporary measure, became permanent, and was followed by further subdivision to satisfy claims by two more branches of the royal family.

The four new states were called independent principalities by the Dutch, who claimed not to regulate their internal affairs, only their foreign relations. Their rulers perceived themselves as equals to the monarchies of Europe and the Middle East, and many of their subjects perceived them in this light too. Java's kings spent their Dutch pensions on staging royal culture. They still called in the Dutch to settle internal problems, such as when courtiers, princes and court artists deserted one court for another, and so the "independent principalities" continued royal habits of dependence on the Dutch.

During eighty years of civil wars in Java there was great destruction of palace libraries, royal regalia and other treasures. Fighting was heaviest along the north coast and in east Java, but the actual violence and destruction of rice fields was of short duration and localized. Because competitors raised armies from mercenaries – Buginese, Balinese, Dutch and Chinese – the demand on farming communities was for porters, animal tenders, cooks and servants, rather than for fighting men. Farming communities had a quick regeneration.

An important trend, with far-reaching consequences, occurred among *bupatis*. They were men with aristocratic titles, often descendants of minor branches of the royal families, who served the sultans as district heads. They had to send goods and levies of labourers at regular intervals to court, and present themselves annually to pay homage. In the chaotic years of the succession wars, *bupatis* were appointed, dismissed, some killed at court, in a few documented cases even personally stabbed to death by the monarch.[10] Under Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703) district heads held their posts an average of four years only. This unpredictable situation caused many district officials to consider that their chances of long-term employment and peaceful retirement might be better if they worked for the VOC. VOC archives contain letters from *bupatis* who sought to secure their jobs and income by asking the VOC to release them from owing duty to the kings of Java.

The nineteenth-century colony maintained the fiction that Java's sultans still reigned; but the reality was that Javanese officials served the Dutch. The

introduction of coffee to Indonesia was just one example of how the VOC was slowly evolving from a joint stock company of merchants and shareholders into a colonial power.

The VOC in the Indies: a balance sheet

Between the 1490s and 1600, Europeans learned the world's coastlines, while Indonesian sailors remained regional and their naval technology did not develop in the directions of using literate skills. Through its system of forts, connected by ships armed with cannon, its disciplined troops, superiority in logistics and the desk skills of its bureaucrats, the VOC managed to exert control over major Indonesian waterways and trade emporia. At sea, the Company's larger ships, greater capital, global knowledge and experience enabled the Dutch to out-trade Indonesians.

On land, the Dutch were able to take over Javanese tax systems and unlock Java's wealth by selling military protection to Javanese kings. While the VOC introduced European methods of training troops and fighting, it did not attempt to change existing methods of raising taxes or of organizing labour. Except on the Spice Islands, VOC managers did not control the production of exportable crops, so that the Company did not change Indonesian agricultural practices or modes of extracting surplus for sales. Both in the Indonesian territories that it controlled and in those where it had diplomatic relations, the VOC fitted in. It adapted, rather than imposing radical change on Indies populations. For these reasons, the Java specialist, Ann Kumar, concludes that the VOC was a modernizing force in Europe, but conservative in Asia (1997).

In the Netherlands, the VOC was the product of a society of printed books and of artisans and scholars whose skills were harnessed to assist overseas exploration and exploitation of opportunity. Dutch shareholders of the VOC adjusted to the concept of pooling anonymous capital for investment over the long term. Amsterdam and Batavia evolved, in relation to each other, as centres of two communications networks for collecting information, allocating resources and managing commerce over a vast area. Over 200 years the VOC accumulated information about Asian societies, their languages, beliefs, customs, forms of government, resources and labour systems. The Company preserved and disseminated this data by publishing it. Dutch scholars built on this research. For example, Andreas Cleyer (1634–1698), the Company's head of medical supplies, established Batavia's first botanical garden in 1667 to develop acclimatizing techniques for introduced species of plants, and relayed results to colleagues back home.

VOC officials conducted diplomatic correspondence with Indies sultans in the Malay language written in Arabic script. The Company hired translators and interpreters, and had on its payroll Dutch merchants fluent in Asian languages. Indonesian sultans did not write to the VOC in Dutch using the Latin script. Here, again, was an imbalance in relations. The global corporation was determined to learn what was necessary in order to operate successfully in many

different environments; Indonesian sultans, convinced of their superior culture, did not sponsor the learning of European languages. No known dictionaries or books on Dutch learning were produced by writers in the employ of Indonesian sultans in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. According to Azyumardi Azra (2004a), the focus of Indonesian intellectual interest in this period was on exegesis of the Quran. Archipelago scholars wanted to study in Islamic academies in Mecca, Medina, Cairo and Sana'a (Yemen), and to win recognition for their religious learning there; they had no interest in Dutch academic institutions and scholarship.

Indonesian history books and standard rhetoric describe the VOC years as colonial exploitation that brought disunity and suffering to archipelago peoples. In reality, few Indonesians would have had direct or prolonged encounter with Dutch people. Far from transforming local societies and economies, the VOC Dutch were overwhelmed by the Asian world. In its 200 years of operations, the VOC sent one million men east. Only one-third lived to return to Holland. Indonesia's fevers killed off all but the strongest within months of their landing in Batavia. Within Asian ports, including those they administered, the Dutch were always a minority. In Batavia in 1673, for instance, only 2,024 of the city's 27,068 inhabitants were Dutch (Blackburn, 1987: 19). As a male immigrant group married to Asian women, Dutch men found their native tongue was overtaken by Malay. Latin schools, founded by the VOC for education of officials' sons, had short lives, for merchants sent their boys back to Holland for schooling. Even technical institutions, such as the marine academy, founded in Batavia in 1745 to teach recruits mathematics, charting and languages (Malay, Malabarese and Persian), failed. The autocratic procedures of senior officials suppressed religious and intellectual ferment in VOC settlements.

In devising a way to write Malay in the Latin script, the Dutch gave Indonesians a key to Western learning. This was a potentially radical move, but the impact was not fully felt until the twentieth century. Only a handful of Indonesians travelled to the Netherlands to enrol at Leiden University in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were Christians, always a tiny minority in Indonesia. It was only in the early twentieth century that Muslim Indonesians became eager for Western learning and only then that opportunities for advanced studies opened up to a small group among them.

Asians, angry at being displaced in trading or whose political futures were threatened, turned on VOC garrisons whenever the Dutch were weak. Chinese labour gangs attacked Batavia in 1740; Chinese and Javanese militias together in central Java, mid-century, attacked both the Dutch and the kings the VOC supported. While tiny Dutch communities and garrisons could easily be overwhelmed on land, Dutch sea power could always bring in supplies and fighting men, and choke off their opponents' access to the resources of the outside world. The Company's literate and numerate bureaucracy allowed the Dutch to maintain their settlements in the Indies and to support trading posts across the world. The Dutch of the VOC knew more about the world than Indonesians did, and this knowledge allowed them to sustain themselves among far greater Indonesian numbers.

The VOC's lifeline was its sea link to Holland. When wars in Europe prevented East Indiamen from sailing to Java in the last years of the eighteenth century, the VOC ground slowly to an end. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Europe's wars and politics brought new administrators, new policies and new technologies to VOC territories. Dutch colonial rule bound Indonesians to processes that incorporated them into a global economy now being organized for the benefit of Europe's colonizing countries.

4 Colonialism

Agent of modern globalization

Tools of empire

Daniel Headrick (1981) has written that modern colonialism and imperialism are outgrowths of Europe's scientific and industrial revolutions. Colonialism is the control of production of resources in a colony for the benefit of the colonizing country. It is based on control over the land and labour of a colony's indigenous inhabitants. Until Europeans had the medical knowledge to survive in the tropics and the technological knowledge to conquer distance, they remained purchasers of foreign produce, shoppers on the fringes of native polities, always at the mercy of local conditions.

Headrick documents how the development of quinine and research into water-borne diseases, such as cholera, enabled Europeans in the nineteenth century to journey far from their coastal bases into the interiors of Africa and Asia, and to live healthily in tropical lands. Invention of steam and its application to ocean-going ships cut travel time between Europe and Asia. Construction of the Suez Canal further bridged distance. From 1869, the sea journey between Europe and Asia could be accomplished in just three weeks. From 1860 telegraph and submarine cable linked colonizing metropolis to overseas territory. Colonial officials and commercial companies could gather information, make and transfer decisions quickly.

In colonial possessions, rail and steam-powered locomotives connected plantations and mines to ports, opened up internal markets, enabled rapid deployment of troops, and allowed colonial officials to control production and relieve famine. In colonies, European scientists in research laboratories investigated soils, bred new seeds and developed new processing techniques. Steam and, later, electrical power ran factories. Trams in colonial cities sped inhabitants – Indigenous as well as European – to new kinds of jobs. Scientists, engineers and industrialists produced the tools of empire. The labour of Asians laid the railways and roads, built the wharves, extracted minerals, and raised crops for export to Europe. Europeans developed theories of a hierarchy of races to explain their rule of nearly all the world in the first decades of the twentieth century, but that rule was the product of European science and engineering, and the application of new discoveries and inventions to new arenas.

Headrick's arguments were built upon research into British colonialism in West Africa and India. His arguments are applicable to the colony created by the Dutch over the course of the nineteenth century. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, the Indies consisted of Java and a string of subordinate port settlements. In the first half of the nineteenth century the Dutch continued to extract produce from the Indies through Indonesian forms of taxation, but the joint-stock company had been replaced by a ministry of colonies that was responsible to the new Dutch monarchy and ultimately to all Dutch citizens, rather than to private shareholders.

Inventions and the necessary conditions were in place there from the 1860s. From that time, Dutch military, political and economic power expanded out of the old VOC points around the archipelago. That process was complete by 1914 when the whole territory of present-day Indonesia was united in one colony, the Netherlands East Indies.

From company to colony: new political frameworks

The Indonesian archipelago has always been open and exposed to outside forces. In the first decades of the nineteenth century there was an interplay of European politics on Indonesian soil. In Europe, the expanding French empire overran Holland in 1795. Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte created a Dutch throne and put his brother, Louis Napoleon, on it. In the east he installed his own appointee, Marshall Herman Daendels, as governor-general in 1808 to administer territories that the French had acquired through conquest of Holland. The English strategy for preventing a French invasion of Britain was to fight Napoleon in Europe and to cut off French access to economic resources from its possessions in the Americas, Africa and Asia. As part of Britain's worldwide campaign, former VOC territories in southern Africa, the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago were captured by English and Indian troops operating from British bases in India.

British commanders hoped to add these newly acquired territories permanently to Britain's overseas possessions. But European politicians, not the "men on the spot", determined the undoing of the French empire, following Britain's defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. In Europe, Holland became an independent country again, now constituted as a kingdom, since a Dutch monarchy survived as a legacy of Napoleonic rule. The old VOC ports and territories in the Indonesian archipelago were turned over to representatives of Holland's King Wilhelm I in 1816, and the British military pulled out of Java.

The treaty between the victorious British and the Dutch gave Britain's navy control of seas from Europe to India and China. The British retained possession of southern Africa and Melaka. A line drawn through the middle of the Straits of Melaka assigned the Malay Peninsula and strategic offshore islands, including Singapore, to Britain's commercial and political agents. Over the following decades, through deals struck with peninsula sultans, British capital, management and expanding power created a new political unit, the colony of Malaya. It became a magnet for migrants from China and India and, to a lesser extent, from the Indonesian archipelago.

The British organized the extraction of Malaya's extensive tin deposits; they introduced rubber trees from South America for commercial cultivation in plantations. Chinese and Indian labourers created the colony's export economy, built its modern infrastructure of rail, road and telegraph, and became the majority population of new cities along Malaya's west coast. The Chinese were brokers between Malay villagers and the modernizing world. They ran small shops and provided petty loans to Malay farmers and fishermen. The demographic make-up of Malaya was permanently altered. While people from across the Indonesian archipelago migrated to the new worksites that British capital and political power created, Chinese and Indians outnumbered Malays (as all Muslims became known). Malays only became the dominant ethnic group in numbers and political power in Malaya following independence in 1957.

From 1816 the sphere for Dutch commercial and political power was reduced to the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesian sultans were not party to the Anglo-Dutch negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of London in 1824 or its refinements in 1870. At first, political deals reached in London and The Hague had little practical impact on inhabitants of British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. Sea borders were porous. Malay and Chinese fishermen, traders and smugglers continued to operate in their own networks with little to impede them until beacons, lighthouses, naval outposts and patrols were put in place by British and Dutch colonial administrations late in the century (Tagliacozzo, 2005). The European entrepreneurs who developed east Sumatra's agri-businesses from the 1860s used the conveniently situated British ports of Singapore and Penang in preference to Batavia as their gateways to European markets. They dealt in British Malayan currency instead of the Dutch guilder. Not until the early twentieth century was Batavia was able to impose archipelago-wide systems for control of the colony.

Impacts of European treaties for Indonesia

There were long-term impacts on archipelago peoples from the fall-out of wars fought in Europe. Significant for Indonesia's subsequent interlocking with global forces were three policy decisions of Daendels's short term as governor-general (r. 1808–1811). In 1808 he ordered construction of an all-Java highway. Its western starting point was Anyer, its eastern terminus Panarukan. The road ran along Java's north coast; connecting spurs linked it to centres of commerce and rice villages of the fertile northern coastal strip.[1] Government way stations were constructed at intervals along the highway where travellers could obtain fresh horses and supplies, lodge overnight and be monitored. Small businesses and markets grew up around these stages on the Great Post Road, as the highway was called, to accommodate officials, businessmen and travellers. The Post Road proved a means for unlocking Java's agricultural resources; it became an economically important thoroughfare. The stationing of officials along the Post Road also facilitated government penetration into rural areas. Stagecoaches could cover the 1,400 kilometres between Batavia and Surabaya in two weeks, whereas before, land travel could take up to four months.

The Java Post Road was cut through mountains, forests and across mangrove swamps; it spanned deep ravines. It was built by the unwaged labour of Javanese villagers through whose districts the road was plotted. Daendels, a man of the Enlightenment, opposed slavery as a matter of principle, but, faced with the possibility of a British invasion force, he resorted to acquiring road builders by adopting the methods of Java's district chiefs. They levied taxes in labour on householders under their control when bridges had to be built or a road repaired.

The magnitude of Daendels's project was beyond any local experience. There were high death rates among workers toiling in tropical heat and malarial environments. But construction of the Post Road showed what Javanese workmen, operating with machetes, pick axes and shovels, could achieve. This method of labour recruitment, *corvée*, revealed to Europeans that Javanese district chiefs could mobilize vast reserves of labour power for massive infrastructure projects. *Corvée* also demonstrated that if Javanese district chiefs both delivered and managed Javanese labourers, large-scale projects could be carried out with minimum numbers of European employees and at minimum cost. Daendels's construction project was to provide the model for extracting income from the colony for the next fifty years.

Another decision of lasting significance taken by Governor-General Daendels was to pull down the dilapidated Batavia Castle. It symbolized the defunct VOC and its narrow goals of buying and selling in Asian markets. Daendels's employer, Napoleon, had initiated large-scale urban redevelopment in Paris to showcase his imperial rule and to control the city's inhabitants. Daendels launched urban renewal in Batavia. He left the old city of shop houses and narrow alleys to Asians and laid out to its south a new suburb around a large public square for Europeans. New government offices, churches, clubhouse and theatre gave Weltevreden (meaning "contented") European-style urban amenities. There were military parades and concerts. Villas designed to admit airflow replaced the closed housing of the old city. The suburb's location on higher ground away from the malarial coastal fishponds also contributed to a healthier environment for newcomers from Europe. Daendels destroyed visual reminders of VOC heritage and created a European model for urban living. Today, only the remains of warehouses in Jakarta's old fish market area and a museum testify that for two centuries the site was the heart of VOC Asia. The modern Indonesian nation is governed from Daendels's new city.

In 1811, Daendels' successor, J. W. Janssens, surrendered to Thomas Stamford Raffles (r. 1811–1816), who headed the British invasion force from India. Raffles's most lasting achievement in Asia was the development of Singapore as a free-trade port and provider of shipping and financial services. His significance in Indonesian history derives from his vision of European–Asian relations and his project of amassing knowledge of Java. In Batavia Raffles was patron of the Anti-Slavery Society. He and his inner circle ridiculed the dominant Mestizo culture that was neither Asian nor European. They tried to make the desired model of manners and thought European, both for Batavia's Eurasians and Java's elite class.

Raffles's coterie revitalized the Batavian Academy of Arts and Sciences, patronized European theatre, and organized exploration of Java's antiquities. Raffles's men came from India. Java provided them with an opportunity for gathering data on its languages, literature, historical monuments and inscriptions for the purpose of comparing them with Indian models. The results of their inquiries were collated in Raffles's richly illustrated, two-volume *History of Java*, published in London in 1817. It laid the groundwork for Indology studies of nineteenth-century philologists, epigraphers and archaeologists.

Many of the men in the British force in Java were Indian. The British Empire offered employment to Indian groups specializing in military skills. Some of their officers were men of high caste who, like Raffles, were interested in the evidence around them of former Indian cultural influence. In the independent principalities, some Indian officers staged Hindu ceremonies for the edification of Java's royals. They encouraged the idea that Islam was a foreign overlay on an ancient civilization (itself, of course, of foreign origin), and that Islam had caused cultural decline (Carey, 1977). A century later, the Budi Utomo organization, founded by men from the royal centres of Java, propagated the idea that the Dutch could only be removed from Java when Javanese people renewed contact with their ancient, Indianized roots.

The British invasion force was accompanied by draftsmen and cartographers. Raffles set them to mapping the topography of Java. His aim was to establish patterns of land use, measure the size of individual farm plots and register their owners, so that a tax system based on property ownership would replace taxes paid in labour and crops. Raffles's land tax (to be paid in cash) was intended to solidify Indigenous property rights and to make land a tradable commodity. This new tax system was also intended to reduce the ability of district chiefs to make arbitrary claims to the labour and property of Javanese living within their jurisdiction. It was meant to regularize social relations through law, and to reduce "feudal" aspects in the relationship between administrator and peasant.

Five years of "British interregnum" (1811–1816) were too short a span to accomplish such a radical economic, political and social transformation. But the years were long enough to exacerbate relations between Java's princes of the independent principalities and Batavia's Europeans. The fifty years following the Dutch-brokered division of Mataram in 1755 up until the eras of Daendels and Raffles had been a time of rising prosperity for farmers in central and eastern Java. Relieved of conscript duties in recurring wars over eight decades for possession of Mataram, they could tend their own businesses. No royal surveys were made of farmed land between 1755 and 1812, so many rice fields escaped the exactions of royals. Farmers were left to raise their rice. Because they were not overburdened by *corvée* and royal depredations, it became profitable for them also to grow dry crops such as tobacco, indigo, peanuts and cotton for sale.

Upheavals in Europe brought renewed strife to the Java countryside. Raffles applied armed force in dealing with difficult sultans. His men bombarded the royal compound at Yogyakarta in 1812. Princes fled, leaving the palace and its treasury to be ransacked. B. P. A. Panular (1771–1826), a Javanese palace

official at the time, described Indian soldiers in the British army as giants, and he conveys the dominant impression of the disaster that had struck the royal court this way:

> Truly at this time, the radiance of the foreigners was awesome. Indifferent to pain or death, they entrusted themselves entirely to the Almighty, unlike the Javanese who were shifty and unreliable, and did not submit to the Lord. (Carey, 1992: 15)[2]

Raffles deposed the reigning Sultan Hamengku Buwono II, selected his successor, and installed a British deputy in Yogyakarta who demanded that Javanese courtiers humble themselves and kiss his feet after they had paid homage to the new sultan.

In 1816 a Dutchman was again governor-general of the Indies. He was not a merchant, but the king's man, directly answerable to the Dutch crown. His brief was to restore order and make the colony profitable for Holland. There was political ferment everywhere. In Java and places such as Ambon, where, between 1806 and 1816, there had been a succession of governors ruling in the name of three different European powers, local elites were seizing the opportunity to restore their authority or to push out the returning Dutch altogether. There was intellectual ferment. Daendels and Raffles had brought hints of Europe's Enlightenment. Some princes were beginning to take an interest in what made Europeans rich, powerful and inventive.

There were echoes, too, from Arabia of the Wahhabi movement.[3] In 1803 followers of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) had seized control of Mecca and Medina. They smashed hundreds of graves to put down what they saw as idolatry, and imposed strict controls on pilgrims. In some archipelago communities, Indonesian bearers of the Wahhabi message were launching campaigns against gambling, opium and cockfighting. They were promoting Arab-style dress for men and women, stricter implementation of Islamic rules on marriage, inheritance and divorce, and "correct" Islamic practice in rituals associated with burial.

On Java, the core territory of the Dutch Indies, Raffles's dealings with Java's royals was the catalyst for a series of uprisings. Over a five-year period, Javanese armies attempted to break the power of Europeans to play a role in palace politics and, in the name of Islam, they tried to expel the Dutch from Java. The end result of these Java wars, fought over the years 1825 to 1830, was that the Dutch became entrenched as the real rulers of Java.

The Java War 1825–1830

Prince Diponegoro (1785–1855) is, for Indonesians, the hero of the Java War. He was a grandson of Yogyakarta's founding sultan, Hamengku Buwono I (r. 1749–1792). Diponegoro's father, a half-brother of the next sultan, got the throne for himself in 1812 when Raffles deposed Hamengku Buwono II. There

was little chance of Diponegoro ever following his father as sultan, according to Javanese rules of royal succession, because his mother was just one of many commoner women in his father's household. Diponegoro was raised in nearby Tegalreja, a famed centre of Islamic learning.

Like all princes, Diponegoro received an income from lands assigned him by the court. Unlike his royal relatives who never left the capital, Diponegoro visited his territories. He also made himself personally known through pilgrimages to holy sites in central Java and through the networks that linked Islamic schools across the region. Diponegoro's travels allowed him to study political conditions and understand how ordinary Javanese perceived them. He witnessed the negative effects of Hamengku Buwono II's reign: the heavy demands for labour for the sultan's building projects, increased tax quotas to support royal retainers and favourites, and multiplication of licenses issued to Chinese and Europeans to run tollgates and lease agricultural lands. Between 1821 and 1825 there were droughts and harvest failures. All these conditions reduced a prosperous farming society to poverty.

In 1822, a court faction that had Dutch support made a five-year old boy sultan of Yogyakarta. It was against this boy that Diponegoro chose to assert his claims to rule. Diponegoro spoke a language of opposition that appealed to the newly poor. He denounced the submission of Muslims to non-Muslim tax collectors, landlords and agents of government. He rejected the right of the non-Muslim foreigners to depose and instal Java's sultans. His call to supporters was in the language of hatred of Europeans and Chinese for their refusal to embrace Islam. He denounced them for selling opium to Muslims, for their foreign clothes, diet and habits. He railed against a new road that was cut through his own domain, built for Dutch purposes of commerce and control. He stood in opposition to European influence of any kind.

Fifteen of the twenty-eight princes in Yogyakarta and forty-one of eighty-eight senior officials joined Diponegoro, along with 108 *kiais*,[4] thirty-one *hajis* and other Islamic scholars, mosque officials and teachers (Carey, 1981: xliv–xlv). Diponegoro called on farmers to starve the capital by refusing to sell their produce in Yogyakarta. His militias drove Europeans and Chinese out of the countryside. In areas Diponegoro won, his agents collected taxes in accordance with Islamic regulations. European and Chinese prisoners-of-war were presented with the choice of conversion or death. Those prisoners who chose conversion were obliged to dress as Javanese and to use high Javanese to their gaolers in an effort to wipe out from Java all traces of foreign manners, language and custom.

Diponegoro was no revolutionary. He stood for the rights of autocracy and inherited privilege. He had no interest intellectually in ideas of a new social contract. Diponegoro followed injunctions in the Hadith[5] on the distribution of booty: he enslaved prisoners and took female slaves into his household as sex partners. Like all Javanese kings, he assumed a variety of reign titles, including the Islamic First Among Believers, Regulator of the Faith, Sultan and Caliph of the Prophet of Allah, as well as an older title of Erucakra, which has the meaning of "Emergent Buddha" (Carey, 1981: canto X, 35). But he stressed the Muslim

character of his ambitions by calling his war a *jihad* and exhorting his followers "to destroy the Europeans and Chinese/Who are in Java/If they do not embrace the religion/Of the Venerable Chosen Prophet" (canto V, 5).

Diponegoro appealed to the Ottoman caliph for support. He wore into battle the kind of costume that was thought of in Java as Turkish: trousers, green jacket and white turban (Carey, 1981: canto VIII, verse 16). The Ottoman Empire was in retreat in Diponegoro's day, although that was not known in Central Java. The defeat of Ottoman armies in central Europe and the loss of Greece and other Ottoman provinces were not publicized in Muslim Asia by the Ottoman ruling class. The caliph did not respond to Diponegoro's appeal. All the same, Diponegoro's action shows that it was not only Java's Islamic specialists who perceived themselves as members of a universal community of Muslims. Other Javanese were able to conceptualize a global society, one anchored in Istanbul, which competed with and contested the West's global community that was being formed through colonial empire.

In Java, by 1827, religious leaders, militia commanders and princes were deserting Diponegoro's cause, calculating they had better prospects under the Dutch. Muslim spiritual guides were not only among Diponegoro's troops; they also accompanied Indonesian troops who fought under Dutch officers. *Sayyids* (Arab men who claimed descent from Muhammad) negotiated with Diponegoro's representatives on behalf of the Dutch. When Diponegoro was finally kidnapped by the Dutch in 1830, his following had shrunk to a few hundred retainers. Slave women, minor wives and servants followed him into exile in Sulawesi where he died in 1855.

At the war's end, around 200,000 ordinary Javanese were dead from famine, disease or battle. In his own day, Diponegoro was not uniformly regarded as a hero for Java or for Islam, or as a hero of anti-colonial resistance, as he is now in the writings of many historians. In Indonesian nationalist historiography, the fighting is called the Diponegoro War, and it is seen as precursor of the war for independence of 1945–1949. Diponegoro takes on a new significance in the twenty-first century. His ideology is a clear indication of the deep roots of those Islamic organizations in Indonesia today that reject pluralism and campaign (in word and suicide-killings) for the removal of non-Muslim foreigners from the country.

For the Dutch of 1830, Diponegoro's war finally sorted out friend from foe, reduced the power of princes to disrupt the orderly flow of goods to market, and allowed for the greater development of Java's natural resources and the extension of Dutch control over the island of Java. Victory made it possible for the Dutch to turn Java into a cog in the economic development and industrialization of Holland. The method was called the cultivation system.

The cultivation system

The cultivation system was inaugurated in 1830 by the new Indies government to stimulate Javanese farmers to grow more crops for export. It required villages

to pay land tax by setting aside 20 per cent of agricultural land for raising sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco or indigo, and to sell any surplus to the government at prices fixed, not by market forces, but by the government. From the government's point of view, cheap production of these crops would realize important profits in Europe, whilst in Java it would create an industrious and prosperous peasantry. The system would also put to productive use the many fields left uncultivated during the Java War because of peasant flight from war zones. Starting in 1830, seedlings were funnelled to farmers through the existing Javanese administration of *bupatis* and their staff. Crops were raised under the supervision of government inspectors who dictated schedules of planting, harvesting and processing.

The cultivation system was not an innovation; it prolonged an already outmoded system of taxation. Java's farmers had always paid their taxes in crops. The Dutch cultivation system was a more efficient application of the same system. Senior Dutch officials exercised only a general supervision of the cultivation system, and few in Java or Holland understood how it affected farmers. This is because so few Dutchmen were involved in running the cultivation system. At its height, in 1860, there was a total of 190 Europeans – ninety crop inspectors and 100 supervisors – overseeing a system that engaged the labour of half the population (then around twelve million) and about 5 per cent of the total land area of Java (Fasseur, 1992: 240).

Within ten years of setting up the cultivation system, the Indies government determined to get out of the business of running export agriculture and turn it over to private individuals and companies. The government's role would become that of creating an environment attractive to investors. It would finance agricultural research stations, extend the network of roads, improve steamship services and upgrade ports. The government would help private enterprise by suppressing workers' protests. Withdrawal was accomplished in stages. Between 1845 and 1864, the government turned the management of tea, tobacco and indigo over to private European entrepreneurs. It retained the two most profitable, sugar and coffee, as government businesses until 1891 and 1915, respectively.

Rice production was never part of the cultivation system, but rice milling was commercialized. The Indies government sold exclusive rights to build and operate rice mills to favourites (Europeans and Chinese), who exercised their monopoly powers by buying peasant-produced rice cheaply and selling the milled product in other markets. Abuses of the system did not end when private companies were allowed into agri-business. There were many political scandals. Relatives of senior government officials obtained contracts to produce for export, and they made lucrative offers to those Javanese officials who could supply "trouble-free" labourers. Plantation workers put in long hours for low wages in unregulated workplaces. Plantations came to be seen by Indonesians as symbols of colonial exploitation. European agri-business did not long survive the colonial state.

From the colonial government's point of view, the cultivation system was successful. The colonial budget was balanced and the volume of exports rose constantly through the nineteenth century. At its peak, profits from Javanese

labour amounted to around 34 per cent of Netherlands revenues over the years 1860–1866 (Ricklefs, 2008: 149). But doubts about the propriety of the cultivation system were created in Holland when the new, faster mail routes brought news from Java of harvest failures and famines in the 1850s and of arbitrary exactions by officials administering the system. Individual Dutchmen at the time and Dutch scholars subsequently denounced the cultivation system as exploitative and as impoverishing Java's farmers. Chief among their arguments were: Javanese were obliged to neglect their rice plots because of excessive demands on their time raising export crops; farmers bore the brunt of agricultural experiments; farmers had no legal protection against corrupt Dutch and Javanese administrators who pocketed large percentages of the profits; farmers were victims of low prices; and farmers were exposed to the oppressive rule of a centralized government that could enforce its decrees. Objections to the cultivation system created a colonial opposition in Holland, and made colonial policy an enduring issue in Dutch public debate.

The cultivation system has been almost universally condemned in the scholarly literature. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, review of the evidence by Boomgaard (1989), Elson (1990, 1994), Fernando (1996) and others concluded that arguments for the impoverishment of the peasantry were not based on actual data. Critics of the cultivation system had assumed that a prosperous peasantry existed prior to 1830. Opponents had termed the crops peasants paid to Javanese noblemen "tribute", but called the crops paid to the Dutch "forced delivery". Revisionists used as their evidence colonial reports that showed peasant taxes paid on time and in full, home improvements, increases in the number of buffalo and agricultural tools owned by farming households, crop payments consistently higher than assessed tax, and increased market purchases. In some areas, in response to market prices, farming families became full-time producers of export crops. Revisionists argued that here was proof of Javanese farmers engaging in commercial agriculture for their own profit.

The current scholarly consensus is that the cultivation system was oppressive, but that it offered some farmers the possibility of material prosperity. Few such options had been available to Javanese families until then. In the period 1830 to 1880 the numbers and kinds of jobs available to workers on Java increased greatly. The rise in production, for instance, generated a need for more crop containers and more carts for transporting harvests to market. There was an increased demand for buffalo for ploughing and transport. Sugar distilleries provided work for factory hands, and there were jobs for waged labourers to build the new processing plants and warehouses, lay railway lines and extend docks. The purchasing power of Javanese was stimulated by the growth in wage labour off the farm. With their cash incomes, Javanese bought tobacco, ginger, palm sugar, fruits, clothes, and pots and pans (Fernando, 1996: 114). Indonesian historian, Bambang Purwanto, calls this "horizontal mobility" (Purwanto, 2006: 17).

Instead of portraying Javanese farmers as passive victims, this research suggests some responded dynamically to new opportunities for earning an income. Staples of the cultivation system, except sugar, were crops introduced to

Indonesia by the Dutch. Sugar is possibly native to Indonesia and was cultivated there as an export crop by Chinese long before it became the most lucrative crop of European-managed agriculture. Java's sugar industry expanded enormously throughout the nineteenth century. Sugared beverages and foods became permanent items in the diet of Asian and European labourers.

European businessmen leased land for sugar from royals in the independent principalities. From 1870 the colonial government also began renting lands under its control on ninety-nine-year contracts to private European entrepreneurs and companies to raise sugar. By 1891 it had turned over sugar production completely to them. Private European capital and management created a waged labour force, brought women and children into the cash economy, engendered changes in social relations, and locked ordinary Javanese into the global economy.

Sugar and private enterprise

Sugar cane requires flat land, abundant water and large amounts of unskilled labour at various points in the growing and processing cycle. Ditches had to be dug for the canes. After the harvest, the stumps had to be cleared from the ground before it could be used again for cane, or turned over to rice, in which case the ditches had to be filled in and the field levelled. Sugar companies with large land leases hired wage labourers for the tasks of preparing fields, planting, weeding, harvest and transport of canes to the mills when nearby villages could not supply enough workers. Women and children were employed to weed and harvest (at 75 and 50 per cent of men's wages, respectively). Sugar plantations also created jobs for labour supervisors, pay clerks and managers.

Cane loses its sugar content rapidly after it has been cut, so sugar mills were built on plantations. Factory work and its regimen of time became a feature, therefore, of rural life. European companies introduced changes in processing technology. They replaced waterwheels and buffalo with steam engines, and installed iron boilers in place of clay kettles. These innovations provided ancillary work for Javanese blacksmiths, woodcutters and mechanics. Plantation managers advanced cash to labour recruiters who scoured villages for male workers. Families of wage labourers became habitual users of cash, and new food industries and laundry services were started by villagers for the teams brought into sugar districts. Some seasonal workers in the sugar industry were wage labourers the entire year, moving between a variety of paid jobs. They were not a semi-proletarianized peasantry, but a workforce detached from access to farmland, completely enmeshed in a capitalist economy.

By 1930 a typical sugar business on Java took cane from 1,000 hectares of land, employed twenty European technicians, 300 full-time and 4,000–5,000 part-time Javanese workers. Two hundred thousand hectares were under cane. The sugar industry employed 90,000 permanent workers and about one million more during the six-month season of harvesting and processing that began in May (Knight, 1992: 68–69). The industry predictably created social problems. Villagers complained that sugar encroached on good rice farmland and water

supplies. Wage labour freed young men (and some young women) from parental restraints. While on the plantation, seasonal workers from outside the region were potential customers for gambling, opium and sex businesses. For all sugar workers there were periods of prosperity and also periods of severe hardship when world prices fell. Community leaders in sugar areas blamed sugar for all social problems.

Opinion makers in the Javanese communities that accommodated temporary labour gangs from outside the village or region were *kiais* and *hajis*. Their thought world did not provide the tools for a political and economic analysis of colonial and capitalist relations. They analysed plantations and sugar factories in religious terms. Their answer to the plantation economy was to incite followers to burn down cane fields and drive all Christians out of Java.

The managers who ran the sugar companies, the technicians who monitored factory production and the banks that provided the finance were partners in capitalist and education systems anchored in the Netherlands. The cultivation system, managed at a day-to-day level by Javanese, had masked or mediated change in familiar ways. European private enterprise made more direct inroads into rural social life. Until 1870, private entrepreneurs found it difficult to acquire licences to set up businesses in the colony. The shadow of the VOC lingered long after the Company's dissolution; its monopolistic practices still informed government policy. It was not until 1870 that colonial policy was to open the Indies to Dutch capitalism. In that year government allowed unrestricted immigration from the Netherlands, and regularized the conditions under which businessmen could obtain long-term leases of commercial land.

The Agrarian Laws of 1870 were important to Indonesian farmers and European agri-business alike. They recognized "native tenure" of lands cultivated by Indonesians, and asserted government ownership of all "unclaimed" and "waste" land, meaning land not currently under cultivation. Such land was primarily the forested hillsides of the archipelago, homelands of Indonesia's shifting cultivators. They were also the sites most suitable for establishing rubber, tea and coffee plantations. Foreign individuals and companies were offered ninety-nine-year leases on this seemingly "empty" land.[6] Agri-businesses could therefore make long-term plans, clear forests, remove "trespassing" locals, and import a labour force to plant and harvest commercial crops.

These policy developments were implemented by metropolitan and colonial governments in response to demands from banks and businesses in Holland. Entrepreneurs could envisage implementing long-term plans in the Indies because between 1830 and 1870, parallel to operating the cultivation system, the colonial government was putting in place the "tools of empire".

Steamships, Suez and colony

Before 1860, travel was difficult and obstructed within and between islands of the Indonesian archipelago. The European tourist had to receive government permission for travel, provide financial guarantees and police statements of good

character. Chinese and Arabs were limited to business operations and residence in specific regions and towns. Sultans had to obtain permission from the Indies government to make tours outside their regions and even within their own royal territories. For ordinary Indonesians, travel was calculated in terms of the time taken to walk or sail on a wind-powered boat to their destination.

The modern colony grew out of solutions to finding new and faster routes between Europe and Asia. European colonial powers were dependent on each other for practical solutions. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, an alternative to the long route around Africa was for ships to travel through the Mediterranean to Alexandria. Passengers and cargo crossed overland by camel through Egypt to Red Sea ports where they resumed their sea voyage to Asia. Steamships taking the Africa route could not make the entire journey non-stop because they could not carry sufficient quantities of coal and water to generate the steam power needed. In 1839 the British occupied Aden, at the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, and developed it as a coaling station and supply centre. In 1859 work began on cutting a canal that would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

The Suez Canal, which covers a distance of 139 kilometres, was surveyed by European engineers led by Frenchman, Ferdinand De Lesseps. Construction was financed by European banks. Workers were Egyptian men who owed unpaid labour days each year to the Ottoman Empire's governor of Egypt, Sayyid Pasha (r. 1858–1863). He sold the services of *corvée* labourers to the canal construction company. Twenty thousand men at a time worked one-month shifts, digging out the canal with spade and bucket. In 1864 dredges imported from Europe speeded up construction, and the canal was finally operational in 1867 (Headrick, 1989: 154).[7]

Within the Indonesian archipelago the Dutch integrated intercontinental and inter-island shipping. The first steamship built by Indonesian workers was constructed in the Surabaya dockyards in 1825. It was a mail boat and operated a service between Java and the other islands. In time, steamship services connected all the inhabited islands within the Indonesian archipelago, bringing communities affordable transport, predictable freight charges and news at set arrival and departure times. Ports too small to host steamships were not left out from the new communications web: wind-powered Indonesian craft ferried cargoes and passengers to the steamships' ports of call.

Archipelago ports on the routes of steamships were transformed, for they needed large, permanent labour forces for constructing and maintaining shipyards and warehouses, for porterage, and for services to seamen and other visitors. Technical staff were needed to operate lighthouses, run customs posts and for passport control. Workers were hired to lay rail and tramlines that connected ports to production centres and cities. Because work was permanent and year-round, labourers settled in port-cities with their families. Residential quarters of the working poor expanded. It was in the ports that the important dockworkers' and railway workers' unions were formed in the twentieth century (Ingleson, 1986).

There is a close link between the numbers of steamships and ports of call and the expansion of the colonial state (à Campo, 1994). Steamships transported troops as well as the mail. The regular arrival of the steamship was a visible sign of an organizing centre. Steamship itineraries directed people and the flow of information along routes that led to and from Batavia. From 1866 to 1890, routes, ports and schedules were developed by the Netherlands Indies Steamship Company. Legally it was a Dutch company, but it was owned, financed and operated by the British India Steam Navigation Company, which linked the Indies to the outside world via Singapore and a web of British connections. From 1891 colonial policy and capabilities dictated that all government business be awarded to the Dutch Royal Packet Company and that all shipping of products and people out of the Indies begin from Batavia.

The speed of steamships was important. Steamships from Holland carried to the Indies increasing numbers of government officials, businessmen, adventurers and wives. Fast connections between company headquarters and field stations transformed archipelago economies. The nature of life in colonial towns changed when Dutch residents could maintain personal and intellectual contacts with Europe. There was less interest in Indonesian cultures because intercontinental connections allowed colonialists to keep abreast of European literature, theatre, fashions and politics through regular delivery of newspapers and magazines. Steamships brought travelling opera companies, French dressmakers and tinned foods. Dutch residents of colonial towns could recreate the habits of "home" and take precautions against "going native". The term "tropical Netherlands" gained currency in the twentieth century among Dutch people whose careers included a term in the colony.

The steamship had a profound impact on Indonesian lives too. They ceased to be controlled by wind patterns and distance from sea highways. Farming men and women could find new outlets for their produce; the sons of wealthy peasants could escape the manual labour of the farm through a period of schooling in a distant town or island and a "desk" occupation on graduation. The Royal Packet Company itself was a source of jobs for men with new kinds of skills. Machine shops and technical schools had to be set up to train Indonesians to operate and maintain mechanized equipment, locomotives and lorries. New jobs and new forms of transport produced new outlooks.

Expanding travel services helped generate identities no longer bounded by village and district town. Some islanders were on the way to envisioning Indonesia as a place and a nation as they came into regular contact with peoples and products from other islands. The global reach and modernity brought by colonialism also involved Indies inhabitants intellectually and emotionally more deeply in the Islamic world. When the Royal Packet Company began operating a fortnightly steam service to the west Arabian port of Jeddah in 1891, numbers of Indonesians making the annual pilgrimage jumped from a few hundred a year to 8,000,[8] and the Indonesian community of scholars resident in Mecca grew. Every hometown of a returning pilgrim felt the impact of closer contact with the Middle East. The path to Batavia, Mecca or The Hague equally began on a feeder ship to ports serviced by the Royal Packet Company.

The Dutch steamship was part of an organization with a global reach. That organization had its headquarters in the Netherlands; it had international finance; it had offices and agents throughout the archipelago. The Royal Packet Company supervised ports and labour forces; it organized coal, food and cargo distribution systems; it managed time by a regular system of arrivals and departures. It brought its Indonesian staff of skilled, semi-skilled and manual labourers into intimate contact with the modern world. Employees worked in teams supervised by foreigners; they were paid in cash; they became consumers of packaged foods and ready-to-wear clothing, consumers of urban services, potential clients for newspapers and other products of modern times, such as the political association. What steam made possible was reinforced by telegraphic communication.

The connectives: telegraph and submarine cable

The first telegraph lines linking cities within the archipelago were strung between the colonial nerve centres of Batavia and Bogor[9] in 1857. The plantation belt along the east coast of Sumatra acquired telegraph in the following decade. Underwater cable was laid between Batavia and Singapore in 1859. From there, archipelago customers were connected, via the British telegraphic system, to the outside world. From 1905 undersea cable connections knitted the entire archipelago into one system of government, business and trade. Laying submarine cable with secure connections was made possible by work in European laboratories on gutta percha, which is a natural plastic formed from the sap of the kayu putih tree, which is native to the Malay Peninsula. From 1849 it was used to coat submarine cables to protect them from creatures on the seabed. Intellectual, political and commercial life in the colony were linked and stimulated by the ability to send messages swiftly.

The full development of the potential of fast communications lay in creating healthy living conditions in the tropics. Improvement to public health in the Indies was the result of worldwide connections forged by intercontinental contact, scientific experiment, Western financing, and colonial management of the land and labour of Indonesian peoples. These ingredients produced both significant advances in medical science and public health, and a fitter workforce.

Botanical gardens, survival foods and irrigation

The Botanical Garden at Bogor was set up in 1817 as a foundation stone of the colony under its new Dutch administration. Its first task was to gather plants and seeds native to the Indonesian islands, and to publish descriptions of plant species. By 1822 the plants were being raised by forty-three Javanese gardeners under the supervision of three Europeans and a botanical artist (Headrick, 1989: 219). The Botanical Garden expanded its research activities to export crops – tea, cinnamon, cacao and tobacco plants – as well as to basic foods consumed by Indonesians such as varieties of rice, soybeans, peanuts and cassava. An experimental agricultural station, laid out at Cikeumeuh in 1876, also trained Javanese

as agricultural extension agents to introduce farmers to new cultivation methods and improved seeds. In this way the Botanical Garden was a site for pure and applied research, a means for boosting colonial income, and an agency for improving public welfare. Laboratory research remained the preserve of European scientists until the Bogor Agricultural Institute was founded in 1903 to produce (male) Indonesian agricultural scientists.[10]

Research centres financed by colonial government and European planters' associations for the study of single crops such as sugar, rubber and tobacco were established around the turn of the century. Here, too, the labour and experience of Indonesian workers, the land of Java and Sumatra, and European scientific expertise and funds combined to improve strains, breed disease-resistant plants and increase productivity.

Research institutes had a role in raising the volume of export crops on which the livelihood of many full- and part-time agricultural workers (including children) in the colony depended. They also took interventionist steps to mitigate the effects of colonial agricultural policies geared to export. In 1850, for instance, Bogor's Botanical Garden began distributing cassava plants to Javanese farmers in response to recurring famines in areas where government was giving priority to sugar and tobacco. Cassava is a root crop native to the tropical Americas. It had been introduced to the archipelago by the Dutch along with other American foods, such as maize, in the seventeenth century. Maize was quickly taken up, raised in Indonesian gardens and prepared in Indonesian kitchens. Although cassava requires less labour than rice, and can be dried and stored, it was never eaten in preference to rice. Rice remains the "prestige" food, while cassava is the food of the very poor, the staple of last resort. It became important as a hunger killer in diets in the twentieth century when a huge population increase forced farmers to take up land in the dry limestone hill regions of east Java.

From 1850 Dutch hydraulic engineers were hired by the Indies government to design irrigation works using European technology so that more land could be brought under cultivation. The Irrigation Service was established in 1885. By 1890 an all-Java irrigation plan had been developed and 1.4 million hectares had irrigation works in 1940 (Boomgaard, 1986: 71). The Dutch did not introduce irrigation to Indonesia; they introduced its centralized organization, large-scale financing and planning. The same tools of government had to be applied to combating disease and controlling epidemics.

Disease and community health

A daily dose of quinine protects against malaria. Before the development of a chemical substitute after the Second World War, quinine was processed from the bark of cinchona trees. They grew wild in the forests of Peru. After researchers in European laboratories established cinchona's efficacy, strenuous efforts were made to obtain seeds and young trees for raising under controlled conditions on watered mountain slopes in Asia. In 1852, two scientists in the employ of the Netherlands Indies government smuggled specimens out of Peru. They shared

the plant material with British gardeners in India, and a period of intensive experimenting and exchange of information on methods of planting, cultivation and bark removal began in Java, Bengal, Madras and Ceylon. In 1854, the world's first cinchona plantation was laid out in west Java. Results of experiments were rapidly transferred, via trained foremen, to Javanese labourers hired to work on cinchona plantations and in processing plants. Javanese para-medical staff were hired to distribute quinine to villagers in malarial areas. By 1916, 114 plantations were producing quinine on Java, and Java was supplying nine-tenths of the world market (Headrick, 1989: 72).

Quinine was a tool of empire. It ensured a healthier indigenous workforce in the colony, and it brought about a fresh expansion of Europeans into tropical regions of the world. Among their numbers, for the first time, were many women who emigrated as wives and workers (teachers, nurses, secretaries, dressmakers). They added a new demographic element to colonial society and helped to modify its character. Women were the letter writers and magazine readers who depended on fast steamship services to stay in touch with European culture. To Indonesians they self-consciously held up the ideal and model of monogamous marriage.

Whilst Europeans could safeguard themselves against malaria, the tropics remained a hostile environment to large-scale settlement. The colonies continued to be run by cheaper Indigenes. They filled most posts in army, police, government and the manual workforce. They, too, could be made more productive employees when general living conditions improved.

Medical records for the archipelago begin with the Dutch and they focus on epidemic disease (Owen, 1987). Port life was frequently fatal to VOC-era employees, yet the Dutch thought local populations healthy, bothered most by smallpox, yaws and scabies. Epidemic diseases appear from Dutch records to be a phenomenon of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period when the expansion of transport systems between and within regions brought new diseases, such as cholera, into the islands and accelerated the spread of known diseases such as smallpox. The transformation of huge expanses of forested land into irrigated fields also seemed to spread malaria. The timing and geographic distribution of epidemics were also connected to harvest failures, so that a local population, already weakened by malnutrition, readily succumbed to disease.

Cholera was the disease most feared, because sufferers could die within twenty-four hours of falling ill. Its introduction to Java is documented: British sailors, whose ships docked in Bengal during an outbreak of cholera in 1821, shortly afterwards arrived in Semarang, the major north coast port for central Java. Cholera spread from there to Batavia. Thereafter, cholera epidemics hit north coast towns and Madura Island in 1834, 1851, 1864 and 1874.

There is only one recorded typhoid epidemic. It broke out in the same north coast region in the years 1846–1850. Malaria epidemics began in the 1850s over a wide area of Java. Globalization brought the world influenza epidemic to the archipelago in 1918. As everywhere, young children and the elderly were most affected. Between one and two million people died in the archipelago from influenza. The epidemic introduced a new word to Indonesia along with a new

disease, and aroused fears that the population of Kudus in east Java expressed in a pogrom against local Chinese.

The Indies government took up the task of combating smallpox by modern means from the beginning of the twentieth century. Vaccination was introduced to Indonesian peoples who came much in contact with the Dutch, so first to soldiers, domestic staff and to wage labourers on European-managed farms. Both government and private businessmen arranged for the vaccination of their employees. Acceptance of vaccination seems to have been linked to the degree of coercive power or influence the Indies government could exert at any time and in any region. Smallpox was, for instance, no longer an important killer in Java by 1870, whereas it continued to be prevalent in other islands for several more decades. The last epidemic of the colonial era was in 1929. By then, all Indonesians were subject to Dutch rule.

It is difficult to discover what kinds of people took up the new job of vaccinator, or where they came from. Dutch records of employees include the description "Muslim leaders", so perhaps mosque staff were among those given training. Between 1840 and 1900 the Weltevreden hospital in suburban Batavia graduated 377 paramedics, only six of them from the city itself. Smallpox vaccination training became the core of a broader programme in 1851 producing the *dokter jawa* (Java Doctor), who was a man trained in public health care, but not in surgery (Abeyasekere, 1987). It is significant that the medical education of the Java doctors included language training in Malay, so that graduates could be posted wherever Dutch power extended in the archipelago. In the twentieth century paramedic training was upgraded to a full medical degree. Because the costs of instruction were paid for by the government, a career in medicine attracted many men who wanted a Western education.[11] It produced men who became public spokesmen, especially in the first years of the nationalist movement on Java.

The colonial government had to create systems to obtain information on disease; it had to finance research, develop medical education and build clinics, hospitals and pharmacies. It also had to write laws for the implementation of public health standards. The Health Act of 1882 established the office of inspector for Java to police health standards in public places. Epidemics therefore brought with them government intrusion into the personal life of the colonized and regulation of private behaviour.

With the exception of smallpox, colonial interventions in public health in such activities as providing clean water supplies and isolating the infectious were limited in scope. Declining levels of mortality, documented from the 1880s, were probably due to other forms of colonial intervention related to food production. Increased acreage under food crops, better diet, greater availability and range of foods consumed, new transport systems, more cash in the hands of workers – all these were factors contributing to fewer deaths of infants and improved public health. Declining mortality coincided with an era of work opportunities. Population on Java rose from below ten million at the beginning of the nineteenth century to above thirty million at its end. There were more people, more cultivated fields and fewer trees.

Receding forests

Indonesia lies in an equatorial zone. Until the nineteenth century, it was covered in dense tropical forests. Great trees, vines, bamboos, rattans, and forest dwelling tigers and boars presented considerable challenges to human occupation before modern times. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, most Indonesian farmers were probably still shifting cultivators, who harvested the forest, grew crops among young trees or in clearings for several seasons and then moved on. Java lost much of its forest cover in its long period of interaction with the Dutch. The deforestation of the rest of Indonesia has taken place over the last few decades.

The VOC was a major consumer of wood. It obtained building supplies for its ships and housing from the teak stands of northern Java. Supplies of logs, planks, roof staves, beams and masts were so important to the VOC's operations that the Company required Mataram's kings to pay for military assistance with annual deliveries of wood. Extensive cutting in teak forests and clearing of land for crops put more soil into rivers, resulting in the silting up of estuaries and the accumulation of sandbars in all the harbours along Java's north coast, forcing the VOC to introduce conservation measures. In 1777 it limited the size of privately owned boats and it prohibited Javanese, other than licensed woodcutters, from taking trees from forests along the north coast for building materials and cooking fuel.

The cultivation system and industries allied to it greatly accelerated the deforestation of Java. There was large-scale clearing for plantations and increased demand for felled trees for new warehouses and factories. Plantation factories created a market for firewood to roast coffee beans and fire kilns. The laying of rail tracks also required tree clearing and lumber for sleepers that had to be replaced every three to four years. Between 1890 and 1910, 400,000 hectares were cleared by plantation companies, and another 1,500,000 hectares by peasant farmers (Boomgaard, 1994: 133).

From the 1850s the Indies government began developing a forestry service of Dutch and Javanese employees whose jobs were to map, measure, manage and conserve forested areas on Java. The sites of deforestation shifted to the advancing Dutch frontier in Sumatra and Sulawesi as Dutch colonial forces spread out from Java from the 1860s. A stretch of Sumatra's east coast running 250 kilometres north to south and extending inwards approximately fifty to seventy kilometres became known as the "plantation belt". Tobacco, palm oil, sisal and rubber concessions created a whole new ecological and built environment in what had been virgin forest.

Rubber: science and coolies

The pneumatic tyre was invented in Scotland in 1888. Rubber was suddenly in demand for bicycles and particularly after 1905 with the growth of the car industry in the United States. Rubber was obtained from the sap of trees that grew

wild in South and Central America, Malaya and equatorial Africa. The demand for commercial quantities led to the British transplanting American species to plantations in Malaya. Staff of the Singapore Botanical Garden conducted experiments in seed selection, spacing of trees, ground cover, tree tapping and processing of latex into sheets of rubber. Results spread to the Indies.

From the 1880s rubber trees were planted on freshly cut forest land along Sumatra's east coast. There a foreign-controlled enclave imposed a new regimen. Through deals with area sultans, and backed by the full force of colonial power, plantation companies drastically altered the physical environment by establishing plantations over thousands of hectares. Plantation companies displaced the area's Indigenous peoples, imposed limits to their exploitation of forest resources, and installed a rigidly controlled labour force recruited from China and Java. Within the plantation enclave colonial conditions obtaining on Java were reproduced: land was made commercially productive, roads and railway lines and new towns were built, and the area was linked directly to world markets and made dependent on economic decisions and conditions prevailing in Europe and North America.

The term "coolie" makes its appearance in Dutch colonial reports and studies of Sumatran plantations. Plantation operations differed from practice on Java in methods of recruitment, in the ethnic makeup of the workforce and in labour control and conditions. On Java, workers were often hired as family units, with specific tasks assigned to men, women and children. Many workers could live at home. They maintained their own vegetable plots or other income-producing jobs that they fitted in around the fluctuating workload of the plantation. By contrast, in Sumatra coolies were hired as individuals and as full-time employees. They did not retire to their own private, domestic space at the end of the workday, but were housed in barracks within the perimeter of the plantation and under supervision of the plantation's management team.

Coolies were treated as unmarried. They were cut off from the moral order that revolves around domestic life. The number of male coolies far outstripped the numbers of women hired. Competition for women amongst workers, and between workers and bosses (foremen, managers), led to violence on plantations (Stoler, 1995: 31). The women were paid less than men. Plantation employers maintained the convenient view that female coolies were without morals, and justified the low wages paid them on the grounds that the women would make extra money selling sex to men in the barracks. Women coolies did not bring children with them, and few bore children on the plantation.

Coolie labour in Sumatran history is also associated with an initial period of rapid recruiting and immigration of male Chinese. Recruiters sought Chinese workmen across the Straits of Melaka in Penang, and also went directly to those parts of China's southern provinces that had, for centuries, fielded commercial networks overseas and operated agricultural, mining and business enterprises offshore. Recruitment of Chinese labourers for Sumatra's plantations began in 1863. By the early twentieth century there were 100,000 Chinese coolies employed on the plantations alone (Stoler, 1995: 31).

For both Chinese and Javanese coolies the regime of plantation work was new. It entailed fixed hours (sunup to sundown), supervision by a foreman who was of a different ethnic group, and ultimate subordination to the white manager. The plantation was a closed society that operated outside social norms. Coolies were controlled by violence. Verbal abuse, blows, canings, poor food, overwork and overcrowding were the lot of most coolies. They were bound to their worksite by a contract they could not terminate.

The Coolie Ordinance of 1880 and subsequent Labour Inspectorate established in Medan in 1905 represented attempts by the colonial government to rectify abuses while preserving the interests of plantation companies in maintaining a low-paid labour force. The central feature of the ordinance was a written contract made between the plantation company and the individual coolie. This contract had to be registered with local government. The contract specified a ten-hour workday for a three-year period. It required the employer to pay wages regularly, provide lodging, washing and drinking water, and medical care. Upon completing the contract, coolies who so wished had to be returned to their place of recruitment at company expense. The ordinance also determined punishments for coolies who ran away, refused to work or were disorderly (Breman, 1989: 39–40).

The ordinance had a wider impact than the Sumatran plantation sphere. It became a model for employment of wage labourers in coal mining and railway construction. It did not immediately improve plantation workers' conditions. The situation on Sumatra's plantations remained so bad that China's imperial government, never noted for its concern for its overseas working poor, sent a fact-finding mission in 1886 (Yen Ching-hwang, 1985). China failed, until 1912, to persuade the Dutch to allow a consulate to be established to represent the interests of Chinese workers in the Indies. By that time, the majority of workers on all plantations were Javanese. Plantation managers had begun to recruit family groups from Java and to view the costs of family housing, clinics and schools as reasonable expenses because they considered Javanese families a more docile workforce.

Few Chinese returned to China at the end of their contracts. Some continued to work for plantation companies as waged labourers, foremen and labour recruiters. Others went into businesses that served the plantations; they bred pigs, raised vegetables, ran shops, and operated the gambling and opium centres that ensured some coolies at least would lose their pay and renew their work contracts multiple times. Many former Chinese coolies moved to the new cities the plantation industry created in Sumatra, notably to Medan, to fill jobs as wage labourers, hawkers and shopkeepers. Coolie migration from China ended altogether in 1931. The world depression by that time had made itself felt in the plantation business.

The conception of the Javanese coolie as a temporarily displaced peasant always pining for the home village was cherished by colonial officials, employers, nationalists and novelists[12] alike. They expected that, at the termination of work contracts, coolies would return home and be reabsorbed into their village.

But for Javanese to return landless to their village was to return to their prior state of drifting in search of paid employment. Ex-coolies stayed on in the East Coast Residency.[13] By the 1930s this vast administrative unit consisted of cultivated lands, growing cities and a communications grid that linked it to Batavia, Penang and Amsterdam. In the chaotic years of the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1950), Javanese coolies took over plantation land to raise food crops for their own survival. After independence, they asserted rights as squatters and resisted attempts by the new Indonesian government to dislodge them. They became the core of today's Javanese population on Sumatra.

Industrious revolutions: rubber, coffee and copra

Rubber brought high prices in the 1920s. Trees could be tapped within six years of planting. Tapping and processing required skills and labour possessed by the indigenous farming family. Farmers along the east coast of Sumatra were quick to plant rubber trees alongside their other crops and sell processed sheets. Between 1924 and 1929, they planted 3.3 million hectares with rubber,[14] and smallholders supplied local markets and competed with the plantations for regional buyers.

Coffee was peculiarly suited to peasant agriculture because it is a perennial shrub whose beans can be harvested after four years, and it is productive for six to seven years. In Java it grows on mountain slopes between 300 and 1,000 metres. Farming families who cultivated a variety of crops in forest clearings added coffee bushes, or they grew them along the boundaries of their plots. Coffee seedlings were raised in nurseries, then replanted in mixed gardens, the land weeded and the beans harvested by women and children. Families sometimes sold the right to harvest, prepare and transport the beans to itinerant teams of workers. In other cases, families performed all the tasks themselves, and women transported the prepared beans to markets where they sold them for cash or exchanged them for market place goods. In many areas, coffee bushes were just one more crop in a system of mixed farming and brought in a small amount of extra income. When coffee prices were high, farming families sometimes concentrated on coffee and used coffee sales to purchase food as well as consumer items.

The archipelago has many hill sides suitable for coffee, and archipelago farmers needed only access to coffee seedlings and a network through which to sell their beans to add coffee bushes to the crops they raised. Where mountain slope could be connected to market, farmers began growing coffee; they did not wait for the extension of Dutch rule to raise coffee commercially and sell it into Dutch markets. Late in the nineteenth century the necessary conditions obtained in the highlands of Sulawesi where Torajans farmed in high valleys still beyond the reach of colonial authorities. Buginese and Arab traders journeyed on foot up to the Torajan homelands with guns and ammunition, which they exchanged with Torajan chiefs for coffee beans. The guns altered political relationships between Torajan clans, while the coffee beans were inserted into a distribution

system set up by Buginese boatmen. They transported the beans to ports where steamships of the Royal Packet Service called. There the coffee was sold to traders who carried it to Batavia or another regional market. Some of the coffee was sold in Europe; the rest slipped into local distribution systems and ended up in stalls frequented by Indonesian workers who became coffee drinkers in the twentieth century.

Businesses built around coconut production are another example of the industrious revolutions sparked in Indonesian communities by the advent of new transport systems and markets that made investment of time and labour in agriculture profitable. Coconut palms grow abundantly in the Indonesian archipelago. Their fruit is an important source of cooking oil, the flesh is used in sauces and the liquid in beverages. Coconuts were also a form of currency for purchasing goods and paying taxes. They were important in local trading only until the 1880s when the European oil and fats industry started to use copra (the dried kernel of the coconut) in the manufacture of soap and later as an ingredient of margarine. European demand for coconut products stimulated a change in agricultural practice. In place of gathering coconuts from wild trees, some communities began cultivating palms under plantation conditions.

Selayar Island, which lies off the southwestern peninsula of Sulawesi, was one of those areas of the archipelago specializing in the export of coconuts. Coconut palms produce fruit in ten years. Cultivated, or growing in the wild, coconuts could be integrated into subsistence farming. Copra was an attractive trade product to islanders, because the process of drying the flesh of the coconut was easier than the time-consuming, labour-intensive processes of rasping and boiling needed for the production of cooking oil. European firms in Makassar advanced loans to Chinese agents, who in turn hired Selayar men to buy up the copra, which was then shipped to warehouses in Makassar and from there exported to Europe. The profits flowing to owners of coconut plantations were spent on pilgrimage to Mecca, marriage dowries, schooling in Makassar or Batavia, or the money was simply hoarded. By the 1920s, the families of brides were demanding dowry payments exclusively in coconut palms, and elite status had become linked to ownership and numbers of trees (Heersink, 1994).

Selayar's elite was quick to respond to the opportunities provided by Dutch steamship services that were spreading throughout the archipelago at the end of the nineteenth century. Whilst the steamship was a tool of empire building, it was, for Indonesian entrepreneurs, a means of making money for themselves, because it provided regular, reliable transport for their goods to regional and international markets. Selayar plantation owners kept costs low by using slave labour decades after the Indies government had banned Indonesians from owning slaves (1860). Steamship service and the copra business knitted Selayar into the colonial state. Steamships brought Dutch copra inspectors to the island; they also brought Javanese, who came to set up local branches of Batavia-based organizations that challenged colonial government and sponsored reformist Islamist movements.

European demand for copra resulted in peoples who were far from the centre of Dutch power being brought under the colonial government. Another example

is the Melanesian Marind-anim people of the southern coast of Papua (West New Guinea), who owned large stands of coconut trees. They became suppliers to the Merauke Trading Company when it was established in 1903 to export copra. This commercial company prompted a modest expansion of Dutch political control into western New Guinea via military patrols and the establishment of a small government outpost. In 1910, the Indies government was represented in Merauke by fourteen officials. For the Indigenous inhabitants, a Dutch company, market and transport provided an outlet and the possibility of their becoming enmeshed in wider patterns of economic exchange. Incentives to harvest and process more coconuts were the new goods, both prestige and utilitarian items. Foreign objects, ideas and people were bound up in exchange in this remote corner of the huge island of New Guinea.

Pawnshop and opium licensees: provisioners of the poor

For industrious revolutions to occur in the Indies, there had to be several essentials: knowledge of market demand; skills in raising the desired product; efficient and cheap means of getting the goods to market; reasonable return for the additional labour; and necessary changes to lifestyle. For businesses to take off there had to be another ingredient: capital. Big banks did not open branches in villages distant from major towns. In the colonial capital they were imposing edifices. Clients able to take advantage of modern banking services were those fluent in Dutch or Malay, with assets, skills in European-style book-keeping, a good credit record and character references.

The barefoot farmer participated in a parallel, but quite different financial system, one that advanced tiny loans, that operated largely outside government regulation in matters of interest charges, that operated on a face-to-face level in the farmer's own milieu. The Indonesian farmer sought small injections of cash from a landlord or *haji*. Some landowners obtained loans from Western banks at rates of interest fixed by government, and then broke down the sum into small amounts for re-lending to tenants at higher fees. A common method of repayment was through the debtor performing unpaid labour services in return. This method obviously kept wage costs low for landowners and *hajis* who operated businesses. Free labour from the debtor also had the advantage of making repayment without reference to interest charges, which were considered by many Muslims to be prohibited in Islamic commerce. Accordingly, the pawnshop, which was an alternative source of credit for rural and small town entrepreneurs, was run by non-Muslims. In the Indies, pawnshop operators were generally of Chinese origin, either recent immigrants or men with a long family history in the community. By 1875 there were 922 licensed pawnshops on Java, 913 of them operated by Chinese (Rush, 1990: 99).

From 1869, the Indies government had required operators of pawnshops to be licensed. Rules for the conduct of business were published, but in practice colonial authorities sold licences to the highest bidders. Licensees operated as cogs in a Chinese network that conducted many related businesses. For example, in

places where they served a rural clientele, pawnshop managers often advanced money to farmer customers while their crops were still standing in the field. Both parties gambled: the lender gambled that the yield would be good, the borrower gambled that the price offered would be equivalent to market rates obtaining at harvest time. Pawnshop licensees funnelled crops at below market prices to their suppliers of capital who thus gained a competitive advantage in crop stapling and wholesaling. The institution benefited its customers by providing cash when needed and it disadvantaged them by tying up their goods in sales where they could not get the best possible price. Pawnshops were also places where rural customers could purchase second-hand goods (the unredeemed pledges). The pawnshop thus fostered desires for goods and the means to obtain them, but again under conditions resented by the purchaser.

Pawnshops were frequently operated in tandem with another nineteenth-century rural institution, the opium shop. Again, a business forbidden to Muslims was run by Chinese and catered to an Indigenous, Muslim clientele. For working Javanese, opium was a home remedy for aches and stomach complaints. Even the poorest could afford it because they purchased opium in adulterated form. They chewed tobacco that had been soaked in opium, added opium to the ingredients of a betel wad, or drank coffee to which a little opium had been added.

Clients of Chinese businesses saw in the ethnicity of pawnshop operators and opium sellers the cause of their poverty, rather than the lack of local banks and of efficacious painkillers in the era before the invention of aspirin (1897). Religious leaders denounced "sinful capitalism", by which they meant non-Muslim business. Pawn and opium shops and their managers were targets of attack. Government ministers of the colonies from the comfortable distance of The Hague and senior administrators in Batavia also blamed the Chinese for rising rural indebtedness and what was seen as the moral turpitude of the Javanese.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, three circumstances enabled the colonial government to push Chinese out of contact points in local economies that caused friction with the indigenous population. These were: a change in colonial policy at the top; the development of a cadre of trained, salaried clerks to administer functions of government; and demands for more modern methods of providing services to the population. In 1903, the government took over control of pawnshops and began turning them into credit institutions for farmers and small businesses to complement the rural banks that it was installing in local post offices to handle deposits and make small loans. They were "user friendly". Tables were set up in the open in front of these people's credit institutions. Men and women customers lined up to transact their business without the daunting formality of a big city bank. By 1940 there were 6,700 such village banks, most of them in Java (6,200), again offering an alternative to Chinese money lending services. Forty per cent of their clients were women (Boomgaard, 1986: 76). In 1905 the government had also ceased the sale of licences for running opium businesses, and ended the practice of selling tax collection. From that time the revenue service was a branch of government, and tax collection, insulated from private entrepreneurs, was the job of salaried government staff.

Figure 4.1 Men and women clients of a village bank in Tegal, Java, around 1920 (source: KIT Tropenmuseum Amsterdam 10001471).

The Netherlands had placed its economy on the gold standard at mid-century. It put Java's economy on the gold standard in the late 1870s and the economy of the wider archipelago between 1908 and 1912. These measures were the actions of an increasingly strong central government. Currency was no longer silver and copper coins minted in other countries and imported as needed by traders. Instead, the Indies government controlled both the amount and the kind of money in circulation. Money in the colony became imperial and territorial. The Dutch guilder became a new kind of marker of belonging to a single political unit that encompassed Holland and the Indies. Money became an item that had to be exchanged at border crossings. It became a tangible reminder of an individual's subordination to government. A single Western commercial law code replaced a myriad of local, ad hoc practices.

The trading network operated by the Chinese represented an accumulation of knowledge, contacts, ways of operating and safety measures to insulate individuals against arbitrary or unwelcome actions by sultans and colonial officials. Key ingredients – mobility, kin ties and shared values – allowed Chinese businesses to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. When the Indies government pushed the Chinese out of tax collection, rural lending and other service industries, the Chinese network moved into new fields, particularly manufacturing cheap goods for Indigenous customers through cottage industry and factory, wholesaling and retailing. Business was still organized

along ethnic lines, privileging family, descent group, dialect and ancestral region in China. Now the trade network's operations responded to the rising population of working Javanese who were paid in cash. It turned them into consumers of mass-produced goods such as ready-to-wear clothing, packaged foods, beverages and cigarettes.

Modernization: road of no return

In regions of the archipelago often called the "outer islands"[15] – Sumatra, Borneo, Sulawesi and islands to the east of Bali – the agricultural revolution came only late in the nineteenth century or even early in the twentieth. Widespread deforestation, near extinction of wild animals, expansion of land under cultivation by farmers settled in permanent villages – these were developments that had been gaining momentum in Java for over 100 years. In China and India, the forests had retreated before cultivated fields and townships centuries before that. By the early decades of the twentieth century in the Indies a modern infrastructure of all-weather roads, steel bridges, telegraph wires and airstrips was being laid over the major islands, and urban centres were being electrified. Epidemics were in retreat. There was more labour specialization, more processing of tropical products and the beginnings of petroleum exploration and extraction. In the colony, major processes in the universal development of societies and introduction of the latest inventions went hand-in-hand.

From the middle of the nineteenth century people and goods picked up speed. Steamships and trains were added alongside transport systems relying on wind power, buffalo carts and porters. Larger volumes of goods could move to farther off places more quickly. On Java workloads increased substantially due to the demands of the cultivation system. As private enterprise expanded, supported by international banks, peasants became wage earners and purchasers of goods they could not make themselves or that were not worth their time anymore to make. They did not immediately become consumers of goods produced in Dutch factories, for Holland only industrialized between 1895 and 1914. Wage earners in the colony used their cash resources to buy items of local manufacture such as agricultural tools. They improved their housing, bought cloves cigarettes and printed batiked cloth, purchased "prestige" items such as leather puppets of the *wayang* theatre,[16] made deposits into their savings account of gold jewellery, or financed a pilgrimage.

Everywhere Indonesia's peasantry became shrewd and hardworking when transport problems were solved and the Dutch removed conditions that had formerly held back indigenous enterprise. Sea raiding and attacks on coastal villages for slaves, for example, had suppressed entrepreneurial activities. The invention of flat-bottomed steamboats, which could navigate delta estuaries, enabled the Dutch to reduce Southeast Asian piracy in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Peasants took to trains when railway lines were laid; they rode trams and bicycles, proving they were neither conservative nor otherworldly.

While there were peasants and artisans who were able to respond to the new conditions with "industrious revolutions", their businesses usually remained small-scale. There was still the legacy of foreigners gaining the most benefit because of their greater mobility and knowledge of worlds beyond the immediate home base and region. The Javanese who moved to work opportunities in Sumatra were locked into the rigid control of the closed plantation, and laboured with human muscle, not as operators of modern machinery. The profits of their labour went to European investors. Outside the towns there was little development of legal systems for the protection of private property. The Dutch forbade *bupatis* from appropriating peasant property, but there was not much they could do to prevent them, as shown through the colonial novel, *Max Havelaar*,[17] which became the *cause célèbre* of 1860. Indonesian trading activities were often single undertakings with profits distributed and assets sold off after successful ventures. Possibilities for capital accumulation were limited.

From the 1860s the Dutch frontier was advancing in Sumatra from south and east. New crops, new modes of labour organization and control united a vast area together. Aceh, at the northernmost end, was incorporated violently into the colonial state in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. In most parts of the archipelago the Dutch introduced modern infrastructure *after* negotiating treaties with area sultans to incorporate their territories into the colonial state. In Aceh the Dutch laid down rail lines, built bridges and constructed a highway from coast to highlands *during* the incorporation process. Building a modern transport web was a deliberate tactic for prosecuting war against Acehnese militias and gaining control of the sultanate. In 1874 Dutch invading forces brought in by sea from Batavia narrow-gauge rails, steam-powered locomotives, sixteen train wagons, modern water pumps, two iron bridges, a laboratory for testing water and a smith's forge.

Technology transfers that colonial rule mediated from Europe to Indonesia made inhabitants part of the modern world, although fundamentals of that world were still often beyond their personal understanding and knowledge. In Holland in 1843 the government created the Delft Academy to train Dutch men to administer the colony. Candidates for the civil service studied Indonesian languages, cultures and history. In 1842 the chair of Javanese Studies was founded at Leiden University. Indonesian legal systems were codified, religious practices analysed and history books written. Knowledge remained one-sided, without any comparable studies of Europe being undertaken by Indonesians.

The Dutch still seemed to have a monopoly on new knowledge. When the first Javanese printers learned the techniques of typesetting from a Dutch company in Semarang, they set up a publishing house for production of books in Malay exclusively on Islamic topics of faith and practice. They distributed their catalogue through schools of religion and travelling teachers. Dutch shipping sustained contacts with the Islamic world. The multiplication of printed books on Islamic topics and greater contacts with the Middle East allowed a deeper study of religious subjects that was more attractive for some than the subjects of Dutch books circulating in the archipelago. During the nineteenth century the

source for knowledge of the modern world lay mainly with the Dutch, although the Japanese were to present another route to modernization.

Traditional leadership in Indonesian communities sprang from two bases. One kind of leadership was rooted in claims of birth and privilege. The colonial government bought off royalty and aristocracy with pensions and patronage. The colonial state itself consisted of over 300 principalities whose sultans surrendered real control of their internal affairs and external relations in exchange for recognition of their lineage and preservation of their privileges. Hereditary leadership was, therefore, no threat to the colonial government. Senior Dutch officials were punctilious in public shows of deference to archipelago royals; they attended cultural functions in their courts. Dutch royalty awarded sultans medals and inducted them into knightly orders. Inequality in knowledge of the modern world and how to operate in it meant that the richest benefits of this partnership went to the Dutch.

The second kind of leadership was Islamic. The colonial government cultivated working relationships with mosque officials. It donated funds for building new mosques, paid the salaries of religious staff, and offered responsive Muslim leaders positions on government advisory boards and jobs for their sons. The Nahdlatul Ulama, an association of Sunni traditionalist religious scholars founded in Java in 1926, obligingly bestowed legitimacy on Christian colonial rule in declaring the Netherlands East Indies an abode of Islam in 1938 (Feillard, 1995: 308). But there were other Muslim leaders and opinion makers, men who operated beyond the jurisdiction of both archipelago royals and their Dutch backers. They were men who built reputations for Islamic learning and piety through their connections to prestigious Islamic centres and figures in the Middle East. They derived their income, not from colonial salaries, but from their students, donations from their followers and from their businesses. Such men opposed the Christian rule of Muslims, treated Dutch learning and practices with suspicion, and openly expressed contempt for Indonesians who enrolled in Dutch schools and worked in the colonial administration. They challenged the alliance of Dutch and Indonesian elites that was the very basis of colonial rule.

Colonial police monitored the activities of these "freelance" Muslim leaders in the colony. In 1872 the Dutch opened a consulate in Jeddah (gateway to western Arabia) to provide consular services to pilgrims from the Indies and to keep watch over Indonesians studying in Mecca, Medina and Cairo. They devoted the latest techniques in surveillance to monitor men whose eyes were fixed on an idealized Islamic past.

Tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco and rubber are plants that built the modern world economy. In this enterprise Indonesia's land and labourers played an important part. The efforts of economic migrants and villagers helped to finance the industrialization of the Netherlands and change lifestyles there, just as they financed modernization in the colony and the ensuing changes to daily life. Colonialism has come and gone in Indonesia, but the science, the inventions and the technologies that colonial rule introduced into Indonesian lives remain. There could be no undoing the transformations brought during colonial times to Indonesia's

physical and built environment, or to new work habits and rhythms of life. Indonesians continued to be consumers of electricity, steel, vaccinations and mass-produced goods after they achieved national independence. They use machine-powered transport, participate in a global economy, and are dependent on the latest in communications technology. There were attempts in the 1920s and 1930s at getting a *swaraj* (self-help) movement[18] going along the lines of Mahatma Gandhi's in India, but there were few Indonesian enthusiasts for turning back the clock. The privileged classes enjoyed automobiles and electrical appliances at home; labouring men and women wanted clean water, soap, kerosene, bicycles and cheap clothes.

Western schooling introduced to archipelago communities a third base for leadership. Indonesian graduates of Dutch schools in the twentieth century turned to Western thought to create a politics of nationalism that was intended to displace royals, Muslim teachers and the Dutch from the seat of power. Graduates used the material culture of modern colonialism to reach their goals. As consumers of newspapers, they broadened their mental horizons; as commuters by bicycle, train and automobile, they expanded their knowledge of home district and region; as steamship passengers they journeyed to the colonial metropolis. Their thought world now included Western theories of political economy and social organization. The claims of science and rationalism competed with received conviction that Allah was the source of all authority.

Those Indonesians challenged intellectually by Western colonialism drew on the latest in communications technology, on the newest organization and management practices to give voice to their goals, to develop political followings, and to assert against colonial and traditional leaders their own right to govern. Many historians, evaluating trends in the late nineteenth century, judge the colonial administration's concern with Islamic leadership as over-reaction or even paranoia. They downplay the appeal and impact of Islamic globalizing trends in their focus on those Indonesians who were attracted to Western models of thinking, feeling, behaving and judging.

5 Colonial regimes

Creators of the modern Indonesian

"If I happened to be a Dutchman…"

In 1913, Soewardi Soerjaningrat (1889–1959) addressed a rally in Batavia, the nerve centre of the Dutch colony. The Dutch community in the Indies was celebrating the centenary of the freeing of the Netherlands from Napoleonic rule. Soewardi used the occasion to draw a contemporary parallel in the servitude of the colony's inhabitants to the Netherlands in a speech now famous as "If I happened to be a Dutchman…"[1] Writing about this rally, anthropologist James Siegel draws attention to a number of "firsts": forum, audience, language, references and source of political inspiration (1997:35).

Soewardi's audience members were participating in a wholly novel form of public behaviour. Men (and some women) from a range of social classes, ethnicities, religions and occupations jostled together in the one public space, their presence the result of their voluntary response to a politician's invitation. No religious leader, prince or colonial officer had commanded their presence, offered inducement or threat to gather the crowd. A sound system carried Soewardi's words beyond normal hearing range so that all attending could be privy to what was said and engaged, rather than playing the passive role of admiring onlookers or laity to a pageant staged by and for more important people. The speaker appealed to their common experience of foreign rule and to their reason to win understanding and agreement with his views.

Siegel discusses language as well as forum. Soewardi addressed the crowd in Malay, a language that was probably the native tongue of none present and was not widely understood at the time, including, as Siegel notes, by those attending the rally. Participants and language alike were making journeys into modernity. Written Malay was freeing itself from the archaic conventions and topics of classical literature;[2] spoken Malay was being refined from the bazaar pidgin of archipelago towns into a multi-purpose medium that could transcend differences of language, dialect, class and convention. Malay was adjusting to the modern world by incorporating new words, concepts and grammatical forms.

The speaker himself was a new kind of man: he was a graduate of a multiethnic, co-educational Western school that taught a Dutch curriculum of secular

subjects in the Dutch language to children from families who could afford the school fees. His learned references were not to chronicles of Java's royals or to commentary on the Quran, but to Dutch history and European political thought. His milieu was the colonial city. No Indonesian religious or royal authority governed Batavia. Instead, offices of the colonial government and churches marked the skyline. Soewardi wore a pocket watch. Like the urban crowd that was his audience, his life was governed by time set, not by religious authorities, but by European government and business.

When Soewardi entered a Dutch school in Java at the end of the nineteenth century, he was one of a very small number of Indigenous students privileged by lineage, class and connections to the Dutch colonial elite to do so. The school system itself was new. Graduates and Western schools were products of a specific historic time in the Netherlands Indies. Changes in colonial economy and mentality produced new kinds of institutions; they, in turn, produced new kinds of colonized subjects.

Immigrants and colonial policy

The 1870 Agrarian laws had flung the Indies open to development by private enterprise. Migrants from Holland rushed to take up new opportunities in the colony. Most of the new immigrants settled in towns, and mostly in towns on Java. There followed the development of suburbs and expansion of municipal services such as sewerage, street lighting and regular rubbish removal in Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya. Immigrants generated demands for amenities such as clubs and bookshops. Rising numbers of female immigrants meant there were more Dutch families in the colony. A critical mass of European children induced the Indies government to provide schools whose curricula and standards meshed with those in Holland.

Rising numbers of Dutch immigrants generated urban jobs for Indonesian workers. In demand were construction workers, food sellers, household staff, transport workers, and a small army of cleaners, clerks and office messengers for both government and private business. Mechanized transport required trained mechanics and drivers; research institutes needed laboratory technicians and field staff to run agricultural extension services; telegraph offices, banks and newspapers needed literate and numerate counter staff.

Historically, Europeans have not formed settler colonies in tropical environments. Nor did the economics of colonialism allow a wholesale importing of men and women from Holland to fill all the new jobs a modernizing economy generated. Consequently, local candidates had to be sought for technical and vocational training to supply the new branches of government such as fisheries, agriculture, transport, public health and native affairs, and to supply processing plants with draftsmen, maintenance men, bookkeepers, labour recruiters and foremen. New training and new jobs produced new outlooks, experiences and opportunities, along with new skills.

It took very few Europeans to spark profound changes. There were only 6,386 European civilians in the entire archipelago in 1870, and that number included

4,043 who had been born there (Bosma and Raben, 2008: 16). Fifteen years after the Agrarian Laws opened the colony to unrestricted migration, there were 45,000, again with the majority locally born. By 1900 the proportion of Europe-born to Indies-born among the European civilians resident in the Indies had grown to just under 20 per cent (Bosma and Raben, 2008: 208, 223). Locally born and immigrant Europeans were about 0.4 per cent of the colony's population in 1930 (Maddison, 1990: 322). The colony's towns remained very small, although there were more of them. In 1815 only five towns on Java had a population of more than 20,000. By the century's end there were sixteen such cities (Boomgaard, 1989: 111), and the six biggest had populations over 100,000 in 1930.

The first among the Indies-born to contend for the new desk and technical jobs were Eurasians and Christian Indonesians. They were the largest demographic in the colonial school system. Eurasians and Christian Indonesians had, therefore, a head start over Muslim Indonesians in participating in the colony's modernization and in becoming members of a modernizing world whose foundations had been laid in Europe and North America. Cities are sites of change and innovation. Immigrants, Eurasians and Christian Indonesians were mostly urbanites. Colonial cities became significant milieus for Muslim Indonesians of well-to-do families after they began enrolling in the colonial school system in numbers in the first decades of the twentieth century. They became competitors for the new colonial jobs.

It is worth noting that the percentage of Java's population living in towns above 5,000 actually declined from 6.7 per cent in 1815 to 3 per cent by 1890 (Boomgaard, 1989). The percentage of urban dwellers dropped because of the great increase in population in the nineteenth century (to around thirty million by 1900). The explosion in jobs that stimulated population growth occurred in the countryside where factories took in skilled and manual labourers for processing plantation crops. Migrations to work were therefore from one rural district to another. Labourers who moved to cities in search of work often did so during slack periods in the agricultural work routine only. Regular return to their home villages injected more cash, new goods, and town manners and ideas into rural lives. Country people were, therefore, not sealed off from modernizing forces introduced by colonialism and the new breed of migrant from Holland.

Post-1870 European immigrants were not resigned to the kind of regulation of private lives that had characterized the VOC and colonial administrations until then. The Netherlands in which the new migrants had grown up was the site of expanding rights for male taxpayers. Men were voters. By the century's end Dutch women were entering the professions and demanding full citizenship through enfranchisement too. In the colony, municipal government with elected councillors developed in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and branches of the women's suffrage movement were established in the principal towns. A discourse on rights – meaning rights for European civilians – was aired in the colony. Vehicles for these European preoccupations were council meetings, civic associations, Masonic lodges and newspapers.

For thinkers among Dutch migrants, the colony was a laboratory in social experiment. Some wanted colonial government to direct European inventions

and philosophies to the social "uplift" of the colonized; others argued that the duty of colonial government was to protect the Indigenous by insulating them as far as possible from global forces of modernization.

Both camps focused on the wealth the Indies generated for Holland, the *batig slot* or *batig saldo* of public debate. These are Dutch terms for a credit balance. In colonial history they refer to the profits made by government plantations on Java in the nineteenth century and sent to the Netherlands. From the 1840s there were Dutchmen who argued that funds generated by Javanese farmers should be spent on public works in Java to benefit the Javanese, such as transport, irrigation, schools and community medicine. By 1875 government withdrawal from the cultivation system was well underway, and that was the last year profits from government-run plantations were actually transferred to the Netherlands treasury. But the adverse impacts on Javanese sugar workers from the sharp drop in world prices in the 1880s caused social reformers to insist on more. In 1899, the Dutch parliamentarian, Conrad van Deventer (1857–1915),[3] recommended that parliament and taxpayers assume a "debt of honour" to the colonized and allocate 750,000 guilders from the Netherlands budget each year for expenditure on public works in the Indies.

Dutch liberals campaigning for freeing up the colonial economy had always claimed to be advocates for the colonized. They believed that prosperity would trickle down to the working majority and that a free market would create conditions for the emergence of a native class of entrepreneurs. But the exposure of Indonesians to the fluctuations of world markets in the 1880s and 1890s brought a reassessment. Social thinkers now saw evils. In place of a prosperous class of rural consumers they found rising numbers who were poor, under-nourished, lacking modern job skills and without legal protection. Indigenous district heads, who owed their jobs to their hereditary status and alliance with the Dutch, were no longer perceived as revered traditional chiefs without whom the Dutch could not rule. Now Dutch critics saw them as grasping representatives of an outmoded oriental despotism.

In 1901 the journalist Pieter Brooshooft[4] crystallized these views in a pamphlet entitled "The Ethical Course in Colonial Policy". He gave a name to a movement and a period. Supporters called themselves Ethici. They were the new Europeans of the colony: writers, journalists, lawyers and government officials, who found in Java a career and an intellectual circle that brought them social prominence. They represented a middle class of men whose entrée into Indonesian circles grew out of personal bonds of relationship and friendship. The journalist and lawyer J. W. T. Cohen-Stuart had a Javanese mother; the Islamic scholar and government advisor Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje was a Muslim convert and husband to daughters of west Java *kiais*. C. E. van Kesteren, the editor of *De Locomotief*, Java's leading newspaper, had been employed by the Javanese head of Demak district as live-in tutor to his children. The lawyer and government official J. H. Abendanon maintained friendships with Javanese men over many years, raised funds for Indonesian students in Dutch universities and for girls' schools in Java. His wife was the intimate of daughters of the *bupati* of Jepara and maintained a correspondence with them stretching over a quarter of a century.[5]

In the colony, Ethici advocated Western-type schooling for Indonesians in both Dutch and local languages. They wanted to halt the import of opium to Java, to end unpaid labour, to develop local crafts and industry, and to expand public health services. On their return to the Netherlands, Ethici took up university appointments or entered politics where they continued to promote their notion of colonial rule as having a special mission to "uplift" the "Natives" (colonial term for Indigenous people), guard them against exploitation by Indonesian officials and train them to enter the modern workforce.

Colonial reformers captured government in 1901. The Ethici's platform became official government policy. Now Holland should work to benefit the Indies. In practical policies this meant that a network of village primary schools, rural cooperatives and public irrigation works should overspread the colony. It meant a public rhetoric of mission and civilizing duty. In a far-distant future, when the Indigenous population had been well prepared for self-rule, the colony would transform into a province of a new transnational entity: Great Netherlands.

Reformers saw colonial government as the necessary agent for radical transformation of Indonesian lives. Only the colonizers could bring an end to practices such as female sacrifice on husbands' funeral pyres in Bali and headhunting in Borneo. Only colonial government could undermine "feudalism" and the "slavish grovelling" of Natives before their hereditary chiefs. Only the colonial government could "rationalize" and harmonize Indigenous and Islamic laws, purge the domestic life of Natives of under-age marriage, polygamy and child labour, and introduce modern standards of hygiene. To free Natives from exploitation by their own hereditary rulers and the "fanaticism" of their spiritual guides, colonial government must exert real authority throughout the archipelago. Natives needed law and order to be prosperous. Therefore Ethici supported the policy that the colonial government carry war to resisters. While many programmes involved schools, health clinics and the like, there was always a strong military component in Ethical policy. Ethici supported the wars fought between 1873 and 1914 to bring populations in Aceh, Sulawesi, Bali and Lombok under Dutch control.

In VOC days, and well into the nineteenth century, Holland's representatives had adapted themselves to local ways. But the Ethici were riding a crest of Dutch power. They demanded that colonials as well as colonized reject old ways. What was once understood as a culture of gift giving in the Indies was now seen as corruption. The so-called "*Hormat* circular"[6] of 1906 ordered Dutch bureaucrats to stop giving themselves Indigenous titles such as *kanjeng* (sir, lord) and to end their demands for courtesies Indonesians customarily paid to aristocrats. Instead, officers of the colonial government were to model modernity.

Dutch colonial reformers, fixed on "uplifting" the Natives, often failed to take note of Indonesian individuals and political parties that were campaigning, in the 1920s and 1930s, for national independence. Ethici were not in sympathy with the view expressed by Indonesian graduates from Western schools that Indonesian solutions must be found to social problems and Indonesian modes used to induct the colonized into the modern world.

Paths to knowledge: upbringing and schools

To understand the impact of the colonial school system, it is helpful to consider first the Islamic schools that already existed (and continue to exist until today) and their approaches to learning (Riddell, 2001). In villages the most learned man would teach boys the formal rudiments of Islam. Pupils would sit in a semi-circle, cross-legged, on the floor of their teacher's private residence and learn to recite aloud passages of the Quran in its original Arabic. Often the teacher's book was the sole text. It sat on a small lectern. At the local mosque or prayer house, boys were inducted into ritual observances of purification and prayer. Mosques were multi-functional: places of congregational prayer on Fridays, meeting halls, and dormitories for travelling men. Mosques were headquarters for specialists in aspects of Islam: men who knew how to determine times for daily prayer and festivals; how to supervise the slaughter of animals; how to make the call to prayer; how to regulate marriage and divorce; how to conduct burial and adjudicate disputes. Such men were a repository of pious stories, precepts and legends, and had committed to memory portions of the Quran or knew it in its entirety. This ability was much prized; it brought honour in the community. Islamic scholarship began with the study of Arabic.

Islamic tradition encourages the (male) seeker after deeper knowledge to travel from teacher to teacher for periods of study. A man known for his mastery of a branch of Islamic learning and possession of a specific book or books was sought out by students who would lodge with him for several months or years and copy their teacher's manuscripts, notes and explanations. Completion of study meant possession of the teacher's knowledge. The student moved on, armed now with his own book and commentaries and a diploma that recorded his accomplishment, the name of his teacher, the name of his teacher's teacher, back in a long line to a scholar in the Middle East. A student might seek additional teachers to study Arabic grammar or jurisprudence. Education was the Quran and absorption of a body of knowledge that was entire and "correct", to be transmitted to future students through the same process of instruction, memorization and copying.

The student committed to lifelong learning accumulated his own library of manuscripts and diplomas; he cultivated a charismatic personality to attract his own students. The numbers flocking to him both created and perpetuated his reputation. Some men specialized in a search for hidden, esoteric meanings of the Quran or a merging of self with Allah. After studying with Sufi masters, they established their own branches of the Sufi brotherhoods, where they taught practices such as controlled breathing exercises and rhythmic repetitions of the names of Allah to induce a state of mystical experience. Whether transmitting Quranic exegesis or leading students into out-of-body sensations, teachers of Islam, *ulama*,[7] demanded obedience and devotion from students, not dialogue or challenges.

A teacher of renown could become the focal point of a religious community called, in many parts of Indonesia, a *pesantren* (a place of *santris*, or scholars of

Islam). The *pesantren* was (and is) a self-contained community, located beyond the boundaries of towns and villages. It consists of the teacher's family residence,[8] study halls and quarters for students, rice fields and businesses that support the main enterprise of transmission of correct knowledge. *Pesantrens* are like mini-states, organized on a strict hierarchy. Son or son-in-law succeeds as head.

The leader of a *pesantren* was revered. To his followers he was teacher, living saint and a source of blessing. He took first place at public ceremonies. People vied to kiss his hand to show respect and imbibe through physical contact some of his spiritual qualities. They brought to him questions on matters of belief, sought advice for prospering in business, the determination of lucky days and appropriate times for setting out on a journey or marrying. Some *pesantren* heads had special powers. They made up documents with Arabic letters to be worn by sufferers of physical and mental illness; they issued talismanic documents to protect men in battle. Some were believed able to make themselves invisible and to fly. The gravesites of men of high renown became *keramat*, holy places, which drew pilgrims seeking blessings and guidance through prayer vigils.

On Java, the *pesantren* was the continuation, in Muslim form, of an older tradition of Hindu and Buddhist communities formed around holy men, endowed by the state with land and labourers and granted tax-exempt status. *Pesantrens* were also bound up in Javanese culture. They kept alive Javanese poetic and performance traditions. They gave an Islamic quality to Javanese culture through their production of moral tracts, romances and tales of wanderers in search of spiritual enlightenment. *Pesantrens* were tied into an Islamic culture too, one that was not confined by colonial borders, but thrived in a zone across Southeast Asia, and was expressed through Malay written in Arabic script. *Pesantrens* were also the local expression of a world Islamic culture that, before the rise of Wahhabism, featured veneration of holy men, vigils at gravesites and respect for *sayyids* (descendants of Islam's prophet), alongside reverence for Quran and Hadith (sayings attributed to Muhammad).

Historians have commented on the tendency of *pesantrens* to function as sites of resistance to royal and colonial authority,[9] and on the ability of *pesantren* heads to raise militias from among their followers, to network across state boundaries and involve themselves in political causes of the day. *Pesantrens* were always a potential danger to government because a leader could emerge who maintained that the only ruler sanctioned by Islam was the expert in religion. As implementer of Allah's will, this leader claimed immunity from public verdict. Other scholars have noted the male character of *pesantrens*. Siegel (1969), for instance, argued that in Aceh, where a matrilineal kin system concentrated possession of house and farmland in women's hands, the *pesantren* gave men somewhere to go, and *pesantren* learning gave them a social importance they lacked in their home villages.

Some aspects of the *pesantren* had equivalences in Europe's monastic tradition, such as obedience to the religious head, copying holy texts, and a

transnational culture of religious practice and reference. But that tradition had been challenged and superseded in Europe. The Protestant Dutch who planted their school system into Islamic communities of Indonesia in the late nineteenth century vaunted quite different principles. School itself was physically located in a purpose-built structure that was not the teacher's home or private possession. Colonial schools were staffed by teachers who had gone to government teacher training institutions and were in possession of diplomas of paedagogy in secular subjects. Teachers were salaried staff of a government department; school fees paid by parents did not go directly to them. While the principal was a figure of authority, parents and students did not kiss his hand or ask for his blessing and spiritual guidance.

Pupils were enrolled into classes on the basis of their age; they studied a curriculum set by the state, and progressed through various levels of competences within a defined time period. Reference points were the Dutch education system of kindergarten, primary school, technical and academic high school, and university. Girls sat in the same classroom as boys. Pupils learned the Latin script. Religion and its related branches of language study, exegesis and commentary were not taught.

Classrooms were furnished with desks and chairs. Pupils had their own printed books. School texts and visual aids on the walls related learning to Holland, Dutch history and everyday experience. Indonesian history was taught as a sub-branch of Dutch history; it was a history of subordination in which heroes were Dutchmen and "patriotic" songs were about the Netherlands.

Netherlands government regulations of 1818 had opened the colony's schools for Europeans to the Indigenous. From 1854, the provision of schools for "Natives" was an obligation of government in the Indies. This was, in itself, a departure in terms of Indonesian histories, but an application to the colony of the practice of government in Holland. The constitutional provision did not commit to universal schooling for Indonesian children, although the government knew it must provide schools of equivalent standard to those in Holland for all children of Dutch extraction[10] in the colony. They were called "First-Class European Schools", offered a seven-year course of instruction, and enrolled children classified as either European or Natives of the "better class". The economics of providing schools with teachers and teaching materials imported from the Netherlands imposed a multi-ethnic clientele on school populations for the first-class schools, while also being a logical decision since colonial power rested on alliance with Indigenous elites. In 1940, these schools had 88,223 Indigenous pupils, 41,814 pupils classified as European, and 25,845 pupils of Chinese or Arab origin (Van der Wal, 1961: 8).

First-class European schools required all entering pupils to be fluent in Dutch. Indonesian families therefore had to engage Europeans as tutors, governesses and nannies to teach very young children Dutch language and customs to qualify them for admission to school. The language of instruction and of the school playground was formative. Where it was Dutch, it cut Indigenous students off from sources of their own cultural heritage. Unless they made a special effort to

acquire literacy in their native or ancestral language outside of school hours, their competency was in the spoken form only. Ideas derived from schoolbooks and study were more easily expressed in the language of the foreigner than in their native language. Mastery of Dutch created a bond among fellow speakers, but opened a chasm between them and fellow Indonesians who were "left behind".

Speech patterns behaviours. Even a century ago, spoken Dutch was less formal than spoken Javanese with its levels of vocabulary that matched words with the social class of speaker and listener. Dutch grammatical constructions favoured the active voice and, in contrast to polite speech in Indonesian languages, seemed terse and direct. For Javanese, speaking in Dutch also meant they had to acquire a new body language: they dispensed with (or were released from) etiquette that dictated who spoke first, who made ritual obeisance[11] before replying, and who lowered the gaze in tangible demonstration of humility. Indonesians speaking together in Dutch could find the experience liberating or deeply offensive because there was the appearance of interacting as equals.

First-class primary schools were opened in towns, but study at high school level often required the Indigenous student to travel to a provincial capital.[12] In these circumstances, a girl's chances for further schooling closed down. Boys embarked on the transformative experiences of relocation and lodging with strangers. Dutch families took in Indigenous school students as paying boarders. They inducted their young charges into ways of behaving and feeling that were foreign to them and could be either repulsive or attractive.

For children enrolled in village schools there were culture shocks too. Their lessons were given in Malay or the dominant language of the region such as Javanese or Sundanese. Colonial officials understood the nexus between Arabic alphabet and religious identity. Indic scripts for Javanese and Sundanese and Latin script for Malay were consciously chosen to distance pupils from nearer acquaintance with their Islamic heritage. Teachers assigned to village schools were likely to be Indies-born, either Eurasians or Indigenous graduates of the teacher training institutes that were called into being by the expansion of schools.

For pupils in schools where the vernacular or Malay was the language of instruction, formal schooling stopped after three or five years.[13] Those with special aptitude and financial backers could still move into the Dutch stream of education by enrolling in a "bridge school" that taught Dutch language intensively. Vocational classes that trained vaccinators, midwives and community health workers taught Malay. Schools training Indonesians for jobs in the colonial bureaucracy taught both Dutch and Malay languages.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the colonial government opened five-year technical or vocational high schools and colleges of law, engineering and medicine. Between 1920 and 1940 Indies institutions graduated fifty-four Indonesian and twenty Indonesian Chinese engineers and 104 Indonesian and eighty-one Indonesian Chinese medical doctors. In the same period, 344 Indonesians and 360 Indonesian Chinese graduated from universities in Holland

(Van der Wal, 1961: 12–13). The 1930 census recorded 3,746,255 Indonesians literate in the sense of possessing the ability to read and to compose independently a letter or report in the Latin script out of a population of thirty-nine million. That figure represented 6.44 per cent of the entire Indies population. Broken down by gender, 10.83 per cent of Indies male inhabitants and 2.17 per cent of the female were competent in the Latin script.[14] At the end of the colonial period, then, only a fraction of the colonized had a Western education, but the tools and lifestyle they had acquired propelled them into the public sphere as leaders and trendsetters.

Cultures in conflict

Graduates of the colony's European schools and tertiary institutions have left a written record of their experiences. The autobiography and memoir were literary genres they became familiar with as readers of Dutch language texts, and these were natural vehicles for reflections on their own life journeys. Before the late nineteenth century it is difficult to find in written sources the personal voices of archipelago inhabitants and reflections on their individual experience. Ancient inscriptions contain the stylized boasts of kings who command loyalty and threaten with curses. Long-gone poets praise their royal patrons as gods, delight in the beauty of women and of nature in florid language, or sing of the soul's unity with deity in the formulae of religious tradition. In prescriptive texts, religious scholars guide kings in behaviour appropriate to their rank. Writers of Old Javanese had lexicons at their disposal containing flowery Sanskrit epithets with which to embellish their compositions. Court scribes had reference manuals to guide their drafting of diplomatic correspondence in such matters as the mode of describing their royal employer's grandeur and the number of lines sufficient for enumerating his noble qualities compared to those reserved for the letter's recipient. The forms, formulaic expressions and themes of these written records were rooted in Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic models. Indonesian experience was further extended when the Dutch language provided fresh vehicles for expression.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, Javanese aristocrats serving the colonial government employed the form of the report and business-like, unadorned Dutch language to urge policy changes and practical reforms. They placed notices in Dutch-language newspapers to announce family events, such as marriages and deaths, with the brevity dictated by the newspaper personals column. Some contributed articles to academic and popular magazines of the day, published in the Netherlands or the Indies, where they described, in erudite Dutch, changing social conditions, explained Indigenous folklore, or reviewed books written on the Indies by Dutch authors. It was in the memoir that the Western-educated introduced the personal note of unique experience and narrated defining moments. And it was here that they stepped across an intellectual boundary that separated the exemplary biography from the individual's personal truth.

For Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879–1904), the defining moment came in the grounds of a first-class European primary school. In a letter written in May 1899 introducing herself to a pen friend in Holland, Kartini recalls her Dutch playmate, Letsy Detmaar, saying she planned to become a schoolteacher when she grew up. Letsy's question, "What do *you* want to be when you grow up?" lingered with Kartini. Her older brother gave her the two alternatives for a young woman: marry well or become a public performer (code for a loose woman). Narrating this in the third person, Kartini explained her situation to her Dutch confidante, Rosa Abendanon (1992: 35, letter of August 1900):

> She did not think about the insult which was thrown at her, she only saw the raw truth which stood starkly before her eyes: There were only *two* paths open to a young Native girl to survive this life – either marriage or … shame! … Either Raden Ayu[15] or dancing girl!

For Achmad Djajadiningrat (1877–1943), son of an ancient Sundanese family, going to school produced the shock of not fitting in anywhere. His father, who served in the colonial administration, placed him in a local Islamic school where he discovered in his compatriots a hatred for the Indigenous aristocracy, their Dutch backers and the West, and found himself an object of their contempt. Dutch schooling gave him the means to shore up social position at home, to achieve local importance in colonial politics and to launch an international career that took him to Geneva as the Indies' representative to the League of Nations (Taylor, 1989). In his 1965 *Autobiography*, Sukarno (1901–1970) recalled his formative years in Dutch high school as a round of parties, dances and first romance – with a Dutch girl. Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894–1978) recalls the humiliation of being obliged to demonstrate to the headmaster of his European school that fingernails and feet were clean to prove that he was not a "dirty native" (1973 [1958]).

Kartini and Achmad Djajadiningrat expressed themselves in Dutch. After independence, Indonesians chose English over Dutch as the preferred Western language for international communication. English had no connotations as the language of colonial subordination for them. It inducts Indonesians into the dominant global communications network of today. Both Sukarno and Dr. A. A. M. Djelantik were schooled in Dutch and fluent speakers of it, but, by the time they recorded their autobiographies in 1965 and 1997, respectively, they did so in English because their desired readers were Westerners and they wanted to reach the greatest possible number of Westerners and explain themselves to them.

This is how the Balinese prince and Netherlands-trained medical doctor, Djelantik (1919–2007), remembers the intellectual excitement of a moment in the classroom of a Dutch high school in Java in 1931 (1997: 68):

> That very moment during the second lesson in geometry with Mr. Elenbaas turned out to be an important milestone in my school years and for the rest

> of my life. It was as if by a magic wand something dormant was loosed or brought to life in my brains. From that time on I started to have an interest in learning. Knowledge became attractive, exciting and enjoyable.

Crossing into European space challenged childhood training. Djelantik speaks of how natural it was for him to defer to his eldest (half) brother, the crown prince of Karangasem (Bali). As a small boy, he waited to eat until his brother had first eaten; he walked behind his crown prince and slept at the foot of his bed. Djelantik recalls the difficulties of playing Dutch games like soccer because an innate sense of the appropriate dictated that the crown prince should always win and this was difficult to contrive. There was also the problem of excelling in school. Kartini, also newly aware of two different forms of relating and the values underlying each system, had to find an accommodation that would satisfy her new sense of self, while avoiding giving offence. She says (Kartini, 1995: 13, letter of 18 August 1899):

> Towards my older brothers and sisters I follow all the formalities scrupulously, I will deprive no one of their entitlements; but commencing with me, we are having nothing more to do with conventional forms. Liberty, equality and fraternity! The younger sisters and brothers with me and amongst themselves conduct themselves as free and equal friends. The sisters say "jij" and "jou" [Dutch informal "you" and "your"] and speak the same language as me. At first people hated the free and easy relationship.… We were called "children without a proper upbringing".… But … now that old mother etiquette has fled before our sense of freedom, people envy our harmonious unity which is so evident among us.

The sense of hovering between two worlds is expressed in the clothing the first classes of schoolboys wore to Dutch school. Photographs capture their ambiguous, in-between status: the upper body covered in European shirt and jacket with bow tie, the lower body wrapped in a length of batik cloth that fell to bare feet, and the hair covered in a batik wrapper. Studio shots[16] show them lined up neatly. Within a generation head wrapper and sarong were replaced with boater and trousers, and young Indonesian men attending Dutch schools also wore shoes and socks. As in any mixed race situation, there were personal slights and affronts to be endured, but what the first generations of schoolboys quickly grasped was the power of dress. Almost every memoir of growing up in the Indies in the first half of the twentieth century contains an account of clothing and the situational impact of dress choice. Appearing before elders in Javanese costume dictated that the young man kneel, crawl across the floor, make a *sembah*, and speak little and only when spoken to. Dutchmen in the colony also expected such self-effacing manners of men presenting themselves as Javanese. But, when the same man appeared dressed in the Western suit, he was extended the same courtesies as any other European.

Djajadiningrat recounted such experiences in his *Herinneringen* ("Memoirs"), first published in 1936. Indonesia's most famous novelist, Pramoedya Ananta

Toer (1925–2006), made them intensely felt moments in his 1980 historical novel *Bumi Manusia*. Sukarno recounts in his *Autobiography* (1965: 80–81) how he viewed Western dress and exhorted fellow (male) students to discard traditional dress:

> This old-fashioned native dress has a demeaning effect. The minute an Indonesian dons trousers, he walks erect like any white man. Immediately he wraps that feudal symbol around his middle, he stoops over in a perpetual bow. His shoulders sag. He doesn't stride manfully, he shuffles apologetically. He instantaneously becomes hesitant and servile and subservient. … We must be divested of that influence which chains us to the cringing past as nameless, faceless servants and houseboys and peasants. Let us demonstrate we are as progressive as our former masters. We must take our place as upstanding equals. We must put on modern clothing.

For Sukarno, the Western suit did not represent the uniform of the middle-class taxpayer and citizen. In the colony, the environment in which he functioned, it was the dress of rulers. So it was the suit that politician and later president Sukarno habitually wore. To men whose formative experiences were shaped in Muslim social and political milieus, suit and tie symbolized Christianity and acceptance of Christian rule over Muslims.[17] Sukarno recounts an incident on his wedding day to his third wife (1965: 47):

> He [mosque official] said, "Young man, a necktie is a strictly Christian mannerism and not in keeping with our Islamic custom.
>
> "Sir," I retaliated, "I am aware that formerly a groom wore only our native dress, the sarong. However, that is the old-fashioned way. The law has now become modernized."
>
> "Yes," he snapped, "but our modernization extends only so far as to permit the groom to wear trousers and an open collar."

Schooling in Dutch language gave Indonesians insight into Dutch opinions, prejudices and beliefs. Because Indonesians were the inferiors in the colonial relationship, knowledge of Dutch views often made them cringe. Polygamy became a cause for embarrassment, often of deep shame, because Indonesians who interacted in schoolroom, club and office with Dutch people were likely to be children from elite, polygamous families. The public discourse of uplift focused on qualities of Muslim family life that the Dutch found objectionable: arranged marriage, first marriage in early teens, polygamy and the seclusion of women. Christian, companionate marriage, mother in the home, father working outside it – these were ideals that the Dutch preached. Inevitably these topics made their way into the writings of the first generations of Dutch educated. Kartini writes of "my humiliation, my shame" when she confides to the Dutch friend she addressed as Mother (1992: 429, letter of 14 July 1903):

> I am the fiancée of the Regent of Rembang, a widower with 6 children and 3 wives.… Now I am nothing more than all the rest [of women forced into polygamous marriages], I am like thousands of others who I had wanted to help but whose number I have now merely come to increase.

Royal children complained of their having no mother among the multiple women in their father's household (Djajadiningrat, 1986). Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980), later prime minister and first vice-president of Indonesia, complains in his memoirs of the neglect of children in the polygamous household. Sent to live in the house of one of his stepfather's wives in order to be closer to the district's Dutch school, the young Hatta felt that there was no adult to care about his studies or watch over him (1981).

Social mixing with Dutch people gave Indonesians the ability to see Natives and judge them as the Dutch did. This could be an unwelcome or uncomfortable experience, inducing guilt, shame and insecurity. Djelantik tells this story (1997: 43):

> As we descended from our big Fiat limousine on the driveway in front of the official residence, Mr. and Mrs. Jansen walked down the steps of their verandah to meet us. While I was looking with awe at the nearing couple they suddenly stopped and turned their backs on us, as if we did not exist any more. For one moment I was puzzled, but I found immediately the answer: coming out of the car Father had taken a few steps to the rear side, lifted his kain [decorated cloth wrapped round the waist and falling to the ankles] and squirted his urine neatly on the wheel of the shining limousine.…
>
> Quite unerringly Father walked up to our hosts who were very polite and friendly and acted as if they had not seen anything wrong.… But I was too shaken with shame[.]

Abu Hanifah, another medical doctor and prominent leader in the struggle for independence, records his defining moment on a Dutch passenger ship that sailed regularly between Surabaya, Jakarta, Singapore and Medan, and on which he was employed as a medical officer. He recalls socializing with the first-class European passengers, dances on board, whiskeys and flirting. Then (1972: 105):

> Every week when our ship reached the port of Semarang, we had to take on board some hundreds of coolies [destined for plantations and mines in Sumatra]. … As the doctor I had to examine the coolies once they were on board. They were lying side by side on cribs in the fourth class. I discovered that I had nearly forgotten about the situation of the ordinary people. … I discovered again the fate of my people in the colonial grip. I myself was treated as a Dutchman notwithstanding the colour of my skin and my native birth. It seemed we lived in two different worlds, these Javanese coolies, my people, and I. Something was really wrong.… I was fully aware that I could do nothing about it. But still something was gnawing inside me.

A different kind of defining experience was that recounted by Achmad Djajadiningrat (1936: 347–348). It occurred as he stepped ashore in Marseilles in 1928. The porter who carried his bags and whom he tipped was a white man.

Dutch influence penetrated Islamic circles. Islam was studied by Dutch scholars who applied critiques learned in the Western academy to its revelations and compared local Indonesian practice with "correct" Islam. In 1882 the colonial government set up a council of Indigenous experts on Islam to bring uniformity to the practice of Islamic law in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance in Java and Madura. The colonial government aimed at extending its control of Islamic life right down to the local level by bringing village administrators of Islamic law, the *penghulu*, under the control and patronage of colonial authorities through giving senior Dutch officials the power to appoint them. Prior to this change, the *penghulu* had been selected and appointed by the highest Indigenous administrator, the local aristocrat.

As *penghulus* became associated with the colonial power, their leadership position weakened. Community leadership often passed to *ulama* with reputations for piety and learning who were totally unconnected to the colonial government. They were potential and actual sources of opposition to government so that, in 1905, another colonial ordinance required religious teachers to have written permission to teach in the new private schools that were springing up, and even with permission they would be able to teach only from government-authorized texts. Colonial government also designated approved summaries of Islamic law to be used by judges in the religious courts.

Another group emerging from Dutch schools dealt with the personal through fiction, adopting the new form of the novel. Their topics reflected the conflict points of their experience: the seduction of urban life and freedoms from convention; the weight of tradition and burden of village superstition; the conflicts between belief and science; and, above all, love for a woman who was modern and forbidden because of a different race, class or religion. First-generation novelists saw no way out for their protagonists whom they condemned to despair, death, or loss of faith. Their novels were didactic, presenting problems in black and white. They are read now only in university literature classes, if at all.

The social historian Rudolf Mrázek (1997) describes the new type of Indonesian who appeared on the streets of the colony's capital in the 1920s and 1930s: the dandy. He wore fashionably cut trousers and jacket, shirt and tie; he had pens in his vest pocket, was bareheaded or wore a boater or the *pici*, the brimless, black cap that Sukarno made popular as the sign of the modern, self-consciously proud nationalist man. The dandy circulated around town on a bicycle or in a car, enjoyed a coffee or lemonade in hotels in the company of a young woman companion to whom he was not related.

Newspapers, books, language and politics

Discussing modernity in the colony, historian Henk Maier (1997) considers an advertisement for Phillips light bulbs that appeared in 1940 in the weekly Malay

language magazine, *Pandji Poestaka*. In the illustration the modern Indonesian family sits companionably around a table in the glow of a Phillips bulb. Father reads the newspaper, the child (only one in the modern family!) reads a book, while mother sews. In Maier's analysis of its drawn and textual components, the advertisement offers a dream family, comfortable, harmonious, orderly, enjoying the advantages of electric light "as bright as day", yet good value for money. He says, "It reads like perfect propaganda of a colonial order". The magazine, published by the government-sponsored publishing house, Balai Pustaka, to provide suitable reading material for the growing numbers of the colonized able to read in the Latin alphabet, had a circulation of 7,000. In the 1930s, most of these readers would have been reading by the light of an oil lamp. Magazines supported by advertising created aspirations for a lifestyle of domestic comforts experienced as individuals within the confines of a small family.

Modern man in the colony read newspapers. In Europe, newspapers had grown out of pamphlets about single events, such as a battle, and from almanacs that summarized news of the year. The newspaper as a regular, weekly publication connecting originator of information, printer and reader began in the seventeenth century. Often newspapers were called "Advertisers", which reflected a principal function. By the eighteenth century the daily was an established feature of European and North American cities and carried news of happenings both in the immediate region and in distant places. Newspapers planted in the reader's mind a picture of world events that they themselves did not see or personally experience. The newspaper also educated its readers to place their own society within the context of their region and the entire world.

This kind of newspaper was dependent on printing, on railway, telegraph and post, and a literate readership, all features of Western societies that had been transplanted to the nineteenth-century Indies. The most important condition for news-gathering and public dissemination was the political order. The first newspaper printed on Java lasted only one year. That was in 1745. It was closed down on instructions from the VOC's Holland-based directors. Government gazettes were published in Batavia in the first half of the nineteenth century. From the 1860s commercial companies were permitted to publish newspapers in the colony. They multiplied and diversified, under the watchful eye of the government censor. Indies newspapers carried in Dutch and Malay languages a regular diet of news, serialized novels, letters and advertisements. They were important sources of information for autodidacts.

By the early twentieth century, European factory-produced paper was in plentiful supply and cheap in archipelago shops. Printing press and newspaper ensured that the amount of reading material increased greatly. Bookshops became new centres of intellectual life in the colony. They sold magazines imported from Europe and those of local production; they published newspapers, almanacs and catalogues, and sold paper, pens and pencils. Indies bookshops drew in many types of people, for they printed, sold and lent books in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese, as well as in Dutch, and Malay-language translations of Chinese stories. All the genres of traditional, handwritten literatures were now

on the shelves in print format: romances, poems, horoscopes, essays on religion, books on etiquette. Alongside these were new items: dictionaries, cookbooks, self-help and how-to manuals, and novels. Printed books on religion, distributed from Cairo and available for rent from mobile bookstands, created another kind of reading community in the Dutch colony.

Regional scripts had a brief revival because of the philological interests of European scholars. Colonial-era schoolchildren were taught these scripts in simplified and standardized form, modified to conform to European conventions on punctuation, spacing between words and text broken up into paragraphs. What had before been rare and hidden, such as magical lore inscribed on palm leaves in the possession of one caste or class or gender, now became available to anyone who could purchase a facsimile of such a text in a bookstore. It seemed the colonizers were penetrating every last corner of the colonizeds' existence. But it was too late. By the time the modern world of print technology, mechanized distribution systems and public co-educational schooling were in place to circulate the literary heritage of archipelago societies, few twentieth-century Indonesians had interest in the contents. Graduates of Dutch schools were reading Western political theory more than literary treasures of a past their schooling had made foreign to them. The speeches Sukarno made to audiences were peppered with references to European thinkers and expressions in European languages. Passages from his Panca Sila speech, delivered in June 1945 in Indonesian, illustrate this characteristic (1970: 43, 48):

> What is it that is called a nation? … Ernest Renan said that the requirement for a nation is *le désir d'être ensemble*, the desire to be united.… Let us look at a definition by another person, namely that of Otto Bauer …: "Eine Nation ist eine aus Schicksalgemeinschaft erwachsene Charakatergemeinschaft".… For decades past I have been thinking about this, that is, the principles of Indonesia Merdeka [Independent Indonesia], our *Weltanschauung*.[18]

Like-minded individuals joined together in reading circles and study clubs where they self-consciously practised modern behaviours. Reading a heritage manuscript was surrounded with ceremony: prayers and incense were offered before the magically charged manuscript was unwrapped and chanted in an archaic form of language before an audience. By contrast, the books circulated in Dutch schools and by the new lending libraries were read by individuals silently. Teachers' notes and commentary could be supplemented or challenged by study of books housed in municipal institutions or available for rent at coffee stalls. This mode of reading released the individual from a closed thought world. Study clubs were arenas for spirited debates that were carried on in Dutch. The language allowed it, the speakers could more easily express concepts of individual rights and critiques of capitalist economy in Dutch, and they could talk across ethnic boundaries because Dutch was the tongue they had in common with all the young men who came from towns on Sumatra or Sulawesi to study in the colonial capital and find work there.

Figure 5.1 Members of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, established 1911) at Islamic Union Conference in central Java in 1921. Male attendees wear the hybrid men's dress that combined items of Western and Javanese dress. Women members in Javanese dress are bareheaded. The Dutch language banner proclaims the conference (source: KIT Tropenmuseum Amsterdam 60009089).

The form of these talk-fests was modelled on Dutch organizations. There were elected chairmen, minute takers and treasurers. Very quickly members wanted to join together in federations and speak to broader audiences. It was this felt need that propelled the decision to give up the prestige language of Dutch in favour of Malay, as Soewardi Soerjaningrat had done in 1913. A number of factors assisted these school graduates in moving towards the goal of a national language for a unified people. The use the Dutch made of Malay was important.

From as early as 1611, the Dutch had used forms of Malay to reach archipelago Christians. Merchants and missionaries compiled word lists and sample dialogues in Dutch and Malay, and translated religious tracts and portions of the Bible into Malay. In 1674 the first attempt at writing a Malay grammar was published by the missionary Joannes Roman. Many varieties of spoken Malay existed, alongside the literary Malay of manuscript tradition, and there were debates among Dutch linguists regarding "high" versus "low" or "market" Malay. Standardization of spelling and usage was spurred from the mid-nineteenth century by the proliferation of training courses for careers in army, school, health and business. By 1902 the colony's schools were supplied with a new dictionary containing 10,130 Malay words written in Latin script (Sneddon, 2003: 91).

In 1908 the colonial government established a commission to provide reading material in Malay for schoolchildren and for adults enrolled in literacy programmes. The commission evolved into Balai Pustaka (Hall of Reading or Library Room) in 1917. It commissioned translations into Malay of fiction and non-fiction from many European languages, and published original works in Malay. It standardized the language. Through its libraries and bookshops Balai Pustaka distributed schoolbooks, fiction and popular science, as well as pamphlets on topics such as rearing children and bicycle repair. Balai Pustaka was both a disseminator and a barometer of modernity in the colony. A new kind of person turned to the printed page in order to learn how to function as parent or commuter. Pamphlets, novels and primers engendered a growth in vocabulary and syntax, for Malay now had to cover a far greater range of functions and topics than it had in classical literature.

Indonesians were not just readers of new forms of literature in new varieties of Malay; they now wrote in Malay. By 1925 there were around 200 newspapers publishing in Malay across the archipelago. It was in this context that the lawyer Muhammad Yamin (1903–1962), in a speech to the First Youth Congress held in Batavia in 1926, advocated Malay as the language best suited to foster an archipelago-wide culture and sense of unity. He delivered his speech in Dutch. At the Second Youth Congress of 1928, delegates, this time making their speeches in Malay, proclaimed Malay as the language chosen for homeland and nation. It was henceforth to be called *bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian). The delegates' historic declaration has become known as the *Sumpah Pemuda*, or youth oath. Commitment to the Indonesian language was linked to youth, self-assertion and the future. Young people in the colony were demonstrating their affinity with movements for nationhood that grew out of European historical experience and that had been mushrooming worldwide since the second half of the nineteenth century.

Ideals inspiring the political parties formed in the Indies in the 1920s and 1930s came from France, Russia and the United States. Nationalism, socialism, communism, liberty – all were attached to the word "Indonesia" that members used to mean "ours" in contrast to "the Indies" by which they signified "theirs", meaning the Dutch. Membership of the National Party of Indonesia, the Socialist Party of Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia, and so on, formed between 1921 and 1927, was in the dozens, hundreds or thousands, but historian Takashi Shiraishi (1990) argues that the impact of these parties was much broader than membership numbers would suggest. A handful of Dutch-schooled men created a public discourse that made concepts such as "Indonesia" and *merdeka* (independence, independent) everyday words and objectives.

Dutch-educated Indonesia enthusiasts carried their own version of "uplift" to the masses. Branches of political parties and self-help organizations opened in towns across the archipelago in the 1920s and 1930s. Ki Hajar Dewantoro's Taman Siswa schools combined Western and Javanese methods of learning and subject matter, and were widely copied in private schools everywhere. Communist Party leader Musso (1897–1948) founded trade unions amongst wharf

labourers and railway workers. Schoolteacher and journalist, S. K. Trimurti (1912–2008), focused on women's issues in the labour movement; she was to be a founding member of the Workers' Party of Indonesia in 1946 and serve as Minister of Labour (1947–1948) for the Republican government during the struggle for independence. Dewi Sartika (1884–1947) started schools for girls in west Java. Soewarni Pringgodigdo (b. 1910) founded Isteri Sedar (Alert Wives) in 1930 to campaign for monogamy and female suffrage.[19]

Men and women who aspired to political independence had to decide whether to work inside colonial systems or to struggle independently. The "cooperators" accepted government jobs and appointments to councils in the major municipalities and to the all-Indies People's Council, the Volksraad. It was formed in 1916 and began regular sittings in 1918. The Volksraad was a multi-ethnic body, its (male) members representing Dutch, "Foreign Orientals" (Chinese, Arabs) and the major Indigenous ethnic groups, as well as community organizations. Members were either appointed by the governor-general or indirectly elected. The Volksraad was not a parliament, but a sounding board for the colonial government: an advisory body. It could review the budget and make recommendations, but it had no legislative powers and could be ignored without repercussion by the Dutch authorities.

Non-cooperators also had limited opportunities to make their mark. Their activities were under surveillance, their newspapers subject to censorship, their meetings likely to be broken up and their members charged with sedition. Rising politicians like Sukarno, Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966) were silenced through gaol and exile. Some communist non-cooperators launched revolutions in 1926 and 1927 that were quickly put down. Colonial controls of the 1930s caused many in the nationalist camp to despair. For others, the goals of nationalists were irrelevant or misguided, or of no interest since they pursued other visions.

Democratizing the study of Islam

The technologies and organizing principles that Dutch colonial rule mediated caught up all Indonesians, not just Christian Indonesians or the aristocratic elites who spoke Dutch and made tours of Europe. Western modernization influenced seekers after Islamic truth and opinion makers in Muslim environments. Modern transport and communications bridged distance between specialists in Islam across the archipelago and intensified contact between them.

In most places the colonial state took on the sultan's role as patron of religion. The experience of greater intrusion by Christian Europeans into Muslim affairs had variable effects. There were Dutch scholars of Arabic, Persian and Islam who drew on Indigenous informants, collected and studied Islamic texts of local production, and compared the "customary" or "community" law of the Indies' many ethnic groups with the body of Islamic rules and precepts (sharia). There were specialized government departments to deal with and "contain" Islamic leaders. Colonial government's desire to tidy up and rationalize was

applied to Islamic matters too. It appointed Indonesian specialists in Islamic jurisprudence to its council of *ulama* to come up with uniform interpretations of points of Islamic law and practice. Mosque *penghulus* were appointed to district law courts to contribute an Islamic perspective to cases involving Muslims that came before Dutch magistrates. *Penghulus* administered oaths on the Quran for Muslims in their capacity as functionaries of the colonial state.

While segments of a community's Islamic leadership were caught up in the colonial state, others remained seemingly oblivious of it. Ann Kumar (1985) has studied and translated sections of a diary maintained by a peripatetic Muslim known as Mas Rahmat. The name shows his roots in a Javanese Islamic culture. *Mas* is a Javanese title for a man. It indicates a near relationship, as it is used by wives to address their husbands and by both men and women to address men where friendly, but respectful relations exist. *Rahmat* is Arabic for "mercy". Mas Rahmat wrote his mother tongue, Javanese, in Arabic script. In 1883 he travelled across Java by train through a landscape stripped of its forests, signposted in Latin alphabet (known as "Dutch letters" in the archipelago), with the Dutch flag fluttering from every pole. Mas Rahmat's account of this journey was a record of names: who came to ask his opinion on points of religious belief and practice; who kissed his hand; who brought him gifts and offers of lodging; the names of caves he meditated in and the individuals for whom he mediated conflicts. The Dutch do not star in his journal of a year of wandering.

Mas Rahmat's journeys were within Java; he did not go beyond it. Pilgrimage to Mecca might have heightened his awareness of Dutch influence over his homeland. Mecca would have brought him into contact with Muslims from many parts of the colonized world. Mas Rahmat would have observed how Europeans were encroaching, even on the fringes of Arabia's holy cities. In 1866 European powers were calling on the Ottomans to control the annual outbreaks of cholera that attended the pilgrimage; by the 1890s they had obliged Meccan authorities to construct quarantine stations and conduct health checks on pilgrims intending to pass through European ports. From the Indies government perspective, pilgrims returning from Mecca were also "infected" with hostility to European colonizers. Whenever there were "disturbances" of public order in the Indies – demonstrations, protests by armed men, the communist uprisings of the 1920s – *hajis* were among those arrested.

It was the colonial state and its commercial shipping that brought Indies Muslims into direct, regular contact with the Islamic heartland. The Royal Packet Company conveyed Indies passengers to Arabia and Egypt. The Islamic heartland was not a static place, but undergoing its own ferment as a consequence of closer contact with Europe. When Napoleon led a French invasion force to Egypt in 1798, over 300 archaeologists, epigraphers, philologists, cartographers, engineers and other professionals accompanied him to begin systematic study of Egypt's pre-Islamic past. Locals were caught up as onlookers, labourers and assistants.

The Ottoman empire lost its European provinces just before the Diponegoro War in Java. Its leaders were engaged in pre-emptive measures to retain the

empire's West Asian and African provinces by intensive study of the West. From the 1790s Istanbul maintained permanent embassies in West European capitals and was engaged in the systematic gathering of new knowledge and its dissemination. Inventions of the Christian West became acceptable to Indonesia's Muslims once they were established facts of Turkish life. A significant example is the printing press and its contribution to the intellectual life of Muslims.

The European printing press had reached Ottoman provinces by the end of the fifteenth century, and Java by 1624, but the press was unable to play the same dynamic role of stimulating literacy and intellectual life that it had in Europe until the Ottomans lifted the ban on printing in Arabic in the nineteenth century and declared the mechanical press acceptable to Islam. Elizabeth Eisenstein (1983: 13) has estimated that eight million volumes were printed in Europe in the first fifty years following Johannes Gutenberg's invention of the printing press around 1439. Her study follows the rapid spread of movable type presses across Western Europe, the "intoxication" of individual or private reading, the opportunities bookish knowledge brought for consultation and comparison, the resuscitation of old learning, the dissemination of esoteric and new learning. Indonesian Muslims had to wait another 300 years before they could be beneficiaries of the mass production of books and the "democratization" of knowledge. Egypt changed Muslim communities worldwide after the Ottoman caliph lifted the ban in 1822.

At first the Ottomans permitted only a government printing press, but in 1862 the Egyptian press was privatized. From the 1860s, commercial publishing companies based in Cairo began printing Qurans, dictionaries, pamphlets and classics of Arabic scholarship both for local consumption and for export. Products of the Egyptian press started appearing in Indies' mosques and bookstalls in the last decades of the nineteenth century, at the precise time that the archipelago was being bound together by steam, rail, tram, telegraph and postal service. Cairo overtook Mecca as the standard setter for students of Islam (Laffan: 2004).

The historian Michael Laffan argues that modernization brought a fundamental change to the way Indonesian Muslims gained religious knowledge. He says it was a change that had political consequences for the colony and its successor state, the Republic of Indonesia. Previously, pious (and adventurous) individuals had left home communities in the Indonesian archipelago on a personal quest for religious knowledge. They had spent years of study in Mecca or Medina in an intensely personal relationship with a teacher, and then built up their own one-on-one relationships with students from Southeast Asia through whom they sent religious opinions in the form of *fatwas* back to their home communities. They made copies of key Arabic manuscripts and translated some of them into Malay for disciples in the archipelago. Laffan finds little evidence that Indonesian scholars who made long-term sojourns in Mecca, Cairo or Yemen had an impact on Arab scholarship or scholars. Those who returned to die among Indonesian communities perpetuated the mystique of the holy man who gains knowledge through withdrawal from regular society and who communicates his learning as secret knowledge to a personal following. Charisma persisted from beyond the

grave. In death his memory was honoured through the pilgrim's vigil more than by study of his actual writings and religious teachings.

According to Laffan, significant change in Indonesian Islam came about when printed dictionaries and religious books came on the market and put access to "secret knowledge" into the public domain. Religious authority stems from mastery of Arabic. Quran and Hadith were written down in the eighth century, so that the student from Indonesia had to learn both the Arabic of the Quran and sufficient contemporary Arabic to function on the pilgrimage and study trips. Early dictionaries (Arabic to Arabic) listed words by their root letters (consonants). These dictionaries belonged to the manuscript tradition: they circulated amongst a small group of teachers and followers through copying, annotating and personal transmission. They were lexical aids for the learned. An Arabic–Malay dictionary became available for archipelago scholars in the mid-nineteenth century. It was organized by themes. The student had to locate the unknown Arabic word in the dictionary by first identifying its classification (e.g. a name of Allah, a word to do with religion, or a word for things belonging to the physical world).

In 1885, Sayyid Uthman (1822–1913)[20] compiled and printed in Batavia a twelve-page *Kamus Kecil* ("Short Dictionary") of words, questions and commands in Malay followed by their equivalents in Arabic. It was designed for pilgrims going to Mecca. A decade later he reissued it, now giving the Arabic word or phrase first and equivalents in Sundanese as well as in Malay. In 1888 Uthman published a dictionary of the Arabic vocabulary of the Quran and the Hadith with their Malay equivalents so that individuals might attempt to read these core texts of Islam on their own. Between 1925 and 1927 Balai Pustaka issued a four-volume *Kamoes Arab–Melajoe* (Arabic–Malay Dictionary). It brought a Western method of organizing Islamic knowledge in its arrangement of the words in alphabetical order. Organization and the script, which was the Latin writing system, made the volumes accessible to students from the colony's Dutch schools. Several more Arabic–Indonesian dictionaries were published in both Latin and Jawi scripts by Indonesian scholars. Laffan says these dictionaries are evidence of the emergence of individual study and silent reading within the Indonesian Islamic tradition, and that Muslim scholars and businessmen were now part of the modernization process. In an Indies context these trends challenged the Dutch commonplace that the West was dynamic and modern, the Islamic world backwards and conservative.

A recent focus of research is on the Hadrami network in Southeast Asia (Mobini-Kesheh, 1999; Laffan, 2003). Hadramaut is the southwest region of the Arabian Peninsula. Hadramis have a long tradition of trading around the Indian Ocean and of male emigration. Colonies with burgeoning economies attracted Hadramis. Numbers, accordingly, increased quickly in the Indies in last quarter of the nineteenth century. Most Hadramis settled and worked in Batavia or Surabaya. As Arabs, Hadramis had an importance in Indonesian communities beyond their business interests. Many claimed to be descendants of the Quraysh tribe of Muhammad, so might be welcomed as husbands for daughters of the pious, and they were regarded as having a special, innate knowledge of Islam. A clue to

Hadrami perspective on Indonesians may, perhaps, be gleaned from a phrase book published in Cairo in 1885, which prefaced many commands with the words "Ya walad!" (Arabic) or "Hai anak!" (Indonesian), meaning, "Hey, Boy!"

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Indonesian Islamic life in many parts of the archipelago seemed steeped in mystical practices for realizing within the self a union with Allah, rather than focusing on outward observance of Islamic practice. The many Indonesian branches of Sufi brotherhoods showed how Indonesian sensibilities were in tune with emotional responses to Islam across the Muslim world. But reformist impulses from the Middle East also reached into Indonesian Muslim communities. Numerous Indonesians were receptive to the reformists' argument that the Sufi focus of energies on inner rapture had allowed the Muslim world to be easily overtaken by Christian powers. The solution lay in a return to Islam as it was believed to have been practised in the time of Muhammad. Some reformists added that Muslims should also catch up with the West in matters of science and technology.

In 1912, with royal sponsorship, the Muhammadiyah was founded in the "Muslim quarter" of the sultanate of Yogyakarta. The title of the organization reflected its goal for men: being like Muhammad. Members were encouraged to model their behaviour on Muhammad in matters of dress, comportment and daily habits. In practice, this meant: rejecting batik because of its Hindu and Buddhist motifs; learning Arabic, the language Muhammad spoke; putting away "superstitions" such as belief in the intercession of saints; and renouncing practices that had "indigenized" Islam, such as the widespread belief among Javanese that making a pilgrimage to the graves of the sultans of Mataram at Imogiri was the equivalent of going to Mecca. Muhammadiyah also aimed at changing mosque practice. For example, the organization pushed for preaching of the Friday sermon in a language each congregation could understand, rather than retaining the tradition of delivering it in Arabic.

Muhammadiyah aimed at creating an Islamic alternative parallel to the society established in the Indies by the Dutch. It set up a network of schools, libraries and health clinics so that members could reduce contact with Dutch people and Dutch institutions as much as possible. In 1917, Muhammadiyah set up a separate organization for women. It was called Aisyah, the name of one of Muhammad's wives. Aisyah presented women members with an Islamic model for female behaviour. This organization for women also opened schools and clinics, and it trained female preachers. It advocated limiting mixing between unrelated men and women, as well as personal distancing from the colonizers. Its magazine, *Suara Aisyiyah* (Voice of Aisyah), showed women in Javanese dress with their hair covered (Schulte Nordholt, 2011).

Muhammadiyah and Aisyah had to decide to what degree they could associate with the organizations being established to promote Indonesian independence. Many saw nationalism and nation as part of a larger Western design to break up identification with the universal Muslim community (*umma*),[21] so that its constituent parts could be kept under Western domination. Joining with Sukarno and the nationalists therefore presented difficulties.

Aisyah members, who were bound to base themselves on Quranic revelation, had to oppose the women's parties that were campaigning against polygamy. Mindful that the historical Aisyah had been a wife at the age of nine, they could not support Isteri Sedar members who wanted the legal age for a girl's first marriage raised to fifteen. Muslim women's associations did join groups with overtly feminist and nationalist goals in the Congress of Indonesian Women in 1928. The federation's leadership attempted to retain its constituency by focusing on issues all could agree on, such as promoting schooling for girls, and by keeping contentious issues off the agenda of its annual conferences (Blackburn, 2004, 18–19). A sign of the deep divisions among Indonesian women and the different alignments they were making internationally was the eventual exit of Isteri Sedar over the Congress's refusal to condemn polygamy. The question of women and public space was also thorny. Muhammadiyah congresses required women members to gather in a separate hall where they could listen to the proceedings by microphone, but not contribute to discussions, ask questions, or even be visible.

Muhammadiyah positioned itself in the Indies mix as modern. Its schools were like Western ones: pupils studied in purpose-built schools in graded classes with printed books. Subjects such as arithmetic and geography were offered as well as religious subjects. Teachers were salaried and appointed by the organization. Muhammadiyah members rejected as "superstition" the accumulated wisdom of centuries of scholars, arguing for the application of individual reason in matters of faith and adherence to first principles.

In 1926 another Muslim organization was founded, this time out of Java's *pesantren* tradition. It was called Nahdlatul Ulama (Rise of the Scholars). Nahdlatul Ulama is usually placed within the history of Indonesia's nationalist struggle for self-rule, but it was also a response to contending forces within the wider Islamic world. It opposed reproducing the Wahhabism of Arabia in the Indies to displace expressions of Islam flavoured by the believer's own culture. To Muhammadiyah members, many practices of Nahdlatul Ulama members, such as night vigils at graves of Muslim saints, were simply "wrong" or "ignorant".

It is in *fatwas* issued during the 1920s and 1930s that the concerns of ordinary Muslims and adjustments to daily life in the colony can be traced. In these two decades, three Islamic organizations in the colony issued *fatwas*. They were Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and Persis. The latter is a contraction for Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union). M. B. Hooker (2003) and Nico Kaptein (2004) have studied the questions, rulings and reasoning of *fatwas* issued for Indonesians in the twentieth century. Examples of the questions asked are evidence of the perplexities of daily life as experienced by ordinary people in the Indies. Are prophets alive in their graves? Is it permissible to summon Muslims to prayer by beating a drum? May a girl ride a bicycle? Should a married woman pray at the mosque or at home? Is it legitimate to charge interest? Can lottery funds be used to finance building a mosque? Is it permissible to listen to the Quran recited on the radio? Can Muslims live a pious life under a Christian colonial government? Is it permissible to eat tinned meat from the United States? These *fatwas* are equivalents of the memoirs and autobiographies of the Dutch educated, because

they reveal what ordinary people were pondering. They show how global forces from the Middle East and the West were acting on Indonesians in big and little ways. Indonesians perceived themselves caught up between contradictory forces. The *fatwas* suggest that, for most Indonesians, Islam rather than the West should provide answers to twentieth-century problems. The degree to which daily life for everyone was conditioned by Western practices and standards can be seen in the matter of the marking and observance of time.

Time: days, calendars and waste

The Dutch planted Christian time in Indonesia and introduced European devices for measuring it. In the late thirteenth century, the invention of the mechanical clock in Europe had allowed for a greater precision in determining time than sundials and water clocks. Clocks on church towers and town halls were visible markers of the authority of church and government to regulate the individual's day. Invention of the watch in the late sixteenth century made knowledge of time personal and portable; the human body now carried its own monitor, although watches were neither reliable nor cheap until the mid-nineteenth century. Greater precision in watch making allowed the expectation that all watches would show the same time.

Factories in the Indies imposed their time regimen on workers, who had to arrive at specified hours and work shifts of set lengths determined by the needs of production, not by the cycle of Islamic prayer times. Concepts could develop about using time, wasting and losing it, and marking off personal time from employer's time. The multiplication of clocks and watches allowed for the scheduling of meeting and parting, and so allowed accurate forward knowledge of a train's arrival, a diary of business meetings, a timetable for classes and examinations. This ability to predict time became a crucial aspect of societies undergoing industrialization. To run trains safely on rails required, for instance, the establishment of regional and national time zones. From 1852 the Royal Observatory at Greenwich (England) began transmitting the time telegraphically for international shipping. Meeting in Washington, DC in October 1884, representatives of twenty-five countries attending the International Meridian Conference set a system of single standard time for the whole world. The world was divided into twenty-four time zones, each with a span from east to west of fifteen degrees, with the prime meridian running through Greenwich (Goudsblom, 2001).

For Muslims it was irksome that a system emanating from Christian Europe, and not from the Islamic heartland, should determine time worldwide.[22] The calendar by which the Dutch set events in the Indies identified Year 1 as the birth of Jesus. It displaced the Islamic calendar in which Year 1 marks Muhammad's establishment of the first Islamic government in Medina.[23] Colonial life proceeded within Christian belief and manipulation of time. The Gregorian calendar (inaugurated by papal decree in 1582) synchronizes calendar and seasons, unlike the Muslim calendar, which does not allow humans to alter Allah's time. The Dutch Republic adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1583 and accordingly introduced it to territories they brought under their control in Indonesia. This

calendar, which historically had resulted from the desire of Church authorities that Catholics everywhere should celebrate Easter on the same dates, gradually became universal time or Common Era. Japan was the first of independent Asian countries to adopt it in 1873, and the Republic of Turkey was the first independent Muslim country to adopt it in 1926.

As colonial rulers, the Dutch also dictated that Sunday should be the day of rest when the business of office, school and factory ceased, rather than stopping public transactions at noon on Friday to allow for communal Islamic worship. Indonesians were used to thinking of time as belonging to their superiors. Courtiers spent hours at court waiting to be summoned. Now time was tracked and filled by the demands of Dutchmen. Western clocks affixed to mosques announced an alternative means of calculating prayer time. Indonesian bodies carried Western timepieces. Old photographs of Indonesian men show the chains of pocket watches.

There was another model for Indonesian Muslims who rejected the Christian West. That was Japan. Japan's motto of "Asia for the Asians" and the strength of its military became increasingly attractive to many Indonesians in the Dutch colony by 1940.

Japan: "leader of Asia, protector of Asia, light of Asia"

Western technology did not just intensify relations between inhabitants of the archipelago and Europe, and between them and the Middle East. It increased their awareness of their immediate region. Japan's defeat of a Russian army on the fringe of the disintegrating Czarist state in 1906 became known to newspaper readers in the Indies. It was Japan's rapid industrialization and ideology of "strong nation, strong people" that appealed to Indonesians who joined nationalist parties in the Indies in the 1920s and 1930s. They were not interested in Japan's socialist and communist parties, but in those groups promoting a military character for society and teaching sacrifice for the national cause. Japan's rising industrial might was achieved at the expense of its farm and factory workers, but the crushing tax burdens and work regimes imposed on ordinary Japanese to build up the state seemed acceptable to middle class enthusiasts for a strong nation in the Indies. Hatta made a three-month visit to Japan as it prepared for a war economy in 1933 and returned to the colony impressed by its factories equipped with the latest machines (1981).

Anti-Fascists among Indies politicians, such as Sjahrir, recognized that colonialism and imperialism were not uniquely Western phenomena. They knew that the Japanese had seized Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria in 1895, 1925 and 1931 respectively, and were using the resources of an expanding empire to build up Japan's military and industrial might. Indies anti-Fascists therefore urged on the Dutch, as more "mature" colonizers, a programme of accelerated preparation for autonomy. A federation of many nationalist organizations demanded that the Volksraad be transformed into a fully elected body with legislative powers. The slogan "*Indonesia berparlemen*" ("A parliament for Indonesia") indicates the degree of Western influence on the politically active in the colony in 1939. At

that time, the loudest voices were demanding government based on, and accountable to, the colony's inhabitants.

When a previous threat to the colony was apprehended in the opening months of the First World War, parties based in Java had agitated for a defence force because the colonial army (like Indonesia's armed forces today) was geared to fighting the local population, not external enemies. On the eve of the Second World War, the Royal Netherlands Indies Army numbered about 40,000. Over half the force were Indonesian men equipped with light machine guns and swords. They were supported by a logistics network that could swiftly bring in reinforcements, supplies and field hospitals to conflict zones. Experience of fighting in Aceh had produced mobile teams of fifteen to twenty-five men trained in guerrilla tactics for operations in mountainous jungle terrains. But the Indies force did not have the numbers, equipment, training or experience of warfare against a professional army to be able to defend an archipelago state that stretched west to east over 5,271 kilometres.

The Indies government focused preparations on stockpiling weapons and positioning small commando units. It resisted demands for Indonesian participation in government and planning defence. In May 1940, when the Netherlands was overrun by Germany, the colonial government activated emergency conditions and suspended all political parties in the colony. Dutch men were assigned militia duties, but Indonesians were left out as Japanese armed forces occupied Vietnam, Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines. Fighting at sea, in the air and on land occurred on the fringes of the colony around the oil fields of northern Sumatra and on islands of eastern Indonesia. The bulk of the Indies population was on Java. They witnessed the flight of Dutch administrators to Australia and the surrender of the colonial army to Japanese forces in March 1942. Indonesians, under military occupation, duly waved the Japanese flags that the new rulers distributed as they marched through the archipelago's towns and watched as Japanese soldiers took control of railway junctions, radio stations, plantations and head offices of Western companies.

Japanese rule of the Indies lasted a short three-and-a-half years, but it had an all-encompassing impact and left a lasting legacy. Evidence of the Dutch was systematically obliterated: street names were changed; statues of Dutch heroes were knocked down; Dutch speech was banned in public places and government offices. School children had to blacken Dutch words out of their primers. Dutch people who looked white were soon taken off the streets and confined in prisoner-of-war camps. Indigenous political leaders who offered their services to the new Japanese military administration were deputed to draft Indonesian labourers as a vast, unpaid workforce for Japan's wharves and coalmines and for Japanese-occupied states on mainland Asia. Being foreign, Indonesian forced labourers could not run away and melt into populations of Japanese, Thai or Burmese speakers.

The Japanese divided the Indies into three territories and three administrations: Java under the Sixteenth Army; east Indonesia (Borneo, Sulawesi and islands between Java and New Guinea) under the Navy; and Sumatra under the

Twenty-Seventh Army. Japanese plans called for a reforming of Southeast Asia's borders. Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and Singapore were to become a new state alongside Java, while east Indonesia, which the Japanese viewed as primitive, was to become a permanent part of Great Japan. Each section of the former Indies was to produce raw goods for Japan's industries. Wartime conditions soon made regular export of goods to Japan impossible. Japanese administration secured its authority by sealing off provinces into autonomous units with movement of goods or people between them cut off. Especially in Java, ordinary people soon faced severe shortages of rice and clothing.

One of the first agencies of government opened by the Japanese military was the Propaganda Office. Radio sets were distributed to villages and hung from poles in public squares to broadcast a steady rhetoric of hatred for the West and Westerners, praise for the sacred emperor and exhortations to sacrifice for the state. Political organizations of the late colony were permanently banned. In place of parties, founded by Indonesian politicians to campaign for independence, the vote and workers' rights, were mass parties established by Japanese military authorities to instil duty and to harness the labour of the population for Japan's war against the Allies. The new authorities promised independence for Java once the war against the Allies had been won.

Japanese rule proved a complex problem for Muslim Indonesians. The heavy stress on Asia did not sit well with those whose models for belief and behaviour lay in the Middle East. They opposed the pressure of Japanese officers to get rid of all foreign languages, Arabic as well as Dutch; they did not welcome the Indonesian-language Quran that the Japanese had commissioned and published in 1944. Village religious heads were more enthusiastic. They got trips to Jakarta[24] for month-long training programmes where they endorsed the anti-Dutch, anti-Christian sentiments of their trainers. They also welcomed the Japanese formation of the Army of Allah (Hizbullah) in December 1944.

As in any colony, locals made Japan's Indonesia function. Indonesians continued to staff most government offices for the Japanese, some at higher levels than before. Defeats inflicted on Japanese forces by the Allies in 1943 and 1944 were not known in the archipelago. Japan controlled the airwaves and even time itself, which was set on Tokyo time. But Japanese war planners advanced preparations to train militias and to instal in Java a government run by Indonesians to prevent re-establishment of Dutch colonial rule in the event of Japan's defeat. In Sumatra and Java, Japanese army officers inducted young men into a martial culture through rigorous military exercises and ideological formation. Militias were kept separate and regional or religious in orientation to prevent their potential for uniting and thus posing a serious threat to Japanese occupation forces. A similar strategy was employed to contain demands for national independence. In June 1945, sixty-four Indonesians resident in Java were selected by the military command to meet with seven Japanese officers to devise the structure of an independent state within the Japanese empire. Tokyo decreed that the state should encompass Java only, but in the minds of Indonesian members of the committee it should embrace the entire territory formerly held by the Dutch.

Visions for a better state

All sixty-four members of the Preparatory Committee spoke Dutch. They came from the privileged classes and had experience in party politics. Two of the three women members had been municipal councillors in the multi-ethnic city administrations set up by the Dutch in Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya; the third had a law degree from Holland. Such a group represented the 250,000 Indigenous inhabitants of the archipelago who were fluent in the language of the Dutch colonizers. Only seven committee members came out of Islamic schools. This minority faction of the committee wanted to give a specifically Islamic character to an independent Indonesia, and could therefore be said to represent the approximately thirty-nine million who identified themselves as "Slam" (Muslim) and who had responded most to the Islamic parties that organized boycotts of Chinese businesses. All members of the committee belonged to the group "cooperating" with the Japanese. There were no representatives in it of anti-Fascist politicians. They spent the Japanese occupation in hiding or in gaol.

The committee was still a forum for debating competing models of governance from a variety of world systems. Japan offered an imperial model. Six of the Indonesian delegates favoured drawing on their own royal traditions, but the non-Javanese were against a Javanese king heading the new state, while Javanese proponents were torn between the merits of the various royal houses on Java. The lawyer, Maria Ulfah Santoso (1911–1988), championed a Western model: she proposed a bill of rights that would define and guarantee the liberties of every citizen.

Sukarno persuaded the committee to dismiss Santoso's proposal. He argued that citizenship in a nation-state was sufficient protection for everyone. His personal experience in pre-war politics and as head of the Japanese-created mass party Putera[25] inclined him to conceive nation as an organic whole. Politics should not be an arena where competing rights of individuals were defended, but a process of reaching "consensus". In a speech, delivered on 1 June 1945, famous to Indonesians as the Panca Sila (Five Pillars), Sukarno set out fundamentals on which all should be able to agree. These were: nationalism, humanitarianism, government by consent, social justice, and belief in God.[26] Sukarno and Yamin argued for a republic, headed by a president who should be *asli* (Indigenous, meaning in this context not of Chinese or Dutch ancestry), and a parliament of representatives. Responding both to pre-war politicians who had championed cooperatives and to those who denounced "sinful capitalism", the committee wrote into the constitution that the state should "regulate" natural resources and run the economy according to "the family system".

In these matters, the committee showed the influence of European, Japanese and "Nativistic" models. An Islamic model of governance was the other alternative committee members had to consider. The minority faction argued that what united members of the future state was Islam. Sukarno countered by arguing that the common experience of Dutch colonial rule was the cementing factor. He emphasized the multiplicity of ethnic groups, traditions and beliefs that had been amalgamated into one political unit by the Dutch. He argued that the Dutch had

fostered ethnic pride to hinder the consciousness of a single common identity within the colony, and therefore the new state could only be held together by the broadest of convictions.

The word Sukarno chose for God in the Panca Sila was the inclusive Tuhan from Sanskrit, rather than the exclusive Allah of Arabic. In his view, the territories amalgamated by the Dutch, splintered by the Japanese, would voluntarily join together only in a state based on commitment to Indonesia, and not on sectarian beliefs. For the Muslim majority, however, the committee attached to the principle or duty of belief in one supreme God, "the obligation of implementing Islamic law for adherents of it (Islam)". In the original Indonesian the clause is: *dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemuluk-pemuluknya*. This has become known as the Jakarta Charter or the "Seven Words", and is an issue of unfinished business, for the clause does not clarify if it is the state that must enforce Islamic law through a council of religious judges or whether obedience to sharia is a matter of individual conscience.

At the conclusion of deliberations, committee members were informed by the Japanese chairman that they could proclaim the new state in September that year. But outside forces upset Tokyo's timetable. On 15 August 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allies, but did not announce its defeat to Japanese forces stationed in the Indonesian archipelago or to members of the committee preparing for independence. On 16 August a youth group, better informed than the committee, kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta to compel them to declare independence, so that the Allies would remove Japanese forces from a sovereign country and not restore Indonesia to the Dutch. As a result, on 17 August, Sukarno proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia. The following day, the committee adopted the constitution, appointed Sukarno as president and Hatta as vice-president, and transformed itself into a central national committee to serve as an interim parliament.

By 18 August, the majority faction of the committee had had time to digest the implications of the Seven Words in the constitution's preamble. The Jakarta Charter might not mean simply that Muslim Indonesians were encouraged to be pious practitioners of their religion. If the clause meant that government should implement Islamic law, then religious judges would have oversight of parliamentary legislation and veto power if they considered laws proposed were contrary to the Quran. Sharia required the application of Islamic punishments, legislation of second-class status for non-Muslims, and a wholesale reordering of the economy since banks would not be able to charge interest on loans. There was also the question of the borders of an Islamic state. Some committee members had proposed in earlier discussions that Indonesia should be a Malay Muslim nation and so should also incorporate Brunei and majority Muslim areas of Thailand and the Philippines, and discard West New Guinea. Nationalist identity should be modified in favour of fostering an Islamic identity within the Muslim zone in Southeast Asia.

On the threshold of success, Sukarno's fears were threefold: first, that Japanese forces in the archipelago would obey the Allied command to maintain the status quo and crush popular uprisings for Indonesian independence; second, that

support for Indonesia would evaporate amongst opinion makers in Christian and Hindu communities; and third, that non-Javanese would reject domination by the majority Javanese. He did not use his proclamation of Indonesia's independence to set out the ideals of the new state. Instead, the text of the proclamation that he read and that had Japanese input, gave nothing away:

> We the people of Indonesia hereby declare our independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power, etc., will be attended to in an orderly fashion and as speedily as possible. In the name of the People of Indonesia. Sukarno and Hatta.[27]

On 18 August the committee dropped the Seven Words from the preamble to Indonesia's constitution.

In 1945, there were few models of Islamic states for Indonesian visionaries to copy. Pakistan had not yet come into being, nor had Malaysia or the Islamic Republic of Iran. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were ruled by kings. While Sukarno's republicans set up (on paper, at least) the organs of government for a unitary state, organized a defence force, and pursued alternating policies of negotiating independence and armed resistance to returning Dutch troops, one segment of resisters pursued an Islamic option, that of *hijrah*.

Hijrah is an Arabic word that refers to the withdrawal of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to the city of Medina in 622 CE. There they negotiated acceptance by the town's tribes of a society governed by Muhammad according to precepts he claimed were given to him in a series of divine revelations. From this historical event came the formulation that Muslims should not live under a government of non-Muslims, but should withdraw, even if the non-Muslim government tolerated the practice of Islam. According to this doctrine, a truly Islamic life could only be maintained under a Muslim ruler; non-Muslims in government were an affront and could tempt Muslims to change their religion.

During the republic's four-year struggle against the Dutch (1945–1949), the *hijrah* option was led by S. M. Kartosuwirjo (1905–1962). He had participated in colonial-era politics in parties that had Islamic agendas, but from 1940 he called for Muslims to disengage from the colony through *hijrah*. In that year he set up a community in Garut in West Java that was based on total submission to him as the movement's luminary. He called it Darul Islam (House or Place of Islam). Kartosuwirjo's tactic of rarely appearing in public fostered among his followers the idea that he could render himself invisible. It was a belief with ancient roots in Java, and had affinities with Shiite beliefs in the hidden imam. Kartosuwirjo denounced Sukarno's republican administration because there were Christians in it. In 1948 he launched his militia against troops loyal to the republic. Kartosuwirjo's men also burned down mosques and killed villagers who refused to submit to his rule. At the time, Indonesians were mentally unprepared for this kind of fighting between Muslims. They have since then been reluctant to admit in history books that more Indonesians died fighting fellow Indonesians for control of the nation's minds and resources than died fighting the Dutch.

Issues raised by the Jakarta Charter went unresolved, and remain so today. Kartosuwirjo's followers have resurfaced in Jemaah Islamiyah (Community of Muslims) through which they carry the fight against Christian Indonesians and against Western values of pluralism and secular government by attacks on churches, hotels, restaurants and embassies. Also unresolved by the years of independence struggle were: the ideal structure of the state (whether unitary or federal), the permissibility of communist ideology and the rights of communists within Indonesia.

The end of an era

On 27 December 1949, the Dutch government relinquished claims to rule Indonesia and began repatriating civilians and military to the Netherlands. The world recognized the new nation led by President Sukarno. The social, political and economic environment of the new state no longer rewarded adopting Dutch ways. Those deeply imbued with Western schooling and ideals felt alienated from the great mass of citizens and uneasy, because the major Islamic parties had issued *fatwas* during the struggle years commending the killing of Christians and Eurasians. Muslim opinion makers at town and village level had benefited from the colony's railways, newspapers and steamships, but they were still often hostile to those Indonesians most plugged into modern information (Christians and Chinese). Many of the terms of independence just negotiated with the Dutch were unpopular. Dutch businesses, for example, were protected, and Indonesia's representatives had agreed to cover the debts Holland had incurred in trying to crush their independence.

The proclamation of independence had heightened expectations for a better future, but years of military rule and warfare had sent Indonesia backwards. It emerged as an independent state in 1949 with fewer roads and bridges than it had had in 1940, with factories broken down, forest reserves and plantations overtaken by squatters. The Japanese had systematically undone the connecting links between the archipelago's major islands, but they had left Sukarno's group with the tools to renew those connections in radio, mass organization, propaganda and militias outside the control of the new state's armed forces.

The Dutch campaign of the 1880s and 1890s to end slavery in fringe areas of the archipelago was less important for future labour legislation than the experience of work on plantations, in factories and on the docks. John Ingleson (1986) has argued that concepts of social justice took powerful hold during the first half of the twentieth century through the union movement. Dutch ideas such as opposition to child labour, the institution of individual work contracts, and encouraging women to leave the workforce to be full-time mothers continued to influence the thinking of the new nation's manual workers and economic migrants.

Tropical crops created the modern world economy. A European culture of civic political life had put the Indies on the map and transformed the lives of Indonesians. Opium became the outmoded palliative of a nineteenth-century colonial past. In the first half of the twentieth century, tea, coffee and tobacco

fostered a sociability in the colony that flowered in civic associations, self-help groups and political organizations of every kind. William O'Malley reminds us, in a 1980 study, that the parties campaigning for a secular Indonesian republic were dwarfed in membership numbers by parties that promoted the rights of ethnic groups and the revival of sultanates (O'Malley, 1980). The 6 per cent of the population that the 1930 census takers had found capable of independently composing a document in the Latin alphabet were most likely to be affiliated with the small nationalist parties and the ones who most identified with the new power holders.

The flag that the youth of 1928 had pledged themselves to was modelled, not on Islamic banners, but on flags of Europe. The national flag had two broad bands of red and white, colours that, according to the state's ideologue, Muhammad Yamin, had been characteristic of all Indonesian cultures for 6,000 years. The Sang Merah Putih[28] that fluttered over the new nation bore no Islamic symbol such as a crescent moon and star. The Republic of Indonesia was ushered into the world of sovereign nations by politicians who equated modernity with Westernization.

6 Coming of age

Post-colonial globalization

Setting boundaries within the world community of nations

Indonesia's new leaders had spent their youth in colonial schools. Within the bounded space of the Dutch colonial state they had studied from a single curriculum in the language of the colonizer in the Latin script. Their schooling had broken their links to their own ethnic communities and cultural heritage, and had moulded them into an elite whose workspace was the colony. Benedict Anderson (1993) argues that the single political unit of the Indies, colonial language, schooling, and communications systems including newspapers and mechanized transport enabled school graduates to "imagine" a new identity. Because they were inducted by the Dutch into a world of nation-states, these graduates gave that imagined identity a national tag, Indonesian, and they campaigned to turn the colony into the nation-state of Indonesia.

The concept of nation embraced by Indonesia's nationalists was the product of an internationalism emanating from the political and historical experience of the West. Indonesia's nationalists who formed government in 1950 were heirs to Europe's Westphalian model of international relations. Signatories to the Peace of Westphalia[1] recognized a European community composed of sovereign states, each one more or less equal with the other in law, whose modes of interacting should be conducted through diplomacy and treaties. The accord required states to accept limits to their sovereignty in granting foreign embassies sovereign space within the host state and conceded immunity to embassy staff. At the same time, the Westphalian model allowed an extension of a state's sovereignty into other countries because, through embassies, a state monitors its own nationals and vets prospective visitors.

On 27 December 1949, when the Dutch officially transferred sovereignty, Indonesians therefore began their independent existence within a political form developed in the West and as partners in an international community of similarly sovereign nations. They had achieved the second pillar of Panca Sila, Indonesia interacting in the world of nations in a "just and civilized humanity" (Sukarno, 1970: 43–44). As masters of Indonesia's government, Indonesians now replaced the Dutch in determining how they should act on the international stage. But many global institutions, procedures and practices in which Indonesians were

now participants were also products of the West, and developments from Western Europe's history, politics and culture. Calendar, time, weights and measures, organizational structure and record keeping, business forms, Sunday rest, English language and Latin alphabet – all were standard operating procedures developed in the West and introduced to (or imposed on) most of the world's populations through the agency of colonial rule. Indonesia's new leaders saw themselves as heirs to Western inventions, technologies and modes of operation; they were modern. At this stage in Indonesia's history voices challenging the single, "universal", Western way of being modern were muted.

An important early task of government was to determine who belonged to Indonesia and who did not by establishing identities that were no longer "imagined", but described in writing in legislation, passports and identity cards. From the late nineteenth century, the colonial state had begun the process of taking away from individuals their freedom to travel without restriction and undocumented across land and sea boundaries. Indonesia was born into a world where territorial boundaries were charted on maps, constructed on Western cartographical principles,[2] and where a universal system of passport control was already in place. Western photographic and finger printing techniques served to establish nationality and to make the state central to including or excluding individuals through its passport-issuing authority.

Passports were the tangible symbol of government control over peoples' movement *across* state borders. The identity card performed the same function over peoples' movements *within* the state. Inside Indonesia the system of passports and identity cards operated to the disadvantage of Chinese residents. The 1945 constitution granted rights of belonging by blood (membership in an Indigenous ethnic group), rather than by birth, with descent legally recognized only through the father. The constitution provided for the acquisition of citizenship through naturalization, but stipulated written forms of verification concerning birth, ancestry and residence that were often impossible for many immigrants and descendants of immigrants to produce, especially after years of warfare and turmoil in the transition from colony to independent state (1942–1949). Indonesian law did not (and still does not) recognize dual nationality. Indonesians of Chinese descent could not secure citizenship status until the People's Republic of China relinquished claims on Chinese living overseas in an agreement negotiated with Indonesia in 1955 (Coppel *et al*., 1982). The identity card continued, until recently, to identify ancestry, as did the colour of the passport cover issued to naturalized citizens. Both were tools government used to monitor and restrict the business activities, education and career options of Indonesia's Chinese.

Identity cards in use in Indonesia fix the individual by name, place and date of birth, marital status, religious affiliation and political class.[3] These functions transfer from religious authorities to the state the duty of record keeping and raise the issue of subordinating religious authorities to national government. Indonesia's system of surveillance derives from techniques introduced by the Japanese military for control of the population between 1942 and 1945. Residents of adjacent streets must register with the local head, and keep the head

informed of visitors and other changes to household composition. Heads of groups of streets pass information up a chain of reporting authorities.

Another visible sign of the state monopolizing authority is the issuing of currency and banning the coinage of other countries as legal tender. From its earliest beginnings as a nation-state Indonesia adopted the international decimal system for its currency and pegged the basic unit, the rupiah, to the United States dollar. It put the faces of national heroes on paper money and postage stamps to endorse exemplary behaviour and convey an approved narrative of the nation.

These tangible signs of government were introduced into communities still reeling from years of revolution. Between 1945 and 1949, during the struggle for independence against restoration of colonial rule, there had been popular uprisings against allies of the Dutch and Japanese. In Sumatra's plantation belt, sultans and their families were murdered; in Java village heads were publicly humiliated or lynched; in Aceh an entire class of administrators was killed; everywhere Chinese property was torched. Landlords and tenants fought each other during a communist-led uprising in Madiun, East Java, in 1948. Darul Islam attacks on villagers and representatives of the state in West Java continued even after a Muslim president headed a sovereign Indonesia. The Japanese had accustomed Javanese to being called out on to the streets to shout slogans in state-sponsored parades. News of Sukarno's proclamation of independence had produced more rallies, sloganeering, graffiti and the formation of militias. Armed bands fought each other for turf and weapons (Cribb, 1991). Revolutionary times engendered distrust and accusations of treachery, as well as a heady sense of the start of a new cycle of history.

Many ordinary people emerged from the revolution with a sense of entitlement. The reality was that most Indonesians had lived under Dutch rule during the years of the independence struggle. They had worked for Dutch employers; retirees had taken Dutch pensions. Now public behaviours celebrated being Indonesian and revolutionary. As free people in a free nation, former employees occupied plantation lands leased to foreign companies, and town dwellers refused to vacate houses when their Dutch owners emerged from Japanese internment camps to reclaim their property. The great bulk of the population expected the state to keep the price of essential goods, such as rice and cooking oil, low through subsidies. Men who had joined guerrilla bands were hostile to moves by the top brass to demobilize them in favour of building a professional and disciplined national army responsive to central command. Revolution had given opportunities to criminal gangs, as well as to units whose leaders drew inspiration from Islam's history of *ghazi*[4] and "armies of Allah".

The men setting up Indonesia's government had learned to fear mass action, for they had seen its excesses during the struggle years. Cabinet ministers made themselves acceptable to the victorious Allies. Sukarno still favoured Japanese forms of social control such as the single mass political party, but Sjahrir (prime minister 1945–1947) pushed instead for Europe's multi-party system and ministerial government. Throughout the independence struggle the republic's administrators had negotiated with the Dutch and made concessions, while proponents

of "100 per cent independence" had argued that Indonesians should fight for it. Militias had carried out guerrilla warfare and refused to accept the armed forces commander appointed by the civilian politicians. Republican administrators had even accepted the Dutch federal model for independence, in which Sukarno's republic was just one of sixteen states, and left West New Guinea out of Indonesia altogether.

In many ways, therefore, the politicians in charge of the state in the early 1950s seemed not to represent the aspirations or values of the majority. They used the resources of the state to protect foreign interests and property and to enrich their political clienteles, rather than improving living standards for the great mass of the population. Nationalism flourished in xenophobia, but it had not sunk roots in the sense of creating a common social will that transcended particularities of ethnic pride, religion and party politics. Those in the "in-group" appointed each other to the central committee, which continued to function as an interim parliament until elections were finally held in 1955. Coalitions of political parties controlled cabinets for a few months at a time, before factions coalesced around a different constellation of leaders and took over. Prime ministers rarely clung to the post for as long as a year. In such conditions, ministers barely had time to learn their duties and formulate policy before they were replaced, and there was no opportunity to develop a professional civil service because party managers saw office holding as the opportunity to procure jobs for supporters and to divvy up the perks while they could (Feith, 1962).

During the struggle for independence, the Dutch re-occupied the archipelago, set up fifteen states, and greatly reduced the territory of Sukarno's republic. Dutch military action secured Dutch control of Indonesia's oil, rubber and tin, and left the republic rich in population but little else. Within each new state the Dutch set up administrations staffed and headed by prominent local families. This "federal solution" was perceived by many as classic colonial "divide-and-rule", but it did respond to regional, ethnic and religious interests and to apprehensions in many areas of Javanese domination.

Ambonese Christians were the first to try to opt out of Indonesia. They proclaimed the Republic of the South Moluccas in April 1950. During the Second World War, Japanese naval administrators of eastern Indonesia had ended the hold of Indigenous Christians on government jobs and replaced them with Muslim Ambonese. Christians took revenge when the Dutch returned. They welcomed the Dutch plan of setting up a federation, and made the State of Eastern Indonesia, established in December 1946, the best functioning and most nearly autonomous of all (Chauvel, 1990). The victory against the Dutch by forces around Sukarno brought the spectre of Muslim Javanese domination, loss of jobs, and reprisals against men who had served in the colonial army. Even though many Christians, including Ambonese Christians, had joined the nationalist cause, fear of Muslim-dominated government, poor economic prospects in the new Indonesia and a continuing sense of connection to Holland propelled the attempt to break away and chart a separate existence. The new state would encompass Ambon, Seram and Buru Islands, and West New Guinea.

These territories form an outer defensive arc for Java. Politicians of all parties in Jakarta were committed, for security and nationalist reasons, to maintaining all the territory of the former colonial state. Sukarno sent his forces against the breakaway republic. Naval blockade, air strikes and ground troops crushed resistance after four months of fighting. Jakarta's appointment of Muslim governors, army commanders and officials has kept the South Moluccas within Indonesia ever since.[5] Targeted in-migration by Muslim settlers makes Ambon today a Muslim majority area. Within months of the fall of President Suharto in 1998 fighting broke out along an advancing Muslim frontier in eastern Indonesia. Muslim gangs were joined in 2000 by Laskar Jihad[6] forces recruited from Java and from as far away as Malaysia to terrify and subdue the region's Christians.

At the same time as putting down the South Moluccas Republic, Jakarta orchestrated the dismantling of the entire federal system that the Dutch had created. On 17 August 1950, President Sukarno announced the establishment of the unitary Republic of Indonesia. Power was now concentrated in Jakarta and public aspirations for states' rights were quashed. Breakaway movements in predominantly Muslim regions of the new nation in 1952 and 1957 were suppressed by negotiation and armed intervention. *Federasi* (federalism) became the "F word" in Indonesian politics. The right of provinces to control their natural resources and to privilege regional, ethnic and religious particularities were not accommodated by central government until the very end of the twentieth century. Only when Jakarta was weakened by the Asian monetary crisis of 1997 and by new breakaway movements along Indonesia's perimeters was legislation enacted devolving powers to local government (Law No. 22/1999), which took effect on 1 January 2001.

Achieving Panca Sila's third pillar, the unity of Indonesia,[7] required integration of West New Guinea into the republic. Under the terms of the independence agreement, West New Guinea was to be incorporated into Indonesia within a year of its signing, but negotiations failed and the Dutch continued building up a separate Papuan state. Indonesians remained determined to live in a country that was identical with the former Netherlands East Indies, and took control of Western New Guinea in the 1960s through a combination of military incursions and bargaining at the United Nations. West New Guinea's coastal regions had had a long history of interaction with peoples of the eastern archipelago. The Dutch had only begun introducing colonial rule beyond a narrow coastal strip in the 1920s. In the 1950s they poured funds and personnel into developing Papua through the standard "tools" of colonialism: schooling to build up a local elite; specialized government departments; modern communications systems; maps that demarcated the territory for a new nation; and propaganda that stressed difference from Indonesia's peoples, cultures and history.

Indonesian personnel took over economic development and the identity formation process once West New Guinea became the Indonesian province of West Irian (later renamed Great Irian[8]) in 1969. But while history seems to repeat itself, there is a key difference. The Indies never became a settler colony of the Dutch. No more than 0.4 per cent of inhabitants of the Dutch colony were ever

Europeans. The Indies was run by the colonized. (A law of 1913 opened all government positions to Indonesians save that of governor-general.) By contrast, Indonesians from across the archipelago have moved to Papua to govern, police, farm, work in the Freeport copper and gold mine, run transport, set up businesses and shops, staff offices, schools and universities. The majority of town dwellers in Papua are now Muslims from Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi. They are well educated and prosperous in comparison with the Indigenous, who are concentrated in rural hill areas, and likely to be Christian and poor (Upton, 2009). Influential spokesmen among the Indigenous beneficiaries of Indonesian communications networks participate in a global trend of minority peoples demanding separate statehood.

Cultivating an all-Indonesian identity

Indonesia began its existence as an independent nation with about 17,000 political prisoners. Most of them allegedly supported the alternative vision of communism for Indonesia. Like Ambonese Christians, communist Indonesians were perceived by many in the new state as traitors, for they had fought against Sukarno's troops in 1948, diverting resources from the fight against the Dutch. In such conditions, D. N. Aidit (1923–1965), who took over the Politburo of the PKI[9] (Communist Party of Indonesia) in 1951, adopted a policy of integration of communism into society. Communist cadres should ally politically with nationalists and focus on building up masses of supporters through addressing issues that directly affected ordinary Indonesians. Indonesia's population grew by twenty million in the first decade of independence (Ricklefs, 2008: 273–274), and no government could provide sufficient rice, housing, schools, hospitals, clean water, roads and jobs quickly enough, or deal with the plight of millions in the agricultural sector who could not sustain their families on tiny plots.

In these early years Indonesia's president focused more on the republic's place in the world, leaving policy making on domestic issues to the government of the day. Prior to becoming president, Sukarno's sole journeys abroad had been to Japan in 1943 staged by his military hosts, which included an audience with Emperor Hirohito, and to Japan's regional military headquarters in Saigon in 1945. Now, as president, he toured the world's capitals to bring Indonesia to global attention. Sukarno tested his welcome in capitalist and communist states alike. In 1955 he advertised Indonesia's rejection of (Western) imperialism and colonialism by hosting a conference of Asian and African countries. This conference of "non-aligned" nations internationalized Indonesian domestic politics. Leaders who attended, such as India's Nehru, China's Zhou Enlai and Egypt's Nasser, supported Indonesia's claims to West New Guinea, and Indonesia played a part in international Cold War and Islamic politics by excluding the two Koreas and Israel from the conference.

The nation's economic and social conditions required methodical planning and practical solutions, but politicians appeared to be fighting partisan causes in back rooms and on the streets. As early as 1952 Indonesia's armed forces

Figure 6.1 National Election Poster, 1955. In this poster for the 1955 national election President Sukarno warns: "Be careful! Don't let the general election become a strife-torn struggle between the parties which could break up the unity of the Indonesian people." In 1956 Sukarno campaigned to "bury the parties", and he closed down the elected parliament by presidential decree in 1959 (source: KITLV 51F7).

attempted to bring domestic political life to an end. Sukarno's intervention gave parties a continuing role in managing government. General elections for a two-house parliament held in 1955 finally gave politicians (hitherto self-appointed) the opportunity to discover if they did indeed have a mandate from voters. The electoral process extended to all citizens, male and female, aged eighteen and over, rights previously never existing in the archipelago's sultanates or in the colony. Elections challenged the mass of Indonesians to perceive themselves as owners and directors of the state. Parties adopted identifying icons. Electors punched a nail through the symbol of their preferred party on the ballot paper so that none could be excluded from voting because of inability to read the Latin script that listed all the parties contesting the election.

Elections seemed to engage Indonesians in a new relationship with their government. Over 90 per cent of eligible voters exercised their say. Twenty-eight parties made it into parliament. Voters appeared almost evenly divided between those apparently endorsing a nationalist, religiously pluralist state and those endorsing a more Islamic cast to state and society. Almost as soon as voters had had their say, however, President Sukarno began a campaign to negate the results and change Indonesia's political complexion. He exhorted Indonesians to give up on Western liberalism and replace it with a system reflecting Indonesian "mentality". On 28 October 1956, he called on Indonesians to "bury" the political parties (Sukarno, 1970: 81–83) and instead to accept a government "guided by the wisdom of the people's representatives". From a speech delivered in 1957 offering a "concept" for implementation, it was clear the people's representatives would be appointed by himself. This new system, Sukarno argued, would be authentically Indonesian, based on mutual help, consultation and consensus,[10] Panca Sila's fourth principle.

Saving the state by suppressing public opinion was to become a common policy of decolonizing countries across Asia and Africa. In Indonesia, martial law was imposed nationwide from 1957 until 1963. During this time, civil courts were suspended, Dutch citizens expelled, Dutch businesses nationalized, political parties banned, newspapers censored, the elected parliament was closed down and evidence of universal youth culture was suppressed. Army personnel staged the cutting of young men's long hair for the national press; state radio banned the playing of Beatles' records. Staff of the censorship division in the Department of Information blacked out paragraphs in America's *Time* magazine before it hit Indonesian newsstands.

This new political system was called Guided Democracy. A national council replaced the elected parliament. Its members represented Indonesians according to their "function" in society as peasants, labourers, women, youth, army officers and regional leaders. Opposition could not legitimately exist in Guided Democracy, for the state was depicted as an organic whole, one huge family. Sukarno's cabinet grew to over 300 members. Poets, journalists and artists of all kinds were pressured to renounce individual expression as narcissistic and un-Indonesian, and to turn out works supporting the state's goals.

Sukarno declared himself "Bearer of the Message of the People's Sufferings" and "Mouthpiece of the Revolution".[11] In 1960 he encapsulated his particular

national vision in the slogan Manipol-USDEK. Manipol or Political Manifesto stood for social justice, revolutionary spirit and "retooling" (read political appointment and dismissal) of government administrators. The acronym, USDEK, was formed from the opening letters of the Indonesian words for the Constitution of 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity. The moral and mental energies of citizens were directed to denouncing the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 as a neo-colonialist plot of British imperialists intent on encircling Indonesia. Sukarno turned over to the armed forces the management of businesses expropriated from the Dutch in December 1957. He did not insist on auditing and transparent regulatory practices as necessary tools for Guided Economy. He preferred to rely on the fertility of Indonesian soils and the patriotism of the Indonesian people rather than on economic planning and accountability. The Eight-Year Development Plan, announced in 1960, called for self-sufficiency in food, clothing and other basic necessities within three years. In actuality, growth almost ceased in the years following the inauguration of Guided Economy. Inflation was running at 635 per cent by 1965, and the rate of the Indonesian rupiah against one US dollar in that year escalated from 5,100 to 17,500.

In cities and rural areas class tensions were heightened despite Sukarno's ideal of an organic society. Newsreels from the early 1960s show many forms of intimidation in public places. There were rallies of thousands carrying banners, shouting slogans, threatening enemies; youth sped around on motorcycles flying flags bearing the hammer and sickle. Sukarno's Indonesia broke with the Netherlands and the United States, and withdrew from global institutions dominated by the West such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. Crowds were encouraged to attack people and property identified as Western, and to burn libraries that held Western books and knowledge.

On 17 August 1965, President Sukarno declared the Jakarta–Phnom Penh–Hanoi–Beijing–Pyongyang Axis to combat Western imperialism. He had chosen his friends among dictators and killers of class enemies. Sukarno did not call for killing his political opponents, but he did announce his support for the Communist Party's policy of giving military training and weapons to a "fifth force"[12] of peasants and workers. This paramilitary force was to operate independently of the armed services' commander and be answerable only to the president. Many Indonesians at the time feared that it would in reality be the Communist Party's private army.

In his memoirs, Ganis Harsono recalled witnessing the conduct of government in London during his first overseas appointment as an assistant press attaché for the young republic. It was 1952 and, in Indonesia, the army chief of staff, Abdul Haris Nasution (1918–2000), had just surrounded the presidential palace with tanks and artillery and demanded that parliament be dissolved. Harsono writes (1977: 97):

> The politics that I witnessed in London were played according to strict rules and traditions accumulated over seven centuries of trial and error. Of course, I noticed there were heated arguments, violent debates, killing remarks and

> dirty-name-calling. But outside Westminster, no politician of any political shade would ever dream of plotting to overthrow the government by non-constitutional means. No politician wanting to lead the government would ever dream of toppling the existing government by way of recruiting the co-operation of sections of the armed forces.

Harsono goes on to say of the breakdown of the political process in Indonesia that the West was "guilty of presenting us with a mechanical toy without giving us the simple directions how to use it" and that it would take "perhaps decades or even a century" to develop a similar, stable political system (p. 98). Neither rule by sultans, governors-general, Japanese military nor by Sukarno conditioned Indonesians for compromise and protecting difference in the public arena, for rubbing along together in the one polity.

On 30 September 1965, a military group declared it was acting to safeguard the president and the Indonesian revolution from corrupt army officers. Squads captured and killed six senior army generals. Major-General Suharto swiftly gained control of armed forces stationed in the capital and of the state radio, and crushed scattered uprisings in Java's cities. On 11 March 1966, he obliged Sukarno to transfer the powers of president to himself.

Sukarno's solutions to the problems of governing Indonesia were undone in the months following the 30 September Movement. His opponents contrived the sinister acronym, Gestapu,[13] to designate General Suharto's version of events that communists had attempted to take over Indonesia. Army and civilian death squads systematically targeted individuals in cities, villages, government offices and universities. Working often at night, they rounded up victims and shot them. Bodies were publicly defiled, denied burial rights, displayed on roadsides or flung into rivers. Most of the killings were in Java and Bali. Roundup of a wider band of suspects resulted in their imprisonment without trial and subsequent banishment to labour camps on the island of Buru.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925–2006), the Indonesian novelist best known in Western literary and university circles, was on the list of suspects for his leadership of the People's Cultural Institute, the writers' and artists' organization sponsored by the Communist Party. His library, one of the most important private collections of manuscripts of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century works in Malay (a national heritage), was publicly burned by the army men who arrested him.

The British embassy had been burned to the ground in Sukarno's time. Now it was the turn of the embassy of the People's Republic of China to be the object of mob destruction. Suharto's Indonesia renewed ties with the West and ended them with China, prohibited the public display of Chinese characters, cancelled the teaching of Chinese language and history in Indonesian schools, closed Chinese-language newspapers, and in March 1967 outlawed the study of Mao, Marx, Lenin and Weber in the nation's universities. Government administrations, armed forces divisions, teaching and newspaper staffs were purged of leftist sympathizers. The new government constructed a national monument to

the slain generals and staged annual commemorative ceremonies in their honour. State television screened every year the officially commissioned five-hour docudrama "Treachery of the 30 September Movement".[14]

"What really happened?" has been a persistent question asked by Indonesians since the fall of President Suharto on 21 May 1998. Investigation inside Indonesia is for the courageous.[15] President Abdurrahman Wahid (r. 1999–2001) publicly acknowledged the unsayable in 1999 when he admitted that Ansor,[16] the youth section of his own organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama, had engaged in killing in 1966 and 1967. His proposition, that communist organizations should be allowed once again to function in a democratizing Indonesia and that Marxism should be reintroduced into political science classes, created a furore that contributed to the early termination of his presidency by parliament.

Pramoedya's memoir of political imprisonment and exile between 1965 and 1979, published in Indonesian in the year that President Suharto's government fell, posed the question "*How* did it happen?" He and his fellow prisoners were arrested "with no official writ of detention, by the authorities of the New Order government" (1999: 344):

> In legal terms, one could say, we were kidnapped. Our families were not told where we were held; our whereabouts were concealed from them. When we were transferred from one place of concealment to another, they were again not informed. Even when we were taken to Buru Island, where we were made to carry out a sentence of hard labor without even the benefit of a mock trial, they were left in the dark.
>
> After our strength had been siphoned from us, after we had been force-fed lectures and sermons on the merits of being upstanding citizens and of devoting one's life to God and the creation of a society based on Pancasila, the New Order government's unwavering ideology, the authorities remained close-mouthed, not deigning to send word to those families whose loved ones had been murdered or had died as a result of overexhaustion or work-related accidents.

Pramoedya had served terms of imprisonment under the Dutch and Japanese. *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu* ("The Mute's Soliloquy") is his meditation on the fruits of independence from the perspective of the labour and "re-education" prison camp on Buru (1999: 257):

> There are times in this exile of mine when I feel so lonely that I begin to fantasize about having been born a European and having equal rights with my fellow citizens under law and not having to serve a sentence for which I have never been tried. These thoughts always bring me back to the past, to the [Indonesian] revolution, and to the question of how we – how I – could have let this happen. "Weren't you there to stop it?" I ask myself. "Does this current atavism reflect the mental state of a people who are not free? Did the

> fires of revolution fail to spark the flame of freedom? Is that why we can't respect the rights of others – simply because they are different from us?"

"Great Leader of the Revolution" Sukarno inspired deep devotion among many Indonesians as the hero who righted the historical wrong of foreign rule. He was a larger-than-life figure who seemed to breathe love of Indonesia and Indonesians, and he was admired for telling the West to back off. But, after 1957, there was no freedom to criticize and no opinion polls were permitted to gauge actual public opinion. Many revering Sukarno today were not alive during his presidency. Sukarno remains, for today's generation, the Indonesians' champion. In 2002, when Malaysia expelled thousands of Indonesian illegal workers, Indonesian public affairs commentators did not lament the condition of their economy that could not provide jobs for all citizens. Instead, on radio, television and newspapers they took the line, "Sukarno would never have let Malaysia push us around".

In the formulation of Panca Sila, Sukarno had reached out to all Indonesians according to the prevailing ideas of the time. He responded to popular sensitivities by giving priority to religious belief. He conceded that belief in one God, originally the fifth pillar of Panca Sila, be elevated to first place. As president, he prodded the Department of Religion to declare Hinduism a tolerated religion so that Balinese might be accepted as full citizens of Indonesia. But Sukarno failed to realize Panca Sila's (now) fifth pillar: a society just and prosperous. His successor, Suharto (r. 1966–1998) made it his mission to foster the rapid economic development of Indonesia.

Back to the West?

Sukarno had turned to communist countries for ideas, loans, grants and technology. He had sent his creative people to the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Cuba and Albania. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was at the forefront of scientific research, but the launching of Sputnik in 1957 galvanized American research organizations and funding agencies. By 1969 the United States was the world's leader in scientific research and development. Suharto turned to the US, the wealthy West European democracies (including the Netherlands, Indonesia's former colonial ruler), and to Japan (Indonesia's wartime ruler) for dollars and ideas.

President Suharto came to power at the height of the Cold War. Indonesia was one domino in Southeast Asia that did not fall to communism, so Suharto was favourably viewed by Washington politicians and businessmen alike. Suharto benefited from timing in another way too. OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which Indonesia had joined in 1962, forced sudden, steep rises in oil prices in 1973 as a political-economic weapon against international support for Israel. Oil exports financed a massive expansion of Indonesia's economy until price crashes in 1982 and 1986. For Suharto, development, not revolutionary anti-imperialism, was the number one priority. The country was bankrupt in 1966, unable to meet the most basic needs of its swelling, restive population. In Suharto's view, people with prospects of rising

welfare would become immune to communism. Nationalist vanity had made Sukarno refuse import of rice from Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbours;[17] his anti-West prejudice had led him to cut Indonesia off from aid funds from the world's richest countries. Two critical acts of Suharto's early administration were opening Indonesia to Western investors and transforming the rice industry.

Suharto inaugurated a phase in Indonesia's national life that he called the "New Order". In the transition years (1965–1967),[18] the Communist Party was outlawed. Advocates of land reform were murdered or imprisoned, and the countryside was made safe for property owners. For a brief period the government retreated from the economic nationalism and xenophobia that had characterized Sukarno's "Old Order". In the view of Suharto's economic advisors (called the "Berkeley Mafia" because of their post-graduate degrees from the University of California), Indonesia's very survival depended on an immediate injection of foreign investment and loans. The 1967 Foreign Investment Law allowed foreign capital to invest in Indonesia's forestry, mining and manufacturing sectors, and gave foreign companies tax concessions and guarantees of protection. American and Japanese businesses flocked to Indonesia, as did advisors and aid groups such as the United States Agency for International Development. Indonesia's Economic Planning Agency developed a series of five-year plans with specific targets in terms of raising agricultural productivity, training engineers and computer scientists, building modern infrastructure, and developing heavy industry. Indonesia's inflation rate dropped from 600 per cent in 1965 to 10 per cent in 1969, and Indonesia's oil wealth produced an annual growth rate of 8 per cent in the decade 1970–1980 (Dick, 1985: 87).

"Miracle rice" was developed by the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines. It produced greater yields than native species, but was dependent on large inputs of pesticides and chemical fertilizers. Its introduction transformed rural Java in the 1970s. Better-off farmers with access to credit increased their harvests and income. Protected by the New Order government that had brought a swift end to land reform, landowners became capitalist farmers. They were able to increase their holdings and to introduce "efficient" practices such as hiring day labourers to prepare fields and harvest. Village women who had harvested rice with a small knife one stalk at a time lost the "safety net" of additional income from harvesting when contract workers were brought in. Returns from miracle rice made it attractive to government officials and military officers to buy up rice lands and turn them over to professional managers.

The new rice made Indonesia self-sufficient in its staple. Its production and management made many rural workers, particularly young women, surplus to requirements at a time when the new economic partnerships between foreign investors, Indonesian officials and Indonesian Chinese entrepreneurs were establishing factories in new industrial parks for the production of textiles, plastics, electronics, batteries, tyres and cement.

Indonesia has never been hospitable to a free market economy. Politicians shared the public's animosity to colonial economic policy that had created enclaves of production for export and had directed the state's policing and legal

system to protecting the interests of big business against plantation workers and miners. Indonesia's government leaders and managers also shared the pervasive hostility to Chinese and Indonesian Chinese entrepreneurs, who had proved able to adjust to changing economic and political conditions. For example, when the Dutch excluded Chinese from operating pawnshops and collecting tolls and market taxes in the 1890s, Chinese had moved into manufacturing and retailing textiles and ready-to-wear clothing, cigarettes, packaged foods and furniture, with prices and credit arrangements pitched to Indigenous consumers. Muslim market traders and cottage industry manufacturers could not compete. Their religious mentors linked ethnicity, religion and economic occupation together and condemned "sinful capitalism". The first political party formed by Indonesians in the twentieth century, Sarekat Islam (Islamic League, founded in 1911), did not have independence as a stated goal, but the promotion of the interests of Muslims. By 1919 Sarekat Islam had attracted over two million members and was running a campaign of boycott against Chinese businesses.

It was only in the wake of the 1929 world depression that colonial economic planners began developing manufacturing for domestic markets in place of imports. But Indonesia had only a very small urban industrial labour force when it gained independence and there were few Indigenous businessmen with capital for large-scale investments or experience beyond the small end of the economy. Pre-war political parties had been vague about the economy of an independent Indonesia. Most parties were inclined to socialist-style cooperatives and state ownership of transport, utilities and nationally important industries. Politicians had encouraged labour unions to focus on demanding political independence, rather than developing platforms specifically addressing workers' conditions.

The cabinets that ran Indonesia prior to Guided Democracy did not seek to undo the economic system inherited from the Dutch. For politicians, getting into cabinet meant the ability to reward backers and relatives with contracts and licences, rather than calling for tenders and public scrutiny. People with *koneksi* (connections) to office-holders specialized as brokers and fixers. They bought the rights to licences from their patrons and then on-sold them to people without political security: Indonesia's Chinese entrepreneurs. Under Sukarno's Guided Economy, Dutch businesses and property were seized by the state and turned over to the military to supervise, even though army officers did not have business degrees or long-range plans for managing assets, capital accumulation, investment and diversification. They had inherited practices since the independence struggle of working through Chinese entrepreneurs for provisioning their troops and for their own wealth creation. Accordingly, when Guided Economy gave them control of Dutch companies, they continued past cosy arrangements, and turned over operation to the one group in Indonesia that had substantial commercial experience, national, regional and international business connections, in return for fees and a substantial cut of the profits.

Politicians of all parties who gained the levers of power pursued policies to expand the share of Indigenous entrepreneurs in the economy. In 1959

Indonesian Chinese were barred from residing and doing business in villages. Government tolerated public displays of hostility towards Indonesians of Chinese ancestry and imposed quotas on their admission to tertiary education institutions. In the first fifteen years of independence Indonesia lost a generation of Chinese. Some 60,000 left for the People's Republic of China (Coppel, 2002: 336). Idealists hoped to take part in building a new China; others, unable to obtain a place in Indonesia's few tertiary institutions, enrolled in China's science universities. Others fled outbursts of Indonesian violence, especially prolonged attacks in West Java in 1963. By the 1970s many who had moved to China were disillusioned with communist government and attempting to leave, but Indonesia had lost their skills in a period of economic contraction.

Indigenous traders, owners of rice lands, fishponds and other small businesses were unable to realize the fortunes being made by foreigners, Chinese and Indonesians with political connections. They saw themselves as having helped Suharto and the military to wipe out communists from Indonesia, but had not got any benefit. The Muslim party, Masyumi,[19] which President Sukarno had banned, was still banned under President Suharto, and its erstwhile supporters nurtured grievances against Indonesian Christians. From this Muslim perspective there were too many Christians at senior levels of government and the military, and Christian communities were building better schools and finer churches. Many Chinese in Indonesia were a double minority because they were Christian as well as of foreign ancestry. Associations and newspapers representing Indigenous small entrepreneurs with strong Islamic orientation conducted a vicious anti-Chinese campaign in 1973. In January 1974, during a visit of Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, widescale rioting broke out in Jakarta. *Time* magazine reported on it this way (28 January 1974):

> The violence started with the burning of every Japanese automobile within reach of the roaming crowd – 100,000 strong at times – and quickly mushroomed into the sacking and setting afire of stores and businesses that sold Japanese products, especially those owned by overseas Chinese. As night fell on the first full day of rioting, the city shook with the crashing of rocks through shop windows, the crackling of flames, the jeering of looting mobs, and the occasional bursts of gunfire as police and troops shot over the heads of the crowds.…
>
> In the opinion of many Indonesians, however, it was not so much an anti-Japanese demonstration as an outpouring of Indonesian grievances. "The Tanaka visit," observed a leading Jakarta editor, "was merely the detonator."
>
> Among the feelings it detonated were outrage over the corruption of government officials and the ostentatious life-style of the rich generals. The students resent the special privileges held by the Chinese residents, who work harder and live better than most native Indonesians. They are also angry that the nation's new-found wealth (derived from oil, which during the past year

has jumped in price from $4 per bbl. to $10.80) has not bettered the lives of the Indonesian masses, whose per capita income is only $95 per year. In addition, the rioting obviously reflected a general dislike of the country's growing number of Japanese businessmen.

Economic nationalism, which re-emerged in the 1970s, opposed policies promoted by the World Bank and IMF that would have Indonesia phase out protective tariffs, import goods produced more cheaply elsewhere, and focus on manufacturing export goods where Indonesia could out-produce international competitors at lower cost. The fees paid by foreign and Indonesian Chinese entrepreneurs to be able to do business, get contracts, bribe government officials to avoid labour and safety legislation, and satisfy Indigenous joint venture partners made Indonesian products expensive and uncompetitive, especially when economic planners of the People's Republic of China began developing China's own export industries.

State corporations in oil, natural gas and steel also operated in an atmosphere of bribes, evasion of government legislation on safety and environment protection, a corrupt legal system and weak auditing practices. Government legislation in 1974 required all foreign investors to have local partners and that local partner had to be an Indigenous Indonesian. In practice, the same patterns repeated themselves. Government officials specialized in obtaining contracts and joint ventures for relatives and clients who turned over the operation of the business to Indonesian Chinese. A select group of Indigenous Indonesians with good connections in government therefore became shareholders in large businesses, and committed to preserving the prevailing economic order of state management of the economy, preferential treatment of the Indigenous and protectionism. A government or military career was the way to wealth for Indigenous Indonesians. For Indonesians of Chinese ancestry the recipe for financial success was an overseas degree, connections with China's business diaspora, partnerships with government and military, and investment overseas to protect funds from depredation at home. The risks were high, because success depended on their patrons retaining access to the nation's resources, but the rewards were even higher. The major corporations of the New Order were owned by immediate members of President Suharto's family and favoured Indonesian Chinese (Elson, 2001: 280–281).

Integration of Indonesia's economy with the West was based on the willingness of all partners to act corruptly. Indonesia was repeatedly nominated, along with Nigeria, as being one of the most corrupt states in the world. In 1999 it ranked last in transparency in a survey of Asian countries. Globally, the Transparency International Corruption Index for 2003 placed Indonesia at number 122 out of the 133 countries surveyed. Among Indonesians themselves, a 2002 survey found that the two most distrusted institutions in the country were the police and the judiciary (see Antlöv, 2005: 237). In 2010 the Transparency Index ranked Indonesia 110 out of the 178 countries surveyed, up from 111 in 2009.[20]

Political scientists and anthropologists have looked to Indonesia's history and traditional concepts of power to explain corruption as a product of a culture of gift giving. But Richard Robison argues that twentieth-century corruption grew out of twentieth century social and political circumstances including: a weak judiciary; under-paid police and officials; lack of a fully developed concept of rights on the part of citizens; and the individual's rational calculation of no recourse or protection for "whistle-blowers". He says corruption is a relationship imposed by the powerful on the powerless, and that it becomes entrenched because those in control of government profit from it (Robison, 1990: 99). In addition, there is no Islamic concept of checks and balances on public authorities (save sanctions of Allah). In Indonesia's case, two men, Sukarno and Suharto, abrogated power as president to rule the country for fifty years. Such characteristics of Indonesian public life have little to do with peculiarities of "national character", but they combined to engender amongst many a sense of "our turn" to plunder the nation's wealth.

Rising prices for oil and natural gas in the 1970s financed Indonesia's modernization. By 1981 oil and natural gas earned 80 per cent of the nation's foreign earnings and contributed 61.7 per cent of tax revenue (Robison, 1990: 103–104). The state invested heavily in steel, cement, petro-chemicals and infrastructure (roads, bridges, irrigation works, schools, hospitals), and fostered manufacturing of motor bicycles, television sets and processed foods to supply the domestic market. Following the global drop in oil prices in 1986, Indonesia's government began deregulating the economy. It allowed private banks to operate, lifted government controls on loans and deposit rates, and opened up transport, telecommunications and electricity to private and foreign investors. Foreign loans and investments were readily accessible in the 1980s and 1990s because Indonesia had conditions unobtainable in many Western countries: suppression of labour unions, and lax enforcement of laws regulating environmental protection and occupational health and safety. Big business corporations were those with impeccable political connections who acquired licenses by "gift" rather than competitive tender and were able to borrow on easy terms from state banks and send funds overseas. Indonesian Chinese firms invested heavily in Hong Kong, China and Singapore as opportunities widened and in anticipation of possible trouble once Suharto should no longer be president.

Suharto's development policies initiated in the 1970s and 1980s were producing documented improvements to the lives of ordinary Indonesians by the mid 1990s. In 1976 government estimated 40 per cent of Indonesians lived in poverty; by 1996 that estimate had fallen to 18 per cent. Infant deaths per 1,000 live births fell from 118 in 1970 to forty-six in 1997. Secondary school enrolments rose from 13 per cent of the young teen cohort in 1970 to 55 per cent by 1995. In the same period the fertility rate dropped from 5.6 per cent in 1971 to 2.8 per cent in 1997 (Strauss, 2004: 1). Between 1990 and 1997 Indonesia's economy grew by 7.6 per cent each year (Friend, 2003: 293). It seemed that President Suharto's policies were on the way to achieving Panca Sila's fifth goal of a prosperous society, if not yet one equitably sharing the nation's wealth.

Closer integration into the global economy, however, made Indonesia increasingly dependent on decisions of international currency traders. Mobile capital made Indonesia vulnerable because it could flee as quickly as it entered the country for investment and servicing loans.

The Asian financial crisis, which broke out in Thailand in mid-1997, was felt in Indonesia by November that year. Sixteen banks closed, businesses unable to service short-term foreign loans collapsed, the rupiah rapidly lost value, unemployment rose to 27.8 million in 1998 and nearly half the population fell below the poverty line, according to Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 149–150). Food prices rose steeply, bringing the crisis home in an immediate sense, because an estimated 50 per cent of the urban household's budget was spent on food and 57 per cent in rural regions (Strauss: 2004: 3).

In seeking rescue funds from the West in 1998, Indonesian policy makers were confronted with IMF demands for: new bankruptcy legislation; pressure on corporations to repay debts; auditing of government departments and corporations; closure of failing banks; an end to state sponsorship of big industrial projects; and withdrawal of state subsidies on basics such as cooking oil and petrol. IMF demands, which would compel Indonesia to submit to Western rules for global commerce, as well as the public attitude of IMF officials, provoked hostility in Indonesia. A photograph of IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, arms folded, apparently forcing a bowed President Suharto to sign IMF demands on 15 January 1998 was shown repeatedly in Indonesia's newspapers and on television. The president's daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (b. 1949, known as Tutut), declared that IMF loans and conditions would degrade the nation's dignity and were not wanted (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 159).

Middle-class professionals and stock brokers who had grown rich in the 1990s, seeing their assets lose value and their jobs vanish, joined students in protesting the government's continued protection of the business interests of Suharto's family and favoured associates at a time of national crisis. Students barricaded parliament; mobs attacked people who appeared to be of Chinese origin and set fire to their businesses. President Suharto resigned as his backers in cabinet and parliament, faced with a bankrupt state and chaos in the capital, abandoned him.

Recovery for ordinary citizens was underway by 2000. Based on results of Indonesia Family Life Surveys of 1993–1994, 1997, 1998 and 2000,[21] John Strauss (2004: 387) concluded that by 2000 Indonesia's unemployed were back at work, wages were recovering, school enrolments rising and health indicators suggested no long-term damage to child or adult health. Robison and Hadiz (2004: 215) argue that Indonesia's economic system did not fundamentally change after Suharto was pushed out of office. Allocation of the spoils of government (licences, contracts, monopolies) merely moved from Suharto's inner circle to political parties, parliamentarians and provincial governments. Following extensive devolution of powers to provincial governments in 2001, the power to control the economy simply became more unpredictable, diffused and chaotic. The military ceased to be protector of Indonesian Chinese, and a

familiar combination of populist, xenophobic and Islamic sentiment promoted the racial violence of 1998–2003.

Suharto's long presidency had stifled dissent, critique and analysis. He had forced all political life to be funnelled through three political federations – Golkar (the party of government), PPP (parties with Islamic agendas) and PDI (Christian and nationalist parties)– and controlled elections run every five years.[22] Suharto had promoted a rhetoric of law and order, which threatened that relaxation of control would allow the rise of communism once again and throw Indonesia back into the turmoil of 1965. His reign and policies produced an Indigenous middle class which gained university education, jobs in government and the professions; which enjoyed the new shopping malls, gated housing communities, toll roads and skyscraper skyline of Jakarta; which travelled around Indonesia and abroad; whose nationalism was grounded in successful modernity rather than Sukarno's anti-colonialism; and which had a preference for authoritarian government that privileged private ownership of property. Symbols of success became cars with drivers, foreign degrees, designer clothing, pampering in spas, and the latest in computers and mobile (cell) phones. Eighteen million Indonesians had already purchased mobile phones by 2003 (Hill and Sen, 2005: 61). Indonesia's potential opinion makers were hooked into global networks of communication; through their electronic "toys" this new middle class found multiple mirrors in which to see themselves and the world.

Communication revolutions: challenge of the global

Dating from the Republic's birth, Indonesia's leaders viewed the media as instruments of nation building. To this end they regulated press, radio, film and television, censored the content of programmes, and supervised writers, journalists and producers, requiring them to join licensing bodies answerable to government. Under President Suharto, the media were required to support national unity and harmony through downplaying factors of race, ethnicity, religion and class in film, fiction and news stories. The nation's media were to preserve cultural nationalism by keeping at bay foreign influences whether from the Christian West, the Muslim Middle East or Communist China. In the early years of Suharto's government this meant few newspapers, a single national radio network and a single national television channel, strict control of local programming, news broadcasts limited to those produced and vetted in the national capital, and bans. One-quarter of the nation's 163 newspapers were shut down in 1965 and 2,000 books were banned between 1965 and 1996 (Sen and Hill, 2000: 37).

In 1970 the government legalized privately owned radio stations and permitted broadcasts in local languages, but prohibited political programming. To ensure compliance, it required all radio broadcasts to be based on written scripts that had to be archived and available for inspection. Similarly, film scenarios had to be approved in advance of filming and finished films submitted to the Film Directorate in the Department of Information prior to their release into cinemas (Hill and Sen, 2005: 22).

At the same time, Suharto's government was promoting rapid economic development through advanced training of graduates in overseas institutions, acquisition of the latest in science and technology, manufacturing for the domestic market, and wealth creation for individuals with good connections to the power elite. Complemented by rapid expansion of schooling, these policies produced rising numbers of literate adults with jobs and money to buy the goods local industries were producing and advertising agencies were marketing. Important entrepreneurs in Indonesia (including Suharto's own relatives) wanted to cash in. The years of Suharto's New Order government were precisely those when rapid development of new communications technologies occurred in the West. Portable, battery-operated radios, video players, personal computers and laptops, satellite broadcast technology, digital processing, the Internet, e-mail and the mobile phone crossed national borders, expanding the means by which people could listen, watch and communicate in ways not easily monitored by government agencies. Cassettes and computers were marketed worldwide, copied in countless factories, and used as vehicles for foreign and local content.

Indonesia's policy makers, administering a country of islands, quickly grasped the potential of new communications technologies to extend Jakarta's reach to citizens in far-off places. In 1976 Indonesia became only the third country in the world (after the US and Canada) to launch a communications satellite. With the launching of an improved satellite in 1983 and construction of over 100 relay stations, state television still was able to reach only 65 per cent of the population (Sen and Hill, 2000: 116). Consequently, in 1986, the government legalized installation of satellite dishes and UHF antennae so more Indonesian households could pick up the national television signal.

The twin goals of development and a unified, national culture quickly came into contradiction. Indonesia could not compete globally if its citizens were shut off from information; its entrepreneurs could not grow richer. The government's decision on satellite dishes broke down its own cultural isolation policies: Indonesian households could now pick up programming from the BBC, CNN, STAR and television stations in neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore. To wean viewers from foreign broadcasts, the government opened the airwaves to Indonesian-owned, private television channels in 1988. In 1995 the government allowed these private television networks to produce their own news programmes. Chasing audience and advertising dollars, news producers imitated Western reporting styles that injected "excitement" into news broadcasts by taking cameras and reporters into the streets, filming "eye-witness" interviews and human interest stories.

New technologies and government accommodation resulted, by the 1990s, in a modern media world. Jakarta's major newspapers had become big businesses owning magazines and regional papers. Five privately owned television stations broadcast to an estimated 100 million viewers. Seven hundred privately owned radio stations offered their own interactive programming such as listener call-in and talk shows. In addition, publishing houses were putting 8,000 new titles into bookstores each year (Hill and Sen, 2005: 18, footnote 5).

The Internet offered even more information, images and ideas when Indonesia's first Internet Service Provider started up in 1994. Government spending installed computers in Indonesia's universities; international aid organizations supplied offices of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) with computers; Asian-manufactured "clones" of personal computers connected middle class homes to the World Wide Web. The Internet brought to individual users the potential for exchanging material free of detection by the New Order's monitoring agencies. Magazines went online and polled anonymous readers for their opinions; chat groups formed to talk about topics banned from public discussion; NGOs, such as Indonesia's Legal Aid Institute, brought human rights abuses to the attention of groups in Indonesia and their supporters overseas. Early Internet users were young, tertiary-educated residents of Jakarta, who had half of the nation's 7.5 million landline telephones that provided the dial-up access (Hill and Sen, 2005: 56). The spread of Internet cafés brought Internet access to this same demographic in towns across Java. By 2004 it was estimated that nationwide twelve million Indonesians (approximately 4 per cent of the population) were navigating keyboards and screens in the Latin alphabet. Users remained concentrated in Java (95 per cent) and were mostly male (75 per cent). With the advent of wireless Internet connections and the circulation of cheap, Chinese-made mobile phones, the numbers of Internet users expanded dramatically. Indonesian youth, male and female, today communicate through Facebook, blogging, chat rooms, text messaging and Twitter. Mobile phones pick up signals in rice fields and rural markets as well as in city malls, schools and university campuses. Today, around nine million Indonesians have Twitter accounts.[23] An estimated 250 million mobile phones makes Indonesia fourth-ranking in world usage (after China, India and the United States).[24]

For most Indonesians, press, radio and television remain their primary sources of information and entertainment, and these have offered an enormous array of opinion following media liberalization by President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (r. 1998–1999). Jurriëns (2009) describes media of the Suharto era as a monologue of government directed at the populace. By contrast, dialogue and interaction between media and the consumer–participant characterize media since Suharto's downfall, especially in radio journalism. Rumours can be reported and virtually anything said, without investigative reporting and substantiation. Radio and newspapers align with political and religious interests. Along with the Internet, they contribute to producing a lively sense of diversity, encouraging both a democratizing Indonesia of plural views and solidifying communities of hate.

It was not just rebellious or "cool" youth listening to Western pop music, or middle-class types watching banned foreign films on their video machines and CD players at home. Businessmen turned to international, online English-language news sources. Indonesian newspapers began vying for international attention by posting key articles in English translation on their websites and in their magazine supplements. They, too, chose the global language to direct information and advertising to neighbouring countries and to attract an overseas readership.

Post-colonial globalization is characterized by: technologies of miniaturization; illegal "cloning" of name brand electronics; pirated software; constantly dropping prices of electronic goods; speed of communication; and by quantity of information through the proliferation of books, magazines, films and websites. It is also characterized by entrepreneurs and producers worldwide acquiring and becoming proficient using the latest inventions from multinational corporations to launch their own ideas, cults, campaigns, pictures and products to consumers anywhere. Over the last four decades globalization has brought to Indonesia's citizens movies from America, Hong Kong, India and South Korea, and cartoons scripted and produced in Japan. Stores stock religious books that are translations of Arabic-language originals from Egypt, and "how-to", management, and personal improvement books translated from English. CD labels reflect and cultivate tastes for Western rock music or Islamic boy bands. These global products knocking over walls of exclusion mounted by the New Order are not from a single source; they are cultural expressions from the West, Asia and the Middle East.

Indonesians have shown themselves avid for the latest in mobile phones, laptops and recording devices, and quick to incorporate them into daily life. Angry groups bent on ideological purity set fire to symbols of Western seduction such as McDonalds; they bomb nightclubs, attack churches, and denounce Western values. But they do not torch electronics shops. They coordinate group activities through the West's mobile phone and Internet. They remain dependent on Western and Japanese invention because few state universities or institutes in Indonesia yet have substantial research and development budgets to pioneer new technologies. Indonesians' openness to Western technologies and their sophisticated applications of them rest in part on developments in the nation's stock of language skills.

Indonesian and English: languages for the modern world

As early as June 1947, while Indonesians were still fighting for national independence, the Republican government set up a language board. One decision was to change the Dutch "oe" vowel construction to "u" in personal names (for example, Soekarno/Sukarno). Comprehensive spelling changes, introduced in 1972, removed all last traces of Dutch modes of transliteration so that Djakarta, for instance, became Jakarta. Language commissions devised new terms to meet the demands of a new age in science, technology, business and academic discourse. However, their preference for reviving archaic Malay words or turning to Sanskrit meant that many of these new words never gained popular acceptance. More potent were journalists in introducing and popularizing new terms, because they drew on American English. *Riset*, for instance, is recognizable as "research" when research is pronounced American-style with emphasis on the first syllable. *Komputer* quickly became everyday usage for "computer"; the language planners' creation of *apurwa* from Sanskrit never stood a chance. Language development was also a goal of President Suharto's Second Five-Year Development Plan. It resulted, in 1988, in publication of a major new dictionary establishing Standard Indonesian.

Indonesia's rapid modernization was also aided by a decision, grounded in anti-colonial sentiment, to switch from Dutch to English as the primary foreign language to be taught in high schools and universities. Foreigners are struck by the use of English phrases within Indonesian casual speech, in advertising, on billboards, tee shirts and posters. The practice reveals the prestige of English as a world language, the dominance of English in international diplomacy, the great numbers of middle-class Indonesians able to study and travel abroad due to Suharto-led economic development, and the impact of American cinema and television, pop music and advertising of Western products on radio and in magazines. Language scholar James Sneddon (2003: 178) reports that a 1996 study of modern Indonesian usage identified over 600 adjectives and 500 verbs derived from English, as well as many nouns having to do with business and economics, education, health, science, technology and politics. Many urban state schools now offer bi-lingual instruction: science and mathematics are taught in English, other subjects in Indonesian, and parents pay high additional fees for this increased English-language content and promise of fluent speakers upon graduation. In Indonesian contexts, English words mark the speaker as trendy and modern. But, challenging the dominance of English now is the growing use of Arabic for terms, titles, personal names and greetings in public conversation, especially among those consciously Islamic oriented, and the greater incorporation of Arabic vocabulary into academic discourse.

Indonesia in the post-Cold War world

Dewi Fortuna Anwar (former spokeswoman for President Habibie) argues (2005) that after the Cold War Indonesia lost its former importance to the United States as a bastion against communism. Instead, the country became a target of US lobby groups that campaigned to link Indonesia's access to American markets, arms purchases and military training to their agendas on human rights, East Timor, environmentalism and causes such as the Freeport Mine.

Freeport McMoRan has mined copper and gold in Papua since 1967. The world's largest deposits of nickel and bauxite ores were found in Grasberg Mountain in 1988, leading to a vast expansion of the company's operations and an enterprise that places this remote territory at the centre of global interactions. Freeport's headquarters are in the United States; international, national and local banks finance its operations; the Indonesian state collects royalties and taxes; the Indonesian military provides "security" services. Freeport uses the soils of Papua in the ancestral homeland claimed by the Amungme tribe; it attracts to its worksites Papuan migrants from the Kamoto, Dani, Moni and Me tribes plus Indonesians from across the archipelago. Christian missionaries and teachers, mainly from the United States, work amongst local peoples; activists representing environmental groups and Indigenous rights monitor the mining company through websites and e-mail lists. The mine sets local against national interests. Claims that Papuans are being robbed of the mineral wealth of their own land are countered by the national position, legislated in Indonesia's Basic Agrarian Law of

1960 (enacted before integration of West New Guinea into Indonesia), that mineral resources are the property of the nation as a whole. The mine is a key issue for the Organization for Papuan Independence, which forges links with Indigenous minority rights groups worldwide (Leith, 2003).

At the other end of the Indonesian archipelago are oil fields jointly operated by Caltex and the Indonesian government. The workforce lives in an enclave off-limits to local people and local jurisdiction. The company brings in skilled staff from overseas, and recruits engineers, computer scientists and other support personnel from Java. It builds housing for its workers, schools for their children, transport systems, and flies staff regularly to Jakarta to alleviate the hardship of enclave living at the northern end of Sumatra. Until a political settlement was ratified between the national parliament and the Movement for Aceh's Independence (GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in 2006, the major share of oil earnings went to Jakarta. The export-production enclave is an example of the global (multi-national corporation, capital, technology and workforce) and national (cooperative central government, national input) that excludes the local in the guise of "protecting" it from international influences.

Breakaway movements in Aceh asserted various goals over four decades. Some wanted a more equitable share of the region's resources; some wanted the introduction of an Islamic administration; some wanted the lifting of army rule and an end to the violence directed at civilians; others wanted Acehnese, rather than Javanese, charting the region's course; still others wanted separate status as a self-governing territory within the Indonesian state. Apart from Libya, no Muslim country could be found to sponsor rebellion within Muslim Indonesia. Neither Western countries nor Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbours wanted a new and unpredictable state controlling entrance to the Straits of Melaka with the potential to obstruct the passage of shipping through this major sea highway connecting the world's largest markets. So Aceh's prolonged military struggle against the central government and what some Acehnese termed "Javanese colonialism" was not globalized (although the peace negotiations were), and it remained quite different from the contemporaneous struggle in East Timor.

East Timor, half of an island at the furthest end of the eastern archipelago, with a population of around 800,000 prior to its takeover by Indonesia's military in 1974, reflected many global currents. It was the most remote outpost of the Portuguese "seaborne empire" that had once stretched from Brazil to Macau. Following decolonization and civil war, East Timor presented to Indonesians the spectre of communist-dominated government just nine years after the 1965 coup in Indonesia and the killings that followed. For East Timorese there were choices: to become a province of Indonesia; to look east to an alliance with tiny Melanesian countries; or to look to Portugal's former territories in Africa as models for independent statehood. Indonesia's pre-emptive strike closed off the second and third options. Between 1975 and 1980 as many as 100,000 East Timorese died through military action or starvation (Cribb, 2001: 82).[25] About 4,000 children were taken from their families between 1975 and 1999 to be raised in orphanages or in Muslim Indonesian families across the archipelago (Van Klinken, 2012).[26]

Indonesia's Panca Sila ideology assigned East Timorese to Christianity. Over the quarter-century of Indonesian rule the share of East Timorese citing Catholicism as their religion rose from 30 per cent in 1975 (Carey, 1995: 14) to almost 90 per cent. East Timorese drew on the support of the global Catholic Church; its independence leaders were taken up by Sweden's Nobel Peace Prize committee. Refugees and diaspora communities using rallies, press, Internet and the United Nations forced East Timor's case on the attention of the Western press and diplomats. From Indonesia's point of view, a small group of leftists succeeded in harnessing foreign diplomats and militaries to break off a territory that had "come home" to Indonesia. From the perspective of East Timorese these same international forces freed the territory from Indonesian colonial rule and enabled it to acquire independence as Timor Leste in 2002.

Proficiency in the Indonesian language marks the leadership of the Organization for Papuan Independence. The Indonesian language fills the role that Dutch did for the first generations of Indonesia's nationalists. Papuans, who belong to hundreds of language groups, have found in Indonesian a common tongue and vehicle for expressing political identity. The name of the movement, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, takes words and concepts from English and Indonesian to express its goal.[27] On the other hand, the leadership of East Timor has opted for Portuguese as the new country's national language and has had to recruit language teachers in Portugal and Brazil, as only around 15 per cent of the population is proficient in that language. Portuguese speakers are, generally, older urbanites, part of the small Indigenous elite under Portuguese rule, while the country's younger generations, graduates of Indonesia's national education system, speak and read Indonesian. The younger generation were targets of Indonesia's development and nation-building programmes, and consumers of Indonesia's national media and pop culture.

Border crossings

The nation-state can be likened to a radio station whose signals become weaker as distance from the broadcasting centre lengthens and eventually are heard only feebly in zones that pick up stronger signals from neighbouring power centres. While this history is being narrated within the bounds of the Indonesian nation-state, it is an essential characteristic of contemporary globalization that national borders are no longer fortress-like, but porous and elastic. Regional economic operations, trans-border environmental degradation, piracy on the borderless sea, and inter-government treaties are examples of such border crossings.

The Singapore–Johor–Riau Growth Triangle, for example, pools the resources of three separate nations, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, for the development of export industries and Asian tourism. Indonesia's contribution exemplifies the centralized development planning and "command" procedures of the former New Order government. It established by presidential decree the Batam Industrial Development Authority under then Minister of Science and Technology Habibie, with minimal input from local representatives. Indonesia

contributes cheap labour drawn from across the archipelago, prostitutes and the land of Batam Island. Singapore provides capital and management and, along with Malaysia, the bulk of the tourists.

In the 1980s Indonesia became the world's largest plywood producer. Massive logging in Kalimantan generated jobs in timber felling, processing and transport, stimulated migration from other regions of Indonesia and illegal logging due to poor licensing controls and light enforcement of environmental laws. As a consequence deforestation has produced silted dams, flooding, drought, pollution, destruction of fragile ecosystems and social conflicts between in-migrating Indonesians and Indigenous peoples who have seen their forest farming habitat shrink. Logging companies and Indigenous farm management practices involve setting fire to undergrowth, causing severe haze pollution that spreads far into Sumatra, Singapore and Malaysia.

Pirates, drawn from an under-employed pool of sailors and fishermen, combine depredation at sea with a clandestine economy on shore in which coastal residents handle sales of stolen and contraband merchandise. They work from bases on islands that fringe the extensive coastlines of the western archipelago, near key commercial hubs. They combine extortion with traffic in drugs, arms and illegal migrants in a culture of survival based on crime and violence. By 2005 some pirate squads were armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore share control over the Straits of Melaka, the sea highway connecting the oil fields of the Middle East to the production economies of China and Japan, carrying one-third of the world's trade and half of its oil. The incidence of piracy increased sharply at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with 220 attacks reported in 2000 and 150 in 2003 (Eklöf, 2006). Indonesia and its partners, Malaysia and Singapore, rejected US demands for internationalizing the Straits and allowing the US navy to patrol it. Their patrols resulted in attacks dropping to fifty in 2006 and to just five in 2009 (Ariga, 2009). This controversy over patrols and jurisdiction may be seen in the context of states asserting sovereign rights, increased competition for maritime resources, the growth of maritime traffic, and the rise of security threats, especially from Islamic groups.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines in 1967 at the height of the civil war within Vietnam between communists and non-communists. ASEAN's founding members were veterans of suppressing communists in their own countries. Their avowed purpose was orderly economic development. Their chosen medium of communication for meetings, determinations and communiqués was the global language, English. By 1995 the rising hegemon of China and its expansion into the South China Sea resulted in ASEAN opening membership to Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. ASEAN focuses on cultural exchanges and projects such as producing school history books that show ancient linkages of the region. Its policy of non-interference in members' internal affairs has meant that it is not able to resolve territorial disputes, such as ownership of the Spratly Islands (claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and

Malaysia, and an exclusive fishing zone claimed by Brunei), or contribute to resolving political, religious and ethnic conflicts in East Timor and Thailand. The major political-religious differences between Buddhist, Christian, Muslim and Communist Southeast Asian governments limit the degree of trust necessary for dealing with trans-border problems such as piracy and terrorism.

Globalization, ordinary folks and Indonesia's new middle class

Openness to the new is the constant characteristic of communities across the Indonesian archipelago. The New Order's economic policies knit Indonesians inextricably into the global community, but Indonesians of all social classes had long been linked to global trends. It is easy to identify the elite's role in integrating Indonesia into global economic, political and cultural trends, and to think of modern change as a trickle-down process starting from the top. Ideologues portray this process as "onslaught" or "imposition" of the West when it is determined by colonial rulers, and as "development" and "emerging tigers" when the process is conducted by Indigenous governments.

Policy-makers in Indonesia have changed urban and rural landscapes forever through directing investment into infrastructure and industrial parks, and opening airwaves to satellite and Internet. However, the great majority of Indonesia's people are not passive recipients, but historical actors who make choices based, not only on prejudice and ideological persuasion, but also on pragmatic perceptions and rational calculations about personal benefit. So, for example, in the 1930s Indonesia's housewives did not respond to the pampered anti-colonial elite's calls for a return to home weaving. They persisted instead in their preference for purchasing cheap, high quality cottons and ready-to-wear clothing over a return to the drudgery of the household loom and home sewing. They purchased machine-made noodles for hungry families, and chose imported soaps for washing clothes over home-produced lyes that were harsh on the skin. Today their children discard pencil and fountain pen for computers. Dikötter (2007) describes these as small, incremental accumulations of modernization. Ordinary people appropriate goods and concepts that are in global circulation and put them to use to improve their own lives. Such steps change a society's material and mental landscape in permanent ways.

In the 1980s sections of Indonesia's new middle class began discovering other ways to be modern, ways that resisted or poured contempt on Western models. As Buruma and Margalit have documented (2004), hatred of Western liberalism is voiced by individuals and organizations employing the products of the West's technology (radio, television, Internet). This middle class is a product of the Suharto era, of the rise of public religiosity, of the heightened influence of Arab-Indonesians, of Al Jazeerah Arabic and English language broadcasts and, more generally, of the post-1979 Islamic world. This new middle class looks to Islamic globalization to meet Indonesian needs and culture and as a shield against globalization that is powered by the West.

7 Competing globalizations

An early Islamic form of globalization?

"European civilisation is unique because it is the only civilisation which has imposed itself on the rest of the world." So opens Chapter 1 of *The Shortest History of Europe* by John Hirst. He continues (2009: 5):

> [European civilisation] did this by conquest and settlement; by its economic power; by the power of its ideas; and because it had things that everyone else wanted. Today every country on earth uses the discoveries of science and the technologies that flow from it, and science was a European invention.

In the opening pages of this book I introduced arguments of world historians which counter the notions of uniqueness in history and challenge the view that globalization is a recent phenomenon. In the tenth century CE, a similar claim might have been made in Baghdad on behalf of Islamic civilization. Baghdad was then the seat of caliphs of the Abbasid dynasty (750–1258) who claimed to rule a single world Muslim community. Islamic civilization had imposed itself on much of the then known world, reaching from its heartland into central Asia as far as the western borderlands of China, across northern Africa to the Atlantic and into the southern reaches of Europe. It had done so by conquest and settlement, by its economic vitality, by the power of its ideas, and because it had things that many wanted.

Islamic civilization drew on the learning of ancient societies of Greece, Persia, China and India; its religious roots sprang from Judaism and Christianity. Like Judaism, Islam was first understood by its adherents as the religion of a particular people. In the first century of conquests, Arab armies maintained separation between themselves and the peoples they conquered. But, outside of the Arabian Peninsula, in subjugated territories, under the press of "client converts",[1] Islam evolved into a missionary religion with universal ambitions, like Christianity. Even so, Arabs, as kin to Islam's prophet, always retained, and still do, a special status within the world community of Muslims.

In Baghdad, Greeks, Persians and Jews developed a lively dialogue of scholarship, preserved in their translations into Arabic of Greek and Persian learning in philosophy, mathematics, medicine, botany, cartography and astronomy, and

in the results of their own further studies in these branches of learning. This cosmopolitan coterie made Baghdad a centre of books and inquiry. Abbasid caliphs commissioned manuscripts from professional scribes who turned the writing of Arabic letters into an art form and embellished text with borders of foliage in bright inks and gold leaf. They patronized artisans who infused Islamic motifs into fine ceramics and textiles. Caliphs sponsored mosque and shrine architecture, and the creation of gardens that replicated the Quran's depiction of paradise.

The Arabic of the Quran in time became archaic, because fixed in the forms of speech memorized in the seventh century and inscribed on to paper in the eighth. Script and language were for Islamic civilization what Latin letters and language were for Christendom. Arabic has, however, remained a language of the living, evolving and developing new vocabularies over the centuries. Ninth-century grammarians settled the structure of Arabic and developed it into a tool for writing diverse kinds of texts. The origins of Islam were narrated within a periodization of world history that began with creation and passed through stages of *jahiliyya* (chaotic social conditions) until Islam's revelations. Year One in the Muslim calendar was dated from the establishment of an Islamic government in Medina by Muhammad.[2] Biographies of men and some women offered readers exemplary lives for their edification. A vast body of popular literature in Arabic, and in Persian written in Arabic script, told of heroes of Islam, adventures of the world-conquering Iskandar (a Muslim version of Alexander the Great), and preserved mystical poetry of love and searching for union with the divine.

Mobility was built into Islamic civilization. Militias on horse and camel kept open trade routes for the regular passage of (mainly) men, goods, ideas and technologies. For example, China's citrus fruits, paper-making technology and gunpowder travelled west into Islamic lands and Europe. Water-lifting techniques, developed in arid Muslim regions, were brought by Arab and North African colonists to Spain. Provincial governors had cisterns constructed at intervals along the pilgrim routes for refreshment of travellers and their animals. A postal system ensured communication throughout Abbasid domains. There were staging posts with relays of horses every thirty kilometres. Students from all parts of the Islamic world, seeking knowledge and the chance to make their own copy of a prized manuscript, travelled by these Islamic roads to study with scholars of renown. Pilgrims made their way to gathering points in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad for the final stages of their journey to Mecca.

Experts in Islamic jurisprudence, mystics, artisans, traders, adventurers and tricksters of all sorts could travel Muslim highways and expect hospitality, jobs and wives from Muslim potentates everywhere. For example, Abu Abdullah ibn Battuta (1304–1368/9) made a journey of twenty-eight years that took him from his native Morocco to Central Asia and India and as far as northern Sumatra and China. Ibn Battuta's *Travels*, written in 1355, shows this Islamic world system at work. Law courts, *madrasahs* (religious colleges) and mosques furnished him with jobs as judge, teacher and advisor to kings. Daughters of colleagues, who were offered him as wives, secured to the newcomer lodging and home comforts.

The common language of religion and scholarship facilitated a degree of intellectual engagement between men in the cities Ibn Battuta visited. The journey itself provided Ibn Battuta with information about conditions in towns and markets across a vast region and turned him into a valued source of news as he pursued his travels.[3]

The Granada-born Muslim Al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan (1485–1554), known in Europe following his conversion to Christianity as Leo Africanus, studied Islamic law in Fez (Morocco's then capital). As a diplomat for Fez's sultan he had travelled widely in the Islamic world of the eastern Mediterranean, Istanbul, Mecca, north and west Africa as far south as Mali. His *Description of Africa*, written in Italy around 1526 and first printed in Italian in 1550, brought to a European readership novel information on African cities, cultures and geography (Davis, 2006). Africanus also wrote works on the structure of Arabic and compiled an Arabic–Hebrew–Latin medical wordlist.

Hamzah Fansuri (d. before 1604) is an example of the Muslim traveller from Indonesia. He used Islamic highways of sea and land to make his way from Barus on the northwest coast of Sumatra to centres of Islamic scholarship, first in the sultanate of Patani (Siam), then in Arabia. After his studies he became an influential figure in royal and religious circles in the sultanate of Aceh where he expounded his understanding of Sufi doctrines of mystical union with Allah in prose and poetry. Hamzah Fansuri is honoured in Indonesian history as possibly the first to use the Malay language as a vehicle for Islamic scholarship (Riddell, 2001: 106).[4]

Azyumardi Azra (2005:10) argues that, while Indigenous Muslim communities date back to the thirteenth century, the formation of Sunni tradition in Indonesia took place between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. He attributes this to the lengthy periods of residence by Malay–Indonesian scholars in Middle Eastern centres of Islamic learning in that period and to their commitment to transmit Islamic doctrines to their compatriots. Most, such as Abdurrauf Singkel (*c.*1615–1693), were prolific writers. Their books formed the core texts of Islamic scholarship in Indonesia until the twentieth century.

Ibn Battuta, Al-Wazan, Fansuri, Singkel and other scholar-travellers were supported throughout their journeys by Islamic institutions that made long-distance travel conceivable and possible. Ibn Battuta's travels through the Islamic world were made sixty years after the destruction of Baghdad and the Abbasid dynasty by the Mongols. Al-Wazzan observed the Islamic world from the periphery of an expanding Ottoman empire. Fansuri journeyed to the heartland of the Islamic world from its farthest perimeter in the late sixteenth century, Singkel a few decades later. By then, the establishment of Muslim governments in the southern regions of Russia, in India and in Southeast Asia had extended the boundaries of the Muslim world, and had greatly increased the physical infrastructure of highways and lodgings, and the social infrastructure of hospitality, jobs and polygamous marriage.

Islamic commercial life was characterized by long-distance trading, ruled by written contracts, underpinned by letters of credit, and regulated by market

controls over production and sales. Islamic coinage, first minted by the Umayyad caliph Muawiya (r. 661–680), became "coin of the realm", simplifying commercial transactions with a unified currency and attesting to the centralization of political power. Coins bearing inscriptions in Arabic and the custom of proclaiming communal Friday prayers in the name of the ruler became marks of Islamic kingship. Muslim governors tried to make nomad herders on the fringes of their cities and states settle in order to protect town and farmland from their depredations and to extend the state's taxing powers. Rulers sought to control daily life and religious practice as sects sprang up in the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam.

Within years of the death of the last of Muhammad's companions, as his inner circle of disciples and confidants was known, disputes developed over interpretation of passages in the Quran. There was a perceived need for guidance on the practical application of Islam to everyday living conditions within Darul Islam. Two centuries after Muhammad's death, the number of sayings attributed to him, and used by local authorities to justify their own policies and actions, had grown to over 600,000. Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (810–870) pruned these maxims (Hadith) down to 2,762 by subjecting the chain of transmitters to tests of authenticity. Juridical scholars, in learned discussions with other students of Islam, attempted to standardize matters of belief and practice by writing commentaries on the Quran and compiling "Islamic law". Their rulings led to the emergence of the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence recognized by Sunni Muslims. The differences between the schools lie in the weight each jurist gave to private opinion and interpretation, to the value of consensus of opinion of the learned, and to the permissibility of reasoning by analogy where problems encountered in daily life might not be explicitly covered in the Quran. (Examples from today would be the permissibility of organ transplants or gender reassignment surgery.)

By the tenth century, it appeared to Muslim jurists that interpretation on all-important matters of religious dispute had been settled. Independent reasoning was no longer necessary or acceptable. Successors had a body of commentary and exposition to consult; all was systematized, known and resolved. This prevailing view has come to be called "closure of the gates of reason". It is not possible to pinpoint the historical who, when and where of this momentous determination. It resonates today in conflicts between those who favour a literal reading of the Quran and those who argue that the Quran must be understood within the historical context when the revelations were received, and interpreted with due consideration of conditions prevailing now. But in the "first age" of an Islamic globalization, this metaphorical closing of the gates fixed belief and practice, solidified the control that *ulama* (scholars of religion) exercised at all levels of society, and diffused a common set of principles and procedures across the very heterogeneous societies making up the Islamic world.

The law school that became the dominant guide in Indonesia (and all Muslim Southeast Asia) is the Shafii. It is grounded in the interpretations of Imam al-Shafii (767–820) who taught in Mecca, Baghdad and Cairo. He promoted the

doctrine of community consensus. On this basis, in modern times, Shafii experts sanction legislative assemblies and representative institutions in Muslim states (Means, 2009: 14).

Caliphs did not engage in these disputes as scholars of theology. They were patrons of the community of Muslims. They claimed the pre-eminence of popes as spiritual and temporal authorities (although this was not a division they would have recognized). The institution of the caliphate, unlike the papacy, evolved into a hereditary dynasty of emperors, there being no belief in the superiority of celibacy in Islam. The reality was political power shared with, or lost to, a host of sultans, warlords, slave kings (mamluks), *ghazi*[5] and rivals who set themselves up as caliphs in Cairo and Córdoba. From the seventeenth century, sultans in Indonesia's islands often added caliph to their titles too. Kings and religion scholars had a symbiotic relationship. Muslim royalty sponsored *ulama* who had acquired reputations for learning and piety; *ulama* taught that defiance of a Muslim king was the worst of crimes.[6] For Muslims, caliphs embodied Islam, despite individual caliphs being known to be corrupt, arbitrary, womanizers or abusers of slaves. The ideal of one supreme ruler and of one undivided Muslim community persisted. Movements flourish across Islamic societies to revive a world caliphate today.

The term globalization is often used loosely, meaning little more than long-distance communication. But we are justified in speaking of an early Islamic form of globalization or world system. Core elements that crossed the borders of polities and topography and that persisted over centuries were: a common religion and ideology in Islam; a common language and writing system in Arabic; a universal ruler in the institution of the caliph; a comprehensive juridical system; a unifying destination in Mecca; urban institutions of *madrasahs*, law courts and mosques; interconnected economies with a regular flow of people, capital, goods, ideas and material culture within and across the Islamic world; a unified coinage and letters of credit underpinning inter-regional commerce; standardized market controls; and distinctive arts and literary forms. Islamic civilization rested on a multi-ethnic community of Muslims that included Arabs, Persians, Turkic peoples, Europeans, Indians, Chinese, Southeast Asians and Africans.

Hiatus or European interregnum

Between roughly 1850 and 1920, most of the world's Muslims became subjected to various forms of colonial rule imposed by Christian powers of Europe. In place of the ideal single community of believers living in Darul Islam, Muslim lands and peoples were parcelled out among the British, French, Italians, Spanish and Dutch. Looking back, it seemed to many of the colonized that Muslims had been rich, powerful, innovative in the sciences and arts, and global players when a universal caliph presided and when Islam's principles were enforced by Muslim governing agencies in all parts of the Islamic world. The solution, therefore, had to do with Islam, or rather with the way Muslims had allowed their understanding and practice of it to deteriorate.

Cycles of reform and revitalization mark Islamic societies everywhere. Reformers often looked back to the 620s, 630s and 640s as the best of times. An historian might characterize these as decades of social turmoil, because three of the first four caliphs were murdered, one by his Christian slave, the other two by fellow Muslims, and there was almost constant warfare. But there is a conviction among Muslim reformers known today as Salafis that a "pure" form of Islam was then practised by those who had been privileged to know the founding prophet personally.[7] In his *History of the World through Islamic Eyes*[8] Tamim Ansary puts it this way (2009: xxi): "Academics approach this story more skeptically … because they are mainly concerned to dig up 'what really happened'. [I aim] to convey what Muslims *think* happened, because that's what has motivated Muslims over the ages and what makes their role in world history intelligible."

In the era of almost universal domination of Muslims by Europeans, another set of reformers revisited the closing of the gates of reason. Negation of the right of individual believers to exercise their critical faculties regarding Islam had, according to some twentieth century Muslim analysts, also spilled over to other kinds of knowledge. There had developed a disdain for information from non-Muslim sources, where formerly Islamic civilization had been open. In place of the critical thinking and intellectual inquiry of the purported "golden age" of Islam, *ulama* had demanded submission[9] to their rulings. Sects such as the Kharajites (Seceders) used assassination as their method of dealing with public figures with whom they disagreed. Sufi masters required absolute submission from their disciples. Overall, outward appearance of orthodoxy in thought and behaviour had become more important in Muslim societies than pushing the boundaries of knowledge. Now, in this new analysis, the religious fervour Sufis focused on the inner life should have been applied to solving the social problems of each age.

Attitudes to coffee illustrate this attitude to intellectual exchange. It was controversial wherever it first spread in Islamic towns. A *fatwa* issued in 1511 in Mecca had banned coffee. There was nothing deemed inherently wrong with coffee itself, but, without the presence of a religious guide, the sociability of drinking coffee might foster freedom of discussion among laymen. The same concern about unfettered discussion over a coffee led Ottoman Sultan Murad IV in 1633 to include coffee drinking along with smoking tobacco as offences punishable by execution. Richard Sennett (1977), a scholar of the culture of public space, has pointed to the importance of the eighteenth-century coffee shop in London and Paris as a site where men gathered to discuss issues of the day untrammelled by controls of church and state. He argues that the habit of free discussion underpinned the extension of personal liberties and flowering of intellectual life in Europe. Islamic thinkers, living under colonial rule in the twentieth century, argued that Muslims had wasted centuries while Europeans surged ahead. Failure to keep pace with learning and invention had condemned Muslims to ignorance and poverty, resulting in the break-up of the Islamic world and threatening Islam itself.

European rule was in fact of short duration in the long histories of Muslim societies. Between 639 and 644, Arab armies had invaded and conquered Egypt in order to gain control of its resources and the labour of its population. Colonized Egypt became the "breadbasket" that underpinned Muslim armies and the rapid succession of their conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries. It took 500 years of Arab rule before all Egyptian peasants had forgotten their native Coptic and thought of Arabic as their mother tongue. Coptic Christianity survived only as the religion of a minority. The lasting consequence of Arab invasion and rule was that most Egyptians ended up as Muslims and Arabic speakers.

European invasion and rule over Muslims did *not* result in the substitution of the colonizers' native tongue and Christian religion for those of the colonized. Yet European rule profoundly affected every one of the colonized. Europeans brought lasting change because of the time period in which Western colonial power spread. European conquest of Muslim territories was not by land; European troops could not gallop into India or Indonesia. These colonizers needed inventions flowing from Europe's scientific and industrial revolutions to transport them to distant countries fast, to mount rapid, secure, long-distance communications, to stay healthy in different climates, to exploit the natural and human resources of colonies efficiently, and to produce in factories at home the goods that the colonized wanted to possess. These necessary conditions were in place by the middle of the nineteenth century.

Steamships, submarine cable, telegraph, maps, quinine and research institutes enabled small numbers of Europeans to make a sharp impact on all peoples in their colonies in a matter of decades. The privileged few among the colonized who studied in European schools and universities quickly appropriated the foreign rulers' learning and thinking. The larger mass of people became wage earners in plantations and mines, at construction sites and in offices. Cashed up workers became purchasers of things made in Europe that they saw a use for and wanted, things such as the thermos flask, lead pencil, bicycle and sewing machine. These were material objects of the West that changed the way people everywhere lived and worked. Hot water flasks supported hygiene in homes without running water; the pencil democratized access to literacy; the bicycle broadened opportunities for school and work; the sewing machine belonged to a cluster of mechanical goods that offered new ways of earning a living and increasing a worker's productivity.[10]

Non-Arab converts to Islam in the Abbasid age had demanded a place *within* the Islamic community where they contributed their skills and learning to the development of Islamic civilization. Muslim subjects of Europe's colonies took over European concepts and inventions in order to create their own place *outside* the colonial framework. They wanted a polity that would expel European Christians, whilst retaining the electrification, transport, health and other services that colonial rule had introduced. The nation-state, popular participation in government and economic development seemed to some new classes among the colonized the way to secure their own place at the top, direct society, and bring to an end inferiorities of person, colour and religion that colonialism had entrenched.

Muslim peoples who were colonized shared these ambitions with colonized peoples who were Hindu and Buddhist. In the second half of the twentieth century, following the withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, there emerged a variety of states, recognized by international bodies such as the United Nations, in which there were experiments with forms of self-governance. Indonesia's independence was acknowledged internationally on 27 December 1949. Its historic birth took the form of a republic that was based on: popular sovereignty; a citizenry defined by ethnic particularity; an interim national assembly; a promise of elections by universal adult suffrage; and a commitment to tolerate pluralism in religious belief.

Indonesian Islam or an Islamic Indonesia?

A new state calls for a new history. Inside Indonesia, historians revisited histories of the Netherlands Indies by Dutch writers in which the actions of Europeans loomed large and Indonesians were relegated to the background. President Sukarno called on historians to contribute their bit to nation building by discovering past evidence of unities across the archipelago and a never-extinguished resistance to colonial rule. Muhammad Yamin wrote a history called *6000 Years of the Red-and-White Flag*;[11] Tamar Djaja compiled a two-volume biography of the exemplary lives of Indonesians admitted to the national pantheon of heroes;[12] Sartono Kartodirdjo investigated agrarian revolts and traditions of attachment to Java's Just King of ancient prophesy.[13] Nugroho Notosusanto and Salim Said wrote histories of the Indonesian armed forces and the armed struggle for independence against the Dutch.[14] Taufik Abdullah considered local Indonesian histories within broader patterns of Southeast Asian Islamic historical experience.[15] During President Suharto's long rule, historians were discouraged from researching class, ethnic or religious conflicts among Indonesians.

In the years immediately following the downfall of Suharto's government, years called *Reformasi* by Indonesians, there was an outburst of debate in popular and academic forums about Indonesian history and the need to rethink it. Not to rethink the place of the Dutch in Indonesia's history, but how to understand five decades of nationhood. How to write about the betrayal of the promise of liberating nationalism? Sukarno and Suharto had deflected the drive towards political participation and civil rights by creating personal dictatorships. Now there were demands to re-educate the public about General Suharto, to discover what had really happened in the coup of 1965, to discredit Suharto's oppressive form of nationalism, to build up civil society, eliminate corruption, and give free expression to Indonesian cultural creativity.

Popular histories of regional heroes multiplied in the years following 1998, years when Indonesians found great difficulty living together. Public experience was the frailty of sociability, the catastrophe of communal wars between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, Halmahera and Poso, ethnic wars between Dayaks and Madurese in Kalimantan, and breakaway movements in Aceh, Papua and East Timor. There were suicide-killings in the name of Islam in Bali

and in the nation's capital. Provincial governments demanded more devolution of powers over health, education and natural resources from the central government. Non-governmental organizations pushed for all kinds of rights, from the right to affordable food, to the right to impose Islamic law on the entire population.

Western scholars were also busy reconsidering Indonesian history when the nation was young. Enthusiastic supporters of the new state, they studied village culture, market economy, performance and literary arts, the nationalist movement, the impact of Japanese rule, and Indonesia's oscillations between dictatorship and democracy. In 1960 Clifford Geertz published *The Religion of Java*. From a base in Pare, East Java (called Modjokuto in his book), he had lived among Javanese. He had interviewed his landlord, men at coffee stalls, men renowned as repositories of local knowledge, *ulama*, mosque keepers, mystics and market traders.[16] In recording their words, he captured the eloquence and humour of his informants. Through the anthropologist's method of "participant observation", Geertz derived an understanding of Javanese society that emphasized the uniqueness of religion on Java. It was, he concluded, an amalgam of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic elements, deeply rooted in folk culture (1960).

Geertz called this distinctive blend of Islam syncretic and wrote that it had evolved in isolation from "scriptural Islam". Java's Muslims saw no contradiction in attributing magical powers to heirloom daggers and batik cloths, or in hailing Java's sultans as descendants of Hindu gods. Most Javanese thought and felt this way, Geertz concluded; only a small percentage upheld a more orthodox Islamic lifestyle. These Javanese (men) observed the fast of Ramadhan, prayed at the stipulated intervals of the day, made the pilgrimage to Mecca, shunned communal feasts where incense was burned, and rejected popular beliefs that holy men were alive in their graves and a source of blessing for pilgrims. Geertz called this segment of the population *santri*. *Santri* lived in town neighbourhoods around mosques and made their living in commerce. The majority who followed "the religion of Java" Geertz labelled *abangan*. Most *abangan* made their living from tiny plots of land and were inclined to leftist solutions in the distribution of wealth. A third group, the *priyayi*, dominated the civil service. They took pride in their education, their aristocratic lineage and in Javanese traditions of philosophical speculation. *Priyayi* controlled inner personality and outward behaviour through meditation. Their politics were nationalist, their tastes cosmopolitan, their preference was for refinement in the arts and interpersonal relations.

Geertz's tripartite characterization of Indonesia's largest ethnic community and his aligning of degrees of Islamic piety with separate sectors of the economy and with political party affiliation influenced the conception of Indonesia held by several generations of students in Western universities. Many found this Javanese Muslim culture to be intellectually appealing and comfortable for foreigners. Sociologists characterized Indonesian Islam as a "thin, flaking glaze" or a "veneer" overlaid on an older culture. Political scientists analysed Indonesian politics in terms of nationalism, republicanism, secularism and tolerance.

So it was that for many Western specialists on Indonesia, the emergence of *jihad* movements in Indonesia in 1999, of "sweeping" (vigilante intimidation of foreigners, especially Americans), and then the suicide-killing of 202 people in Bali on 12 October 2002 occasioned consternation and the response that these actions were somehow "un-Indonesian". Also challenging was the widespread conviction on the part of Indonesians that the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States and murder of more than 3,000 people were plots of the CIA or Mossad designed to cast Islam in a negative light. A Pew Global Attitudes opinion poll of June 2006 found that most Indonesians opposed terrorism against civilians, but many interviewees could "understand" why some Muslim Indonesians used killing as their preferred solution to social problems.

Most opinion leaders of the "mainstream" Muslim organizations remained silent in 2001 or were remarkably restrained in their public comments. There was no publicized determination by local mosque leaders to steer their followers towards non-violent avenues for bringing about change. Instead, paramilitary and university student organizations such as the Laskar Pembela Islam (Soldiers for Defence of Islam), the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (Council of Jihad Fighters of Indonesia), the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Action Unity of Indonesian Muslim University Students), and two political parties formed after the downfall of Suharto, the Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party) and the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), formed an anti-America coalition and demonstrated in major cities across the archipelago claiming President George W. Bush was plotting to destroy Islam (Hasan, 2005: 302–305). They demanded Indonesia cut diplomatic relations with the United States and threatened to force Westerners to leave the country. Businessmen sold tee shirts

(a) (b) (c)

Figure 7.1a–c Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas were convicted as masterminds of the 2002 suicide-killings in Bali. For public appearances the three Javanese chose styles of clothing that signified their understanding of correct Islamic comportment and set them apart from the majority of fellow Indonesians (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amrozi; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukhlas; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imam_Samudra).

printed with Osama bin Laden's face. The state's *fatwa*-issuing body, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, called for *jihad* against the United States for its invasion of Afghanistan.[17]

In the opening years of the twenty-first century, a spate of books on Indonesia with "violence" in their titles was published by Western academic presses.[18] They explored darker sides of Suharto's New Order government and its aftermath, such as: the "disappearance" of political opponents; the strategy of "mysterious murders" for dealing with known criminals that the president had boasted of in his 1989 autobiography[19]; the thugs for rent (*preman*); the campaign of terror through rape, abductions and arson conducted by Indonesia's armed forces in Aceh and East Timor; and the violent confrontations between Christians and Muslims that broke out in many cities across the archipelago between 1998 and 2002. Attention was also turned to the policies of Suharto, in the last decade of his presidency, that favoured Muslims and responded to decades-long complaints from Muslim pressure groups.

Indonesians call these policies the "greening" of Indonesia. "Greening" in its Indonesian context does not refer to policies for protection of the environment, but to policies advancing Muslim causes in public life. (Islamic tradition has it that green was Muhammad's favourite colour.) In the 1990s "green" policies of Suharto's government included: the establishment of an Islamic "think tank"; the mandating of religion classes in all public schools; the licensing of Islamic banks; the government's supply of prefabricated "mosque packages" to towns and villages; Islamic cultural festivals and programmes on television; and permission for women to wear the *jilbab*[20] in public schools and government offices, reversing a ban instituted ten years earlier.

So Indonesia *looked* different in the 1990s. For the first time outside Aceh schoolgirls and women began wearing trousers along with figure-concealing tunics and *jilbabs*; more Arabic letters were displayed in street signs; mosque architecture now featured domes rather than tiers of roofs. Indonesia *sounded* different. The call to prayer from mosques was amplified by loudspeakers; Islamic pop dominated the airwaves; Arabic greetings began and ended public meetings even though attendees included Christians; more Indonesians chose Arabic names for their children in preference to Indonesian names that identified ethnic and class backgrounds and often had Sanskrit roots. Indonesian public *behaviours* altered. The handshake, adopted from the Dutch in the 1920s and 1930s by Indonesian nationalists as a way for people to greet each other as equals, went into decline, especially between men and women. Advocacy of polygamy came into the open through newspaper contests and the publicized practices of prominent politicians; recruiting stations for wars in Bosnia and Afghanistan registered hundreds of Indonesians; vigilantes attacked nightclubs, brothels, Western fast food chains and churches.

Two main explanations for such changes were advanced. One cited external causes: Indonesians were reacting to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Here was a popular movement that had overthrown a corrupt monarchy, rejected courting the West's approbation, and was making Islam the

basis for all aspects of modern life. The second explanation related to internal politics: Suharto was losing support within the armed forces that had brought him to power in 1965. To counteract dissidents he promoted generals known to favour Islamic agendas, and he acted to broaden his support base by courting Muslim intellectuals and encouraging them to come up with Islamic solutions to contemporary problems. To make up for suppressing political parties with explicitly Islamic agendas, Suharto channelled public monies to Muslim charities and tolerated the proliferation of Muslim organizations that promoted personal piety.

Some scholars understood the end result of a decade of "green" policies to be a sharp decline in the numbers of *abangan* and a steep rise in the number of *santris* among Indonesian Muslims. In this analysis, Javanese Muslims became less distinctive and more like other Indonesians in their religious lifestyle. Suharto fell from power in May 1998, but Indonesia's Muslims advanced their hold on public life and policy.

Introducing an important book on Indonesian Islam in 1996, Mark Woodward had addressed the problem of interpreting contemporary Indonesia by declaring "the paradigm had shifted" (Woodward, 1996). A paradigm is a set of assumptions that shape the questions people ask. Woodward says the paradigm shifts when crises cannot be explained by the generally accepted assumptions of the day. Then a new set of assumptions comes to dominate intellectual discourse and, in its turn, this new paradigm limits the types of questions asked and the allowable range of answers that can be given. In the views of both the Indonesian and the Western scholars contributing to Woodward's book, the old assumptions about the nature of Islam in Indonesia could no longer explain Indonesian society at the end of the twentieth century. The complacent assumption of a superficial Islamic glaze was powerless to account for the motivations of Indonesians who fought in Bosnia and trained in terrorism techniques in the Philippines, or the willingness of sections of the Indonesian population to succour and conceal jihadists.

Taufik Abdullah (1996), one of the contributors to the Woodward volume, argued that this new Islamic paradigm was a product of New Order "green" policies. He pointed to the mushrooming of mosque youth groups and of branches of international Muslim associations on Indonesian university campuses, to the equalizing in status between Islamic and civil courts of law, to the Association of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI[21]), which brought Muslims into the centre of public policy making and made Islamic credentials a plus in career paths. He noted the trend in "pop" sociology that offered Islamic solutions for personal problems and society at large, and the high attendance levels of ordinary Indonesians at Islamic festivals, their interest in seminars, pamphlets and television talk shows devoted to Islamic issues, their receptiveness to Islamic arts and entertainment. Large numbers, Taufik Abdullah argued, were coming to appreciate the Indonesian character of Islamic civilization and to perceive the Islamic character of Indonesian life. The Indonesian middle class was now comfortable being Muslim. There was more awareness of Muslims elsewhere in the

world and empathy with them. In short, he declared, Indonesia's Muslims no longer saw themselves as *dhimmis*.

Dhimmi is an Arabic term for non-Muslims living among Muslims in countries having Islamic governments. *Dhimmi* status is often discussed in positive terms as a mark of the tolerance and protection afforded Jews and Christians by Islamic states. But, under *dhimmi* regulations, Jews and Christians are obliged to practice their religions on terms intended to convey their inferiority to the Muslim public and to impress themselves with a personal sense of inferiority. There are restrictions on the number and size of synagogues and churches. In the past, there were sumptuary laws reserving clothing and footwear of fine materials to Muslims. The state distinguishes between Muslim and non-Muslim in civic duties such as in levying taxes.

Muhammad had declared himself the last of the prophets and Islam the final revelation, so there could be no concept of equality for all believers and all religions in Darul Islam. The Torah injunction "Choose good and avoid evil" became in the Quran "Do good and forbid evil". From there it was understood that the duty of Muslim rulers was to provide the conditions in which Muslims could lead an observant life. Muslim governments were obligated to support scholars of Islam, establish Islamic law courts, and ensure that rulings handed down by jurists for the punishment of criminals and the regulation of public and private life were enforced. Other religions and their believers could not have parity, in this understanding, for then they would tempt Muslims to deviate from Islamic precepts. And, where an Islamic government administered society and provided all the conditions necessary for an observant lifestyle, non-Muslims were considered to display obstinacy in refusing the opportunity to convert.

When the Christian Dutch ruled Indonesia, Muslim Indonesians felt *they* were the *dhimmis*. In independent Indonesia headed by the Muslim presidents Sukarno and Suharto, there were Indonesians who continued to believe Muslims suffered *dhimmi* status because there were still Christians in high places. In their view, it was an affront to Muslim citizens of independent Indonesia to be subordinated to Christian cabinet ministers, heads of government bureaucracies and senior officers in the armed forces, even if these Christians were fellow Indonesian citizens. Many Muslim social critics objected to Indonesia's Panca Sila ideology because its first pillar or principle committed Indonesians to monotheism rather than to belief in the Muslims' Allah. Even the name for the One God offended them, for Sukarno had chosen the Sanskrit-derived Tuhan Yang Maha Esa and his successor had maintained this formula. In 1983 President Suharto had taken a further step by ordering every single organization in Indonesia to adopt Panca Sila as its mission statement. This rule applied even to parties formed to promote explicitly Muslim causes. Suharto's designating commemoration of the suppression of the 1965 coup as Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Pancasila Day) had also offended Muslims because it endowed the national ideology with a sacral quality (McGregor, 2002). Other evidences of Muslims' *dhimmi* status in a free Indonesia were large churches, prestigious, well-equipped Christian schools, and the national calendar that still made the Christian Sunday Indonesia's day of public rest.

By seizing on Suharto's "green" policies, Indonesia's Muslims achieved the self-confidence to feel and act as the majority and assert their supremacy in society. In proposing Islam as the basis for arriving at a "society just and prosperous" (Panca Sila's fifth pillar), Muslim opinion makers effectively exclude from public debate and policy formulation the 13 per cent of fellow Indonesians who are Christian, Hindu, Buddhist or Confucianist. *They* have finally become the *dhimmis* of Indonesia.

Significant steps: from containment to centre stage

The Dutch who administered the Netherlands Indies knew that *kiais* and *hajis* were leaders and opinion makers in villages. Whenever there was "trouble", whenever a group of men, armed with bamboo spears, daggers and Islamic amulets, converged on a Dutch official's residence, *hajis* were at their head. When the Dutch rounded up the ringleaders of the communist uprisings of 1926 in West Java, they found, in the words of the investigating commission, "There was a proportionately large number of hajis" among them (Benda, 1960: 40). Netherlands Indies consular staff in Jeddah monitored the activities of Indonesian pilgrims to Arabia. In the 1880s and 1890s, consular officers in Singapore and Penang tried to prevent Muslim "provocateurs" from slipping into Aceh, where *ulama* had taken over leadership of the long war against the Dutch. Letters circulated in Aceh offering young men paradise replete with virgins if they fell fighting the Dutch. After the war was over, suicide-killers continued to claim Dutch lives in Aceh in the name of Islam into the 1930s. The prison labour camp the Dutch built in the remoteness of West New Guinea always housed a high number of small-town Muslim leaders. Political opponents whom the Dutch could understand, men like the Holland-educated (Muslim) Sjahrir and Hatta, were quickly removed from the Boven Digul prison camp to more comfortable exile in other parts of Indonesia, but the *hajis* and *kiais* were kept deep in the jungle interior of New Guinea.

The Japanese military who controlled Indonesia from 1942 to 1945 understood, too, that the village Muslim leader was the opinion shaper of his community and key to Japanese exploitation of Indonesia's natural and human resources. In 1943 they set up month-long training sessions in Jakarta to which they brought leaders of village Islam. This was a novel experience for *kiais* to be recognized and courted by government, as much as it was a novel experience for many to travel (at no expense to themselves) to the colonial capital. There was a ready reception for Japanese propaganda of hatred for the West and Christians, but ambivalence towards a Japanese-style Asian Islam that downplayed the centrality of Arabic and offered Indonesia's Muslims an Indonesian-language Quran in 1944.

The Japanese did not bring representatives of village Islam into the Investigative Committee for the Preparation for Independence, which began its deliberations in Jakarta in June 1945. Appointees were, in the main, graduates of Dutch schools. Benedict Anderson (1961: 21) identifies only seven of the sixty-four

Indonesian members of the committee as Islamic in the sense that they wished to acknowledge the significance of Islam in Indonesian lives and give an Islamic character to the independent Indonesian state the Japanese were promising them. In the minority, these seven could not override the conviction of Sukarno and his supporters that Indonesia must be based on the broadest of ideals and be inclusive, rather than exclusive.

When Indonesians finally secured their independence in 1949, there was a natural feeling of "Now it's our turn". Muslims looked to the government to champion Islam. The Ministry of Religion, established in 1946, saw itself as an arm of the Indonesian state, with the prime duty of catering for the Islamic majority. It acted immediately to open diplomatic ties with Muslim countries. In 1952, however, when the government seemed overly concerned with the sensitivities of non-Muslim minorities and neglectful of local concerns, influential politicians in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi provinces proclaimed Negara Islam Indonesia (the Islamic State of Indonesia) in direct confrontation with Jakarta. Sukarno attempted a charm offensive to keep Indonesia as one, but he backed negotiations with military force, and again in 1957 when rebel administrations in Sumatra and Sulawesi proclaimed autonomy and some prominent politicians from Muslim parties quitted Jakarta to join them.

Both the Dutch colonial government and the Japanese military administration had had offices to administer religious affairs. Their goal had been to *contain* Islam and to limit Muslim opposition to the ruling power. In the challenges to central authority in the first decades of independence, containment was also the policy of governments of a free Indonesia.

In the early years of independence, most national-level Muslim opinion makers worked within the political system rather than against it. Muhammadiyah activists, for example, were willing to throw themselves into the national arena along with people of more secular orientations to build a new Indonesia. When the nation's first general elections were held in 1955, Muhammadiyah's political vehicle, Masyumi, won 20.9 per cent of the nation's votes and support from electors across the entire archipelago (Ricklefs, 2008: 287).

Sukarno banned Masyumi in 1960. Masyumi was too independent-minded for his Guided Democracy. It opposed his institution of Nasakom government in which Muslims were expected to harmonize their goals with communists. After the 1965 coup, Muslim politicians expected rewards from the New Order government for their staunch anti-communism. Instead, Suharto maintained the ban on Masyumi and prohibited frank airing of religious and political questions. By 1972, when his New Order allowed organizational life to re-emerge, politicians championing Islamic causes were forced into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). The name, Unity Party of Development, did not acknowledge the federation's Islamic character. Suharto's ban on the PPP using Islamic symbols such as the crescent moon in its logo prevented the party from even hinting at its orientation to the public.

Suharto's Minister of Religion in the years 1977–1982, Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, formalized Indonesia's religious policy as: good relations between

government and the five authorized religions; good relations between the authorized religions; and good relations among adherents of each religion. It was dubbed the Trilogy of Tolerance. This New Order policy was a negation of the Islamic concept that government should legislate inferior status for non-Muslims. Muslims were directed by the New Order to unite with all Indonesians in the drive for more schools, electricity in villages, clean running water, jobs and fertility control through family planning. They should find fulfilment in satisfying material needs and desires. Suharto's Indonesia offered rewards for the neatest village. It required bureaucrats, academics and university students to wear uniform shirts and blazers. Female employees of government and wives of government officials had to join Dharma Wanita (Women's Service) and subscribe to its five pillars: support husband; manage the household; bear children; socialize the next generation; and fulfil the duties of citizenship. None of these tasks made specific reference to Islamic values.

In 1976 the New Order government established the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic Scholars Council). In some respects the MUI was an updated version of the Dutch board of religious leaders of 1882, and it was called into being by the Indonesian state for the same reason: to restrict the number of *fatwa*-issuing bodies; monitor the content of *fatwas*; and bring public practice of Islam into conformity with government policies through issuing formal "Advice and Instructions". At issue was the source of authority within the Islamic community. For Muslims, Allah is the sole source of authority, but in practice the state, philosophy and science offer alternative justifications for action. For example, the rationale for environmental protection laws could be research findings from scientists on climate change or verses from the Quran about the divine act of creation. Now the Indonesian state appeared to be abrogating to itself the right to rule on Islamic belief and practice. It continued to deny Islamic courts jurisdiction over all areas of law by retaining the separate courts established by the colonial government for civil, criminal and commercial law, and leaving only personal law (marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance) to Islamic jurists. Even the digest of rulings drawn up by the MUI for guidance of religious judges in 1991 was issued by presidential decree, rather than by the religious experts themselves.

Serving the state, rather than ruling it, the MUI was called on to issue *fatwas* supportive of key government policies and so win broad support for them from the Muslim majority. For example, the New Order's family planning programme was bolstered by MUI rulings in 1983 and 1984 that Muslim married couples could practice birth control if the intent was to preserve the mother's health and enable the family to educate existing children adequately. The MUI also came down on the side of the modern medicine being practised in Indonesia's hospitals. For example, it issued a *fatwa* in 1979 allowing the removal of corneas from a deceased person and their implant to save a living person from blindness. MUI also authorized heart transplants for Muslim Indonesians (Hooker, 2003: 185, 186).

From the very beginning of the New Order, Muslims were allowed to participate in the political life of the state only in the same way and to the same degree as Christian Indonesians. Christians had their own section within the Ministry of

Religion, although with smaller staff and funds (reflecting their tiny percentage in the population). Government drafted Christian parties into a federation with nationalist parties. Again, no religious identification was permitted in the name the government selected: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, the Indonesian Democracy Party. Political candidates wishing to campaign for the PDI and PPP in the elections the state ran every five years had to be pre-approved by government, as did their party platforms.

Indonesia's New Order government appeared to be following the practice of Western countries in treating religion as private business and hedging it in. In this context of containment, prominent Muslims, led by Mohammed Natsir (1908–1993),[22] turned to the wider Islamic world for inspiration. They formed, in 1967, the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Mission Council). *Dakwah* is an Arabic word that means call or conversion. The Council's goal was not conversion of Christians to Islam. Its sights were set on Muslim Indonesians. The goal was to induce in them greater inner devotion to Islam and greater outer conformity to communal religious observances such as mosque attendance, fasting during Ramadhan and Islamic presentation of the self in dress and manners. In choosing the strategy of permitted religious activity, the Council leadership calculated that, by stealth as it were, *dakwah* would eventually accomplish the goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia. That is: sovereignty should issue from Allah, not from popular will; sharia would be the source of Indonesia's law; the state would become responsible for making Islamic law operative and channel popular consultation through a *shura* or council for discussion of public matters and decision making.[23]

Converting the broadest possible band of Muslims to the Dakwah Council's version of Islam, right under the eye of government, would bring about a groundswell of support for the embedding of *ulama* in the top governing bodies of the state. Muslims of all social classes, regions and ethnicities would be persuaded to welcome implementation of sharia and actions reducing the political, social and cultural influence of Christian Indonesians in national life.

The Dakwah Council began by running upgrading courses for teachers of religion schools, supplying them with books, training missionaries for work amongst Muslims inside Indonesia, and providing scholarships for Indonesians to study Islam in the Middle East. The Council also acted as a lobby group. It persuaded government to clamp down on homegrown mystical movements, and to ban Christian missionaries from proselytizing among Muslims. These measures were ostensibly to underwrite the New Order's policy of harmony and tolerance among religions.

"Above ground", *dakwah* benefited from some measures of the New Order. An example is the government's financial and institutional support of IAINs. The initials stand for *I*nstitut *A*gama *I*slam *I*ndonesia (Islamic Institutes of Indonesia). The first had been established by the Minister of Religion in 1960 with faculties of Islamic theology, comparative religion and sharia in Yogyakarta, and faculties of education, Arabic, historical studies of Islam and *dakwah* in Jakarta. From this single institution with a few hundred students has developed a string

of state Islamic institutes (currently fourteen), with over 100,000 students. Several have been upgraded to full universities.

IAIN graduates became visible and influential in Indonesian public life in the term of Suharto's government and the years since. Graduates staff religious bureaucracies and courts, and teach Islam in public schools. The Institutes foster a conception of Islam as a living tradition within local conditions and times, rather than taking a strictly literal interpretation of the original sources of Islam. This perspective complemented a *dakwah* objective of encouraging a feeling of pride in being Indonesian Muslims, sufficiently knowledgeable to mix with Muslims anywhere as valid and valued co-religionists.

The Iranian revolution appalled Suharto's circle. Here was a movement that knew how to manipulate press and television, that preached a volatile message in favour of pulling down established authority, getting rid of conspicuous consumption, and enforcing Islamic justice. Iran set itself up against Saudi Arabia and Sunni Islam, as well as against the "great Satan" of the United States. Sunni and Shiite Islam, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, began competing worldwide for influence and allegiance, with Indonesia the prize as the country with the world's largest population of Muslims.

Rapid economic development in the 1970s and 1980s made Suharto and his family very rich, and raised to national prominence big entrepreneurs (called cronies by Indonesian critics) who were mostly of Chinese ancestry. Corruption seemed to be the national way of getting through a day. Senior army officers, gold-ringed and overweight, featured on television screens and in magazine stories detailing their extravagant lifestyles. Young people were emulating Western youth culture. Indonesian Chinese were prospering, but perceived by many of Indonesia's Muslims as refusing to fit in. Even those who conspicuously converted to Islam, such as "Bob" Hasan,[24] were distrusted. Suharto's government took pre-emptive measures by restricting the access of Western journalists to Indonesia[25] and by acceding to demands bubbling up from the *dakwah* movement. Significant steps in Islamizing the character of Indonesian public life were government's authorizing establishment of an Islamic newspaper and an Islamic banking system.

Republika first appeared on Indonesian newsstands on 3 January 1993. It was founded by ICMI, the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals' Association. The paper's name suggested commitment to Indonesia and its form of government. *Republika*'s editors aspired to displace Indonesia's leading newspaper, *Kompas*. Originally started by Catholic Indonesians, *Kompas* was regarded by some Muslims as one more example of Christian Indonesians exercising undue influence in the nation. *Republika* carried news coverage of the wider Islamic world, disseminated theories of conspiracies against Muslims, and was not backward in using "Jewish" as a term of abuse and throwing it at Western analysts, Christian and Jewish alike (Liddle, 1996). It coarsened public discourse.[26]

Islamic banking[27] was expected to imbue Indonesian business life with Islamic principles of fair dealing, risk-sharing, financial and social justice, and to put Indonesia in step with other Muslim countries. It would resolve prevailing

controversies in Indonesia, such as contradictory views over charging interest. Indonesian *fatwas* refer to verse 278 of Sura 2 in the Quran to declare that interest may not be charged on loans, but Muhammadiyah *fatwas* have differentiated between high-interest rates (not allowable) and administrative charges that have a social function (allowable) (Hooker, 2003; 206–207). Nahdlatul Ulama ruled in 1938 that banks could charge (low) interest, and reiterated in 1990 that low interest rates did not violate the Quran's teaching (Effendy, 2005: 70–71). Supporters of Islamic banking argued that, in a period of rapid economic growth, Islamic financial institutions would help Muslims adjust to "lawful" capitalism. And Indigenous entrepreneurs would be able to avoid financial dealings with banks owned by Indonesia's Chinese.

In 1973, the Saudi Arabian government had founded the Islamic Development Bank to provide capital and financial advice to Muslim countries attempting to develop their own Islamic economic systems. Indonesia's Muslim think tank, the Centre for Information and Development Studies, argued that, with Saudi assistance, Islamic principles could be made to work in Indonesia's modern economy and that Indonesian Muslims ought to join fellow Muslims across the world to counter the global Western financial system with a competing Islamic one. ICMI considered Indonesia's integration into the world Islamic financial system to be an important step towards achieving Islamic globalization.

Existing banking law (No. 14/1967) stipulated that banks must offer and charge interest. So support from the highest levels of government was needed in order for banks to offer Indonesians financial services such as deposits, loans, transfers and leases on a fee basis.[28] Opponents, especially senior military officers, argued that provision of one banking system for Muslims and one for Christians would heighten sectarian sentiment in Indonesia and endanger national solidarity. But, with President Suharto's backing, Indonesia's national assembly passed legislation in 1992 to allow sharia-compliant banking, in effect setting up a dual banking system in the country.

The national Bank Indonesia established a Sharia Bureau to develop the legal framework and regulations on accounting standards for private Islamic banks. Existing, conventional banks could now form an Islamic banking unit and offer customers a choice of interest-based or profit-and-loss sharing banking. Furthermore, a new bank, Bank Muamallat Indonesia, opened that same year to offer Islamic banking exclusively. Government funds from tax revenue, plus a personal donation by President Suharto and contributions from private entrepreneurs provided the start-up capital. Bank Muamallat Indonesia also received income from the state lottery. This was a controversial source, but Persis in 1936 had issued an opinion that money derived from gambling was acceptable if put to supporting Islamic goals, such as Muslim schools (Hooker, 2003: 222–223).

According to Effendy (2005: 76), the establishment of Islamic banks, credit unions and insurance companies brought an end to debates in Indonesia over the permissibility of interest, because bank patrons now had a choice. In line with Suharto's objective of wooing Muslim support, the state could be seen as responsive to demands welling up from society's lower and middle classes.

Television news channels in the 1990s filmed Suharto's increasing appearances among the mosque faithful and making donations to Islamic charities. The First Family made a well-publicized pilgrimage to Mecca in 1993. Haji Suharto added Muhammad to his name and, on her return to Indonesia, his daughter Tutut began consciously modelling a more Islamic dress style in public. Her mother, Indonesia's First Lady, always wore Indonesia's *kain kebaya* in public and, under her influence, this Javanese costume was the uniform of Dharma Wanita members. Its elements – a tightly wrapped batiked skirt that dropped to the ankles, a fitted, long-sleeved blouse, and hair done in an elaborate bun – were in stark contrast to the loose tunics and trousers worn by Hajah[29] Tutut with a head covering, often in green.

Sukarno had promoted *kain kebaya* as the national dress for all classes of Indonesian women. During the New Order the *kain kebaya* came to indicate elite female status and moneyed decorum. Tutut presented herself as modern Muslim "superwoman": wife, mother, businesswoman and, in 1998, cabinet minister. Her adopted style linked her to prominent Muslim women in Southeast Asia, and presented a strong contrast with the Western "power suits" worn by the Catholic Philippines president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Magazines promoted the Southeast Asian Muslim look as functional in contrast to the restrictive nature of "feudal" Javanese dress. Signs began proliferating at entrances to schools, shops and public meeting halls denying entrance to women who did not conform to this Islamic dress code. In some circles women took the next step of covering their face as well.

On 21 May 1998, President Suharto resigned his office. His successor, the "born again" Muslim Habibie, freed political prisoners, released organizations from the obligation to pledge to Panca Sila, allowed the media greater freedom of expression, and opened the right to contest the next national elections to any party that had branches in over 50 per cent of the country's provinces. Forty-eight parties met the test and twenty made it into the new parliament, including three parties with explicitly Islamic agendas. They achieved 19.75 per cent of the national vote and won 105 of the 462 seats.[30] Joining together as the Poros Tengah (Middle Axis), the Islamic parties manoeuvred to block Megawati Sukarnoputri, leader of the party that had won most votes in the elections, from being appointed president. Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle had won 33.74 per cent of the national vote and 153 seats, but the renowned Muslim scholar, Abdurrahman Wahid, head of Partai Kebangkitan Nasional (National Awakening Party), with 12.66 per cent of the national vote and fifty-one seats, was chosen by Poros Tengah and its allies in the assembly as president (Means, 2009: 294–295). Megawati was appointed his vice-president.[31]

During the election campaign, press and talk shows had vigorously debated whether it was permissible for a woman to rule over Muslims and whether Megawati was genuinely a Muslim. Indonesia's constitution does not stipulate the gender or religious affiliation of candidates for the presidency. The Third Indonesian Islamic Community Congress, meeting in November 1998, called for

women to be prohibited from campaigning for the presidency (Robinson, 2004: 189). The MUI issued an Advice and Instruction for the June 1999 parliamentary elections that voters should choose parties striving for the interests of Indonesian Muslims and elect candidates who were good Muslims. It quoted from the Quran: "Let not the believers take the unbelievers as their leaders" (Kaptein, 2004). Following President Wahid's dismissal from office in 2001, Laskar Jihad declared Vice-President Megawati's elevation to the presidency a sin that devolved on all Indonesian Muslims (Hasan, 2006: 204). During the 2004 presidential campaign, NU issued a *fatwa* citing the Quran and the Hadith to justify ordering members to vote against female candidates.[32] It seemed that Indonesia was set on a new Islamic course.

An Islamic history of Indonesia?

Were these developments a major wrench from Indonesia's moorings? Anthropologist Robert Hefner saw in the proliferation of groups with Islamic agendas the foundation for "civil Islam" in Indonesia (2000).[33] He argued that civil Islam would underpin the "democratization" of Indonesian society. And Indonesia would show the way: it would create a template for Muslim democracy within the global Islamic community. Hill and Sen (2005) embarked on a study of the Internet in Indonesia, which took as its premise that the Internet was a tool for facilitating pluralist democracy there.[34]

But how could the seemingly intolerant character of some Islamic agendas be explained? Could Indonesian societies be understood as Islamic in centuries past, not in the way Geertz had described for Java, but from a perspective that took into account a continuous thread of connection to global Islam and attachment to religious absolutism? There were always scholars who argued that the popular interpretation of Indonesia was skewed. Historian Merle Ricklefs made the case for locating the birth of Indonesia around 1200 CE, because from that time onwards, he argued, Indonesia was positioned within the history of world Islam, and Islamic religion and culture were what shaped the subsequent course and development of societies in the Indonesian archipelago.[35] Mark Woodward, in his critique of Geertz, argued that, regardless of the degree of observance of individual Indonesians, all understood themselves as Muslims, not as anything else.

Influential Western political scientists, who were contemporaries of Indonesians controlling the state in the 1950s and personally acquainted with many of them, perhaps misread Indonesian society. They believed their Indonesian colleagues were putting in place a constitutional democracy on a bedrock of secular, inclusive nationalism, and that this programme reflected the aspirations of the majority of Indonesian Muslims. But historian Harry Benda, as long ago as 1964, argued that Western scholars were asking the wrong question (Benda, 1964). The question was not why did constitutional democracy decline in Indonesia, but how did it ever happen?[36] Azra describes pioneering Western studies of Indonesian Islam this way (2004a: 2):

> As it [the Malay–Indonesian world] is situated on the periphery of the Muslim world, there is a tendency among scholars to exclude the Malay–Indonesian world from any discussion of Islam. It is assumed that the region has no single stable core of Islamic tradition. Islam in the archipelago has long been regarded as not "real Islam."

Linguistic and other evidence for the earliest sources of Islam in Indonesia point to the stimulus of Muslims from well established Islamic communities in Gujerat (northwestern India) and Yunnan (southwestern China). Indonesian legends about the coming of Islam, however, make a direct connection with Mecca or Egypt. Missionaries or *wali* came on treasure ships from the Middle East. In some legends Muhammad himself appeared before an archipelago king in a vision or dream and subsequently sent a learned envoy from Arabia to instruct the general population in Islam (Jones, 1979).

Myth establishes the centrality of the Islamic heartland for Indonesian Muslims and their emotional connection to it. Turning points in chronicles of local kingdoms are the result of seeking directives from Mecca. In 1638, for example, Abdulmafakir Mahmud Abdulkadir of Banten took the title of sultan after receiving permission in a letter borne by envoys from the "king of Mecca". A *fatwa* from Mecca is said to have triggered the overthrow of Aceh's reigning queen, Sultanah Kamalat Syah, in 1699. In other words, legitimacy for actions within the domestic politics of Indonesian communities was sought from external sources. *Ulama* based in the Middle East took pre-eminence over Indigenous *ulama*. A twenty-first century example is the request made to prominent Saudi Arabian *ulama* by Salafi groups in Indonesia to authorize their determination to fight Christian Indonesians in Ambon.

Research by Azra and Riddell has overturned the former view that Indonesian Islam long developed in isolation from the wellsprings of Islamic theology. Riddell (2001) argues from textual evidence that Malay language commentaries on the Quran date from at least the sixteenth century. Azra finds evidence for Indonesians' continuous connection with Islamic scholarship in Arabia to the seventeenth century through biographical studies of archipelago scholars who studied in Mecca and Medina and examination of their writings. To counteract and correct the "Geertzian" view of Islam, Azra argues that transmission of Islamic scholarship, emphasis on observance of sharia, and a Sufism regulated within the Sunni tradition are datable and characterize Indonesian Islam from the eighteenth century (2004b: 148–149). The corpus of Islamic knowledge absorbed by Indonesian *ulama* in Arabia and transmitted to followers in Indonesia included exposure to the writings of absolutist thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) who taught strict conformity to the Islam he believed was practised in seventh-century Medina, and the crushing of all Muslims deviating from his interpretation.

Azra's study documents that individual scholars from the Indonesian archipelago, who spent one and more decades immersed in religious studies in Mecca, still maintained relationships with their hometowns. In Mecca, with its resident

population of scholars and pilgrims drawn from all over the Islamic world, it seems that Indonesian scholars sought their disciples among the fellow townsmen whom their reputations attracted to Mecca, and through them communicated with compatriots back home. They wrote explanations on questions of religion and issued rulings for the guidance of Indonesians in far-off archipelago communities. It was a communication stretched over time, for it took up to two years for petitioners to reach Mecca and another two to complete the return journey. Letters, borne back to Indonesian communities through all the hazards of long-distance travel, were endowed with an aura of sanctity. But their authors made no impact on general Islamic scholarship or on scholars of Islam from other regions of the Muslim world. Their fame was within Indonesia. So, in a sense, Indonesian connection with the centre of world Islam was, in these early centuries, parochial in nature.

The relationship of Indonesian Muslims to the wider Islamic world began to change as Western powers laid grids of transport and communications systems across the world in the second half of the nineteenth century. Steam-powered transport ended the "tyranny of distance" between the Indonesian archipelago and centres of learning in Arabia and Egypt. Printing in Arabic letters, now sanctioned by the Ottoman caliph for the entire Islamic world, multiplied the numbers of pamphlets and books in circulation and brought their price within reach of the many. The right to print was followed by the publishing of newspapers in Egypt. Books, magazines and newspapers created reading communities that crossed geographic and political boundaries and altered the way the literate, and those to whom they read aloud, envisioned the world and their place in it.

The single-minded or unidirectional focus that had characterized Indonesian scholars abroad and their relationship with their home base was now blown open. New generations of students of religion who journeyed to Mecca and to the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo[37] still lived together and devoted their energies to congregations in their hometowns. But now they used modern aids and were plugged in to teachings that used Islam to critique the contemporary world. Laffan (2004) introduces Kemas Haji Muhammad al-Falimbani, who commenced his studies in Mecca around 1843 and, on return to his home town of Palembang (Sumatra), set up there the first Indonesian-owned and operated printing press for publication of works on Islamic topics. In the 1880s, Indonesians studying in Cairo began writing books in Malay to bring readers back home up to date with the new trends in religious studies they themselves were discovering. Their press published Abu Bakr bin Abd al-Quddus al-Tubani's Arabic–Malay–Javanese dictionary in 1885 for his fellow Javanese.[38] From Cairo, in the 1890s, the Sumatran Ahmad Khatib bin Abd al-Latif al-Minankabawi published attacks on the customary forms of family life and inheritance patterns of his native Minangkabau that he now perceived as contrary to Islamic norms.

In Cairo Indonesian religion scholars came into contact with the teachings of Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in

1928. Al-Banna's core message, "the Quran is our Constitution", and his platform of ridding Egypt of all foreigners and non-Muslims seemed to Cairo Indonesians applicable to the Netherlands Indies. They welcomed the Saudi–Wahhabi alliance in Arabia that, in the 1930s, purged Mecca and Medina of "idolatrous" practices. It seemed to these students that Arabia and Egypt were setting new standards for the world's Muslims, and they could make Indonesian lands "pure" again and "holy to Islam".

In general accounts of Indonesia, these years, the 1880s-1930s, are characterized as the period of "high colonialism". Attention is focused on Dutch-instituted changes, on modernization, and the Western orientation of the new Indonesian opinion makers. Attention to developments in Indonesian Islam points to a whole separate field of intellectual activity and response that is submerged by this dominant discourse. For example, the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama in Java in 1926 is generally placed within a narrative of colonial history, the rise of anti-colonial associations and politics. But Laffan (2003: 226–228) explains its founding within a different sequence, that of Indonesia's Islamic history. In a narrative focusing on Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama was a defence of Javanese Islam mounted by traditionalists against the Cairo-trained "modernists" who wanted to follow the lead of Arabia's Wahhabis and purge Indonesia's Islam of folk practices.

Taking both narratives, we can see that, while Indonesian graduates of Dutch schools were debating liberalism, socialism and fascism among themselves, another group, the graduates of Islamic schools, were debating how to live Islam in the twentieth century. Their reach into society was more encompassing. By the end of the colonial era, around 50,000 in the colony, out of a total population of seventy million, subscribed to Indonesian language newspapers (Reid, 1974: 10). Membership in the ten associations still active in nationalist politics was under 50,000 (Dahm, 1971: 76). Sarekat Islam (Islamic League), on the other hand, had already claimed a membership of two million by 1919.[39] Opinion leaders in thousands of small communities across the archipelago led mosque-centred lives. Preachers, teachers, scribes, *hajis*, healers and heads of Sufi brotherhoods all had a connection to the wider world of Islam. From the early twentieth century this connection was intensified by religion students who, on return from Cairo, went from mosque to mosque with catalogues of Islamic reading material. Mobile libraries in towns lent readers pamphlets for a small fee. Villagers travelled on the colonial railway system to cities such as Surabaya, with its important community of Arab immigrants. Travel to Arabia itself became conceivable via the Dutch steamship service that, from the 1890s, departed every fortnight for Jeddah.

The colonial camera of the 1920s and 1930s shows us Indonesians in suits, bow ties, trousers and shoes in school, at work, in political meetings and cultural associations. The colonial camera also tells us that mosque leaders and Islamic jurists wore turbans and *jubbah* (gowns). This global Islamic dress marked them as graduates of Islamic, not Dutch, schooling and signified that their orientation was to the Islamic world, not the West. Connection with Islam's heartland, once

sporadic, difficult to maintain and awe-inspiring, marked by the slow accumulations of hand-copied manuscripts, became regular and "normal" when the West's steamship, train and printing press were in place.

The quality of the relationship between Indonesia's Muslims and centres of Islamic learning changed again in the second half of the twentieth century. Air travel and communication by telephone, tape recorder, video-cassette, film and television cultivated deeper attachments to Islam among ever larger audiences. By the end of the twentieth century the volume and speed of electronic communications were creating cyber communities that linked Indonesia's Muslims to Muslims elsewhere and to Muslim concerns worldwide.

Sovereign Indonesia within the Islamic community of nations

Perhaps in centuries past Mecca was imagined in far-off Indonesian communities as timeless, unchanging, the destination of dreams. But in the very different circumstances of the twenty-first century, the holy city has upscale shopping malls, high-rise buildings and multi-lane highways that Indonesian Muslims can see through various media and discover for themselves, whether they travel to Saudi Arabia as pilgrims, students or "guest workers".

The Islamic world has grown in size to around 1.25 billion followers. Muslims live in very diverse societies, all plugged into global trends and all undergoing their own profound, internal changes. All are sites of rapid population growth, have young populations and rising rates of urbanization. Muslim lives are organized in kingdoms and republics, controlled by oligarchies, military juntas and also by elected governments monitored by councils of religion scholars. These states use the modern world's communications systems to project diverse images. Egypt offers cinema and soap operas, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood that battles the army for control of national life. The Gulf emirates have planted extravagances such as golf courses, horse race tracks and high apartment towers in desert environs; they launched an airline aiming for a global market share in 1985. Qatar-based Al-Jazeera, which started broadcasting in Arabic in 1996 and in English in 2006, brings to Indonesian computer screens the Islamic world's answer to CNN. Pakistan has acquired the nuclear "Islamic bomb". Saudi Arabia, grown very rich from petro-dollars, has developed tourist logistics on a colossal scale to manage pilgrim crowds of up to two million each year, and spends billions exporting its Wahhabi or Uniate form of Islam across the world.[40] Iran's Arts faculties are dominated by female students; in Afghanistan girls still risk their very lives just to go to primary school. Turkey has claimed to have the necessary political, economic and cultural credentials for admission to the European Union. It forbade in 1997, but now wavers on whether women in its universities may advertise their Islamic identity by wearing headscarves.

In short, all these states project different ways of being Muslim. But very different Islamic societies share a common rhetoric that rejects the right of Israel to exist and portrays the world's Muslims as victims of Western plotting to destroy

Islam. In the many international Islamic forums there is the sense that Muslims once belonged to a great civilization that no longer exists. The greatest number of Muslims dying in warfare, however, was, and still is, in wars fought between and within Muslim countries.

Indonesia's *dakwah* leaders and their followers came into their own in an era of rapid economic development, paid for by the country's oil and natural gas exports. They, too, were beneficiaries of the new communications technologies that increased integration into the global economy brought to Indonesia. Air travel, fax and now e-mail and websites forge links between Indonesia's *dakwah* leaders and international Muslim organizations, and keep them up to date with trends prevalent in world Islam. The Dakwah Council's journal, *Media Dakwah*, regularly calls for stricter public observance of Islamic rites and more religious education at home; it denounces conspicuous consumption, corruption, and the economic dominance of Indonesian Chinese. *Media Dakwah* also reports on concerns of the wider Islamic world. Continuous exposure to Muslim opinion makers elsewhere make Indonesian readers understand themselves and Islam as besieged by enemies the journal variously identifies as Christian Indonesians, Chinese Indonesians, the West, the Jewish people, the CIA or the United States. KISDI,[41] an allied association spawned by the *dakwah* movement, has poured a steady stream of racist, anti-Semitic vitriol into the public arena.

Republika, ICMI, the Dakwah Council and KISDI moved Indonesia's foreign policy from low-key positions to more strident support of Islamic policies in international bodies such as the United Nations. They accelerated Indonesians' contacts with Islamic world movements and representation in them. The introduction of Internet services fostered, for all Indonesians with literacy, typing skills and access to computers, the possibility of new forms of self-identification within a new kind of public sphere.

In their pioneering study of the Internet in Indonesia, David Hill and Krishna Sen (2005) make the observation that the Internet is not a nationally bounded medium like a newspaper. Users, in the sense of readers and responders who identify as Indonesians, can be anywhere and everywhere in the world. Indonesian Internet users can simultaneously form identifications with sub-groups within their own country and globally, and do so in ways that evade government surveillance and control of content and opinion. President Suharto was well aware of dangers from the new medium. They quote him warning, in a speech delivered in April 1997, against Indonesians' exposure to global currents because:

> this enables people to receive foreign values that can erode their sense of nationalism. So extreme is the impact of foreign influences some people no longer care about maintaining their nation's unity.
>
> (Hill and Sen, 2005: 51)

But Indonesia's government could not block access to the World Wide Web. Business and tertiary education demanded it, and the government's own

development goals could not be achieved if Indonesia were to be uncompetitive in world markets and isolated from the global flow of information. Habibie, as minister of research and technology (1978–1998), pushed Indonesia's connection to the world's circuits of information and was the first Indonesian cabinet minister to have his own home page.

At first, Internet access was most available on major university campuses with the acquisition of computers and pools of staff returning from overseas study with both computer skills and understanding of the new technology's capacities. Academics and students, media professionals, NGO staff, and middle-class householders in the nation's capital became the vanguard of users. They were the beneficiaries of Suharto's development policies and, at the same time, the group with the mental and practical equipment to explore sites that opened up widely divergent views on organizing society. While the Internet has been hailed as a tool for democratizing access to knowledge, Hill and Sen point out that, in Indonesia, it widened the gap between users and the great mass of society.

The Internet, in its Indonesian context, mobilizes opinion setters, sharpens their allegiances and convictions, and enables them to disseminate their messages through channels that the majority of Indonesians have access to: print media, radio and television. Hill and Sen's case study of the violent confrontations between Muslim and Christian communities in the Moluccas between 1999 and 2002, which resulted in thousands of deaths and nearly one million refugees, illustrates the role of cyberspace communication. Ambon Berdarah Online (Ambon Bleeding Online) brought a grisly record of Muslim atrocities against Christians. Of the 50,000 visitors the site recorded between August 1999 and July 2000, one-quarter were viewers in the Netherlands (Hill and Sen, 2005: 125). Laskar Jihad's website appealed in Indonesian and Arabic to Muslims across Indonesia and Malaysia and to the world Islamic community to send donations for arms and men to fight to protect Muslims against Christian attacks. Both sites posted photographs of corpses, places of worship destroyed and people made homeless. Through their web pages, both sides raised funds for arms, attacked their opponents' sites and appealed to international communities to support their cause. Hill and Sen found that the Internet had not provided a neutral forum where Christians and Muslims could air and debate grievances, and, significantly, that it had not been used by those living in the conflict zones, but by people living in Jakarta or overseas (2005: 140).

The Internet also opened up the possibility that everyone and anyone could interpret Islam. The MUI, outlasting President Suharto, uses *fatwas* to close down public debate on controversial issues on the grounds that ordinary Muslims will become confused, and that the public airing of contentious issues will only play into the hands of extremists and give them unwanted publicity. In 2004, for example, the minister of religion banned discussion of Islamic laws that female staffer and theologian Siti Musdah Mulia argued failed to meet Islam's principle of equality between women and men. The following year the MUI issued a *fatwa* stating that liberalism, secularism and pluralism are *haram*

(forbidden) because they contradict Islamic teachings. The MUI rejected Mulia's recommendations. It reaffirmed that in Islam polygamy is permitted, interfaith marriages are not, and that women may not lead prayers if men are present (Means, 2009: 312).

In 2005 the minister also forbade Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Islam Network), established in 2001 under the leadership of Ulil Abshar Abdalla (b. 1967), from publicly challenging literal interpretations of the Quran. While its core membership was only around 150, JIL was reaching a wide audience through its website, talk shows and pamphlets on issues such as multiculturalism, human rights and pluralism (Means, 2009: 373). An article in *Kompas* on November 18, 2002, "Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam" ("Revitalizing Conceptualization of Islam"), resulted in a statement issued by Athian Ali Muhammad, chairman of the Forum of Ulama of the Indonesian Community, that its author, Ulil, had insulted Islam and that this crime was punishable by death (*Jakarta Post*, 24 December 2002). In this article, Ulil had urged Muslims to distinguish between Islamic teachings that reflected Arabian cultural values and those that were core principles of the Quran, and argued that these truths were also to be found in other religions. He had also queried whether sharia obligations such as covering of women and amputation of thieves' hands were applicable in all cultural contexts and historical eras. The *Post* article, "Islamic moderates, hard-liners wage battle in media", reported that Indonesian press and television were now fearful of publishing or airing content that would offend conservative Muslims:

> The dispute highlights again Indonesia's majority moderate Muslims' struggle to raise their voice at a time when the threat of terrorism has turned public attention to the extremist groups. (…)
>
> JIL member Hamid Basyaib said Ulil's article reflected the network's position, but declined to say whether the same applied to the rest of the country's moderate Muslims.
>
> However, women's rights activist Neng Darra Affiah and political analyst Rizal Mallarangeng believed it did represent all moderates.
>
> Neng said that Ulil's article was nothing new, although Muslim moderates had never put the ideas into writing like he did.
>
> Rizal said history had shown how efforts to impose sharia in Indonesia failed to find support from the majority of Muslims here.
>
> He urged all moderates like JIL to continue their struggle but warned of an uphill battle against the reactionary Muslims.
>
> "It is because they are fading in their numbers, that their voices are getting louder," he said.

Continuing its campaign to bring a single public voice to Islam, the MUI declared in 2005 that the Ahmadiyya sect was heretical because members recognize Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), as a prophet–successor to Muhammad (Means, 2009: 311–312). John Olle (2009: 96, 111) argues that combating

heresy has become the MUI's priority, that it now demands all government branches enforce MUI rulings, and that it has an "ideological synergy" with groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Front), which physically attacks those perceived as enemies of "true Islam". In this century Indonesians seem to be distributed along a continuum in their relationship to the Islamic world and the West.

8 Conclusion

Oscillations

Ways of relating to world Islam

One socio-economic group of Muslim Indonesians is highly visible. They are the beneficiaries of development programmes of the Suharto era. University degrees, prosperity, *dakwah* and the World Wide Web have produced a new Indonesian Islamic middle class that has a cosmopolitan lifestyle characterized by new media and consumerism (Leeuwen, 2005). Muslim fashion labels, lifestyle magazines and popular tele-evangelists all affirm it is "hip" to be Muslim. Islamic boy bands, inspired by Western bands of the late 1990s, sing religious songs to mainly female audiences. Teen magazines feature girls wearing "jilbab sexy"; fashion designers promote "Muslim salon" (fantasy dressing styles of shimmering silks in bold colours); travel bureaus offer "Haj Plus". In contrast to the villagers and urban lower-class people who take cut-rate pilgrimage packages subsidized by the government, the middle-class pilgrimage includes accommodation in Saudi Arabia's five star hotels, air-conditioned buses and tents at Arafat, and shopping excursions to Riyadh, in addition to religious study sessions and performance of the pilgrim's rituals. Indonesian pilgrimage guide, Moeslim Abdurrahman (1996) has argued that performance of this key rite of Islam has become penetrated by capitalism and commercialism, that it is a status signifier, affirming middle class identity, as much as a religious experience.

Female circumcision is spreading in Indonesia as a Muslim middle-class practice. Although it is not an obligatory procedure, circumcision of girls has become associated with Islamic culture in many countries. An archipelago-wide survey conducted by the Population Council of Jakarta (Budiharsana, 2003) of 1,694 Muslim mothers with female children under nineteen years of age found almost all had had some form of circumcision. Ninety-two per cent of families interviewed believed the practice enhanced personal hygiene, ensuring a woman was ritually clean for prayer, and supported continuation of the tradition for future generations of girls. Today, female circumcision for the Muslim middle class is a medicalized procedure offered by birthing clinics as part of a package that includes vaccinations and ear piercing (Feillard and Marcoes, 1998).

There is more boundary marking, such as *fatwas* that call on Muslims to discontinue the practice of sending Christmas cards to Christian friends and praying

with them at funerals. There is more Islamic programming on television, Muslim advice columns in magazines, and Muslim radio talk shows. This middle class participates in a transnational Islamic culture that values command of English. Self-help and motivational books in English share the shelves of Indonesian bookshops with fiction whose Muslim themes and romances stir readers' dreams. The homepage of Surabaya's Al-Hikmah school attracts wealthy urbanites by its promise to give pupils "Islamic Character and Academic Excellent [*sic*]" plus instruction in English.[1]

Fads in youth culture in Jordan or Egypt are taken up in Indonesia and spread to neighbouring Southeast Asian countries with Muslim populations. Young professionals enjoy Jakarta's opulent shopping malls, mobile phones, net surfing, smart cars, air conditioning, all markers of "sukses", within an Islam-infused sensibility. The Dutch anthropologist, Bart Barendregt, has coined the term "Islamic chic" to characterize the tastes and lifestyle of this new middle class and the culture of emergent civil Islam in Indonesia (2006: 10).[2]

Other ways Indonesians connect with the wider Islamic world are through *pesantrens* and membership in transnational Islamic associations that operate on Indonesian university campuses. *Pesantren* communities have a long history in Indonesia. Formed around the household of the spiritual head, they had dormitories for a transient population of student–disciples plus income-producing workshops and rice fields. They were located *outside* villages, closed off from their immediate neighbourhood, but open to men on the move, men uprooted from home communities or out of sympathy with them, who were attracted by a particular leader's reputation for piety, his magical powers or specialization in a particular branch of Islamic learning. A web of marriage relations and the personal ties of teacher–disciple connected individual *pesantrens*, so that itinerant men could travel from one to the other, assured of lodgings and the company of like-minded individuals.

The characteristic of a closed community under the sway of a dominant, charismatic leader, preserving a sense of difference, refusing to mix with people of different outlook, inclinations and habits, typifies *pesantrens* of past and present. The majority of today's *pesantrens* are privately owned and funded, suspicious of government, wary of inspection and accreditation, and can call on supporters to intimidate outsiders perceived as unsympathetic to their teaching and goals. Their education programmes do not equip students to fit easily into the larger society, find careers in it and respect difference; but they may slip into the world of clandestine Islamic organizations, training grounds and theatres of war. Graduates welcome Islam-friendly legislation that says no to marriage reform favouring monogamy, yes to single-sex hairdressing salons and massage services and, through provisions of the Pornography and Porno-Action Bill of 2008, curtails women's working hours by banning night shifts.

Most *pesantren* heads enjoy a regional fame only, but several came to national prominence through their personal charisma, their radical teachings, their organizations, and their ability to launch private armies against fellow Indonesians. In 1971, Abdullah Sungkar (1937–1999) and Abu Bakar Basyir

(b. 1938) opened a *pesantren* in Ngruki (Central Java), to which they gave the name Al-Mukmin, which means the faithful or believers (in Islam). There they taught that Muslims must wage *jihad* against contemporary Indonesian society, replace its laws, practices and norms with those of the "ancestors", that is, the seventh-century populace of Medina, and carry war to non-Muslims and "misguided or insincere" Muslims. They rejected the nationalism that wooed Muslim loyalties away from Islam (Means, 2009). In this, they can be considered to belong to an international lineage of Islamic teachers and theologians such as Osama bin Laden's mentor, the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), that reaches all the way back to Ibn Taymiyyah. As a first step towards rebuilding a universal Islamic community, Sungkar and Basyir aimed for a single Islamic state that would incorporate all Muslim regions of Southeast Asia.[3]

The New Order banned organizations such as Komando Jihad and forced Sungkar and Basyir into exile. But, following President Suharto's downfall, when restrictions on politics and public expression were removed, and when Indonesia's government lost the capability and seemingly the will to protect all its citizens, private Muslim armies were recruited and sent into local wars between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas and Sulawesi. Jafar Umar Thalib (b. 1961), who had studied in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan between 1987 and 1989, established his Laskar Jihad in January 2000. Units of Indonesia's national army secretly trained recruits in West Java. Seven thousand *jihadis* fought in the Moluccas (Hasan, 2006: 17). Theodore Friend states that Thalib sent a total of 10,000 fighters to eastern Indonesia and Papua (2003: 383). The Indonesian Al-Qaeda operative, Abu Jabril (b. 1957) recruited volunteers from Al-Mukmin's network into his Laskar Mujahideen Indonesia and sent 500 fighters to Poso and the Moluccas that same year (Means, 2009: 176).

Around 5,000 died in Muslim–Christian wars in the Moluccas between 1999 and 2003 (Pringle, 2010: 147).[4] Above ground, Basyir's Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (Council of Jihad Fighters of Indonesia) registered itself in 2000 as a "civil society" NGO to coordinate political measures to bring about an Islamic state.[5] Below ground, cells of Jemaah Islamiyyah prepared the violent arm of this struggle.[6] In 2002 Ngruki graduates coordinated the assembling of bombs and grooming of the suicide-killers who launched attacks on the non-Muslim space of Bali, its Hindus and foreign tourists on October 12. Attacks were launched in Jakarta on the Marriott Hotel in 2003, on the Australian Embassy in 2004, against Bali again in October 2005, and on the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in 2009, in all cases killing Indonesians and foreigners. Attacks continue on Christians and churches.

Public opinion polling had been barely underway in 1950s Indonesia before being banned in President Sukarno's Guided Democracy. The ban remained in place throughout President Suharto's New Order. Therefore, when surveys were allowed by President Habibie (in office 1998–1999) after a forty-year hiatus, observers were eager to discover how Indonesians saw the relationship of Islam to the state.

In 2002 and 2007 the Centre for Research on Islam and Society of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta conducted face-to-face interviews with 2,500 Indonesian men and women aged seventeen years and older, who were married and residents of villages and towns across the archipelago. Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle published their analysis of the responses in 2004 and 2009.[7] To questions on the state and its governance, they found that 7 per cent of respondents in the 2002 survey opposed the right of women to stand for parliament; 26 per cent believed Islam forbids women from becoming a country's president; 30 per cent thought the government should supervise fasting during the month of Ramadhan; 33 per cent supported amputating the hands of thieves; 36 per cent believed the government should compel women to wear the *jilbab* in public; and 37 per cent approved of polygamy (2004: 115–116). Forty-three per cent of interviewees in the 2007 survey accepted stoning for adulterers; 39 per cent were opposed to banks charging interest; 20 per cent thought apostates should be executed; 20 per cent believed the attack on New York's World Trade Centre and suicide-killing were justified; 10 per cent supported the bombings in Bali of 2002 and opposed the death sentence for the convicted planners Ali Amrozi bin Nurhasyim (1962–2008), Mukhlas (Ali Ghufron, 1960–2008) and Imam Samudra (1970–2008).

Means refers to a survey from 2003 that found 53 per cent of Indonesian Muslims agreed with the statement: democracy is a Western way of doing things and would not work in Indonesia (2009: 384). Surveys found public sympathy for militant Islam and sharia strongest in West Java and South Sulawesi, regions that came out for Negara Islam Indonesia (the Islamic State of Indonesia) in 1952. Christine Dobbin (1998) calls this identification of belief with place "religious geography".

The 2002 survey established that Indonesians supporting core demands of Islamist activists were likely to be rural, from low-income households, with low education levels, were more likely to have studied in *pesantren* than government schools, and male. Their responses showed them to be less tolerant of non-Muslims, more likely to object to having Christian neighbours, and less likely to belong to civic organizations such as sports and cultural clubs, labour unions or secular non-governmental organizations. Mujani and Liddle argue that Islamist values resonate in villages because these values conform to many aspects of traditional culture. They call this conception of Islam the "Village of God" (2004: 119). But they also point out that these same traditional cultural values threw up the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama organizations whose leadership has mostly stood for a tolerant Indonesian society. Writing after three fairly conducted national elections and noting that parties supporting a pluralist Indonesia won the support of 57 per cent of voters in 2009, Mujani and Liddle offer this assessment of the state of Indonesian politics at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century (2009: 590):

> Secular political parties and secular politicians now dominate Indonesian politics and look set to do so for the foreseeable future.…

> The dominance of secular parties in Indonesian politics is certainly a plus for relations among religious groups in multi-religious Indonesia. It is probably also good for short-run democratic stability, because no significant groups challenge the principle of popular sovereignty on which the Constitution is based.

And they conclude that "the real challenges to democratic consolidation in Indonesia" are "governmental venality, incompetence, and unresponsiveness", not radical Islamist organizations.

Noorhaidi Hasan (2006: 218) discovered from interviews he conducted with Laskar Jihad members[8] over a period of eighteen months in the major cities of Java and in Makassar that recruits were young men from small towns and rural villages who had, in Geertz's terms, an *abangan* background. They had migrated to big cities for education and jobs. There they witnessed the bounties the New Order's development policies showered on the middle class, but they remained shut out, conscious of corruption in all its daily forms, their sense of self challenged by forces of Western globalization. To defend themselves they withdrew from what seemed to them the "anything goes" society of contemporary urban Indonesia. They found their way to membership of cells through mosques that function as hostels for the homeless in poor urban neighbourhoods. There they could join an enclave.

Noorhaidi Hasan calls it "a closed system that distinguishes itself by an exclusive pattern of dress, interactions, and relationships" (219). Their attitude to Islam he characterizes as literalist. These young men were not interested in the application of modern scholarship to ancient texts, but fixed on a literal reading of the Quran, believed every word of it to be revealed, not to be deviated from, and so worked their way to the view that Muslims should not cooperate with the tainted – nationalists, secularists, women, foreign non-Muslims. They should keep themselves separate from pluralism and tolerance, close the mind and avoid influence from anyone other than their spiritual guide. Martin van Bruinessen argues that, given such low levels of trust, contemporary Indonesia lacks the "social capital" necessary to preserve its cohesion (2004: 13–14). *Jihad* for recruits, Hasan concludes, gave them (2006: 219–220):

> the opportunity to flaunt their new, religious identity and negotiate their illusory strength. Under the banner of jihad they felt free to shout out, wave swords and challenge much more powerful – and often inaccessible – opponents. Therefore, among these youths, jihad is not only a language of protest in their attempts to break out of their own sense of frustration, but also a message trumpeted to resist their own sense of marginalization. … Thalib's recruits competed to clamber on board the ships that would take them to the Moluccas and absorb them in a protracted bloody communal conflict in the islands.

A different socio-economic group became supporters of radical Islam on Indonesian university campuses. While President Suharto remained in power, his

"campus normalization" programme made overtly political student associations illegal. In the nation's universities, especially in science and engineering faculties, politically motivated students therefore networked through religion study groups such as Tarbiyah. This movement, developed by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and linked to the Saudi-sponsored World Association of Islamic Youth, approaches Islam as a final and complete thought system. It organizes study in small groups, segregated by sex, under a hierarchy of leaders, to produce exemplary Muslims who will, from below, bring about the full implementation of sharia in Indonesia and work towards a Muslim world united under a single spiritual head. Another transnational organization with branches on Indonesian campuses is Hizbut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). It vociferously opposes the policies of the United States in the Middle East, seeks to limit the roles women may play in public life, and campaigns for a world caliphate. Hizbut-Tahrir rejects democratic politics and the nation-state as incompatible with divine sovereignty, and so boycotts Indonesian elections.

Tarbiyah moved openly from religion study to politics following the fall of Suharto. It founded the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) in August 1998. The Justice Party won only 1.3 per cent of the nation's vote in the 1999 elections. Repackaged as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and campaigning on a platform of improving social services, combating corruption, and deferring implementation of sharia in the short term, it raised its share of the national vote to 7.34 per cent in the 2004 elections, won forty-five of the 560 seats in parliament and gained representation in the cabinet of President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono (Means, 2009: 307). It won 7.88 per cent of the nation's vote in the 2009 elections and fifty-seven seats.[9]

The worldwide movement for restoring a single, universal authority over Muslims in the person of a caliph seeks to undo contemporary political forms that are historically rooted in Western colonialism in Muslim countries. Indonesia's caliphate enthusiasts argue that the nation-state has failed to deliver fair living standards for all and that "Islam is the answer". Azra (2004b) characterizes Indonesia's caliphate movement as made up of people "trapped in romanticism", by which he means they have not undertaken a critical examination of the history of Islam's caliphs and kings or analysis of how such a world system operated in the past. Azra attributes the rise of radical groups to a weakened central government unable to enforce the law. *Jihad* groups step into a vacuum, take the law into their own hands, and impose their particular vision of good and evil on the general populace. Indonesian groups that are closed to Indonesians they consider insincere Muslims or aggressive unbelievers are simultaneously open to like-minded groups across the Islamic world.

Sharia state or Muslim democracy?

In a guest opinion piece in *The Jakarta Post* in November 2007, Israeli scholar Giora Eliraz observed that, "Democracy in Indonesia has not been left unnoticed by the Arab Middle Eastern media" (Eliraz, 2007). Based on his reading of

Arabic language newspapers over the decade 1997–2007, Eliraz says Middle Eastern observers note "the leading role played by reform-minded Muslim democrats" in "building the third largest democracy in the world". He continues:

> The positive impact of the parliamentary elections and the first direct presidential elections of 2004 on the world media imprinted itself on the Arab media as well.… Indonesia is viewed by certain Middle Eastern observers as an impressive model offering compelling evidence of the compatibility of Islam and democracy and it does that in the home of the world's largest Muslim community.… More important, the Indonesian case gives them hope by providing evidence that the global process of democratization does not leave untouched countries with a predominantly Muslim population and that the current state of democracy in their region has nothing to do with Islam.
>
> (Eliraz, 2007)

Eliraz was reflecting on the impact of Indonesia on Islamic societies in the Arabic-speaking world. Political scientist Greg Barton, focusing on terrorism committed in the name of Islam inside Indonesia itself, says that "the advent of Jemaah Islamiyah-al-Qaeda-style *jihadi* Islamism in the Indonesian archipelago marks a sea change in Indonesian Islam". Every violent act has a "ratchet effect"; "gains made by radical Islamists are very difficult to reverse and over time the cumulative effect of a series of small gains can be considerable" (2004: 86). In other words, people become accustomed to violence. There is no retreat. Means (2009: 161) notes that in 2002 there were as many as 37,362 religion schools in Indonesia with five to six million students, but that only a very few of them need to teach a radical brand of Islam to create havoc in the whole country.

Other observers argue that the cultural oppression of the New Order years and abrupt removal of control produced the violence of the twenty-first century's opening decade. Friend (2003: 480) discounts the poverty ensuing from the Asian financial crisis of 1997 as a cause of the bloodshed. Western analysts take comfort from the elections conducted since 1999. Many parties compete for the right to represent Indonesians; presidential campaigns and elections have been conducted without intimidation of voters. Starting with the parliament elected in 2004 there have been no seats set aside for members of the armed forces.

Noorhaidi Hasan argues that following the collapse of the New Order and the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, radical Islamic discourse moved to centre stage in Indonesia and Islamic radicalism "engulfed the political arena of Indonesia" (2005: 305). He says the Indonesian public was at first astonished at the sight of bearded young men in robes wielding swords and at Laskar Jihad's readiness to impose the sentence of death by stoning on one of its own for rape. Hasan argues that, while Indonesian Islam responds to trends in global Islam, radical expressions of Islam have indigenous roots. He also points to Indonesia's history of political elites, civilian and military, directing and manipulating religious radicals to attain their own goals. For example,

high-ranking army officers gave military and financial assistance to Laskar Jihad in the Moluccas in order to destabilize the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid and prevent assertion of civilian control over the military (2006: 107). Hasan also contends that Laskar Pembela Islam, the paramilitary division of the Defenders of Islam Front, received orders from elements within Indonesia's civilian and military elites to mount demonstrations against political rivals, especially Megawati Sukarnoputri (2005: 305). Like Barton, he doubts if there can be a drawing back when leaders of "mainstream, moderate" Muslim organizations are pressured into support of radicals' demands, when paramilitaries beat up opponents and attack businesses associated with the US, and *jihad* becomes a weapon for retaliation and revenge, a means to "liberate" Muslims from the influence of the West, and to achieve martyr status. He argues that only strong government and political stability can counteract these currents.

The tsunami of 2004: pacification via sharia?

On 26 December 2004 an earthquake deep beneath the Indian Ocean erupted off Sumatra's west coast, sending tidal waves that destroyed communities on land and sea in a zone bounded by the coasts of India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia. Fishing and agricultural villages of Asia's workers, tourist resorts catering to members of McWorld, and Indonesia's "Verandah of Mecca" were sites of destruction and a quarter of a million deaths.

For Indonesia, the tsunami struck a province in revolt, led by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), which labelled occupation by Indonesia's national army "Javanese colonialism". Grievances against Jakarta were many and varied. Some accused the central government of exploiting Aceh's oil wealth; some claimed Jakarta was imposing secularizing, cosmopolitan values on the populace; some saw their province corralled within a Western-derived nation-state, prevented from realizing its proper place in the universal community of Islam; all complained of corruption and the brutality of Indonesia's armed forces (Aspinall, 2009). The Acehnese had no international lobby in the West to push for their independence from Indonesia, as East Timorese had cultivated in the worldwide Catholic Church. Libya offered arms and training until its own political and economic imperatives made its government seek rapprochement with the West. Other Islamic states, facing their own militant oppositions at home, would not support revolt against the established government of a Muslim majority country.

GAM militias and Indonesia's armed forces attempted to establish a ceasefire in 2005 so that the disaster of nature could be tackled. Soldiers from many countries, including United States Marines and Australian army engineers, armed units from Pakistan, Turkey and Singapore were admitted to Aceh. Non-governmental organizations sent representatives. Swiss, New Zealanders, Indians and Indonesians from across the archipelago cooperated and competed to remove bodies from building debris, restore missing relatives to their families, distribute clean water and explain the cause and meaning of the tsunami to survivors. A province previously closed to outsiders now became workspace for foreigners

and platform for competing visions of the world. Arab donations were described as the largesse of Osama bin Laden; representatives of Christian organizations had to refute accusations of plotting to spirit away and convert Muslim orphans. American and Australian political leaders hoped their practical aid would soften the anger and suspicions of Muslim Indonesia over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Voices in Indonesia's national assembly demanded in March 2005 that Aceh be returned to Indonesian control and Indonesian destiny. Indonesian opinion makers confronted the wealth of the West with its stockpiles of disaster supplies, its helicopters, its teams of engineers rebuilding bridges and inoculating survivors, its organizational capabilities, its electronic information services that brought news and images of isolated Aceh villages into Western living rooms, and Western management practices that produced a string of instant fundraising concerts worlds away. They saw the commitment of Western public and private funds to rebuild Asia's houses, schools, industries and infrastructure. In Aceh province, local preachers attributed earthquakes and tsunami to Allah's anger (Graf *et al*., 2010).

Consciousness of the catastrophe of the tsunami for Aceh helped bring a conclusion to negotiations already underway between Jakarta and GAM.[10] Units of the army began withdrawing. Devolution of powers over policies, loans and foreign investment were sanctioned and new finance-sharing arrangements between centre and provincial governments approved. Local political parties were allowed to organize, and direct elections for a new governor of the province (instead of an appointee from Jakarta) authorized. Representatives from the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (rather than from a Middle Eastern organization) were appointed as the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Jakarta set up the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency. Rebuilding of houses and infrastructure was to be a vehicle also for the process of reintegrating Aceh into Indonesia.

During the long period of conflict (1989–2005), the central government had offered rule by sharia enforcers in place of the nation's fighting men. A special autonomy law for Aceh, enacted in 2001, gave sharia courts jurisdiction over family, property and criminal cases. In 2004 the jurisdiction of Islamic courts was extended to include banking, the school system, and matters of personal behaviour including dress (of men as well as women), gambling, alcohol, sex outside marriage, apostasy, and deviant teachings and beliefs (Means, 2009: 276–277). Courts were allowed to punish the convicted by ordering fines, caning or imprisonment. Proposals for "comprehensive sharia" passed by Aceh's elected assembly in April 2009 include amputation for robbery and execution by stoning for illicit sex, with sentences to be carried out in public on Fridays. Speaking to the press, several legislators expressed personal abhorrence of stoning and amputation, but felt constrained to vote for these Quranic punishments, lest their opposition be construed as their being "against Islam".[11]

Sharia integrates Aceh province more into the global Muslim nation and establishes a precedent for sharia-supporters across Indonesia. For Jakarta,

however, the Aceh settlement neutralized a movement dangerous to the nation's territorial integrity. It allowed pulling back of "occupying" troops and greater civilian authority over the armed forces. Increased political stability enabled Indonesia's leaders to shepherd the nation through the global financial crisis of 2008. Indonesia was spared the social and economic chaos that the 1997 Asian financial crisis engendered.

Weathering the 2008 global financial crisis

Colonial economic planners had favoured an export economy based on private enterprise, plantation agriculture and mining. Nationalist politicians at the helm of independent Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s considered this policy responsible for the country's underdevelopment. They opted for industrialization and a USSR model of state-planned and -led enterprises. Nationalization and restriction of sectors of the economy to Indigenous entrepreneurs had characterized Sukarno's "Sosialisme à la Indonesia" (Indonesian-style socialism). Economic planners of Suharto's New Order retained state protection of industries deemed of national significance, but opened up Indonesia to multinational corporations that, in the 1970s, were relocating manufacturing to Southeast Asian countries to take advantage of cheaper labour. Starting from a low base, there was record growth in export of manufactured goods. By 1990, manufacturing had overtaken agricultural products in export earnings for Indonesia. Easy access to capital in the 1990s generated booms and a steadily greater dependence on mobile foreign capital for short-term loans.

Indonesia's Islamic media were quick to blame Asia's financial crisis of 1997–1998 on Western currency speculators and the fickleness of Western and Chinese capital, rather than analyse Indonesian banking and regulatory practices. Suharto's policies had generated support from the benefiting classes who appreciated the state's protection of private assets and suppression of labour unions. Indonesia's urban and rural middle classes remembered the chaos of the Sukarno years and the violence following his downfall. So, for much of Suharto's long monopoly of the presidency, they did not clamour for liberal Western democracy as Fukuyama's model envisaged. Instead, the New Order created stakeholders who pursued business success through political connections. They were nationalistic, and receptive of the transnational Salafi discourse that Islamic social justice, rather than Western democracy, could best deal with Indonesia's endemic corruption and alleviate the poverty of the bottom third of society.

Economic crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 brought political crisis to Indonesia. In fifty years Indonesia had had just two presidents; now, in the six years between 1998 and 2004 it had four. All along Indonesia's borders religious and ethnic conflicts and movements demanding autonomy or outright independence erupted following Suharto's downfall. Political stabilization, achieved through constitutional change and the successful conduct of elections, plus a new focus by Indonesia's economic planners on the country's huge domestic market, facilitated economic recovery before the next financial crisis that was to engulf the

advanced economies of the United States and Western Europe in 2008. A large class of consumers in Indonesia wanted upgraded housing, air conditioners, household appliances, television sets, motorcycles, trendy clothing, mobile phones, compact discs, processed foods and bottled drinks. Here were customers in a population of 240 million acquainted with new products and primed by advertising to want them. Manufacturing for *them* could rebuild Indonesia's prosperity. By 2005, 85 per cent of goods and services produced in Indonesia were for its domestic market (Djaja, 2009: 2).

The onset of the 2008 global financial crisis brought a plunge in Jakarta's stock market, sharp depreciation of the rupiah (29 per cent between September and December 2008), large capital outflows, a drop in prices and demand for Indonesian exports, particularly of crude palm oil, coal, rubber, wood and wood products, and layoffs of workers, especially in Jakarta, Riau and Kalimantan. Even before the global financial crisis, Indonesia's economy could not absorb the steady increases in its labour force. It grew from 106.3 million in 2001 to 111.5 million in 2008, while, according to the National Manpower Survey for 2008, the number of jobs grew to only 9.4 million. Indonesia also has 5.8 million workers overseas in Middle Eastern countries, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, sending home annually an average of five to six billion US dollars. Many are domestic workers. Plantation workers became vulnerable to the global downturn in demand. In 2008, Malaysia sent back 250,000 workers to Indonesia, laid off from its palm oil and rubber plantations (Djaja, 2009: 7–8).

Rising demand from China for Indonesia's palm oil, copper and timber helped insulate Indonesia from the 2008 global financial crisis. Loan guarantees from the US government of ten billion dollars and of one billion from Australia allowed Indonesia to continue borrowing on international markets. Investment from ASEAN countries and South Korea helped spark a new manufacturing and construction boom. Indonesia's gross domestic product increased by 4.5 per cent in 2009 and by over 6 per cent in 2011.[12]

Indonesia's government did not collapse as the 2008 financial crisis spread. On the contrary, government continued to function, and elections proceeded in the second year of the world crisis in accordance with the new democratic forms. Arrests and prosecutions of men charged with terrorism pushed exponents of violence to the political periphery even in a context where petrodollars could no longer cushion Indonesia's economy. Declining production had brought a change in status for Indonesia from oil exporter to oil importer. In May 2008 the government announced its decision to withdraw from OPEC in order to conserve Indonesia's domestic oil supplies and save on membership fees. Indonesia's unemployment and underemployment remain very high at forty million people but, where US and West Europe's economies have seen recession, Indonesia's economy is characterized by growth. By February 2010 international loan guarantees could be withdrawn because of Indonesia's relative success in managing the crisis. Indonesians could see their achievements as the result of adjustments to conflicting global trends.

Indonesia in the world

The late Mohammad Natsir argued that Islam is a great world force that steers a middle course between capitalism and communism. Islam, reconstructed into a "theo-democracy" (his term) was a solution to the tyranny of the masses within Western democracies. He labelled the West's secular nationalism "idolatry". He taught that racialism and ethnocentrism were antithetical to Islam, and, apparently blind to entrenched class interests and to minority religious communities in Islamic societies, he argued that only Islam could stop civil wars (Sevea, 2009: 159–161).

Can the liveliness of intellectual life that Eliraz discerns in Indonesia continue to flourish? Is the view of militant Islam ascendant a shallow judgment, just as the former conception of Indonesians embracing pluralism wholeheartedly was erroneous? Is there a single "Islam" in Indonesia?

Abu Bakar Basyir, of Indo–Yemeni descent, presents himself in loose white tunic and plaid sarong; he eschews the turban for a white *kuppiya* (brimless cap). Amrozi bin Nurhasyim of Bali infamy had roots in village Java. He maintained a website, yet claimed as his inspiration Darul Islam's Kartosuwirjo whose followers believed he could make himself invisible and fly through the air. Kartosuwirjo did not deny this. He handed out lucky charms to the soldiers who were to establish his Abode of Islam inside West Java.

Village Islam may become dangerous when hooked into world Islam via websites. Indonesia's judiciary sentenced the Bali bombing planners to death in 2003; Indonesia's police carried out their execution in 2008. In the years since, police and army personnel have killed men alleged to be senior strategists of terrorism in pitched battles fought with them and their supporters. Representatives of Indonesia's government visiting Australia in July 2009 declared that Indonesia had become a "normal" country: it had survived the global financial crisis and it is surviving terrorism.

Journalists hold up Indonesia to Middle Eastern countries as a model of successful transition by a Muslim majority society from authoritarian rule underpinned by the armed forces to a government drawing its support and legitimacy from popular will as voiced through free elections and media. Sixty-two per cent of respondents in the 2011 Lowy Indonesia Poll identified democracy as their preferred form of government (Lowy Institute, 2012). Ninety-seven per cent stated that the right to a fair trial was important for Indonesia; 96 per cent valued the right to freedom of expression. The right to vote in national elections was the preference of 95 per cent of respondents. Twenty-seven per cent thought religious tolerance was decreasing in today's Indonesia. A majority (62 per cent) opposed attacks on Ahmadis (a sect condemned as "deviant" by Indonesia's leading Islamic authority).

Indonesians' heritages vie in edgy combination. Absolute monarchy seems, historically, a quintessentially Islamic form of governance, yet kings are not part of the Quranic revelation. Neither are democracy and popular sovereignty. The late Nurcholish Majid (1939–2005) argued that the concept of the state is not to be found in the Quran either. Accordingly, he made the case that there was no need for an "Islamic state", and urged Indonesians' focus to shift to the "private state" of

the individual believer. Liberal Islam (JIL) urges Indonesians to distinguish core Islamic principles from Arab cultural practices, to follow universal values while living local lives and making Indonesian cultural accommodations to both Western and Islamic-inspired modernity.

Many Indonesians are conducting research on Islam in all its Indonesian manifestations. They show a lively interest in their own society and commitment to it. Public conversation is about Islamic solutions to Indonesian problems, Indonesia's place in the world, Islam's place in the world. Today's dominant discourse in Indonesia is an Islamic one. It is a public discussion that leaves Indonesia's religious minorities out, and excludes them from the search for solutions. This is the current paradigm until the next crisis, within or externally induced, causes a shift.

Looking back, Noorhaidi Hasan calls the violent rhetoric and actions of Islamic groups in Indonesia between 1999 and 2003 a politics of theatre and of recognition (2006: 220). In the years of upheaval following the fall of authoritarian government, Indonesian Salafi communities competed – with each other and

(a) (b) (c)

Figure 8.1a–c Three images of Indonesia's First Lady, Ani Yudhoyono, in national costume, Western business suit, and Indonesian Islamic dress typify Indonesians' recognition of their national heritage and claim to Western and Islamic cultures (sources: http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkas:Susilo_Bambang_Yudhoyono_and_Ani_Yudhoyono.jpg; www.presidenri.go.id/ibunegara/imageGalleryD.php/659.jpg; www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/fokus/2010/08/26/5808.html).

with groups advocating democracy – for media attention and control of the production of ideas in public discourse. Umar Thalib's mobilization of his fighters to take *jihad* to Indonesia's Christians in the Moluccas riveted the nation. Killing by suicide bombing in Bali captured the world's attention. Violence was the strategy chosen to seize leadership of Indonesian Islam and to compel recognition of Indonesia's Islamists and their importance within the global Islamic community.

Hasan argues that this strategy was actually a sign of the weakness of groups espousing an intolerant Islam in Indonesia, not of their strength. They could only operate when important segments of the military, police and civilian elites were willing to tolerate violence to achieve their own political goals. Furthermore, he says the majority of Indonesians remained committed to nation, to electoral democracy, to tolerance in religion and dissent exercised within the bounds of law. At all levels of society people work to support democratic institutions, protect human rights and enable gender equality. The attacks on church communities and buildings are the acts of people on the periphery of Indonesian life.

Robert Elson (2008) says that the "idea of Indonesia", born around 1910, is still "seductive" 100 years on and attaches the loyalty of most Indonesians. In other words, Indonesia oscillates between extremes, but the main current of thinking, feeling and behaving flows back into a broad, middle channel. John Sidel (2009) argues that *jihad* in Indonesia is essentially reactive and defensive. He contends that whenever Christians, secularists and Westernized liberal Muslims dominate Jakarta politics, Muslims feel reduced to the status of outsiders and onlookers in their own Muslim majority country. He also argues that the shift in targets for *jihadis*, from Indonesian churches and Christian communities to international targets, that is hotels and nightclubs frequented by foreigners, was due to the slight success of Islamist political parties in mobilizing Indonesians behind Islamic agendas. He concludes that liberalism and cosmopolitanism are on the rise in Indonesia, as evidenced by Western pop music on the airwaves and Santa Claus in shopping malls, and that *jihadis* are "waging a rear-guard, losing battle under the banner of Islam" (312). But it can also be argued that decades of assertions by Islamist organizations and media that Christians, Jews, Americans, the West in general, are relentless enemies of Muslim peoples and their religion have become received ideas that have changed Indonesia and Indonesians. Separation of Indonesian identity through dress from global images of Western and East Asian modernity is an established accomplishment of the last two decades.

The decentralization law of 1999 dispersed power among the regions. Elections are held now at all levels from nationwide to local. In Aceh, sharia obliges all businesses to close during Friday prayers and all men to attend. Either this will be the Aceh way, or it may become the way of all Indonesia. If so, could Indonesia be said to have fully joined the world Muslim community?

In 2009 the Afghan-American author, Tamim Ansary, published his history of the world. The book had its origins in his reflections on an outline proposed for a school world history textbook that gave scant consideration to Islam and Muslim peoples. Ansary concluded that Islamic history is not a subset of world

history as, for example, French history might be understood. In his conceptualization, *two* distinct, parallel world histories began in Mesopotamia. One of these histories was Islamic and evolved over time to occupy a geographical zone stretching from Istanbul to the Indus. He calls this the Middle World and lists its formative themes and eras as: Ancient Times: Mesopotamia and Persia; Birth of Islam; the Khalifate: Quest for Universal Unity; Fragmentation: Age of the Sultanates; Catastrophe: Crusaders and Mongols; Rebirth: the Three-Empires Era; Permeation of East by West; the Reform Movements; Triumph of the Secular Modernists; the Islamist Reaction.

Ansary identifies the driving force of Islamic history as the "quest to perfect and universalize the Muslim community" (2009: 117). He argues that the dream of a universal community of piety and justice has sustained Muslims over 1,300 years of religious schism, political fragmentation, conquest, Islamic empires, European colonial rule, modern experiments in Arab nationalism, socialism and sharia state, and movements to revive a single world caliphate. From a Muslim point of view, Islam's expansion out of Arabia and Muslim conquests of lands and peoples prove the truth of the revelations spoken to Muhammad. Accordingly, religious movements to revive Islam cannot be extricated from the imperative of resurrecting Muslim political power (2009: 251). In an epilogue Ansary writes that Islam is not the opposite of the West's democracy, but a whole separate conceptual framework. Islamic history is one world history unfolding simultaneously among others; it moves through time from the Medina community established in 622 (Year 1), driven by its own assumptions.

Indonesia and all of Muslim Southeast Asia lie entirely outside this construction of world history through Islamic eyes.[13] And indeed Ansary's conception of the Islamic world is mirrored in scores of histories of Islam. On the periphery of that world, Indonesians oscillate between powerful Western and Islamic globalizing forces. Some seek to enclose Indonesia wholly within the Islamic. With Saudi backing, they work to fashion within Indonesia a "pure" Arabian Islamic culture and, to paraphrase Sidel (2009: 305), to make the centre of their world not "here", in Indonesia, but "there" in the heartland of the Arab world. The West sees globalization as valuing freedom in economic, political, cultural and religious life, and therefore as addressing all people's needs everywhere. Globalization is natural, universal, not specifically grounded in the West, in this conception. It is transmittable by globally circulating images, texts and practices through the hyper-communication of electronic media. Islam offers a counter globalization that invites and, indeed, requires individuals to move away from freedoms so construed, and to view *Islam's* principles and law as universal. People are offered membership, not of a global nation, but of a Muslim nation. Many Indonesians look both West and East and into their own heritage. If they find worth in their unique Muslim cultural identity, they may infuse their value for inclusiveness into the character of global Islam and achieve recognition within the global community of Muslims that their standing as the world's largest Muslim country would seem to justify.

Glossary

Note: All foreign terms are translated the first time they appear in the text. Words appearing in more than one chapter are also listed here.

abangan	characterizes Javanese Muslim culture and individuals
brahmin	member of Hindu scholastic and priestly caste, learned in Sanskrit
bupati	chief administrative officer of a district
dakwah	movement to improve understanding and practice of Islam
dhimmi	"protected status" and limitations on Christians and Jews living under Islamic governments
fatwa	ruling on matters of belief and practice by Islamic legal scholar
Hadith	collection of authenticated sayings of Muhammad for guidance on belief and practice
haji	man who has made pilgrimage to Mecca (female form: *hajah*)
imam	Islamic leader of congregational prayer (title: Imam)
Jawi	pilgrims to Mecca from Southeast Asia; Malay written in modified Arabic script
jihad	inner struggle for personal rectitude; defensive or offensive struggle against those defined as enemies of Islam
kiai	man regarded as pious and learned in Islam (title: Kiai)
merdeka	freedom, independence; free, independent
Panca Sila	five pillars, philosophical basis of the Republic of Indonesia
pesantren	Islamic (boarding) school
Ramadhan	ninth (fasting) month of Muslim calendar, commemorates reception of Quran
santri	scholar of Islam; observant Muslim
ulama	scholars of Islam, community religious leaders
wali	Friends of Allah

Notes

1 Introduction: globalization and Indonesia

1 The OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, brings together countries with high-income economies in Western Europe, North America, Japan, South Korea and Australia for global development.
2 NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is the military alliance linking North America and Europe.
3 OPEC is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Its members include Venezuela, Ecuador, African and Middle Eastern oil-producing countries. Indonesia was a member until 2008.
4 ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, promotes economic and cultural ties between member countries, and aims at ensuring regional stability.
5 The 2010 census gives the population as 237.6 million. See Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics, www.bps.go.id.
6 The ten member countries of ASEAN are: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar (Burma). The eleventh and newest Southeast Asian country is East Timor (Timor L'Este or Timor Loro Sa'e).
7 Nasakom is an acronym made up of *nasionalisme*, *agama* and *komunisme*, the Indonesian words for nationalism, religion and communism.
8 Panca Sila means five pillars or five principles. It may also be written as Pancasila.
9 Ramadhan is the month in which Muslims commemorate Muhammad's reception of the Quran by fasting during daylight hours.
10 *Fatwas* are rulings on a point of Islamic principle or practice issued by an Islamic jurist or *fatwa*-issuing organization in response to questions put by members of the Islamic community.
11 The Lowy Institute for International Policy, *Australia, Indonesia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, poll conducted 19 June–6 July 2006 (Lowy Institute, 2006). The Lowy Institute's most recent poll, conducted between 20 November and 13 December 2011 found that most Indonesians wanted the focus of government-to-government relations with Australia to be on education, health and trade (Lowy Institute, 2012).

2 Early encounters: archaic globalization

1 Varman is a royal suffix meaning "protected by".
2 Horses were probably first introduced to Java by Chinese and Indian merchants, but they were not generally found there until the end of the fifteenth century (Bankoff and Swart, 2007: 52).

3 *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671–695)* by I-Tsing, translated by J. Takakusu (1896: xxxiv), books-google.com/record-buddhist-religion-tsing-takakusu-book-8130702932. Yiqing says there were 3,000 students in his time at Nalanda, so Srivijaya's 1,000-strong learning community suggests its importance in the seventh century world of Buddhist studies.
4 Tin, at this stage in China's development, had no industrial use. Instead, thin sheets of tin were used as backing to paper items that were burned in Chinese altar rituals at home and in public temples.
5 Tan Ta Seng (2009) argues that the Zheng He fleets had a lasting impact on the course of Indonesian history. He documents that Zheng He built mosques for port-based communities of Chinese Muslims in Java and, along with Arab and Indian Muslims, promoted the spread of Islam within the Indonesian archipelago.
6 Before paper reached the Arab heartland, the Quran was stored in the memories of professional Quran reciters and parts of it were written on strips of leather (Bloom, 2001).
7 The date of Hamzah Fansuri's death is the subject of scholarly debate, ranging from 1527 and 1590 to the early seventeenth century (Riddell, 2004).
8 Tan (2009) argues that, in China, the Ming dynasty's Sinicization policies resulted in a distinctively Chinese Muslim culture. Consequently, in Java, Chinese Muslims retained non-Muslim cultural traits that distinguished them from other Muslim communities there.
9 Imam is an Arabic term. For Sunni Muslims it designates the leader of Friday prayers at a town's main mosque, a community spiritual guide.
10 The puppet master sits before a lit screen and narrates the drama vocally and through manipulating flat puppets. Their images project shadows on the other side of the screen. Traditionally, women spectators sat on the shadow side, while the musicians and singers supporting the puppeteer and the male audience sat together on the illuminated side.
11 The code, *Undang-undang Laut*, was drawn up in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century and had the imprimatur of Sultan Mahmud of Melaka (Reid, 1999: 75–76).
12 For example, the name of Srivijaya's King Balaputra is inscribed on a tablet dated 860, contributing to support a monastery and its monks at Nalanda.

3 The global corporation comes to Indonesia: the VOC

1 Bantam, an alternative spelling for Banten, is located on Java's north coast to the west of modern-day Jakarta. It was a terminus for trade routes that passed through the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java and for routes connecting eastern Indonesia to Java.
2 The painting is part of the Rijksmuseum Amsterdam collection, A2858, and can be viewed online (www.rijksmuseum.nl).
3 Makassar was (and is) a major city on the southern arm of the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. It was renamed Ujung Pandang in 1971, but since 1999 the name Makassar has been reinstated.
4 *Dhimmi* is an Arabic word and refers to the legal and social status for Jews and Christians subordinate to governments controlled by Muslims. The "contract" for tolerance by Muslim rulers included restrictions on place of residence, employment, number, size and ornamentation of places of worship, clothing and public behaviour, as well as tax codes, all designed both to impress non-Muslims with a sense of inferiority and to deter Muslims from converting.
5 *Haji* is the Indonesian form of the Arabic *hajji*. It designates pilgrims in general and is also used before personal names as an honorific title. I use this form, and the Indonesian *haj* (Arabic *hajj*, pilgrimage to Mecca), because it is the customary spelling in Indonesia.

6 A *liang* was a Chinese unit of measurement for spices and precious metals.
7 Oxford University Press republished Nieuhof's *Voyages & Travels to the East Indies 1653–1670* in 1988. It was first published in Dutch in 1682.
8 His report was first published in 1666. It was edited by Darja de Wever and republished as *Javaense reyse: de bezoeken van een VOC-gezant aan het hof van Mataram, 1648–1654* ("Javanese Journeys: The Visits of a VOC Envoy to the Court of Mataram, 1648–1654"), Amsterdam, Terra Incognita: 1995.
9 Printing in Arabic was allowed briefly by the Ottomans in 1729, but then the ban was re-imposed until 1822. The first private press licensed by the Ottoman state began operating in Egypt in 1862.
10 Luc Nagtegaal (1986: 56) documents from Javanese sources the killing of the *bupatis* of Jepara (1694), Pati (1705), Surabaya (1709), Pasuruhan (1714) and Batang (1741) at the royal court of Amangkurat II.

4 Colonialism: agent of modern globalization

1 Seas off Java's south coast have dangerous rip tides, and there were no foreign ports within sailing distance of it. North coast ports, by contrast, give on to the relatively shallow and calm Java Sea. They were within easy sailing distance of ports on Sulawesi and Kalimantan and accessible to merchant shipping on the major sea routes leading to China, India, the Middle East and Europe.
2 Carey has published the original Javanese language text with extensive commentary and provided a summary of its contents in English.
3 Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd, central Arabia. He preached a return to the values and practices of original Islam. He stressed the singleness and unity of Allah, and taught that the purpose of social and political life was to build a Muslim community that strictly implemented Islamic law. He declared *jihad* a duty of individual Muslims against enemies of Islam, defined as non-Muslims and deviant Muslims (including Shiites and Sufis).
4 *Kiai* is a Javanese term of respect for an older man, often considered a pious and learned Muslim.
5 Hadith is the collected determinations transmitted by Muhammad to his followers on points of Islamic practice. Together with the Quran they are core sources of Islam for Sunni Muslims.
6 Under the Agrarian Laws, outright ownership of agricultural land was denied to all foreigners, European and Asian alike. Cultivated land that met the definition of native title could only be leased by foreigners for a maximum of three years.
7 Passage through the Suez Canal was slow until it was widened and deepened. There was no night travel before the introduction of electric headlights for ships in 1887. Until the end of the nineteenth century, wind-powered ships continued to haul cargoes between Asia, Europe and North America, using the Africa route, because towing through the canal was expensive.
8 By the end of the nineteenth century, pilgrims from Indonesia represented about 15 per cent of all visitors to western Arabia (Reid, 2005: 229).
9 Bogor was known as Buitenzorg in Dutch times. It means "carefree", and was the name given to the private residence built by the VOC governor-general, Gustaaf Willem baron van Imhoff (r. 1743–1750) in the foothills of the Priangen Mountains about fifty-eight kilometres south of Batavia. Bogor's cooler climate and mountain springs made it attractive to government officials in the era before air-conditioning. Raffles made it the seat of his government, and it remained the centre of operations for the Dutch colonial government until 1942. The building is still an official residence of Indonesia's president.
10 Female students were not admitted before 1950, even though half of all Indonesian farmers were women.

11 Again, women were excluded from the new medical school founded for Indonesians. One of its purposes was to create a pool of indigenous medical officers to accompany colonial armies taking war around the archipelago (for example, to Aceh in 1873 and Lombok in 1894), hence the exclusion of women. They were not totally excluded from Western medical training. Midwifery and public health programmes, established by the colonial government, routinely accepted female students.
12 Plantation life became the subject of novels. *Coolie*, by Madelon Szekely-Lulofs, and *Tropic Fever*, by Laslo Szekely, contain graphic descriptions of living conditions that were also documented in the pamphlet *De millioenen uit Deli* (The Millions from Deli) by J. van den Brand and a fact-finding mission led by the Indies public prosecutor and member of the Justice Council, J. L. T. Rhemrev, in 1903.
13 A residency was an administrative unit equivalent to a province. Its Dutch head ("resident" in colonial parlance) was a senior official in the Indies bureaucracy.
14 This was the official estimate. Ian Brown's research suggests the actual extent might have been double that figure (1997: 49).
15 They were outer islands to the inner or core island of Java. The Dutch inherited this way of looking from the Javanese.
16 *Wayang* refers to forms of theatre with flat or round puppets and to dance dramas. Stories are chanted by the puppeteer and sung by a female chorus. Plots, characters and themes are derived from local versions of the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* epics of Sanskrit Hindu literature. In Java these stories are understood within an Islamic context. Missionary saints of Islam are believed to have brought *wayang* to Java.
17 *Max Havelaar*, first published in the Netherlands in 1860 under the pen name Multatuli, by Eduard Douwes Dekker, was a barely fictionalized account of his tenure as a civil servant in west Java. Douwes Dekker wished to expose the comfortable alliance of Dutch and Javanese officials for exploiting Java's peasantry. He hoped to restore his personal financial circumstances by writing a bestseller, for his critique of colonial rule had led to his dismissal from the colonial civil service. Liberals in Holland campaigned against the cultivation system, arguing that free enterprise would benefit both Dutch businessmen and Javanese workers. The novel was reprinted many times and translated into numerous languages. Its message continued to be powerful. President Suharto banned from screening in Indonesia the 1976 film version of the book produced by a joint Dutch–Indonesian company.
18 Gandhi aimed to counter the colonial economy that disadvantaged Indian manufacturing by, for example, urging Indians to reject imported, cheaper, high quality machine-produced textiles in favour of home produced materials.

5 Colonial regimes: creators of the modern Indonesian

1 The Committee of Indigenous Sons published the text of Soewardi's speech in July 1913 in Dutch and also in Malay translation. The colonial government sent Soewardi and two other political colleagues into exile in the Netherlands in September that year until 1919. In 1922 Soewardi took the name Ki Hajar Dewantoro in founding the Taman Siswa school system, which fused Javanese and Dutch education systems.
2 Malay chronicles and epics told stories of heroes' quests for princesses or hidden knowledge, and their defeat of myriad enemies; they narrated tales of heroes of Islam translated from Arabic and Persian sources, or recounted the founding of kingdoms, palace intrigues and wars.
3 His personal fortune was drawn from Java's sugar industry.
4 Brooshooft (1845–1921) made his career in the regional press of Java over the years 1877 to 1904.
5 In 1911, the Abendanons published an extensive collection of the letters Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879–1904) wrote to them and other Dutch acquaintance from 1899 until her early death. The letters, which discussed the then explosive topics of polygamy, child

marriage, the rights of girls to schooling, careers and choice of their marriage partner, were republished numerous times in their original Dutch and other languages, including Indonesian and Javanese. More complete editions have been published since the 1911 text. Letters written to the Abendanons by younger sisters of Kartini have been translated into English and published by Joost Coté as *Realizing the Dream of R.A. Kartini: Her Sisters' Letters from Colonial Java*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008.

6 *Hormat* means respect or etiquette in Indonesian. It stood for formal marks of respect such as the knee and foot kiss that characterized unequal relations between Indonesians of different ranks and between colonized and colonizer.

7 *Ulama* is the plural form of the Arabic *alim*, meaning scholar of religious learning. In Indonesian usage *ulama* is used as both the singular and plural form for a scholar or scholars of Islamic learning.

8 There is no tradition of celibacy as a precondition of religious knowledge in Islam.

9 Since the fall of President Suharto's government in 1998, *pesantrens* have again emerged as challengers to government authority. Java's Ngruki *pesantren* is the training ground and spiritual home of men charged with killing through bombings of churches, restaurants, hotels and embassies across the archipelago between 2002 and 2009.

10 While Dutch women migrated to the Indies after 1870, the majority of all marriages and unions made in the colony by Dutchmen were with Indonesian or Eurasian women. By Dutch law, wife and child took the nationality of husband and father, so that Indonesian wives and mixed race children were legally Europeans and counted as such by census-takers. In 1930, of a European population of 250,000 in the Indies, only 50,000 were immigrants from Holland or the offspring of families where both mother and father were immigrants.

11 Javanese etiquette required the person of junior status to draw the hands together, raise them to the forehead and breathe in before beginning to speak. The action is called a *sembah*.

12 In the 1939–1940 academic year, Indigenous students were 49 per cent of all graduates of state junior high schools (1,160), and 26 per cent of five-year state secondary schools (220) (Van der Wal, 1961: 9).

13 By 1940 there were 20,699 state vernacular primary schools, and 44.5 per cent of all children aged between six and nine years were enrolled (Van der Wal, 1961: 7). From the 1890s the colonial government also provided subsidies to private Muslim and Christian schools that met government standards in curriculum. It estimated that there were 129,000 pupils in unsubsidized and unaccredited schools (p. 6).

14 The census did not inquire into literacy in Arabic, Chinese or Indonesian scripts.

15 Raden Ayu was the title of the principal wife of a Raden, so indicative of aristocratic descent and privilege.

16 Photographic technology in the early twentieth century did not allow for "candid camera" shots, and would not have indicated the solemnity of the occasion or the complicated and often troubling experience that attending European school was for these young Javanese boys.

17 Nico Kaptein (2009b) notes that debates over the permissibility of wearing Western dress focused on men's wear in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Thereafter attention turned to women's dress outside the home.

18 Many speeches Sukarno delivered in Indonesian with phrases from European languages are published, in English translation, as *Under the Banner of Revolution* (1966) (Publication Committee, Jakarta).

19 Trimurti, Sartika and Soewarni were female graduates of the colony's Dutch language first-class schools.

20 Uthman wrote and published over 150 books in Arabic and Malay on Islamic topics. He was Honorary Advisor for Arab Affairs to the colonial government (Kaptein, 2009a).

21 Umma is the Indonesian form of the Arabic *ummat*. Azra (2005: 7) translates *umma* as "Muslim nation".
22 A giant clock tower erected in Mecca in 2010 aimed to reclaim time standardization from the West by offering Mecca Mean Time in place of Universal Standard Time (GMT). The *Saudi Gazette*, explained that Mecca Mean Time would enable Muslims worldwide to live within a common time frame ("Muslims may soon set their clocks to Makkah Mean Time", Internet Edition, 23 October 2010). Non-Muslims will be incorporated into an Islamic globalization in which Mecca is the centre of the world and the true global meridian. The *Gazette* included this post from Feri Ramon of Indonesia: "We are moslems in Indonesia very proud about this huge project. It can make history of the world. Personally I'm very proud the Makkah Mean Time will be used as time standart [*sic*] in the world" (www.saudigazette.com.sa).
23 Year 1 in the Islamic calendar is the equivalent of 622 CE. Islamic dates are referred to in some English-language texts as AH (Anno Hijrah, meaning "in the *Hijrah* year").
24 The Japanese replaced the name Batavia with Jakarta (written as Djakarta before the 1972 spelling reforms) and kept it as the capital, although only of Java.
25 Putera was established on Java by the Japanese in March 1943 to garner support among the Javanese for Japan's war goals. Its name is an abbreviated form of Putera Tenaga Rakyat (Centre of People Power). Its leaders were Sukarno, Hatta, Ki Hajar Dewantoro and Kiai Haji Mas Mansur (of Muhammadiyah).
26 Panca Sila alluded to Indonesia's complex heritage: the words were Sanskrit, while the choice of five principles echoed the five pillars of Islamic belief. Later, in response to protest by Muslim representatives, Sukarno changed the order of the principles, making belief in God the first *sila* instead of the last. Over the years Panca Sila was transformed into the state ideology through complex elaboration, training programmes, compulsory study in schools and university, and examination. An English translation of Sukarno's Panca Sila speech is in Feith and Castles (1970: 40–49).
27 A photograph of the handwritten document is in Sukarno's *Autobiography* between pp. 156 and 157.
28 *Sang* is an honorific descriptor, *merah putih* means red and white. The term has a flavour of the American "Old Glory" for the Stars and Stripes national flag.

6 Coming of age: post-colonial globalization

1 A series of treaties signed between May and October 1648 brought an end to decades of warfare in Europe. The crowned heads of Europe recognized that each prince had the right to determine which denomination of Christianity (Catholicism, Lutheranism, etc.) would be practised in the state he headed, and guaranteed Christian subjects of a different persuasion liberty to follow religion according to their own rites. The treaties made the sovereign state the basic unit of international relations and instituted modern diplomacy.
2 Muslim mapmakers, in the tradition of Al-Idrisi, had drawn their maps with south at the top of the page. Indonesian atlases today retain the Western mapping practice of placing north at the top.
3 From 1977 Indonesians had to list their religion on their identity card. In 1978 the government declared the allowable choices to be Islam, Catholic and Protestant Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. Failure to register a religion meant an individual was an atheist or communist and thereby in conflict with the state ideology's requirement of belief in one God, the first pillar of Panca Sila. In 1999 the state granted Confucianism the status of a religion as one of a series of measures designed to integrate Indonesians of Chinese descent into the nation. Since the outlawing of communism in 1966, identity cards have recorded illegal status through the designation "ex-Tapol" (abbreviated form of *Tahanan Politik*, Political Prisoner) or relative of a Tapol. See Strassler (2010) on photography and identity in Indonesia under President Suharto.

4 *Ghazi* is a word of Turkic origin meaning "soldier for Islam". Historically it was connected to conquest of non-Muslims and colonization by Muslim armies.
5 Activists still risk unfurling Republic of South Moluccas banners at political rallies and ceremonies, most recently in 2010, but they are rapidly overpowered by police and arrested.
6 *Laskar* means militia; *jihad* means struggle. In this context it means defensive or offensive war to assert Muslim interests.
7 Sukarno's initial formulation was "nationalism". This was modified to "unity of Indonesia" to accommodate concerns from sectors of the Muslim majority who deprecated nationalism as a Western invention and in opposition to the unity of the world community that bases its identity on Islam (Madjid, 1996).
8 In 2000, in response to widespread discontent with Indonesian rule, President Abdurrahman Wahid attempted to appease Irian's Indigenous population by endorsing their preference for the name Papua instead of Irian. This change in name for the province was formally accepted by Indonesia's constituent assembly in October 2001.
9 PKI stands for Partai Komunis Indonesia. It grew out of the Indies Social Democrat Association, which had changed its name (from Dutch) to the Malay Perserikatan Kommunist di India (Indies) in 1920. The amendment from the colonial "Indies" to "Indonesia" in the organization's name in 1924 marked the party's acceptance of "bourgeois" nationalism as a stage in the struggle against the Dutch and its acceptance of Soviet strategic thinking.
10 Sukarno chose the Arabic-language terms *musyarawah* and *mufakat* to express these decision-making processes.
11 After Sukarno's forced removal from office in 1966, when it was safe to do so, comrades from the days of the independence struggle publicly criticized the president's failure to acknowledge the contributions of all the nation's independence leaders.
12 At the time, Indonesia's armed services consisted of four branches: army, navy, air force and police. A recent reform in Indonesia has been to separate the police from the armed forces with the aim of making the police responsible for internal law and order, and concentrating army, navy and air force on external security.
13 Acronyms are a highly developed linguistic form and usage in modern Indonesian language. Gestapu is formed from Gerakan September Tigapuluh (30 September Movement). The choice of Gestapu to vilify supporters of the movement indicates the degree of familiarity Indonesia's new leadership had with European history and their concern to send a justificatory message to the West over the mass killings that followed the removal of Sukarno from power.
14 The film, *Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September*, directed by Arifin C. Noor, was compulsory viewing for school children and government officials until the end of Suharto's presidency.
15 A recent, important study, by John Roosa (2006) of the University of British Columbia, concludes that the 30 September 1965 coup was the product of an alliance between active military officers and members of the PKI.
16 *Ansor* is the Indonesian transliteration of the Arabic *Al-Ansar*, the term by which assistants to Muhammad in Medina came to be known.
17 Indonesia's rice harvests were below normal levels in the 1960s due to droughts, crop diseases and political unrest in the countryside.
18 In March 1966 the national assembly, which had been purged of pro-Sukarno members and enlarged with supporters of Suharto, appointed Suharto acting president. A year later it made him president. Sukarno spent the remaining years of his life (until June 1970) under house arrest.
19 Masyumi was a federation of Islamic organizations formed by the Japanese during their wartime occupation of Indonesia. President Sukarno had banned it in 1960, suspecting it of having supported uprisings in Sumatra and Sulawesi against the central government in 1957, and of opposition to his policy of forcing politicians

with Islamic agendas to share government with nationalist politicians and communist sympathizers.

20 "Indonesia's fight against corruption stalls: Transparency International", *Jakarta Globe*, 27 Ocotober 2010.

21 The surveys were conducted in thirteen provinces on Java, Sumatra, Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and East Indonesia. The 2000 survey covered 10,500 households and 43,600 individuals. The research methodology is outlined in Strauss, (2004: 6–9).

22 Golkar, an abbreviation of Golongan Karya (Functional Groups in Society), had been founded by the army in 1964 to foster cooperation with anti-communist organizations. PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party, was created, under government pressure, in 1973 as a federation of parties with Islamic agendas. PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, was similarly formed as a federation of Christian and nationalist parties. In 1970 President Suharto had required "monoloyalty" of all government employees; they were expected to vote for Golkar's candidates in elections and explicitly forbidden from membership in any other political grouping.

23 Lynn Lee, "Twitter taking Indonesia by storm", *Straits Times*, Singapore, 8 November 2010.

24 www.ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/AID/10323.

25 Cribb discusses the difficulties in reaching sound estimates for East Timor. The figures tabulated in censuses taken before and after the first phase of Indonesian occupation are unreliable: there was little collection of data from survivors, and few mass graves. After 1999 Indonesia's armed forces turned to militias and gangs to terrorize, punish and control East Timorese communities.

26 Some of these "stolen" children have learned of their origins and been reunited with their relatives in East Timor since its independence, but most have remained inside Indonesia in their identities as Muslim Indonesians. Van Klinken describes the motives of those who took children – both individuals (usually army officers) and agents acting on behalf of institutions – as a mixture of compassion, paternalism and, in 1999, as a form of revenge for East Timorese voting to reject permanent incorporation into Indonesia.

27 *Merdeka*! (Freedom! Independence!) was the slogan of Presidents Sukarno and Megawati Sukarnoputri.

7 Competing globalizations: an early Islamic form of globalization?

1 Non-Arab converts to Islam in its early development were required to be "adopted" by an Arab patron. They were called *mawali* and had an inferior status to Arab Muslims.

2 Year 1 of the Muslim calendar is 622 in the Gregorian or Common Era calendar.

3 Handwritten copies of Ibn Battuta's account of his travels do not appear to have circulated widely among Muslim readers. Manuscripts found by Europeans in an Istanbul repository in the early nineteenth century led to publication of extracts from his *Travels* in English and German in the early 1800s. A complete version in French, plus the Arabic original, was printed in the 1850s.

4 Riddell argues that Fansuri was primarily a transmitter of the ideas of famous Arab Sufis, not an innovator. Of Fansuri and his successor, Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani (*c.*1575–1630), Riddell says (p. 115): "They took Sufi teachings circulating in the Arab world and India and caste them in a Malay mould for the benefit of Malay Muslims."

5 *Ghazi*, like sultan, is a word of Turkic origin. It means "soldier for Islam".

6 Azra (2005: 7) characterizes this relationship of *ulama* with Islamic monarchs as "submissive politics".

7 The thirteenth-century Taqiy al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah mythologized the perfection of life in the first community of Muslims (Ansary, 2009: 163). He called Muhammad's disciples *al-Salaf al-salihin* (pious ancestors). Ibn Taymiyyah demanded a return to the way he believed Islam was practised in Medina under Muhammad and called for violent revolution against Muslim rulers who did not conform to his views. Ibn Taymiyyah was a prolific writer whose teachings command a wide readership in radical Islamic circles today.
8 This is the sub-title to his 2009 *Destiny Disrupted*.
9 Submission is the meaning of Islam itself. Muslim means one who submits to Islam.
10 The thermos flask was first manufactured for commercial and domestic use in Germany in 1904; mass production of the lead pencil began in the US in the 1860s; the two-wheeled bicycle with pneumatic tyres dates from 1888. The Singer sewing machine, patented in 1856, was already in Indonesia by 1880.
11 *6000 Tahun Sang Merah-Putih*, Djakarta: Siguntang, 1951.
12 *Pusaka Indonesia: Riwajat Hidup Orang-orang Besar Tanah Air*, Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1965.
13 For example: *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973.
14 Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia*, Jakarta: Deptartment of Defense and Security, Center for Armed Forces History, 1975; and, with Marwati Juned Pusponegoro, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, 4 vols, Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1984; and Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945–49*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991.
15 For example, *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927–1933)*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1971; and, with Sharon Siddique, *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986.
16 Geertz's then wife, Hildred Geertz, made a parallel study based on living among and interviewing Javanese women. Her documentation and analysis of lifestyle patterns and rituals was published as *The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization*, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
17 MUI's secretary-general later clarified that the institution intended peaceful assistance to Muslim Afghans, not warfare.
18 For example: Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (eds), *Violence in Indonesia*, Hamburg: Abera, 2001; Benedict R. O. Anderson (ed.), *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Project, 2001; Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds), R*oots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002; Anthony Reid (ed.), *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006; John Thayer Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006; and Jemma Purdey, *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–99*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006.
19 Suharto, *Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K.H.*, Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989.
20 The *jilbab* is a scarf draped over a cap. It completely covers the hair and ears and is pinned under the chin to conceal the neck.
21 President Suharto authorized the formation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia in December 1990. Most of Jakarta's leading Islamic thinkers joined, and membership rapidly expanded to 40,000 as it became the mouthpiece of middle-class Muslims with aspirations for imprinting a more Islamic character in the nation's political, economic and social life and networking to fast-track their own careers (Hefner, 1993). ICMI founded the Centre for Information and Development Studies in 1992 as a think tank to produce Islamic solutions to Indonesian problems.

22 Natsir had begun his political life in a regionally affiliated group. He then joined Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) in 1931. It denounced nationalism as destructive of Muslim universalism. He became head of the Masyumi federation of parties with Islamic agendas in 1949, represented it in parliament, and served as prime minister from September 1950 to April 1951. His opposition to President Sukarno's policies earned him imprisonment from 1961 to 1965.
23 The *shura* has its roots in Arabia as a council of senior male tribal elders.
24 Mohamed Bob Hasan (b. 1931 as The Kian Seng) was known in Indonesian circles as "First Friend" because of his long business and personal ties with President Suharto and his family. Hasan made his fortune in timber exports, and expanded into finance, insurance and the automotive industry. He was Minister for Trade and Industry in Suharto's last cabinet. After the fall of his patron, Hasan was convicted of corruption and served three years in gaol.
25 The Australian journalist, David Jenkins, author of an influential study of the New Order (1984), was banned from working in Indonesia following publication of "After Marcos, Now for the Suharto Billions" in *The Sydney Morning Herald* on 10 April 1986. In this lead article he examined the business activities of President Suharto's wife, known to Indonesians as Ibu Tien or "Mrs Ten Percent" because of fees she allegedly received from the profits of big business in Indonesia. The president's response was to deny visas to journalists from Australia and freeze diplomatic, military and cultural relations.
26 Muhamad Ali (2010) argues that Indonesian Muslim intellectuals' views on Jews and Israel are not monolithic, and cites writings by Muslims prominent in academia and religious organisations that show complex, ambiguous responses, or support attitudes of international cooperation.
27 A depositor's funds placed in an Islamic bank are converted into an Islamic investment deposit. The funds do not earn interest and there is no guaranteed rate of return. Instead, the bank assumes the role of agent, and the owner of the money and the receiving bank become partners in profit-and-loss business ventures. Funds advanced by the bank to a third party are considered a debt of that third party, not working capital. The third party can buy goods and re-sell them at a profit or loss, with all three parties sharing portions of the gain or loss. Since the depositor takes no active part in the business venture, the depositor receives a smaller share of profits. Applying sharia laws to investment in businesses involving international companies is an evolving process, with prohibitions on purchasing stocks in "sinful businesses", such as pork processing. "Portfolio purification" measures are donations to Islamic charities to "neutralize" investments in multinational businesses that may transgress some sharia principles (Venardos, 2005).
28 All these terms for financial transactions are Arabic (Effendy, 2005: 75).
29 *Hajah* is the female form of *haji*, and indicates a woman who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.
30 The PPP won 10.7 per cent of the vote and fifty-eight seats; Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, linked to Muhammadiyah), won 7.1 per cent and thirty-four seats, and Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party) won 1.94 per cent and thirteen seats (Ananta *et al*., 2005: 14).
31 Vice-President Megawati succeeded to the presidency when the assembly voted on 23 July 2001 to remove Wahid from office. Constitutional changes since then have made the office of president elected by universal adult suffrage. In both presidential elections that have taken place since, in 2004 and 2009, the winning candidate was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
32 This *fatwa* was subsequently rescinded by the organization's acting chairman on the grounds that Islam does not discriminate on the basis of gender or ethnicity (*Jakarta Post*, 5 June 2004).

33 Political scientist Bahtiar Effendy calls it "new Islamic intellectualism" (2003).
34 By the end of their research the authors acknowledged the Internet's capacity for facilitating repression and stoking hatreds too.
35 The first edition of Ricklefs's general history of Indonesia had the title *A History of Modern Indonesia since ca. 1300*. Later editions have pushed back the starting date by one century based on new evidence of the origins of Islam in Indonesian societies.
36 Benda made this argument in his review of Herbert Feith's *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (1962) (Benda, 1964).
37 Al-Azhar Mosque was inaugurated in 972. In the late nineteenth century it was the base of a number of scholars who became influential throughout the Muslim world through their critique of Western influence and their polemics in favour of a resurgent Islam.
38 The author's name shows his hometown connections with Kudus and Tuban in Java.
39 Ricklefs (2008: 200) notes that the actual number of members was probably closer to one million, but the point remains that SI dwarfed the so-called secular parties.
40 Between 1973 and 1997, for example, the Saudi government spent eighty-seven billion US dollars on its worldwide campaign. According to Howard Means (2009, footnote 30 to p. 161), over forty-five billion was spent in South and Southeast Asia. Uniate is the alternative term for Wahhabism and preferred by followers, since it denotes the guiding principle of Wahhab's message, which rejects intermediaries, such as saints, between the believer and Allah. Hasan (2006: 48) describes Saudi funding of Jakarta's Center for the Study of the Islamic Religion and Arabic Language as a turning point in the spread of Wahhabism in Indonesia in the 1980s. He notes that Indo–Yemeni leaders of terrorism in the name of Islam in Indonesia are its graduates.
41 KISDI stands for Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with World Islam). It was established in 1987.

8 Conclusion: oscillations

1 www.alhikmahsby.com. The school offers instruction from kindergarten to year 12.
2 The article focuses on Indonesian versions of *nasyid*, a form of Arabic religious song popular in the Middle East, and the struggle of contemporary Indonesian musicians to combine the erotic power of pop music with the didactic, religious content of the lyrics.
3 This "Islamic superstate" would incorporate Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the southern provinces of the Philippines and Thailand, and the Muslim regions of Myanmar.
4 Barton's figures are 5,000–10,000, and a further 2,000 killed in Poso (2004: 77–78).
5 According to Means (2009: 171), the Mujahideen Council was financed by Saudi dollars.
6 Jemaah Islamiyah was founded in Indonesia in 1993. Indonesian members arrested in Singapore in 2002 identified Basyir as its *emir* or (military) leader, but Basyir himself has denied heading JI and even knowledge of it. In 2006, Indonesia's Supreme Court overturned his 2003 conviction on treason and immigration charges that had resulted in his serving a two-year gaol term. In August 2010 Basyir was again arrested and charged with supporting a *jihad* training base in Aceh and inciting terrorism. He was sentenced to fifteen years' gaol in 2011.
7 The methodology of the survey is described in footnote 4 of their analysis of the 2002 survey (2004: 123). Eighty-nine per cent of the interviewees were Muslim.
8 A description of his methodology is on pp. 28–29 of *Laskar Jihad* (2006).
9 Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 11 May 2009, "Hasil Penghitungan Suara Sah Partai Politik" (report by the National Elections Commission on the general election results: www.bps.go.id/ tab_sub/view.php?).

10 A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 15 August 2005 between the Indonesian negotiating delegation and GAM representatives. It was ratified by Indonesia's national assembly in March 2006.
11 Governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf, did not sign the legislation into law.
12 *Bloomberg Businessweek*, "Indonesia's GDP rises 6.54% aided by consumption, investment", 7 November 2011.
13 Indonesia receives two mentions in the 416-page book. There are no references in the index to Indonesia, Malaysia or Muslim Southeast Asia.

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